THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

WILLIAM S. MORGAN

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

A Consideration of the More Profound Aspects of Religious Thought

BY
WILLIAM S. MORGAN, Ph.D. S.T.D.

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TO MY WIFE

PREFACE

The philosophy of religion is here presented from the viewpoint of a unitary conception of the universe, which it is hoped will do justice to the demands of the intellect and the needs of the heart. None is more conscious than the author of the difficulties confronting this notion. To grasp the psychological and neural processes, physical and chemical energies, social and individual principles, environment and heredity, historical and natural interpretations of human life; the ethical, aesthetical and intellectually verifiable, the finite and infinite, the accidental and orderly, the permanent and evolving,—to mention only a few aspects,—under one comprehensive scheme, is a task which in its completeness is beyond present knowledge. There are, so it appears to our present vision, insuperable difficulties in the way of its realization. But it is an ideal worthy and persistent. Science and philosophy are converging to this end. And the ideal is particularly fascinating to religious thought. The writer holds it as a profound conviction, believing that the universe is such a whole that its divers phenomena may be most satisfactorily explained under the guidance of the principles of unity and continuity. He hopes this treatise may be a contribution to this end.

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BOOK I

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY AND OF RELIGION

CHAPTER ONE

THE ATTITUDE OF PHILOSOPHY

General Description of Philosophy

The simpler way of describing philosophy is to regard it as the search for ultimate principles. But when the philosopher in his quest for ultimate principles follows the divers streams of existence to their separate sources, he is still far from completing his task; for these sources may have a common origin hidden from the investigator.

Tendencies in Modern Philosophy
Descartes' Two Substances

The Cartesian thinkers were able to their own satisfaction to trace all existences to a duality of principles, mind and matter: accordingly, there are three substances of which we must take account, the supreme substance and two finite substances—mind in man and the extended universe. Finite mind is unextended, a thinking substance; finite body or extension is extended substance.

Of the two sets of problems which Descartes thus found confronting him, one set arose out of the relationship conceived to exist between God and the world. In the world are two distinct substances needing nothing beyond themselves for their existence; and yet were created by God, are dependent upon him, exist by the help of the concourse of God and sustain many other relations to the infinite.

The other set of problems is presented to Descartes in the relationship between finite mind and corporeal substance. How shall we account for the interaction of these distinct substances? How does the mind come to guess at the existence of an extra-mental world? By what power does it effect an egression from its own absolute independence and penetrate the absolute independence of corporeal substances? If the extramental object present a diversity, how is this presented or cognized as a unity? If it be a unity, how is it possible for this unity to separate itself into the many of consciousness? Descartes holds that he perceives objects clearly and distinctly, "By a natural light that affords a knowledge of its truth," and falls back upon the veracity of the deity to validify the existence of the corporeal objects which he perceives. "But as God is no deceiver, it is manifest that he does not of himself and immediately communicate those ideas to me, nor even by the intervention of any creature in which their objective reality is not formally, but only eminently, contained. For as he has given me no faculty whereby I can discover this to be the case, but, on the contrary, a very strong inclination to believe that those ideas arise from corporeal objects, I do not see how he could be vindicated from the charge of deceit, if in truth they proceed from any other source, or were produced by other causes than corporeal things: and, accordingly, it must be concluded that corporeal objects exist."[1]

Such an explanation is contrary to our present scientific spirit; it would demand an extra and constant supernatural aid to bridge over the theoretical gulf interposed by Descartes between these two distinct substances. His disciples saw this more clearly than he. Meanwhile an explanation of knowledge is demanded from the viewpoint of its unity and harmony, its internal and pervasive operation. That a closer unity between mind and corporeal things was necessary even for theoretical purposes, Descartes, nevertheless, realized. But his intuition for unity found no reflection in his theoretical provisions.

Geulincx's Occasionalism

The scholarly Geulincx deserves commendation for his efforts to overcome the dualism of his master, Descartes. The peculiar merit of his work is its unerring feeling that the finite substance of Descartes needed a constant and effective underlying agency. In order, however, to make the demand for this unity unmistakable and imperative, he found it necessary to intensify the dualism of Descartes as far as finite substances at least are concerned. In this he resembles a physician who magnifies the disease so that the cure may seem the more marvelous. Having accepted the notion of two impenetrable and self-sufficient substances as an inheritance from Descartes, when he was confronted with the actuality of their operation in a human being, there was no alternative but to call in a minister plenipotentiary to coördinate their initial and sequential activities. The ineffable cause he conceived to be permanent and omnipresent in its operation. All needs and complaints of the body are reported through it to the mind; all desires of the mind are transmitted by it to the body. To repeat, Geulincx accommodated in the best possible manner to one another the anarchical substances of Descartes. But his will was better than his deed. In an orderly scheme of philosophical government these anarchists, despite Geulincx's good intentions, fulfill no useful function. He should have transported them beyond the seas and made the endeavor to form a constitution and direct the government independently of their control.

The value of Geulincx's effort lies in its manifestation of an unconscious trend in the founder of modern philosophy and the group of thinkers which he influenced during the initial stages of this impulse toward a unitary conception of reality.

Doctrine of "La Recherche de la Vérité"

Nicolas Malebranche, priest of the Oratory of Jesus in Paris, gave additional impetus to this irresistible movement. In his most important work, *La Recherche de la Vérité,* he gives a description of the nature of ideas. The process of ideation, as Malebranche conceives it,[2] is linked up with his notion of substance, which he received from his master, Descartes. With this prepossession he demands to know how it is possible for mind, an unextended substance, to enter into relation with what appears to be extramental, extended substance. There could not possibly be an interrelation between two independent and self-contained realities. Geulincx perceived this difficulty and had made a strenuous effort to overcome it by a system of occasional causes, which does not appear to satisfy Malebranche. Something else was desiderated. Geulincx's method was too mechanical, too external. It violated the principle of continuity. In some mysterious way the antithesis between mind and matter must be overcome. This Malebranche finds possible only by overcoming the antithesis between the finite and the infinite. The infinite alone is the dynamic and organizing force in man's mind.[3] All modification of the mind, its thoughts, emotions, volitions, are modifications of God's mind. By philosophical reflection Malebranche looks beyond the finite subject. He is convinced of the presence of an unseen host in the soul who provides all the spiritual meals of which the soul partakes; but, strange as it may seem, the soul never suspects that it is the recipient of these divine favors except through philosophical reflection or moments of special insight.

This being so, it became necessary that human souls be endowed with characteristics of the divine soul, with a code common to both, for otherwise the process of interdependence would be interrupted. The human must be a replica of the divine soul. The theory does not impose the necessity of the finite mind grasping all the processes of the divine mind; that would be impossible; it demands only that provision had to be made, when man's soul was created, for its ability to participate in the divine thought and life. Human thought, in the language of Malebranche and the Cartesians, generally is contained not formally but eminently in the divine mind.

In such a theory, it must be admitted, provision is made for growing revelations to the mind of man of the secrets of nature. But Malebranche was not disposed to grant unlimited freedom here. God's will becomes a restraining power.

There is another implication to be noted. Finite minds are permitted to see the works of God. His use of the word essence is somewhat ambiguous. It may refer to the question of extent, the question of the relation of the finite to infinite, the partial insight in relation to the complete grasping of the all-inclusive mind; but there seems to be a contradiction between this attitude and another possible interpretation which calls for a similarity and identity of the finite and the infinite. The human and divine minds are essentially one. They both perceive the same idea. It is apparent that the human mind does not comprehend the idea in all its complex relationships; it does not comprehend it fully but so far as the human mind reaches; in this particular perception it is as perfect a modification of mind as that of which the divine mind is capable in relation to the same idea. The human mind sees things in God precisely as God sees them; the difference is only one of extent. The difference is quantitative rather than qualitative. But when we have settled down to this interpretation, there looms before us the possibility that a qualitative difference occurred to Malebranche, between the finite and the infinite mind in relation to the same idea.

This becomes clear when we consider his agnosticism in relation to the divine substance. The absolute substance of the divine is the holy of holies into which the human mind may never penetrate. It is permitted only to know certain relations which the infinite bears to created beings. For God is not an individual, not a particular being, but only a being in general. This is a species of Platonic realism. It is a reversal of Aristotle's position "that the universal existed *in and through* the particular, and that the existence of the particular was *in and for* the universal."[4] At any rate, this much must be said: that a general being, who is no being in particular, is rather inconsistent with the being demanded by the theory of Malebranche, in whose actual mind only can human beings see things. He has confused the God of logical abstraction with the being of thought and will who causes both human ideas and the created universe in general.

Malebranche conceives a constant and necessary dependence of man upon God. He fully agrees with the sentiments and thoughts of Saint Paul: *"Non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis tanquam ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est."*[5] It is God himself who enlightens philosophers in the knowledge which ungrateful men call natural, although it comes to them only from heaven:

Deus enim illis manifestavit.[6] It is He who is properly the light of the mind and the Father of lights: *Pater luminum.*[7] It is He who teaches science to men: *Qui docet hominem scientiam.*[8] In a word, He is the true light which lights all who come into the world: *Lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.*[9] The dependence is thus absolute; human beings perform nothing in thought or deed without God.

"It is certain that all things are present to our mind and it is apparent that all things could only be present to our mind because God himself is present there, that is to say, he who contains all things in the simplicity of his being."[10] It is through this ineffable presence pervading the soul of man that he receives general ideas. This is an adumbration of the realism of Plato, as we have already noticed. Universals exist in nature prior to their existence in the mind of man. Man by participation in the universal being discovers within himself an ideal implicating the universal. Thought and existence are thus locked together in single experience. This is the dominating attitude of the Cartesian thinkers. The *cogito ergo sum* of Descartes was the arachnidium from which emerged the web of their fundamental philosophizing. Not only indeed the coupling of the metaphysical fact of human existence with the noetical experience of what they called thought but also the uniting of both human and divine existences with this very fact of thought.

"Therefore let us dwell in the thought that God is the intelligible world or place of minds, as the material world is the place of bodies; that it is by his power that they receive all their modifications; that it is in his wisdom that they find all their ideas, and by his love that they are stirred in all their orderly activities; and because that his power and his love are only himself, let us believe with

Saint Paul that he is not far from each one of us and that in him we have life, movement and being. *Non longe est ab unoquoque nostrum; in ipso enim vivimus, movemur et sumus.*"[11]

Doctrine in the "Entretiens sur la Metaphysique et la Religion"

The *Recherche de la Vérité* was published in 1674 and the *Entretiens sur la Metaphysique et la Religion* in 1677. The *Entretiens* of Malebranche is not more Spinozistic, as some have supposed, than the *Recherche*. It is natural to infer that when Malebranche found in Spinoza's *Ethics* such close affinity to his own system of thought, he would have been attracted to and influenced by it,—if not to the extent of modifying his fundamental notions, at least to the extent of modifying the form of expression and the manner of substantiating his thought. This does not appear to have been the case. If a general characterization of the *Entretiens* in comparison with the *Recherche* be justifiable, it is doubtless more Platonic than the latter. It contains interesting phases not only of Malebranche's theory, "seeing all things in God," but also of its causal implications, "doing all things in God." In it is enunciated the absolute union of the divine and human mind, so much so that the latter sees or realizes ideas in God's mind as it apprehends its own selfconscious processes. It is an immediate intuition. In fact, seeing an idea in my own mind and seeing an idea in God's mind are one and the same process; involved therefore in our selfconscious realizations is at once our realization of the processes of the divine mind. It is identically one and the same process; that is the teaching both of the *Recherche* and *Entretiens*.

In the *Entretiens*, however, there is a distinct contribution to his theory of the nature of extension, the world which responds to sense perception. The *Recherche* magnifies the divine being at the expense of the human. So completely is the human dependent upon the divine, that the former takes a subsidiary and inefficacious position. A baby will frequently attempt to open a door. The father becoming apprehensive of its inability so to do, steps silently toward the inner side and opens the door, while the baby's hand is still on the knob. Whereupon, the baby in high glee rejoices in its own act and believes firmly that it opened the door by its own power. Similarly, in the immediate consciousness of a human being, all sense of divine coöperation is absent. But the coöperation is actually there. Noetically, my ideas are not really mine, though they may appear so to me; they are God's ideas, I merely see them in him. Causally, my act is not mine; it is God's act in the last analysis.

In the *Recherche* the absorbing problem is the nature of ideas and their relation to mind, both human and divine. In the *Entretiens*, while reasserting his ideational positions, the problem of externality, as I have said, demands a more fundamental treatment. And it is well to bear in mind the end of our quest in the examination of the Cartesian thinkers. They are seeking for the unity of reality as the foundation upon which to build a philosophy; they see clearly that only thus can the principle of rationality be injected into existence. Unless in some fashion it contains a unity after the pattern of that unity with which we are familiar in our own conscious life, then indeed it were vain to philosophize. Malebranche, like Descartes and Geulincx, had a passion for unity. Thought and existence in his thinking are one in the divine being. God and man are one in the ideational processes,—*i.e.*, in all mental realizations. He was not prepared to take the uncompromising leap to the position, although he stepped to the very edge of the precipice, that both the divine and human mind are one metaphysically. He conceived them to be one in experience but not in essence; one noetically but not metaphysically. So far as the relation of God to extension, the external world, is concerned, he leaped over the precipice. The infinite substance "sees in himself intelligible extension, the archetype of the matter of which the world is formed." "The visible world is merely an expression of intelligible extension." The question now is, did Malebranche succeed in securing the unity he desired even here?

The Correspondence between de Mairan and Malebranche

The correspondence between M. Dortous de Mairan and Malebranche is illuminating, especially in its bearing upon the intelligible world of the latter. De Mairan, a young man of twenty-five, a student of physics and mathematics, possessed an unusually keen mind, destined to become a member and secretary of the Academy of Sciences, writes to Père Malebranche, who was forty years older, a profound student of Descartes, renowned as the author of *La Recherche de la Vérité* and a priest of the Oratory of Jesus, where priests without vows gave themselves entirely to philosophical and theological culture, in the city of Paris. A copy of Spinoza's *Ethics* had fallen into de Mairan's hands. In his first letter to Malebranche, of September 17, 1713, he writes of his impressions of the *Ethics*. "But the more I read it, the more I find it to be solid and full of good sense. In a word, I know not how to break the chain of his demonstrations. In the meantime, the agitation causing the overthrow of my principal and most cherished ideas, has compelled me sometimes to cast it aside. I have desired to forget it; but when one is intensely moved by the desire of knowing the truth, how is one able to forget that which appears so evident? On the other hand, I am not able to consider, without compassion for humanity and sadness, the consequences which follow from his principles; on the other, I am not able to resist his demonstrations."[12] He begs, therefore, that Père Malebranche point out to him the paralogisms of Spinoza *cum more geometrico*, so that he may be equipped for the counter-attack with his own weapons. He confesses: "I have seen pretended refutations of him made but they only bring his positions into clearer light."[13]

Père Malebranche replies on September twenty-ninth, "The principal cause of the errors of this author come, it appears to me, from the fact that he confounds the idea of created beings with the beings themselves, the idea of bodies with bodies themselves and that he supposes one sees them in themselves; a very palpable error as you know. For, being convinced from interior evidence that the idea of extension is eternal, necessary, infinite, and supposing besides that creation is impossible he confounds the world or created extension with intelligible extension, the intelligible world, which is the immediate object of the mind. Thus he confounds God or sovereign reason, who contains the ideas which are clear to our minds, with the object which the ideas represent."[14]

In de Mairan's second letter he confesses his inability to distinguish between the notion of created or material extension and intelligible extension, as Malebranche desired. He refers to the works of Père Malebranche himself and has a penchant to hold that intelligible extension may be identical with substantial extension of which bodies are but modifications. "In all these passages, that which you call created or material extension, which you regard as one substance, is really only the simple modes or affections of extended substance. And it is in this sense that created extension is to the true extension, which is substance or attribute, what time is to eternity or what ideas are to thought; a comparison repeated over and over again by the author (Spinoza) and by which he intends to say nothing other than that which you have said, that *created extension is to the divine immensity what time is to eternity, and that all bodies are extended in the immensity of God as hours or days follow each other in eternity.*"[15] In fine, Père Malebranche seems to agree with Spinoza and if that be so, "It follows that that which you qualify as created extension is properly only the modification of extension, and that which you call intelligible extension, in the way you have for the most part explained it, is really confounded with extended substance or attribute, of which all bodies, matter and the whole universe are modifications. It is at least certain that one finds in this all that you attribute to the other."[16] Such a position, doubtless he conceived, would be embarrassing to theology. "For this extension, which is in God and constitutes his essence as an attribute, is in God or it is not in God. If it be in God, the whole universe and all bodies are only modifications of one of the divine attributes, which are only modified in such and such a manner as to be extended; this is the pure doctrine of the author (Spinoza). If extension is not characteristic of God, then there is something which is not God and which does not constitute his essence, that exists necessarily, that is infinite, eternal, indivisible, etc. Thus it appears, permit me to say, that the distinction between 'created and intelligible extension' had only been imagined to cover these difficulties."

We are now prepared to say that in the *Recherche, Entretiens* and correspondence with de Mairan, Malebranche does not appear consciously to have secured the unity of reality which he sought. Noetically, he unquestionably satisfied a thoroughgoing demand of a theory of knowledge as the condition of knowing any fact whatsoever, such a fact must be recognized as a segment of a circle, which includes it. There are and can be no isolated facts of knowledge. Each fact is linked up with all other known facts. Each fact is suggestive of the totality of known facts. *Seeing things in God,* therefore, is a popular way of enunciating a very profound principle of knowledge. We should have much hesitancy in accepting the principle in the form in which Malebranche has stated it. His notion of being in general is too far removed from actuality; it needs enriching by the experiential processes of actual psychological beings, especially from the genetic viewpoint. His theory of universals, as we have acknowledged, contains a profound truth, but once more it needs restatement in the light of the psychology of knowledge. Nevertheless, the unity involved in all knowing processes is incontestable; Malebranche deserves credit for making that clear.

But why did not Malebranche see the metaphysical complement of this truth? After quoting with approval the words of Saint Paul, who took them either from Cleanthes or Aratus, "In him we live, are moved and have our being," it is strange that he remained on the doorstep of the temple of truth. Why did he not enter? Do we not have our being in God as truly as we know all things in God?

The refusal of Malebranche to accept de Mairan's interpretation of his own theory of the relationship of intelligible to material extension is one of the curiosities of philosophical literature. De Mairan was right; the thought of Malebranche was Spinozistic, more Spinozistic than he was prepared to acknowledge. The conclusions of Spinoza with regard to extended substance were anticipated by

Malebranche. But Malebranche, the priest, in spite of a clear philosophical grasp of the problem and the compulsion of his intellect irresistibly toward Spinoza's result, that the material universe was merely one of the modifications of the being of God, refused possibly on theological grounds to accept the conclusions of Malebranche, the philosopher. De Mairan's perspicacity brought this out in the correspondence.

Unconsciously, then, this noted Cartesian, starting with premises which certainly were rather uncongenial to the great issue of a unitary conception of reality, was forced, nevertheless, even in spite of personal theological attitudes, to espouse this holy cause.

Spinozism the Culmination of Cartesianism

Although Leibnitz had remarked that "Spinozism is an exaggerated Cartesianism," we must be careful not to interpret such a statement in the direction of an exaggeration of the dualistic tendencies of the system; for it is evident that the desire for unity is intensified in the philosophical system of Baruch Spinoza. Some contend that he did not completely overcome the dualism of Descartes. His own conviction was that he had bridged the chasm. There is and can be only one substance; all else is an expression or modification of it. This is the thought of Spinoza. We shall have ample occasion in the course of this essay to appraise the value of Spinoza's work and his great contribution to philosophical thought. Suffice it to say now, that Spinozism is the culmination of Cartesianism from the tendencies revealing themselves both consciously and unconsciously in the progress of this productive historical movement, looking toward a unitary notion of thought and reality, the finite and the infinite, the material and spiritual universe.

Heraclitus and the Principle of Unity in General

This tendency toward a theory of the unity of all things manifesting itself in the group of thinkers who gave the impulse to modern philosophy, is illustrative of a similar tendency, not only in schools of thought or groups of thinkers marked by similarities of thought, but also has an ectype in the thinking of any individual, who pretends to evolve a systematic interpretation of life and thought. Even when the individual thinker consciously intends to avoid such a conclusion, it is nevertheless revealed in his work. It might be inserted, were it not too early in our discussion, that reality being what it is, it could not be otherwise. At any rate the system of Heraclitus will serve as an example of this fact. When we seek for a tendency toward the principle of unity in the fragments which have come down to us from Heraclitus, at first blush the quest seems hopeless. There is an enunciation of the eternally becoming, "Everything advances (flows), nothing remains." Change or becoming is fundamental in nature. While it is not correct or profound to interpret Heraclitus as accepting the Eleatic principle of unity, his system may legitimately be regarded as an extension of it. The Eleatic one was eternal, unchangeable and static. It was uncreated, underived, imperishable, indivisible, continuous, perfect, having no past or future but always a present existence, evenly extended in every direction and identical with thought. On the other hand, Heraclitus asserts that flux or change is characteristic of all things. Change is not merely applicable to the phenomenal world leaving the real at the basis of the phenomenal untouched. Neither is it a solution of the problem of one and many by applying the principle of unity to the real and the principle of diversity to the phenomenal or what leads to the same issue by denying reality to the phenomenal. Heraclitus applies his principle in thorough-going fashion to the real as well as the phenomenal. The real is changeable. Reality does not by aristocratic right of birth escape the common fate of all existence. Yet the thought of Heraclitus supplements that of Parmenides. He combines the static and the dynamic, change and the law of change, evolution and the force controlling the evolutional process. This combination, it must be admitted, was not so clear to Heraclitus as it is to the modern thinker, but it was his vision. There is also an irrational mixture of physical and psychological elements in the thought of Heraclitus, as there is in the thought of all the Ionic thinkers. Philosophy was not yet emancipated from Physics. But Heraclitus saw the promises from afar.

It would be interesting indeed to carry our investigation far into the field of philosophy. Did the intent of the present discussion lead in that direction, we are confident we should find it a profitable and successful investigation for our purpose. Reflections upon any aspect of reality lead by diverse ways to its unitary nature. Heraclitus did not leave a hopeless diversity, a world of irrational change, merely to subsequent thinking; he found change to be according to law, according to the eternal *logos* governing the change; and, mark you, the eternal logos is still eternal, eternal and changeable. In grasping this unitary aspect of his problem, Heraclitus indicates a true philosophical spirit. He could not escape it; no thinker can escape it.

Conclusion of this Section and a Definition of Philosophy

The conclusion seems inevitable; the main tendency in philosophical reflection is toward a unitary conception of thought and existence. A study of groups of thinkers or of individual thinkers in either ancient or modern philososophy will establish this position. At the beginning of modern philosophy when the reflective human spirit, under the spell of the movement loosely characterized as the renaissance, was assimilating more extensively the underlying principles which shaped the social life of the ancient world and supplied its ideals, the tendency to a unitary interpretation is very marked; even in spite of the uncompromising dualism of the thinker, who through his own originality had brought philosophy into line with the new order of things. In spite of any conscious intention to avoid it, it is there. All dualistic and pluralistic systems of thought betray it, in spite of their ingenious efforts to avoid it. Even monistic systems themselves may succeed only partially. They can at best only give aspects of an all-inclusive reality. But the ideal of philosophy is an interpretation of thought and existence in such a way as to make for a unitary conception, though full attainment of this ideal of necessity will always elude its grasp. In view of these considerations, philososphy may therefore be defined as a tendency to refer all experience and its implied realities to a fundamental and all embracing principle, which is the originating, dynamic and organizing principle of this experience and of all its implicated realities.

CHAPTER TWO

THE NATURE OF RELIGION

The Realization that We Are Essential and Contributory Participants in God

Comprehensive Definition of Religion

NARROWNESS IS THE SIN which doth so easily beset all who endeavor to define religion. There are two reasons for it. The first is that all definition is limitation, a partial suggestion of a process, which can only be suggested; and the second reason is that definitions naturally rise from specific attitudes and interests. But religion must be defined comprehensively. All facts of religious experience must be noted and the underlying principles stated. The experience of religion is quite extensive; if it be not a universal experience of human beings, the exceptions are so few and the rule so pervading, that for both theoretical and practical purposes it may be regarded as universal. Religion is a human quality. To be man is to be religious. It has its roots in the psychological experiences of both the individual and the race. Theories which regard it as an incidence of growth in the human race are at a par with those which regard man's intellectual nature as an incident. If we accept such an explanation of universal qualities, there is no sense in speaking of anything as supreme.

If all be subsidiary, there can be no main issue. We are not able to regard religion as other than a principle imbedding itself in the concerns of the finite and the infinite, in a relationship fundamental and normal.

Since, however, we hold religion to be a human characteristic, we are compelled to regard all religion as one; one in its present developed forms, one in the relationship of its developed forms to all past expressions; nay, fundamentally, to regard that attitude which we must hold to be religious as the expression of a unique relationship borne by every human being to something which includes him. It may therefore be personal and formal, individual and social. The following definition will embody this attitude. Religion may be defined as the realization that we are essential and contributory participants in ultimate reality, in nature and humanity. That all three factors enter into what must be regarded as religion, will become clear in a further elaboration of this thought.

Animism

A few illustrations from the primitive forms of religion will indicate the drift of our definition. In the animistic form of religion the notion appears that spiritual beings are directly related to human life and destiny. It concerned itself with human spirits and their continuance after death and spirits other than human through innumerable grades up to powerful deities. These spirits or certain grades of them became objects of worship to primitive man. He worshipped those which were regarded as controlling the affairs of nature and humanity. These spirits dwelled in human bodies and nature. They were the active agencies in natural forces, causing devastating floods, the ebb and flow of the tide, the motion of rivers, the reverberation of thunder and the flash of lightning, earthquakes and all varieties of extraordinary natural phenomena. They were, therefore, present in nature's ordinary processes; in the lush grass and growing trees as actually as in storm and flood.

It is apparent, at this initial stage in the development of religion, that man anthropomorphized everything which became the object of his reflection. The anthropomorphic and anthropopathic characterizations do not rest with primitive man. It is not a tendency in religion alone. Philosophers and men of science indulge in it, even when they think they are most abstract. The human mind is compelled to think after the mould of its own fashioning.

The spirits are thought of as closely related to human beings; they are capable even of occupying human bodies; there is a reciprocal relation between them and human beings, the biological process of conception was regarded as specifically theirs. The spirits guarded all the interrelations of human beings. The close affinity between man and outer nature was also brought into relief. In other words, the bases upon which the super-structure of advanced religion is erected are already there.

Totemism

The totemistic stage in religious development validifies also our contention as to the nature of religion. Totemism was prevalent among many savage and barbaric tribes. The American Indian had a familiar, whose name he bore and with which he sustained a mystic *rapport*.[17] The familiar was usually an animal. At the initiation of the Indian into the mysteries and obligations of the tribe, which each Indian lad was compelled to undergo, the totem was suggested to him during the long fast incidental to his initiation; or it was adopted as a gift from a friend or medicine man. In either case, the totem from that hour continued to be the protector of the person who had adopted it.

The totem was regarded as the protector of all the totem kin. Not only did the totem afford them protection but also imparted to them warning concerning impending danger and important affairs through dreams. A great reverence, which developed into worship, was felt for the totem. Religious rites especially at birth, entrance upon the state of puberty, marriage and death, were performed. Religious dances were conducted in honor of the totem.

The Origin of Totemism

Herbert Spencer and Jevons contend for the non-religious origin of totemism. It seems probable that it had its origin primarily in the instinctive religious impulses of primitive man; and, secondarily, in his social necessities.

The deified animal or subject in course of time was propitiated, reverenced and worshipped. The totemist came to regard himself as descended from the totem; the blood of the animal totem was in his veins. The totemistic spirits were responsible for conception in women; thus members of the tribe became the veritable sons and daughters of the god. Natural forces were also deities; rivers were sacred and exercised divine powers; trees were worshipped as gods and the stars took their place among the galaxy of deities. Bound up with the religious life even at this stage was the realization of participation in the life of the gods, of humanity and nature. These factors did not emerge as fully conscious appreciations; but they were there in the germ.

Taboo

In the institution of taboo, which was as prevalent among primitive men as animism and totemism, the fact of the individual's participation in and contribution to the life of man, nature and god comes out through a system of prohibitions on man's use of natural things and his relation to his environment.

It is interesting to notice the sanctions of taboo. Punishment for its violation might be directly by natural law; or animistically administered by the god, the soul of a deceased person or some other spirit. One of the forms of direct punishment was through *mana,* a supernatural force,[18] comparable to the force of electricity,[19] operating through physical agencies. In all taboo things and places, there is mana enough resident to destroy the person that violates taboo. But if the person so violating possesses an equal force of *mana* in himself he is thereby enabled to neutralize the punishment; for in that case action and reaction would be equal. An ordinary person, for example, speaking to a king would be instantly destroyed according to the taboo theory; but if he were a great personage, such as an ambassador or prime minister, the force of *mana* in him would offset the punishment. A cemetery being taboo, the force of *mana* in it, for the same reason, will not destroy a priest who may enter it to perform ceremonies for the dead, though an ordinary person would risk his life by entering.

We touch the nerve of the institution of taboo when we think of it as arising out of respect for the gods. Primitive man—and indeed much of all these institutions—lingers on in our modern life-severed relations with certain objects, persons and institutions because he believed that commerce with them would be displeasing to the gods. The notion of their will operating as *mana* through natural forces, contains the germs of a religious and metaphysical relationship between God and nature on the one hand and man and nature on the other, which prophesied prolific and profitable systems of philosophy.

Fetichism[20]

There is a tendency to define fetichism as a belief that some sort of psychological power, human or superhuman, dwells in inanimate objects. This power is prayed to, and concurrently it is believed that the resident power may operate upon the believer through the instrumentality of the particular object. Herbert Spencer, Comte, Dr. E. B. Tyler and Charles de Brosses shared in this view; but the fetich worshipper did not always consciously regard the object as containing a spirit; nevertheless on account of certain associations the object possessed for him magical powers, just as people today attach certain virtues to horseshoes, the rabbit's foot, etc. In general, therefore we may say that fetichism is the belief that some sort of a psychological being, either human or superhuman, is resident in or acting through a particular material object or that the object is possessed of magical power and will benefit the individual who pays homage to it.

This feeling on the part of primitive man of the relationship sustained by him to inanimate nature and the power or powers resident in it indicates the intuitive metaphysician and religionist.

Sacrifice

The primitive institution of sacrifice, whatever theory of its origin be accepted, accentuates the fact that in the religious attitude there is a realization of human participation in the life of the gods; and the further realization of a human contribution in some form to that life.

In sacrifice there was a ritualistic act of offering or destroying an object, or killing of animal life, through which act the status of the individual in relation to the gods was supposed to be changed. Several theories concerning the origin of sacrifice have been propounded. We shall mention one of them, for it illustrates our theme. Dr. Otto Pfleiderer holds that sacrifice was originally a participation by the gods on the invitation of men in their festive occasions.[21] Others refer the origin of sacrifice to totemism. L. Marillier contends that by killing an animal, a magical source in the animal is released through the effusion of blood; this process was considered well-pleasing to the gods. There was also a mystical union established between the worshipper and his god, when the former touched the blood of the animal. Robertson Smith has developed three forms of the totemistic theory, the honorific, piacular and mystical or sacramental.

The fountain of youth theory as applied to sacrifice has been held by J. G. Frazer. He accepts the piacular theory of Robertson Smith. In this view the sacrifice was an atonement made within kinship bond. Originally the man who had committed a crime had to die; later the totem itself was killed; thus the very god died for the people. But in addition to this, Frazer thinks that the totem was sacrificed in order to preserve the gods from inroads of old age; for otherwise the god within the animal would have to undergo the tribulations of old age with its consequent loss of vigor and power, which would be a serious disadvantage to the totem kin.

It is beside the mark, I think, to fit a theory of the origin of sacrifice into the institution of totemism, animism or fetichism. The act itself is always an offering of something to the gods in consideration either of blessings received or anticipated. The fact of communion naturally entered into the transaction. At first it might have been nothing but a crude guest notion; then there developed the attempt to enter into the mystical union with the god and a participation in his life. As time went on, men of deeper insight, like the Hebrew prophets, Greeks poets and philosophers, pointed out the shallowness and inferiority of ritualistic sacrifice in comparison with genuine sacrifice of purity of heart and conduct. The sacrificial offering at length became a spiritual exercise, although undoubtedly sacrifice by its cruder aspects continued to be an aid to the worshipper.

What appears from these considerations is that through these dim beginnings of the religious life it is seen that religion is a realization that we are participants in the life of God. That we are also coworkers with nature was but dimly felt and that the individual is a participant in the life of humanity emerged but faintly in primitive expressions of religion.

Mythology

This identification on the part of early man of himself with nature and nature's god comes out very clearly in his mythopeic constructions. Mythology is a by-product of religion. It is early man's metaphysical interpretation of nature and his own life. Legends of cosmogony, gods and heroes arose from an effort to explain the causes of natural phenomena. Only by a psychological study of the development of the human race is a clue afforded to mythology. It is the metaphysics of the imagination, a method of explanation used by both child and savage; a desire to know the causes of things by aid of the imagination rather than by aid of the ratiocinative processes.

The myth making tendency is not confined to savage and barbaric man; civilized man will never be able to eliminate it from his life. Christianity very properly teaches that God is a spirit and that he should be worshipped in spirit and truth. It thus makes use of general terms, but in so doing it does not dispense with mythological anthropomorphism. The Heavenly Father is as valuable a notion to Christianity as Demeter, the kindly mother, or Zeus, the all-seeing father, was to the Greeks. Even the notion of God as a spirit is a species of psychological anthropomorphism, God thought of after the manner of the human spirit.

Philosophy and science use the most abstract terms to denote the laws and forces of nature, but analysis reveals the fact that all philosophical and scientific terms are borrowed from human experience and are simply psychological qualities applied to things. The terms force, energy, conservation of energy, attraction, repulsion, gravitation, etc. used in science, and the terms cause, substance, time, space, etc. used in philosophy, are anthropomorphic terms. The best science or philosophy can do is to abstract the human ingredient as much as possible, but complete elimination is beyond the power of human thought. Human thought and language are our necessary instruments, both necessary and unavoidable in processes of reflection. We are only led astray by such use when we consider linguistic descriptions ultimate rather than as suggestions of universal qualities. Terms of this nature are merely indices to something larger than themselves, something of which they are a suggestion. The child and unthinking person are unable to advance much beyond the imaginative construction. The majority of human beings are still in the mythopeic stage. It is only the gift of the few to see or guess at realities beyond the myths of the imagination in science, philosophy and religion.

The significance for our purpose in mythology is that man, through his imagination, unconsciously identified himself with gods, heroes and nature. He interpreted them in human terms; this we contend was possible and appeared proper to him because of a community of interest between these and himself. They are all included in the same scheme; they all partake of similar and even of identical qualities. Man has been evolved from the very heart of nature and shares her life. His life and thought are indices to her life and thought. He interpreted and continues to interpret the causes of things as if they were psychical beings. He felt intuitively that his life somehow was locked up with the life of the universe, that his mind was an ingredient of it and an index to it, that indeed he was a part of a stupendous whole and understood it because of this relationship.

Meaning of Realization

It is now time to call attention to the word realization as used in our definition. Religion describes a comprehensive psychological attitude. It is not the exercise of a peculiar or unique religious faculty but an experience of the total psychical man. Any thorough-going psychological theory must regard volition, intellection and emotion as descriptive elements of one psychological process. They are all involved in each process. Each of the elements of course may be isolated for purposes of analysis, but it can never be isolated in fact. There is naturally always a predominance in the ongoing psychological experience of one or more of these elements, but the others are always present as undertones in music or undercurrents in the sea. Genetically also a certain element may predominate as volition or emotion during the period of childhood. Both in the theory and practice of religion, in certain sects of its organized forms, one of these elements has been isolated and made predominant to the detriment of a well-rounded religious life. An over-emphasis of emotion results in insulting and thwarting both the intellectual and volitional life; an over-emphasis of the intellectual element freezes the divine warmth within the soul and deprives it of the consolations and benevolences of religion; an over-emphasis of the volitional life creates a thoughtless and emotionless life, devoid of reason and love. We need emotion as the driving force of religion, intellect as the guide and volition as the practical incorporation of its inspirations. An adequate religion must do justice to all of these elements. Religion is a realization which involves each because each is a part of the total psychical reaction to the divine, to nature and humanity.

Religion to the individual is primarily an intuitive process; he does not become religious; he is religious. It is in this sense a primordial, indefinable fact. Like all facts grounded in our larger life, we cannot give a reason for its origin. Why knowledge became an endowment of human beings is beyond our province to discuss. As religion develops in the individual it becomes, partially at least, an intellectual affair, but it is more inclusive than an intellectual grasp. We must be able to give a reason for the faith that is in us, but the reason will cover areas which are not uniquely intellectual. It also becomes, if it be of any value, a volitional process, incorporating in life those acts of conduct consistent with the religious life, but it must have its roots in something larger and deeper than the will. It becomes an emotional process; it inspires, purifies and ennobles, but it is deeper than the emotional fires. Even to say that religion is an affair of all these elements, at once a reaction of intellect, emotion and will, does not go to the root of the matter. A reaction to what? Religion is a transaction between the finite and divine; it takes its rise in the unique relationship existing between them. It is the reaction of the human soul to the being in whom we live and move and have our being. The reality of religion consists in the fact that we are living the life of the universe.

Externalities. Authority and Tradition

Religion, therefore, is in the life of the spirit within and not an imprint of anything external. The religious life has expressed itself in external forms. The reflections of religious souls have been recorded; a halo of sanctity gathers around them as they recede into history. They crystallize into dogmas and believers must shape their thinking in conformity with them. Even the language, although it has become meaningless and antiquated, becomes sacred and not an iota of it can be changed. They are now regarded as the directors of the life within. Historically they were expressions of a life within the soul which could only suggest its experiences; now they are regarded not only as adequate expressions for the inner life of the believer, but they deprive him of the privilege of expression in any other terms.

Institutions also appear in the wake of organized religious life. Churches and temples are built, an ecclesiasticism is developed, and no one will gainsay the value of them for the cultivation of the religious life. But when, as often happens, they come to be regarded as ends in themselves, they are very detrimental to the best life. They must be reformed or destroyed. The error which is liable to arise in connection either with sacred words or sacred institutions is to place reliance upon them and to regard them as absolute instead of as subsidiary and helpful; as causes instead of effects; as standards instead of as historical facts to be handled for the profit of the spirit.

Great souls in all ages have felt that creeds must be rewritten, institutions reformed, and other institutions originated to meet the demands of the spirit of man. A religious institution is a frozen form of the liquid experiences of living religious souls. Sacred words are *post mortem* facts. That is the meaning of the words of Coleridge in his ode to "Dejection":

"It were a vain endeavor
Though I should gaze forever
On that green light that lingers in the West;
I may not hope from outward signs to win
The passion and the life whose fountains are
within."

Religion therefore, it must always be remembered, is a realization that the life of the infinite enfolds the life of the finite. That fact is supreme to the religious soul. He has a right to fall back upon it. It is the alembic in which he tests all institutions and beliefs. It expresses itself through his intellect, his feelings and volitions, but it is deeper than these. It takes the human soul into the very deeps of God's life.

Unity with God as the Ideal of All Great Religions. The Gospel of St. John

The religious consciousness defied a disparate notion of God and the phenomenal world. God and man become one to it. In the act of worship all differentiations of the intellect necessary to its processes disappear; and to the extent to which the worshipper realizes his own being merging into that of God's, he feels the deeper satisfaction of his life. When he worships in spirit and in truth, he experiences an enlargement of his personality, a disappearance of the checks of sense perception, a subsidence of the intruding of his own volition and an assertion of the divine will which includes his own; he is able to say most sincerely, "Thy will not mine be done." In his religious moods, either in the act of worship or of contemplation, the more a man feels himself identified with the divine, the more easily does the course of life run; he is freer from despair and blighting pessimism, he is better able to perform his task with joy and laughter. The gospel of Saint John has been an inspiration and continues to be an inspiration to Christian worshippers. It voices the deepest needs of the soul. Why?

The Logos Doctrine of Philo

This gospel gives expression to the monistic and idealistic philosophy of Philo. It is an application of the logos theory to Jesus and the Christian doctrine and tradition as they had developed at the time the author penned this gospel. The theme of the gospel is struck in the opening words: "In the beginning was the Logos and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God."

The divine logos or universal reason was the basis of Greek philosophy.[22] Heraclitus regarded eternal reason as the permanent law beneath all change. The universe and man were exhalations of it. Anaxagoras incorporated the notion of the logos in his theory of the *Nous* (mens). Later it appears in Plato's ideas, the ideal forms or patterns which were the spiritual principles expressing themselves in all phenomena. There was to him a real world of spiritual principles, a world of intellectual realities beneath and sustaining the phenomenal world of our experience.

The Stoics perpetuated and developed further the notion of the logos. Zeno says: "Nothing that is destitute of mind and reason can generate from itself a living being endowed with reason; but the universe generates living beings endowed with reason; therefore the universe is a living being and endowed with reason."[23]

Seneca speaks of "The divine spirit diffused through all things, the greatest and the least, with equal tension," and of "the divine reason inserted in the whole world and in all its parts."[24]

The relation between man and the logos is thus stated: "Reason is nothing else than a part of the divine spirit immersed in the human body."

The basic universal reason was regarded by the Stoics as the common element in men, enabling them to communicate with each other, to act in accord with common judgments and ethical principles. It was also the principle of evolution in both man and the universe.

In Philo is the climax of the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy. He incorporates the doctrine of the logos, ready to his hand in Greek thinkers. In an elaborate way he canvasses the reflections of Greek thinkers, and the Old Testament Scriptures to find illustrations of this doctrine. The necessity for the logos arose from his conception of the transcendence of God. God transcends the phenomenal world; is without qualities, a genus by himself; is rational but transcends rationality. How, therefore, may we consider the relationship of this transcendent God to the phenomenal universe? How may this transcendent God sustain immanent relations to nature? In the thinking of Philo the ultimate reality and the universe have nothing in common when we consider them in their unmediated isolation. There is only one way to bring them together, only one way of making the transcendent God effective for the purposes of creation and the sustenance of the present order and that is through a system of powers or intermediaries. These powers are six in number:

I. The logos, the oldest and best of all the powers, which unites them all.

II. The creative power, by which the cosmos was made through the instrumentality of a word.

III. The regal power, by which he who made the universe rules that which he made.

IV. Propitious power, by which the artificer pities and takes compassion on what he made.

V. The perceptive power, which is a subdivision of the regal power.

VI. The prohibitive power, which is also a subdivision of the regal power.

These powers must not be considered as separated from God in the sense of secondary causes; they are simply instrumentalities of his direct operation in the cosmos. The powers collectively express the essence of God. They are immaterial principles, divine like God himself, incomprehensible like Him in their essence, independent of time and therefore unbegotten. They are like the Platonic ideas and must be considered not only noetical factors in the mind of God but the efficient causes of things. They thus produce the phenomenal world and give an ideal form to each thing just as a seal impresses the wax with its particular form.

Among these powers, the logos, or the eternal reason, assumes the most important rôle.[25] It is the primary power, primary in logical importance and effectiveness. In this sense it is regarded as the oldest or first-born son of God. In fact, it is the only begotten son of God, for through the logos God directs and controls the other powers; it includes all except God, who includes the six powers and the universe. It is the common bond of the powers. The logos makes a cosmos out of chaos; it is the order and harmony of the world. It has noetical reality in the mind of God and objective, metaphysical reality in the universe. The logos does not exhaust the being of God; it is a phase, albeit the most important phase of his being. The logos is the mediator between God and the universe.[26]

This reference to Philo's Platonic system is for the purpose of illustrating the profound truth that the unitary conception of the world, which it presents, becomes through the gospel of St. John very satisfying to the religious consciousness. Not that there is anything very satisfying or profound in the particular expression given to the unitary conception of the universe by Philo, but the fact that he tried to see the unity and harmony of the whole cosmos, that the phenomenal earth, the body and soul of man, the sun and planets and distant stars and all the forces operative within them were united into a vast system, whose bond of union was eternal reason, becomes of profound significance to the religious soul. The application of that thought to Jesus and his disciples, causing Jesus to say: "I and my Father are one," and to desire this identical unity for all believers,[27] is far-reaching.

The Realization that We Are Essential and Contributory Participants in Humanity

Ethics and Religion

The ethical attitude of a human being has frequently been considered distinct from the religious,—a separate department. Over and over again in consequence of the attempt to separate ethics from religion both theoretically and practically, philosophers, prophets and poets have called men back to consider and practice the ethical life as being a life supremely religious. The ethical and religious in man are one and inseparable; they may be separated for purposes of analysis only. The vision of the best prophets was one that gave explicit direction to conduct both individual and social.

Martineau's Notion of Ethics before Religion

Martineau regards the consciousness of duty as an originating condition of religion.[28] He also believes that if the avenue to God were through our emotional nature alone we should be at the unconscious state in which there would be no dawning of the infinite upon the soul; even intellectual and selfconscious discrimination would yield us only a thinking necessity.[29] This intellectual attitude doubtless would fall under one of the categories of religion according to Martineau, but if taken to include the whole of it religion would indeed be clad in beggarly elements. It is only when we come to "the high altar of our Moral Experience," as creatures of determination and choice, superior as causes to the nature around us, that "there enters a kind of dependence on the universal Cause unfelt before."[30]

Martineau states: "By Religion I understand the believer's worship of Supreme Mind and Will, directing the universe and holding moral relations with human life."[31] "This is a definition of religion from the exalted position of its anthropomorphic reaches. The beginnings of religion both in the child and the race are ignored. But we are not justified in taking such a broad human characteristic as religion and defining it as if it had sprung full-armed from the brain of Jove. It has a long and interesting history. Its antecedents had reached back to the very beginnings of Christianity; and Christianity had absorbed all the values of its Hebrew progenitor and the pagan religions which surrounded it; in fact, these antecedents reached back to the shadowy beginnings of the race when human beings were stretching their hands helplessly to the heavens and praying to anything which seemed to supplement their impelling and little-understood longing after the eternal. The religion of the savage, barbarian and the civilized man in all stages of his development is reflected in the more perfect religion of the present. No one can begin to understand the religion of the present unless he take into the account the presence even now of primitive elements and contributions from the numerous religious attitudes of mankind, which enter into its makeup. Analysis of Martineau's definition would reveal the use of terms and conceptions such as *worship, Supreme Mind, Supreme Will, universe* and the notion of a *directing power,* which are a composite of the attitudes assumed by man during the various stages in the evolution of religion.

Any adequate notion of religion must take these facts into account. And equally important is a consideration of the dawnings of these unique phenomena in the individual. The conception of development must enter into any scientific and comprehensive treatment of all human problems, and least of all are we able to dispense with it in our treatment of religion.

But it was not necessary for Martineau to ignore the evolutionary phase of religion, even if we grant him his definition of religion. A belief in a Supreme Mind and Will, the worship of this infinite being and the conception of his holding moral relations to man, as we have partly suggested, have their roots in history. Even if we grant that the religious consciousness does not emerge until the moral life dawns upon man, there are infinite gradations in the attitude and achievements of this moral life. It is not a static principle; neither is the religious attitude which emerges from it static but an ever-moving, living principle.

Martineau was driven to his attitude also by an overemphasis on belief. His first definition of religion was, "Belief in an ever-living God, that is, a divine Mind and Will ruling the universe and holding moral relations with mankind."[32] We should not object to his use of the word *belief* if he had given a broader scope to the process of believing. "In the soul of religion," he asserts, "the apprehension of truth and the enthusiasm of devotion inseparably blend." But the psychological content of religion is much richer than is indicated by either *apprehension of truth* or *enthusiasm of devotion.* He recognizes religion as something other than merely intellectual, and that is proper. But it is just to say that in Martineau's *A Study of Religion* there is ample justice done to the *apprehension of truth,* but the *enthusiasm of devotion* plays a secondary part. An analysis of what is properly meant by belief would bring this point out clearly, but we must reserve it for notice in the proper place under considerations for an adequate theory of knowledge; suffice it to say now that belief included volitional, emotional and intellectual elements. It draws its sustenance from all processes of the soul, from the vaguest to the most clearly defined, from the lower promptings of volition to the most elaborate choices, from the most primary feelings to the sublimest emotions as well as from the most timid forth-puttings of the intellect to the profoundest intellectual grasp. Both ethics and religion grow out of a common metaphysical basis, both are eternally wedded in the human soul, and no man can tear them asunder. The fact of our being essential and contributory parts of God makes us at once essential and contributory participants in humanity, for the former relationship involves the latter. Humanity is one physically and biologically, socially and economically, religiously and ethically. Humanity and the supreme reality are one; humanity is a process in the infinite, which includes it.

Causes of the Separation of Ethics and Religion

Ecclesiastical and theological authority cast their blight upon the ethical life. When the modern ethical theorist essayed to emancipate his domain from both the theoretical and practical autocracy of external impositions, he was compelled to advance along the identical highway which the Cartesian thinkers had taken in the magnificent effort to release philosophy in general from its bondage. Descartes and his school turned from external to internal authority, from ecclesiasticism and theology to the human soul. Here was the best known product of the infinite life; what has it to declare for itself? Here is the source of philosophy, religion and ethics: what verdict is here pronounced upon the fundamental problems of life? Here in fact is the source which antedates all authority, the realm to which each human being is eternally confined so far as knowledge is concerned; what may we learn by investigating this rich dominion? In the *Discours de la Methode,* Descartes presented a method of rightly conducting the reason and seeking truth in the sciences. This method was the principle of doubt. He was desirous of finding truth, absolute truth. He took stock of the truths he possessed and subjected them to the assaying process of doubt. His attitudes toward God, other men, the universe and himself were tested in order to discover what was pure gold in them and what was dross. Any truth that could not stand the test of doubt he rejected. It would have no place in his spiritual equipment. He then proceeded to deal with all the assumed truths which he found in his soul and discovered that he was compelled to reject all of them except one supreme truth, which defied his test and came out of the assay pure and lustrous. No sceptic could disturb the truth, "I think, hence I am."[33] For, to doubt his own existence would involve him in hopeless confusion; it would take away the only criterion he had left. If the mind that doubted all did not exist, it were mere shibboleth to talk of any other existent fact of truth. This was most clear and indubitable to him; the process of doubt was a process of thinking; the thinker must at least exist to make the doubt possible; what, therefore, can be more veritable than the coexistence of two indubitable facts—the fact of existence and the fact of thinking? *Cogito ergo sum*: that is to say, *ergo* means coexistent with; the *cogito* involves or is a process *pari passu* with the thinking self.

We are not concerned at present with an exposition or criticism of the philosophy of Descartes. We merely remind ourselves that he originated a new method of philosophizing, a method taking its departure from the analysis of human consciousness. He looks within the soul. He seeks the foundation of philosophy in human nature. Ancient philosophy had been content to take cosmical principles as the bases of their speculations. The material universe or the principle of *Nous* (mens) operating within it, or archetypal ideas eternally existent in the cosmos. Generally these starting points in ancient thinking were *à priori* principles tested by dialectical processes.

In mediaeval philosophy there is a mixture of dogmatic Christianity and ancient philosophy. The dogmas of the church embodied the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle and others and formed a magnificent mass of uncritical opinion, based upon tradition and authority. The criterion for philosophical truth was sought, therefore, in principles which were outside the human soul.

The modern ethical theorist entered into the heritage left him by Descartes and other thinkers. The problem was identical. If intellectual principles adequate for the construction of philosophy could be discovered in the mind, why not ethical principles? And the ethicist turned to selfconsciousness in order that he might found ethics upon human nature; naturally there was a clash with ecclesiasticism and theology. External *ipse dixit,* dogmatic construction of councils and traditional accumulations had to be repudiated in favor of a more fundamental basis.

This schism between ethical theory and the organized form of religion led men in time to consider it a schism between religion and ethics. Organized religion, however important it may be, is after all accidental. It comes and goes; it changes with civilization and the needs of the race. It is only the body, the visible expression of religion, and does not form a part of its eternal and permanent worth. But these distinctions do not obtain in some minds.

The Notion of Natural Law

In order to gain additional coigns of vantage from which to study the essential unity of ethics and religion, a consideration of the notion of natural law will be to our profit. The springs from which the notion has flowed reach back to the earliest philosophical reflection among the Greeks, to the Ionic Thinkers.

(a) Natural law was an interpretation of nature as the expression of a single physical and ethical principle. The Ionic thinkers were not purely physical philosophers, as ordinary opinion concerning them would have it. The physical may predominate their thought, but the ethical is always involved. They approached the study of nature through geography, astronomy and mathematics. They were immediately confronted in their cosmographical studies with impressions of uniformities and regularities, whether they considered the unitary being as expressing itself either as a definite physical principle like water or air or an indefinite principle, the undifferentiated, indeterminate something of Anaximander, or as an inexhaustible source of being to supply the deficiencies arising from the perpetual evanescence of things. But these uniformities had an ethical character as well. If Simplicius, the Neo-Platonist, has preserved accurately the words of Anaximander, they are suggestive: "Things must give justice and satisfaction to each other for their injustice, according to the order of time."[34]

(b) Natural law as an interpretation of nature as the expression of a unitary principle of reason. The Eleatics had emphasized the permanent and unchangeable element in nature, the Ent or existent. Parmenides will serve as a good representative of this type of thinking. The existent "is uncreated, for it cannot be derived from the Ent or the non-Ent; it is imperishable for it cannot pass into the non-Ent; it is whole, indivisible, continuous, for nothing exists to break its continuity in space; it is unchangeable, for nothing exists to break its continuity in time; it is perfect, for there is nothing it can want; it never was, nor will be, but only is; is evenly extended in every direction, and therefore a sphere exactly balanced; it is identical with thought." It is the sole object of thought. It is the only reality; all else is unreality, non-Ent. Parmenides contends that the early Ionics had committed the error of mistaking the phenomenal for the real; they dealt with the non-Existent and the transformations of the non-Existent. The identification of reality and thought, however, is a distinct and decided step in advance.

Heraclitus takes the torch still farther into the dark cavern. To him, the supreme law of nature was that everything changes, nothing remains (omne fluit, nihil manet). While the early Ionics and Eleatics had not an entirely static universe,—for the primal unitary principle in their thinking underwent phenomenal transformations, and with the latter when the transformations ceased all things returned to their primal source,—yet they neglected the principle of development. It was of course foreshadowed in the mere fact of transformations. But the Eleatics could not account for these transformations without denying the reality of the phenomenal. How else could the one, eternal and unchangeable, become the phenomenal? There was a better way open to them had they the vision to see it. Their conception of reality was too abstract; it was too isolated from the world of actuality; it could do nothing, bring about nothing. Heraclitus introduced the principle of becoming to explain the relationship between what we should call the real and the phenomenal. In fact, it is a mode of life for reality itself. The visible manifestation of the principle of becoming is primordial fire, which is the cause of all phenomena, even the soul itself. "This primordial fire is in itself that divine rational process, the harmony of which constitutes the law of the universe." Here looms into view the theory of a cosmical logos which is destined to play a conspicuous part in Greek thinking. All things then are in a state of eternal change; this is a conclusion to which our reason drives us, but we are also driven further to seek the law of this change. "The law of things is a law of reason universal (logos), but most men live as if they had a wisdom of their own." It is only life in accord with the reason at the heart of things that is truly virtuous. Both the ethical and the rational element of life are, therefore, not subjective phantasmagoria of the mind but all men may partake of them; all men through reason and a noble life may voice the universal reason and the moral order of the world.

It is useless to ask whether Heraclitus resolved all into the reality which expresses itself in phenomena. He recognizes no such distinction, although there is a distinction made between the seen and the unseen world and we are compelled to use this phraseology in our endeavor to explain his position.

The principle of becoming also harmonizes opposites.

In this sense, "Strife is the father of all things." In the process of evolution, the homogeneous becomes heterogeneous, to use the phrase of Herbert Spencer; things fall apart to be reharmonized into a greater unity. Parents become heterogeneous in their children, but these in turn form other unities to be severed later. There is an identity of contraries. Contraries are but particulars in a larger system which includes them all.

There is, therefore, something eternally permanent in this universe of flux, the cosmical logos, the law of change in all phenomena. He attached no consciousness to this permanent element. That reminds us that we must look neither for a comprehensive nor a very consistent system of thought from Heraclitus. The use of a noetic principle of reason, severed from its proper place as a function of consciousness and also from a being whose consciousness it is, would be a very grave error at a more developed stage of thought. The notion of consciousness is yet to dawn upon philosophical reflection. Neither was Heraclitus able to apply very rigid thinking to the principle of development. What is the nature of the reality that evolves? How is it possible for it to become conscious in man? How far do phenomena express its nature? These are but samples of numerous questions we might put to Heraclitus, but they are out-of-date in the sense of antedating a maturity of reflective thought that would make it possible for thinkers to tackle such problems.

In a word, then, we get from Heraclitus a very profound notion of natural law. It is the operation of a cosmical, unconscious logos or reason which underlies all the changes in phenomena. This is the permanent rational and ethical reality of the world. Nothing escapes the law of change; but no transformation escapes the universal and permanent law of every change.[35]

Anaxagoras continues to think in terms of universal reason. His studies in physics, which led him to a modified atomic theory, and his investigations in astronomy impressed him also with the notion of a rational order. A universal cosmical order or law captured his imagination and led him to profound thought concerning it. Let us take our stand at the beginning of the present order of the world; and assume that there existed an infinite number of atoms, infinitesimally small, containing all possible qualities, the seed (semina) of all possible things. The quantum of these atoms is constant, but they existed in this unorganized, undifferentiated mass. At this point *Nous* or reason begins its work by segregating these heterogeneous elements by a process of continuous differentiation until the present state of things is reached. "All things were together, then reason came and put them in order." The atomic seed were all of like nature (genus simile) with the wholes into which they entered as component parts.

It will be observed that both the quantitative and qualitative relations of atoms remain unchanged. The process of continuous differentiation merely aggregates these qualities and quantities into larger wholes. Anaxagoras therefore incorporates in his system the principle of becoming forged out by Heraclitus.

The principle under which the building up of the present diversity of objects takes place is a principle of reason but apparently unconscious reason. An analogue of this may be found in Schopenhauer's *Wille*. This Anaxagorean *Nous* (mens) is the subtlest and purest of all things. It is capable of exercising power, the first manifestation of which is mechanical motion. It is also in all things and must be identified with extension, something similar to the intelligible extension of Malebranche minus the intelligibility. It is devoid of that full-orbed intelligibility which is a function of a self-conscious mind; yet it partakes of certain qualities of intelligibility, such as the ability of bringing order out of chaos, of giving to material an order which, as Anaxagoras recognized, could only be a rational order; it possesses also the power of originating motion, a power which can only be connected with selfconscious activity; and the further power of arranging things in a purposeful evolution. If Anaxagoras had been in a position to realize it, he made such large drafts upon selfconscious activity that he might as well have borrowed its full equipment. But his limitations were too great.

Plato's Influence on the Notion of Natural Law

Plato gave no new interpretation of natural law. He gave a more poetical interpretation to the conception of a rational universe. Nature is the ectype of the original archetypal forms, that is the least that can be said of nature. Natural phenomena are resemblances or reflections of these great patterns. The patterns are absolute, whereas the things fashioned after them are relative. There is an absolute beauty which defies the flux of time, but beautiful objects are changeable. The patterns are eternal; their expressions in particulars are amenable to change and decay, and when they pass away new forms take their place, which in turn are destined to pass through a similar cycle of history.

Nature has to Plato, to use the language of Kant, not only an *à posteriori* aspect, wherein is the play of laws and forces and the various dispositions of its material content in star and planet, landscape and seascape, lake and river, hill and valley, tree and flower, insect and mammal, fish and fowl; but has also an *à priori* phase, wherein it is eternal, unchangeable and archetypal. The former, that is the nature which we experience, is merely a copy of the latter. When Plato therefore speaks of nature, it connotes more than our modern term; it is not only the nature of Huxley, Darwin and Tyndall, not merely a nature of chemistry, physics and biology, but a nature that is not amenable to time and space, a spiritual nature embodying the highest ideals of our reason.

This notion of nature has a very practical purpose. It is a metaphysic on the way to an ethic. It is the scaffolding which enabled him to build his moral theory as affecting both the individual and the state. Individuals express in themselves ideal reason, which embodies supremely the ideal of the good; or to put it in another form, virtue depends upon knowledge, for the good is an ideal of reason. Virtue and knowledge in the individual are inseparable as the expressions of the archetypal ideas in which they are united. In the Protagoras Plato teaches through the mouth of the sophist, Hippias of Elis, the distinction between the conventional and the natural, (lex) and (natura).[36]

There is also in this same report a social expression of the ideal theory, the germ of the rich product of the *Jus gentium* of the Romans.[37]

The burden of the Protagoras seems to be that human nature on the moral side is an expression of the eternal, unchangeable, archetypal nature. Virtue, therefore, cannot be taught as the sophists contended; it is an essential quality of our nature. Protagoras, the sophist, did not conceive "Virtue to be given by nature, or to grow up spontaneously, but to be a thing which may be taught."[38] On the contrary, Plato held, "To prefer evil to good is not in human nature."[39]

A Synthesis of the Elements Entering into the Notion of Natural Law in the Thinking of the Stoics

Our study of the notion of natural law has yielded the following results: (a) To the early Ionic thinkers, nature was the expression of a single physical and ethical principle; the principle so expressed was the law of nature. (b) The next step modifying this notion was the conception of nature as the expression of a unitary principle of reason. (c) Then nature was regarded as an evolving, dynamic expression of reason. (d) As it was necessary to account for the infinite diversity of nature, Anaxagoras and others concluded that this diversity, both as to quality and quantity, could be best expressed through an atomic system without relinquishing its incorporation of the principle of reason. (e) The effort to explain the diversity of nature was continued by Plato. Nature and human nature with him are regarded as the embodiments of eternal forms or ideas. He also distinguishes between the conventional and the natural, the transient and permanent, the essential and non-essential elements in human nature.

The Stoics united these results and their tendencies. They deduced for the purposes of law, ethics and religion the practical norms of natural law.

The monism of the Stoics comes into bold relief when contrasted with Plato's theory of ideas. Plato tackled the fundamental problem of the one and the many or the diversity of nature as an expression of reason. He was unable to overcome the fact of diversity; on the contrary, he sublimated it and made it a part of ultimate reality. Platonism is the polytheism of the common people of Greece elevated into a philosophical system. The ideas of Plato are the gods of Greece seen through the process of abstraction.

Like the gods, they are *Dei ex machina,* in spite of Plato's effort to make them immanent powers. They remain aloof and unrelated to the actuality of human life and nature in general. The ideas are also exclusive to each other although the idea of the good seems to be supreme. Bearing a similarity to henotheism in religion, the good remains chief among the many gods, but nevertheless each god exercises his function independently.

But the Stoics are distinctly monistic. Nature includes all, archetype and ectype, necessity and reason, matter and form, ideal and actuality. The logos is universal in nature, —not, indeed, as a dead logical principle, but as a dynamical principle of tension or force which permeates all matter and is co-extensive with it. This is the doctrine of universal permeation or intermingling (res admixta) This means that matter, force, spirit, or any other factor in nature intermingles with all other powers. Being is defined as that which has the power to act or be acted upon. This action is restricted to a material object; but under this category is included God, the soul, virtue and vice,— in short, all bodily and mental essences, attributes and functions. It is an endeavor to include the physical and psychical under one comprehensive category. As a consequence, there is a great confusion between noetical and metaphysical factors, between being and function. But throughout, the one comprehensive and all-inclusive principle is dynamical and not mechanical. As with Heraclitus, it is both dynamical and evolutional, but we must not divorce from it rationality; its dynamism includes the logos. On account of this immanency and unity of process, it is just as proper to call the Stoic metaphysics spiritual as material. It is both. Any metaphysical system whose effort it is to explain nature from the viewpoint of a unitary principle may be designated either way, according to the desired emphasis.

To show how accurately the Stoics struck the fundamental note in human nature on the practical side, it is sufficient to point out that the spirit and tendency of Stoicism was incorporated in Christianity; it appears in such fervid religious expressions as Cleanthes' hymn to Jupiter; it bore the ripest ethical and religious fruit in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius; and colored the whole development of Roman law with an ethical infusion. The force of Stoicism is not yet spent. "Philosophy should lead to right action and to virtue. But right action is, according to the Stoics, only rational action, and rational action is action which is in harmony with human inanimate nature."[40]

Know thyself; know nature outside thyself, are the two guiding maxims of the Stoics. But since the knowledge of nature depended upon the knowledge of self, the tendency of Stoicism was to place the chief emphasis upon self-knowledge. The Stoic retired into his own soul, observed the great law of nature at work there, and endeavored to conform to it in practical life and to submit to it in calamity and inevitable circumstance with calmness and resignation. He submitted to the guidance of irresistible conviction in knowledge and practical life.

The conclusion of these considerations of the Stoics is that they found religion and ethics to be essentially one. They were identical expressions of the law within themselves, and this law was none other than the eternal reason particularizing itself in each man, thus binding man to man, demanding his submission to the great ideals of life, eliciting his endeavor to know the immanent God and issuing in a moral and pious life. There are no hard and fast lines of demarcation here. A virtuous life is the highest expression of the religious attitude. Nor did the Stoics fail in acts of worship conformable to the high dignity of their relationship to God.

Sir Henry Sumner Maine on the Application of the Notion of Natural Law to Legislation

In his treatise on Ancient Law, Sir Henry Sumner Maine gives an able treatment of the application of the notion of natural law, prevalent in the ancient and modern world to legislation. He labors to give a correct estimate of the origin and influence of the notion, with a view it seems of freeing it from certain misconceptions which have become attached to it and to prevent us, if possible, from being led astray by its *ignus fatuus*. The confusing of natural law with the *jus gentium* of the Romans was a grave error arising from the natural reflections of later Roman jurisconsults and continued under the dominance of modern philosophy and jurisprudence. The identification of it with international law is a still more modern error without justification in history. The superimposition of the Greek notion of international law upon Roman jurisprudence came through the Stoics, and here again the error was committed of applying it in its moral implications, whereas that never entered the mind of the Ionics by whom it was originated. To them, it was purely a physical law. And curiously enough, the impression gained force that to live according to nature was to return to a certain assumed pristine state, in which man was free from the conventions, superficialities and sins of society. This misinterpretation was grossly exaggerated under the leadership of Rousseau in the eighteenth century. He and others converted the law of nature into a state of nature; and this grave misconception dominated the thinking of the leaders of the French revolution and even crossed the ocean and contaminated Jefferson and the leaders of the American revolution. Sir Henry, therefore, finds notions of natural law have been hopelessly mixed up with conceptions foreign to it, an unholy alliance without historical justification, and certain deductions have been made and accepted by theorists and practical people in consequence of these mistaken alliances without warranty whatsoever.

The Argument of Sir Henry

It is evident that the argument of such a high legal authority deserves consideration, and I shall give some of its details. The legal system of the Romans was described by them as consisting of two ingredients. "All nations who are ruled by law and customs are governed partly by their own particular laws and partly by those laws which are common to all mankind. The law which a people enacts is called the civil law of that people, but that which natural reason appoints for all mankind is called the Law of Nations, because all nations use it."[41]

This law of nations which the edicts of the Praetors had worked into Roman jurisprudence is elsewhere called *jus naturale* or the law of nature. Its ordinances are said to be dictated by natural equity, as well as natural reason.

The distinction between the *jus gentium* and the civil law can be better understood if we take into account the large immigration of foreign peoples into Rome. The Italian population was very unstable, and so was that of all Mediterranean tribes. The presence of foreigners in such large numbers within the gates of the mistress of the world affected the traditions and history of the Republic. In common with the citizens of any ancient commonwealth, the Romans "Always believed themselves to be united by kinship in blood, and resented a claim to equality of privilege as a usurpation of their birthright."[42] But neither the interest nor the security of Rome permitted the foreigner to be altogether outlawed. Something had to be done for him in the interests of the peace and self-preservation of Rome. The Roman jurists refused to decide cases arising among foreigners by pure Roman civil law and considered it a degradation to apply the law of the country of the litigant. They therefore resorted to the expedient of selecting what was common in Roman law and the law of the several Italian communities from which the aliens had emigrated. That is the historical origin of the *jus gentium,*[43] a law common to all nations. The *jus gentium* thus based upon common elements in human legislation would command the respect of a modern man as being superior to the accidental or adventitious; but the Roman jurisconsult disdained it as being much inferior to the pure Roman civil law. His attitude participated in his general attitude toward the foreigner. The *jus gentium* later, through the more mature views of Roman jurists and in our time through the influence of modern philosophy and jurisprudence, has gained supremacy and is held as the ideal to which all law should conform. The specific reason for this idealization comes from the application of the Greek theory of the law of nature to it.[44]

Further, the identification of the *jus gentium* and international law is entirely modern. International law among the Romans was the *jus feciale.* Indistinct and inaccurate impressions as to the origin of the *jus gentium* operated to form international law. This was the greatest service rendered by it.

Nature (*natura*) "Denoted beyond all doubt originally the material universe,[45] phusis. Afterwards, the later Greek sects, returning to a path from which the greatest intellects of Greece had meanwhile strayed, added the moral to the physical world in the conception of nature."[46]

The Stoics preached emancipation from the crustations of society and exhorted people to live according to nature, to penetrate through self-denial and self-command the simpler and more primitive world. This conception dominated Roman society after the subjugation of Greece. As the time went on, Stoicism also dominated legal conceptions, not so much by specific rules as by its general spirit. After nature had become a common word in the mouths of lawyers, the belief gradually prevailed that the old *jus gentium* was the lost code of nature and that the Praetor framing an edictal jurisprudence on the principles of the *jus gentium* was gradually restoring a type of law from which they had departed. It was felt that man must once more be governed as he was in a primitive state of society.

The exact point of contact between *jus gentium* and the law of nature was in the conception of *aequitas* (equity) in its original sense. It is in this great notion they touch and blend. The author derives the word from *aequus,* which carries with it the sense of levelling. This process occurred in the application of the *jus gentium* to a class not citizens. For it overrode the restrictions of the civil law. Associations with the Greek notion of the law of nature led the jurists to think of equity, a simple symmetrical order, as being the primitive condition of the race. Equity at present, as in the ancient world, is based upon moral rules.

The notion of the law of nature as implying a historical pristine condition of the race led to serious consequence. Simplicity and harmony became the criteria of the law of nature. Consider therefore its effect. "The theory of natural law is the source of almost all the special ideas as to law, politics and society which France during the last hundred years has been the instrument in diffusing over the western world."[47] The law of nature became the battle cry of the French revolution. Rousseau has driven it home to every nook and corner of the literary and political world. With Rousseau as with all the thinkers who followed him, the dominant note is the restoration of man and society to a supposed former state of perfection. Instead of a law of nature, we have now a substitute,—that is to say, a state of nature as the ideal. All men are equal by nature,[48] contended the Romans from the judicial viewpoint; but that is a far cry from the modern political doctrine that all men ought to be equal. France and America departed, therefore, from the Roman ideal and incorporated a very different view of equality from that entertained by the Romans.

Thus the author deplores the consequences arising from such gross misrepresentations, and especially that the weakest part of the law of nature rose to the level of the strongest parts in the eighteenth century. He commends Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois* with all the defects of this work for proceeding "On that Historical Method before which the Law of Nature has never maintained its footing for an instant." The weakest aspect of it still controls "the looser thinkers of every country" balking the progress of the historical method, but it is a consolation to think that higher minds discredit it.

But why were thinkers led so far astray under the fascination of the notion of natural law? The cause of this in the eighteenth century at least was the lack of the proper study of religion, which would have corrected the misapprehensions of "exclusive attention to legal antiquities." The Greek religion was regarded as purely mythical; oriental religions when noticed at all were reduced to vain cosmogonies; the only body of primitive record worth studying, "the early history of the Jews," was ignored.

Rousseau and the school of Voltaire disdained religious antiquities, especially those of the Hebrew race. "Debarred therefore, from one chief security against speculative delusion, the philosophers of France, in their eagerness to escape from what they deemed a superstition of the priests, flung themselves headlong into a superstition of the lawyers."[49]

Criticism of Sir Henry's Theory

We cannot confine the value of any human ideal to its imperfect beginnings. Sir Henry failed to take note of the principle of evolution in his discussion of the law of nature. It is correct to say that the Ionic philosophers applied their theory of natural law to the physical universe. Subsequent thinkers corrected and amplified their crude thinking. The intellectual and moral aspects of nature appeared in later thought. These profounder considerations deserved more attention. While granting to the infancy of philosophy its proper place, it must not be exclusively emphasized. When the notion of *Nous* dawned upon the Greek mind and nature began to be interpreted as an expression of reason and later as that of a moral order, by what right are these later insights denied them? Sir Henry does not deny them, but he refuses liberty to the Roman jurisconsult to apply the notion of natural law to *jus gentium* because it was a theory of physical nature regarded as an expression of a unitary principle, while the *jus gentium* was merely a selection of common elements from the civil law of Italian communities. How could, he demanded, the *jus gentium* be the expression of such an antique and peculiar theory? The answer is that the Roman jurisconsult was justified in applying the notion of natural law to the *jus gentium* from the viewpoint of later modifications of the principle; he was justified in applying to it the conception of nature as an expression of immanent reason and ethical qualities as worked out by the Stoics.

It might also be added, that it is doubtful that we do full justice to the Ionics by interpreting their notion of natural law on purely physical grounds, as we have already seen. The merest fragments of their intellectual labors have come down to us; but the word they used to denote the physical order is full of suggestiveness. From the viewpoints of mathematics and astronomy, they proceeded to explain the universe as the expression of a single principle. Why did they call the cosmos, nature (*phusis*)? There are at least two possible answers. Either they found a principle present in the cosmos, which they detected in the process of birth (*natura*); or, reversing the process they discovered in the process of birth a principle which had become clear to them in their astronomical and mathematical studies. Be this as it may, it was an identical principle operative in both cases. They identified with the mysterious force responsible for the birth of animals, the mysterious force controlling the planets.

In course of time there was an enlargement of the sphere of the application of this principle, both in the human and non-human ranges of interest. The power present at and controlling the birth of the individual continued to influence his life, socially as well as individually. It became the tie binding men in the social order. The next step in the application of the principle was to identify it with a permanent quality in human nature. Reason was common to all men; this must therefore be the principle of the universe. This was an audacious leap to identify the birth controlling power with the rational force in men. With this fruitful thought, the great thinkers following Anaxagoras urged that this principle must be the force responsible for all processes both physical and rational. This being so, human beings were not only bound into a solidarity, wherein each was related to the whole, but there existed a community of interest between each individual and the general nature which surrounded him. Thus both human and natural forces became the expression of the selfsame principle. Reason produced and controlled the stars,—in fact, all terrestrial and celestial phenomena and all phases of the life of man.

It was but a short step to another inference which thinkers hastened to draw. Reason expressed itself in the regularities and uniformities of the cosmos. There were no deviating paths. Hence the notion of right obtruded itself. The Greek word dikē came from a root dik, meaning to point or direct, and associated with it became a notion identical with the meaning of the Latin word, *rectus,* a straight line, which metaphorically implied acting according to a rule. What was obedient to the rule of reason in human life was right; that which deviated from it was wrong. Of course it took a long time for this notion to take root, but at length it gained the mastery, especially over the best thinkers. In some such simple fashion was evolved the elaborate notion of a law of nature, valid everywhere among men, a law of reason and right. It was inherent even in the thinking of the Ionics. To have conceived a law or rule of nature, in which one principle produces all and controls all according to a regular and set order, was to impose upon outer nature, consciously or unconsciously, a constitutive and regulative principle of the human mind. It revealed an intuitive belief that general nature conformed to a law of mind,—that is to say, to the order and connection of the subjective processes.

There is unquestionably a direct connection between this more developed notion of natural law and that held by the Roman jurisconsults. Sir Henry believes this influence came through Stoicism. But it was not certainly the result of misapprehension on their part, nor was it indirect; it was their intellectual heritage coming directly from Greece. It was the great message of the Greek Stoics to the Roman Stoics and jurists. The Greek Stoics had compelled the thinking world to reflect in their own terms. It is erroneous to say that these trained lawyers regarded the *jus gentium* a mere assemblage of the common elements of the civil laws of various Italian tribes, a law of nature regulative of society in a past golden age of the Roman people in a primitive, innocent state, from which they had departed. What a reflection upon legal, philosophical thinkers under the influence of Stoic philosophy! It would be passing strange if any man of legal training at this time would have erected such an elaborate theory upon so slight a basis of fact or no fact at all. I find nothing in the philosophy of the Stoics to justify the assertion that they confounded the reign of universal reason with the popular notion of a primitive reign of Saturn, when all were innocent and society was simple and idyllic. And it is rather a stretching of the imagination to hold that the Roman jurists, disciples of these Stoics, should be guilty of such a palpable mistake. I am pleased to find two eminent authorities agreeing with me on this point: Sir Frederick Pollock and the Hon. James Bryce.

Sir Frederick Pollock argues that the position of Grotius respecting natural law was continuous with that of the Schoolmen and canonists, and that the mediaeval doctrine was founded on Aristotle and Cicero. It is fair to assume that Grotius could not have emancipated himself from the traditions of reflective thinking to which his own age was heir. Sir Henry seems to neglect the use of the principle of continuity as it affects fundamental thinking. He assumed that the Roman jurists had no right to avail themselves of the progress thinking had made respecting natural law and holds them to the primitive notions of the Ionic philosophers; he criticizes them for introducing elements into the notion other than those of a purely physical nature, because the early doctrine was confined to this sphere; and accuses them of great confusion of thought in identifying the natural law of these philosophers with the *jus gentium*. Once more Sir Henry would have us forget the centuries of development intervening, let us say, between the fall of the Roman empire and the renaissance, a period saturated with Aristotelianism, and go back to the mistaken Roman jurists to discover the source of the grotesque notion of natural law used by Grotius. Such a position is absurd and unjustifiable.

Of course it is very easy to show that many departments of International Law as well as some of the fundamental assumptions contained in the treatise, *De jure belli ac pacis,* are derived from juridical law. To claim that each particular item of International Law as worked out by Grotius and others who have labored in this field is based upon natural law, is a position which cannot be defended. The treatise of Grotius and the endeavors of others may be summed up as a collection of rules and regulations formed either by agreement, custom or delegated power for the direction of the intercourse of sovereign states with each other based upon ethical principles assumed to be discovered in human nature. How far International Law is so based is of course a question for discussion. We have superseded many of the ethical positions of Grotius, and some of his positions would not be ethical in any age. The ethical intention of Grotius is clear.[50] He held that certain humane principles should regulate both war and peace between sovereign powers. He opposed strenuously those who would do away with war entirely, for he believed them to act contrary to the principles of Christianity, such men for example as Erasmus and John Ferus.[51] Over against this position there are many today who, although they regard war to be a present necessity, hold an ideal of its complete abolishment and believe that this is the highest ethical attitude toward it and that as the race advances in its ethical attitudes and conceptions it will spurn it as a poisonous viper. It is as they would contend an irrational and unethical method of settling international disputes tolerated because we have not advanced to a higher rational and ethical plane.

The whole intent of recent International Law has been toward such an ethical standard. The two Hague tribunals, which have exerted more influence upon this body of law than anything which took place previously, have held before the world the desirability of adjusting through methods of arbitration and legal ways all disputes. So far forth it is based upon ethical principles found in human nature. That was the meaning of Grotius, and neither he nor others who have done such magnificent work in expressing this law of nature were laboring under the misapprehension of the identification of the *jus gentium* and the natural law of the Greek philosophers.

Grotius held that international law is based upon natural law; the basis of natural law is man's desire for society, the 'oikeiōsis of the Stoics, the domestic instinct or feeling of kindred. This tendency to conserve society is the primary source of *jus* or natural law; for it cannot be conserved unless we leave to the other what is his, and give him what we owe.[52] Such a law may be ascribed to God.[53]

This position is in line with that of Hobbes and Cumberland, that there is no ethical situation until we get society. Or more accurately, in the case of Grotius, it is correct to say that he founded International Law upon a natural law of the social instinct which presents two sides: a basis in nature, the *jus naturae,* which the Institutes of Justinian defined as that law which nature "has taught to all animals; a law not peculiar to the human race, but shared by all living creatures whether denizens of the air, the dry land or the sea;"[54] and also upon natural law as embodied in the *jus gentium* of the Romans.

Bryce's Understanding of Natural Law

The Hon. James Bryce in *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* has given a profound and, to my way of thinking, an accurate treatment of the law of nature. He calls attention to the law of nature as the permanent over against the adventitious element in human nature. As we have already noted, Aristotle distinguishes between natural, political and conventional justice. "Now the customs and rules wherein tribes or nations agree are evidently the result of dispositions and tendencies which belong to man as man. In other words, they are the expression of what is permanent, essential, and characteristic of man."[55] These customs and rules are therefore natural, normal,[56] "that is, they are due to the Force which has made the human species what it is." Then there are rules and customs which are variable, due to circumstances or environment, chance. These two forces are recognized everywhere, and the conflict between the ethical, permanent and natural law and the adventitious element in all departments of life is realized in many forms. Therein consist many of the tragedies of life. They arise from the assertion of the higher, ethical law within against prevalent accretions of opinion, custom, civil law, theology, philosophy, science, fashion, etc. Sophocles illustrated this conflict in the Antigone. Antigone was an ideal daughter and sister. She remained faithful to her blind father, Oedipus, king of Thebes, to the end. In the quarrel and war which ensued between the two princes, Polynices and Eteocles, for the possession of the throne of Thebes, they were both killed. Creon, the uncle-king, now issued an edict forbidding every one on pain of death to bury the body of Polynices, although he had caused Eteocles to be buried with proper princely honors. Antigone heard with indignation that the body of her brother was denied the rites considered to be essential to the repose of the dead and was left to be preyed upon by dogs and vultures. She defied her uncle-king, took the body of her brother, and gave it proper burial,—in obedience to an unwritten law in her soul.

St. Paul, in agreement with Sophocles and Roman jurists, felt that the natural law within was superior in its sanction to all external codes, even the Mosaic code itself. "For when gentiles, which have no law, do by nature the things of the law, these, having no law, are a law unto themselves. In that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness therewith and their thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them."[57]

Conclusion Concerning Religion as the Essential and Contributory Participation in Humanity

The conclusion we draw from these considerations is that religion is not only our realization of union with God but also of our unity with man; the latter is a part of the former. As we separate God from man for purposes of analysis, for similar reasons we may separate religion from ethics, but in reality they are one. Both the religious and ethical attitudes arise from the experience of God within the soul. This realized presence gives meaning to all worship, all expressions of religion both individually and socially; and involved in this experience is also the dynamic that gives meaning to all expressions of the ethical life; for in the holy of holies of the human soul are the sources of all the reverences toward the presence there and all impulses to live on the basis of goodwill and justice with our fellowmen. All reform in religion is based on this fact. When ritual becomes unreal, when intellectual statements fail to correspond with inner reality, great reformers step into the foreground. At such times men retire into their own souls and find an ample and never-failing source of a richer and truer expression of those intimacies existing between the human and the divine. A study of the history of religion reveals the fact that the great religious movements of the world are results of peculiar crises in their initial impulses, in which there is a reconsideration of the experiences and principles of a particular religion or religions in the light of the corrective contributions of great individual, religious souls. These experiences become watersheds in religious history. And when the streams taking their source from them become once more turbid with dead formalisms in worship and belief, some other great soul or souls come forward and again turn the course of the stream in a new direction by giving free course and directing into new channels the ever-living fountain of pure religion in the human heart.

A similar method is followed with respect to the ethical life of the race. The Roman jurists applied natural law, which they discovered through the aid of the reflections of Greek philosophy within man's soul. This influence continues to this very day in legislation and in the interpretation and application of law. The same principle obtains in the effort to secure governmental, social and economic equality and justice among men. All movements for the establishment of ethical relations are essentially religious arising from the presence in man of an ethical spirit which is expressed in his own attitudes, of a force, a righteous force of which he and all men as well as nature in general are parts and in which they are participants.

The Realization that We Are Essential and Contributory Participants in Nature

The presence of a power present in nature has unquestionably been the inspiration of all scientific workers, even when they have been unconscious of this source. The mystery of nature fascinates; its orderly, rational procedure satisfies the intellect of the inquirer, and occasional glimpses of her profounder meanings repay all his toil and anxieties.

All religion finds its birth in nature worship of some form. The heavenly bodies led early man to worship them because he felt that they expressed his ampler, inner life. He made the woods his temples because growing nature was a visible expression of the mysterious power within his own soul. In one form or another he bowed before the undefinable power so far as he was concerned whose presence he felt in the pull of the tide, the flow of the river, the swing of a planet, the witchery of forests and groves, the performances of lower animals, and the various phenomena of floods, lightning, thunder, volcanic eruptions and earthquakes.

We are chiefly concerned at present with the aesthetic appreciation of nature. We have already seen that both the religious and ethical appreciations are parts of the same unitary experience, one in their psychological source, one in the fact that they are reactions to a larger whole of which each individual possessing these experiences is a part and in which he participates. It remains for us to point out that the aesthetic experience is a part of the same process.

The Unity of Ethics and Aesthetics—System of Shaftesbury

The fully conscious movement to demonstrate the unity of ethics and aesthetics was started by Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, and followed up by his disciple, Francis Hutcheson. Plato had seen the promise of this from afar. Shaftesbury believed in the unity of the ideals of the true, the beautiful and the good. From the ethical viewpoint, he gives us a system of aesthetical ethics. A large number of his critics fail to do him justice. Even Hutcheson is among the number. If the good like the beautiful, these critics contend, is just a matter of taste, then woe betide our ethics; but Shaftesbury does not make aesthetics a matter of mere taste. If we interpret him correctly, the truth has a reality beyond the psychological experience of it; the good and the beautiful have a similar reference. None of them is merely a matter of taste. The good, the beautiful and the true are actualities in the selfconscious being who is the immanent life of the whole universe. They have thus an objective existence. Different psychological attitudes—different, that is to say, for purposes of analysis—are assumed toward them. In the appreciation of truth, the intellect plays a predominant part; in the reaction to the beautiful and sublime, emotion takes the leading string; whereas in all affairs of the life of conduct volition is chiefly emphasized. But all these reactions are processes of the same mind, involving all its functions. It is therefore evident that there is an underlying psychological unity of these ideals in the mind whose processes they are. They are similarly united in the universal and immanent being of the world, the being in whom we live, are moved and have our being. This gives them both subjective and objective unity. This interpretation will do justice, we think, to the theory of Shaftesbury.

The particular task before this author was to find a psychological basis for his aesthetical ethics. What particular reaction do we find to the ideals of the beautiful and good? He found this in the experience of proportionable affection. Conscience is proportionable affection toward the ideal of the true: and the aesthetical sense is a proportionable affection toward the ideal of beauty. Thus the differentiation in experience comes from the fact that the same psychological experience of proportionable affection is directed toward different ideals not because the experiences are diverse and distinct. These ideals therefore form an inseparable group. "Worship the Lord in the beauty of holiness" is the injunction both of the good and the beautiful. A human character may be beautiful or even sublime. Self-sacrifice even at times may wear the garb of beauty.

While therefore announcing that "All beauty is truth" and that "Beauty and good are one and the same," Shaftesbury may well contend that good conduct is good taste in morals. But this is the subjective and superficial aspect of his theory. The metaphysical implication takes us deeper. The kernel of his theory is metaphysical. It is evident to him "that in the very nature of things there must of necessity be the foundation of a right and wrong taste, relish of choice, as well in respect of inward characters and features as of outward persons, behavior and action."[58]

This position in ethics may be characterized as a system of altruism—utilitarian altruism. There is in every creature a private interest or good which nature compels him to seek. There is also an end to which everything in his constitution must refer. What does not conduce to this end is ill; what does, is good. He alone is virtuous who through intelligent reflection keeps the public good in mind. Worth and virtue depend upon a knowledge of right and wrong and the use of reason.

Contrary to the egoistic system of Hobbes, that which is social in us is supreme. Herein also lies our happiness. The supreme, resident principle of nature has designed that private interest shall be advanced and happiness procured by working for the general good. Good to society is always good to the individual. On the other hand, if one ceases to promote the good of society, he ceases to promote his own happiness and welfare.

The Ethical System of Francis Hutcheson

Hutcheson gives additional emphasis to the principle of disinterestedness made prominent by Shaftesbury. It is the common element in both morals and aesthetics. There is a sense of beauty in all men. It is called into action whenever we are impressed with the feeling of harmony in connection with objects presented to the mind. Then the sense is universal and natural. It belongs to the very constitution of the mind. Uniformity and regularity are presented to us everywhere. Our power to detect them may very properly be called a sense of beauty. This power does not depend upon habit or education. A butterfly's wing or a sunset is beautiful to a human being just because he is a human being. It is a part of his equipment; nature has endowed him with the power of enjoying the beautiful, be the man ignorant or learned. Neither does a consideration of the advantage to be gained from such an enjoyment enter into the account. The sunset is enjoyed without expectation of making money from it. The enjoyment arises spontaneously. The advantage to be gained is contained in the actual satisfaction it gives to the soul. Likewise we love those actions in the realm of ethics which are performed for the good of others. It is contrary to human nature to ask, "What's Hecuba to us or we to Hecuba?" Hecuba is much to us just because she was a human being and because we find within ourselves principles of right and wrong and human sympathy. Spontaneously we ally ourselves with Hecuba's cause without further consideration.

The sense of morality is as universal as the sense of beauty. What is meant by moral goodness? It is disinterestedness. The moral sense implanted in human nature is just as natural as the aesthetical sense. God "has made virtue a lovely form," and we have within us "that determination to be pleased with the contemplation of those affections, actions or characters of rational agents, which we call virtuous."

Hutcheson unites the beautiful and moral as Shaftesbury did. This is merely the determination of the mind to be pleased with harmony in things. This determination to see harmony in actions, characters and affections, is called the moral sense. It is the same determination of the mind that is exercised in aesthetics; the difference being in the objects to which it is directed. The beautiful and the moral are eternally wedded, and no man can put them asunder.

Metaphysical Aspect of the Unity of Ethics and Aesthetics

That we are essential parts of nature follows from the fact that we are essential parts of God. We and nature are in God,—that is to say, nature and a human being are expressions of the life of God. That is the great fundamental principle of unity which underlies all disparities. Just as we are biological and physical parts of nature, we are also essential parts of her spiritual life. That is the foundation of the joy and satisfaction we find in our experience with nature. What creates within us a sense of "proportionable affection" is not so much the harmonies existing among the divers phenomena of nature as they impress us, as it is a sense of harmony existing between the life expressed in nature and our own life. The sublime sunset fascinates us not as an external fact whose chief reference is to the objective fact but as an internal fact whose chief reference is to the experiences of the inner life. It expresses our life as parts of the infinite life; or it expresses the spirit of beauty in us and the spirit of beauty in nature.

There is also something compelling about the beauty of art and nature. All our moral judgments are brought into play in appreciations of beauty. A work of art ought to express beauty, and nature is held to a similar demand. Our judgment upon animal deformities, or botanical imperfections, or vast expanses of ugliness in nature is that they should conform to those principles of beauty of which we deem nature capable.

Poetic Appreciations of Nature

This great truth of our unity with nature finds ample expression through the emotions of the poets.

Byron:

> "Are not the mountains, waves, and skies a part
> Of me and of my soul as I of them?"

Bryant:

> "Thou art in the soft winds
> That run along the summit of these trees
> In music; thou art in the cooler breath
> That from the inmost darkness of the place
> Comes scarcely felt; the barky trunks, the ground,

The fresh moist ground, are all instinct with thee."

Wordsworth:

[There is a power] "Whose dwelling is the light of
setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things."

Schelling:

"I am the God who nature's bosom fills,
I am the life that in her heart's blood thrills."

Browning:

"He [God] dwells in all
From life's minute beginnings, up at last
To man—the consummation of this scheme
Of being, the completion of this sphere
Of life."

Shelley:

" 'The interminable wilderness of worlds' [Paracelsus] is the fitting temple of the Ultimate. The lightest leaf, the meanest worm are instinct with it. 'The pure diffusion' of its essence throbs 'Alike in every human heart.' "

BOOK II

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWING REALITY

CHAPTER ONE

KNOWLEDGE AS THE REALIZATION OF UNITY AND HARMONY

General Aspects of Knowledge—The Element of Certainty

KNOWLEDGE IS AN ultimate fact and, like all ultimates, is inexplicable. We can describe only the conditions under which it takes place. In describing its most universal characteristic, we may say that knowledge is that state of the soul in which there is a realization of unity and harmony, as we contemplate any segment in the general inflow of our psychical life.

In the very nature of knowledge, it is always a partial process, always a stage in the journey. Thus it is always a probability when measured by absolute standards, always a certainty when considered in the light of the mind's reliance upon it. But all its certainties issue from its totality and not from any of its partial processes. The intellective aspect of knowledge as a general rule is too exclusively emphasized because the intellect is able to place its goods in the shop window of the mind; goods of the volitional and emotional sort are generally too illusive and sacred for public exhibition. Every fact of knowledge is a complicated process, the resultant of all streams of consciousness, commanding ultimately the willingness of the mind to rely upon this consensus in deducing present results or in anticipating future ventures. This element of reliance is the unique fact of knowledge. It is the resultant of a series of mental forces which come under the emotional, volitional as well as intellective classification; it is also the resultant of vague, intuitive and instinctive processes as well as the more developed and solidified ones. But we always know in part and shall never know perfectly, simply because we are finite beings. Knowledge is always the selection of a particular phase of a process, a section of the stream of consciousness or, to take a more comprehensive view, if we regard reality as the wealth of all the ongoings of the universe, it is a selection of a small section of it which we deal with for but a moment under the microscopic gaze of the mind. So that a mind in process is dealing with its process in relation to a still larger process of which it is a part and all the processes are hurrying on to a far-off goal while this is taking place. Knowledge therefore in dealing with a particular phase, a partial manifestation of reality, always has a practical end in view. It is therefore absurd to talk of demonstrable knowledge; this is only possible in the abstract processes of mathematics, by which reality is stripped of all its wealth of life, and the merest shreds of beggarly elements left.

Knowledge and reality are always inseparably locked together. The realization of certainty which Descartes embodied in the dictum, *cogito ergo sum,* was not so much noetical as he thought, as it was metaphysical. It was the realization of existence that became compelling to him. Existence is a unique fact. To enunciate a principle deduced from this experience, which should be a universal principle of knowledge, is not justifiable. Descartes' realization was confined to one fact of self-existence, taking note as we consider it that self-existence is a partial process in the infinite whole of existence. The knowledge of self or better, the realization of self, comes nearer to absolute knowledge than any other experience which a human being is privileged to obtain. It lies deeper than knowledge, deeper than all processes of which the soul is capable. This will become clearer as this discussion proceeds. The fact here to be enunciated is that self-realization is unique and when we apply this experience to objects other than the self we do it by apology and have to guard ourselves against the error of abstraction. It is applied to other things merely by way of a secondary inference because of some resemblance they possess of the self. Descartes commits the error of applying the principle with equal force to things and selves.[59] He urges us to go forth with this principle: *"Que les choses que nous concevons fort clairement et fort distinctement sont toutes vraies,"* for the noetical conquest of the world. Our contention is that Descartes from the viewpoint of his philosophy of sharp and uncompromising dualism had no right whatsoever to make general use of this principle. By what right does he apply it to God, who was *ab extra* to his experience? And he certainly had no right whatever to apply it to the extramental world. To deduce the appearance of the heavens, the earth, the planets, comets, the sun and other fixed stars, the nature of light, the substance, situation and motion of heavenly bodies, etc., from the infinite perfection of God is doubtless a process clearly and distinctly conceived by Descartes, but it is certainly very far removed from the principle of self-realization. He took the logical schematism of his principle as a criterion instead of its inner, psychological content. The fact of knowledge arises from the realization of ourselves as a part of a larger process, that gives us a feeling of certainty regarding our own existence; and when we realize that things outside ourselves fit into this general scheme we likewise acquire a feeling of certainty concerning their existence. Their existence is locked up with ours, but this attitude concerning them is the result of a logical process rather than an immediate intuition such as we have of the self. The certainty of the existence of things appeals to us with varying degrees of probability as they are removed farther and farther away from self-realization. Any fact does not become a fact to us until we take its larger relations into the account. We cannot say we know a fact until we have so related it.

Faith Theories

This leads us to consider the principles of faith or belief. That knowledge is something realized between a partial and larger process of which it is a part appears from many considerations. A thinker is readily beset with one of two errors; either to mistake a partial, noetic process for the whole or to take a partial, noetic interpretation as exhaustive of the total meaning and content of reality. Theories concerning the element of faith or belief illustrate the former defect. With David Hume, belief consists in the *vivacity or force and liveliness of the perception.* This alone distinguishes the object of perception from the imaginative object; and it always accompanies both perception and memory.[60] On this assumption, the further away from sense perception we go, the paler grows the impression and the weaker grows belief. Over against this theory of Hume confining belief to sense perception, Spinoza restricts it to reason.[61] According to him, it differs from opinion, which is mere guessing.

These two theories will serve to place before us the question of belief and to suggest that it may be a more comprehensive process of the mind than these theories indicate. Both Hume and Spinoza are correct in their contention of the participation of the element of belief; in perception, according to Hume and in the process of reasoning, according to Spinoza. But each seems to exclude the element of belief from the province demarcated by the other. Belief is thus an element accompanying certain limited processes of mind. It is also to be noted that Hume is dealing with the cause of belief,—that is to say, the liveliness and vivacity of the percept, rather than with belief itself. Both Hume and Spinoza fail to detect the processes of volition and emotion which enter into belief, without which indeed belief could not be belief. They fail to recognize belief as a partial process involved in all mind processes. Belief is concerned with the simplest as well as the most elaborate functions of consciousness. Without the element of belief, it is safe to say we could not have consciousness at all. Without it, Descartes would have been helpless to accept the fact of his own existence; without it, the simplest percept would be a vagary.

The intuitive aspect of belief is also absent from Spinoza's view; he makes a state of mind consequent upon the logical deductions of the mind. Fries contends, and in our opinion with more accuracy, that belief is a fundamental judgment which does not admit of proof. According to this interpretation, our affirmations are possible only in virtue of our knowledge finding its unity in the ultimate of belief. The unitary totality of our immediate knowledge is thus transcendental apperception. Our knowledge is of phenomena; our belief is fixed on the true nature of things. Without committing ourselves to this Kantian transcendentalism, the element of immediacy here pointed out is a true psychological analysis of belief or at least a phase of it. Spinoza has omitted many phases of the believing act. Emotion, volition, ranging from primary impulses to mature choices and decisions, are entirely overlooked. The historical aspect to which Fechner calls out attention,—that is, the fact that we believe what has been believed before our time and many other phases which are not the result of the ratiocinative processes have also been overlooked.

Belief also partakes of what Spinoza describes as *true belief* or *clear cognition*, although he distinguishes this from ordinary belief. All the functions ascribed to *clear cognition* by Spinoza need not be accepted; but its leading trait—that is to say, that we are enabled through *clear cognition* to have a feeling and enjoyment of the thing itself —is very characteristic of what we should call belief.

Truth and Belief

It will give us a better opportunity to set forth our view of belief if we contrast it with what we consider to be truth. Truth and belief are aspects of the same process. The kernel of these processes is a dynamic realization of unity and harmony with the ramifications of our personality. A realization of this unity and harmony is what we call truth; a reliance upon the fact of unity and harmony at once involves a sense of truth. The constructors of the first Quebec bridge had absolute faith in their mathematical computations of the strength of material necessary for the greatest bridge span ever constructed by man. All the mathematical relations were true,—that is, true to the extent that the material when constructed according to their plans would meet all the demands made of the bridge. They believed the calculations to be true. But the bridge collapsed. After-reflection indicated that the engineers were wrong; they had miscalculated. This, however, introduces another set of considerations. Before the attempt was made to construct the bridge, the engineers believed their plans represented engineering truth; their belief was coincident with their recognition of the unity and harmony of all the relations consequent upon the erection of the bridge.

Then the new bridge was erected. It remains in its place today, performing the work put upon it. Now in both cases the engineers had a similar sense of truth and belief. The subjective, psychological attitude was the same. The difference arose when the noetical fact was converted into a metaphysical fact. Evidently the first engineers did not grasp the true relations of the bridge,—that is, the arrangement and strength of the material was not equal to support the dead weight of the bridge, and so it collapsed. But the lesson to which I wish to draw attention is that the sense of truth and belief in the minds of both sets of engineers was an identical process.

If we were to analyze completely not only the ingredients which enter into the composition of belief but also the inducements to this state of mind, we should have to take cognizance of affectional, cognitive and volitional elements, the contribution of heredity as well as the influence of environment upon the believer. All this is suggested when we mentioned the ramifications of our personality; and these reach out not only to the particulars herein enumerated but also to the very warp and woof of this universe, to our capital relationships to the world ground itself.

The result of our discussion so far is that the state known as knowledge arises when the mind comes to the point of relying through belief upon the fact that a partial process is in unity and harmony with and involved in a larger process of which it is a dynamic part. Our relationships are always dynamic; they are more than mere logical processes.

The Categories and Laws of Thought

In the processes of knowledge the mind follows definite rules or laws, which are to a measure statable. A study of these laws indicates that they illustrate the general principle that the mind in its procedure realizes a sense of unity and harmony within its individual range and also when we consider it in relation to its larger implications. The habitual ways in which this unity and harmony are realized are what we call laws of the mind. If we follow the psychological history of a single thought, this will at once appear. Stimulations of the end organs of sense are carried along the neural tracks to the cortex of the brain. In the act of perception there is a selection made from the reports of some of the eight or nine senses, which in turn is amalgamated into the percept. But reports thus taken from the senses are united with the wealth of experience already in the possession of the mind. Treatises on psychology describe the marvel and complexity of the material thus selected and amalgamated in the interesting process of perception. It is not to our purpose to follow the complete story of this marvelous feat, more interesting than all the stories of the *Arabian Nights' Entertainment*. Perception, it will be seen, unifies and harmonizes the material of sensation. This process is followed in the higher amalgamations of thought. Opening the stock room of perception, the mind analyzes or synthesizes the percepts, thus unifying and harmonizing what it needs for the process of thought. These unities and harmonies apparent in thinking have always attracted the attention of psychologists and philosophers especially since the days of Aristotle.

Under the name category, an effort has been made to enumerate the number of these fundamental ways in which the mind unifies and harmonizes its successive experiences and relates them to its environment. The result shows a diversity of enumeration. Aristotle had ten categories; Kant twelve, and modern thinkers vary in their demand from one to fifteen. This illustrates what a subjective process the deduction of the categories is; the supreme principle upon which the mind acts is that of dynamic unity and harmony. The categories, however numerous, are only specific instances of this capital category. Certain objection may be made to this. For example, if we consider two of the quantitative categories of Kant, those of unity and plurality: Is not plurality something which violates the category of unity or at least something which destroys the notion of unity and calls attention to its dissevered parts? No, we reply. Plurality is merely a group of smaller unities subsummed under a larger unity. Plurality points to unity both ways; unity of origin, for we could not think of plurality except in connection with a unity with which it is connected; and a prophetic unity or indeed an actual unity, for the moment we direct attention to the parts of larger unity they in themselves are also unities. Dynamic unity and harmony are only thrown into more complicated processes.

The same set of considerations applies to our notion of the laws of thought; they are all deducible from the principle of unity and harmony. The law of identity finds expression in the proposition, whatever is, is. All propositions claiming the name of law are very abstract of necessity. They are at a par with mathematical constructions. We hasten to say of course that the principle of identity when considered in the fulness of its concrete reality has an absolute validity. No thinking is possible without it;

science and philosophy could not be of any possible value without it. What we wish to emphasize is that it merely embodies the assertion of the unity and harmony of psychical realizations. As such it strikes down to the very roots of the universe. The abstractness of the principle as stated above will appear from the fact that it is a static, intellectual statement applied to living, vibrating experience. Heraclitus was right; all things change, including the mind observing the change. But we cannot put that phase of the principle into a formula any more than the painter can transmit, except by a far-off suggestion, the vibrations of light and color to his canvas. The living experience involved in the principle of identity cannot enter the logical notion which endeavors to embody it. The intellectual statement of the law, therefore, confines itself to the most general aspects. The most abstract feature of a definite psychological experience is selected and stated in a law to suggest the unity and harmony of the actual experience. A man of eighty years may visit his birthplace and the center of his life until he reached maturity. He may upon this visit recognize the apple tree which he climbed many a time, and numberless stray incidents of his early life come streaming back upon him. He recalls that at the age of twenty he fell from the roof of the house, and that the lameness to which he has been subject ever since was contracted by this fall. Though that event goes back sixty years, it was peculiarly his experience; the numerous changes in mind and body through which he has passed are not able to obliterate this feeling. The ravages of time are unable to take away from him the sense of identity he possesses. He is the same person, he feels. Now when the endeavor is made to include this realization and all its ramifications and meaning under one law of identity, it is at once apparent that only one abstract feature can be emphasized, a feature which gives meaning to the experience in its entirety,—that is to say, the conviction that the past experiences of any individual, let us say the man of eighty, were uniquely the possession of the man who at that time was twenty years old and who now is eighty years old. The latter is able to bridge the gap through a sense of unity and harmony in his successive experiences and the relation they sustain to a larger environment. Individual experience is totally inadequate to bring about this consciousness in any human being of a past as his past linked to a present which is his present. The sense of personal identity defies change. Considering only individual experience, the man of eighty would be swept forward through the years with no impression whatever left of his experiences. The events of sixty years since entered the cosmic swirl, and he himself entered it at the same time. But the universe never forgets, and because of this and of the fact that he is an essential part of the whole he is able, through the dimness of the years, to recall the events of the past with an intimacy which is altogether unique. By this assertion the issue is not complicated; there is no violation of the law of parsimony. It makes clear what to a physiological or psychological theory is impossible—the possibility of personal identity. Psychology merely assumes it. The only explanation of it is to assume that the individual is a part of a larger self, his psychical processes are involved in processes which include them; without such a provision, the simplest feat of memory is left without a vestige of scientific explanation.

That is the only way ultimately the laws of thought may be explained. These laws are: (1) The law of identity indicated by the statement that whatever is, is. (2) The law of contradiction, which enables us to assert that nothing can both be and not be. (3) The law of excluded middle, which empowers us to believe that everything must either be or not be. These are very abstract statements endeavoring to embody certain fundamental attitudes of the mind toward some of its experiences. When we analyze the full meaning of these laws of thought, we shall see that they assert a unity and harmony of individual experience and a unity and harmony in the relation of this to its larger implications.

Our conclusion respecting the general aspect of the problem of knowledge is now apparent. Knowledge is impossible except as a partial process in a larger process which includes it. Its unity and harmony in an infinite process forms the basis of our confidence in it. But knowledge is always of a part, for the moment we consider it more extensively its further relations dawn upon us and these are never exhausted. It never can be absolute for the simple reason that we can never transcend our finitude to gain a viewpoint afforded by the whole. But the certainty afforded by our knowledge is sufficient for our needs if we persist in it; and the more it is in unity and harmony with the processes of life which include ours, the greater is the certainty it brings us.

CHAPTER TWO

KANT'S SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

KANT DESERVES GREAT CREDIT for recognizing the unity of existence. In human life he saw that reason had a practical as well as a theoretical application. He was conscious from the first, as he wrote his critical system, of the necessity of the ethical life and the light to be derived from it in the solution of theoretical problems which otherwise would remain insoluble. Practical reason actually emerging into both the subjective experiences and issuing in deeds of conduct gave a clue according to his notion to a solution of the difficult contradictions of our intellectual life. But while Kant recognized the unity of all existence, he was unable to carry this thought through his critical philosophy; that accounts for the serious contradictions into which he fell. Nevertheless, he made a great contribution to a theory of knowledge which may be stated in this brief way: principles of theoretical reason involved in our thinking about God, human freedom and immortality will be seen to be valid when we consider the principles of practical reason imbedded in our nature, especially as they embody themselves in our subjective, psychological experiences and emerge into the life of conduct. In order to give a just appreciation of Kant's doctrine, we shall follow his argument in brief, especially through the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*; then we shall be in a position to consider it in the light of the theory we are advancing.

General Statement of Kant's Problem

The difficulties of reason arise from its habit of raising questions it cannot answer because they transcend its powers, but the questions are inevitable.[62] It is well, therefore, to investigate that whole field of that knowledge which reason may strive for, independent of all experience; thus only may contradictions be avoided. The limits of knowledge must be clearly demarcated; the sign *Verboten* here erected is an estimate of the troubles into which we fall by a failure to observe this sign.

The Aesthetic and Analytic

Kant's investigation shows that *à priori* notions are applicable only to the stuff of sensation in the last analysis. In the Aesthetic he deals with the transcendental or *à priori* aspects of sense perception. Here the intuitive form is imposed by the mind upon the given of sense. My world of external objects no less than my inner world of objects is the pure weaving of my mind.[63] I create it; but I create it out of something which I do not create. That something, the unknown, the *Ding an sich,* call it what you will, is utterly beyond our intuitive reason.

The Analytic through the whole range of the categories of thought is a persistent hunt for the unknown X, but all in vain. The sole employment of these categories is with reference to possible experience only.[64] Conceptual knowledge is purely a reaction to the reports of the senses under the forms of space and time.

Theory of Knowledge in the Dialectic

"All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds thence to the understanding, and ends with the reason."[65] Reason under the influence of sensibility is led into the illusion of thinking it can solve the problem of the unknown X. Reason vainly ascends to the ultimate. It merely gets entangled in a *Logik des Scheins.* Reason searches for an *Ich an Sich,* a *Welt an Sich,* and a *Gott an Sich.*

This is the supreme reach of reason—to search for the unity of all objects of thought in general.

Rational theology deals with *Gott an Sich.* Let us endeavor to define an ideal of reason. We have seen that the pure concept of the understanding is far removed from objective reality, but nevertheless can be applied to phenomena *in concreto.* The ideal of reason is still further removed from reality. In the idea reason unifies the concepts of the understanding. In the ideal we have an idea not only *in concreto* but also *in individuo.* That is to say, we have an individual thing determinable or even determined by the idea alone.[66]

"What to us is an ideal, was in Plato's language an idea of a divine mind, an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal copies."[67]

Reason possesses ideals not in the creative but in the practical sense; these ideals form the basis of the possible perfection of certain acts. An ideal then serves as archetype or permanent determination of the copy.[68]

By what attributes can we determine the concept of God or the transcendent ideal? A concept may be considered either from the viewpoint of form or of content. In considering form, only one of two opposite predicates may be true, according to the principle of contradiction; while as to content, only one predicate of all possible predicates can be true according to the principle of complete determination.[69] But the notion of all possible predicates is a transcendent idea and can never be realized *in concreto*.[70] When all possible predicates are eliminated, we have a transcendent negation.[71] A negation as to content therefore is based upon affirmation.

If reason therefore postulates a transcendent substratum for all determinations, then we possess an idea of the sum total of reality. All negations of this *omnitudo realitas* would be mere limitations which have no significance unless in the first place we posit a *substratum*.[72] Such an ideal is God. The complete determination of everything depends upon the limitation of this total reality.[73] It is a prototype of all things; all things are ectypes of it.[74] All this reasoning leaves us in total ignorance as to the existence of a being of such superlative excellence;[75] it is merely an ideal of our mind. As such, it must be free of contradictions; we must on no account make it a sum total of which individual things are but parts. We must regard it rather as the cause of individual things.[76]

Let us now notice how illusion enters in connection with this ideal. Reason uses it as a concept of the whole of reality for the determination of things by demanding that this reality should constitute itself a thing.[77] But it is a mere ideal of the mind; we have no right to make this reality a thing.[78] Why does reason commit this error? By simply imitating the procedure of the understanding, which completely determines phenomena or forms the basis of their possibility. But the ideal of reason has nothing in common with phenomena and cannot be applied to them.[79]

The Arguments of Rational Theology to Establish the Existence of the Supreme Reality

The ontological argument is not valid. This argument proceeds entirely *à priori* from the mere concept of the existence of a supreme being. There is here, of course, a confusion of the logical and real object. We simply predicate existence of a hypostasized ideal and thus commit the mistake of the capitalist who thinks he is fulfilling his ideal of becoming rich by adding a few ciphers to his capital account.[80]

The cosmological proof fares no better. In this, changes are traced to causes until the first cause is reached. In the ontological argument an effort is made to prove the existence in reality of a being from the presence of the ideal in our mind; but here we proceed from the *contingentia mundi* to the absolutely necessary being upon whom the contingencies must depend.[81] The proof, however, is the ontological argument in disguise. Or at least it is a compound of the ontological argument and the experiential; the former is impossible, and the latter superfluous.[82] The argument proceeds thus: I at least exist; therefore there does exist an absolutely necessary being.

The physico-theological or design argument is a little more plausible. But even this disappoints us. The step leading to absolute totality is impossible on the empirical road.[83] This argument takes refuge in the cosmological proof and this, in turn, as we have remarked, takes umbrage in the impossible ontological proof.[84]

Reason then from the speculative viewpoint can give no proof of the being of God.[85] On a future occasion, however, Kant will show that ethics not only presupposes the existence of a supreme being but postulates it by right from the practical viewpoint.[86] But speculation serves a negative purpose at least; it corrects our knowledge of the supreme and clears it from every taint of empiricism.[87] It gives us an ideal without a flaw, and that is the crowning point of human knowledge.[88]

Conclusion of the Dialectic as to a Theory of Knowledge

Rational psychology, cosmology and theology promised to lead us beyond the limits of experience; they failed to keep their promises and only led us into a maze of illusions, and we have seen why. These sciences merely converted the regulative ideas of reason into constitutive principles of transcendental knowledge. They thus endeavored to persuade us that synthetic propositions *à priori* were possible in their application to the supersensuous, which is absurd. Intuitions, concepts and ideas confine us eternally to the experiential; beyond this, we cannot advance on the speculative side.[89]

Theory of Knowledge in the Method of Transcendentalism

Reason then must be disciplined, so that it may not overstep the limits of experience, but what method shall we use to this end? Shall it be the method of dogmatism? It is well here to distinguish between *mathemata* and *dogmata*. Mathematical knowledge is obtained by the construction of concepts and philosophical knowledge from synthetical propositions; the former is intuitive, the latter reflective;—the former dealing with abstractions obtains certainty, but this is denied the latter. We are able to write Q.E.D. only where space and time are concerned. Is dogmatism therefore the proper method for philosophy? No. In the whole of pure reason there is not a single direct synthetical judgment based on concepts. The categories of the understanding were derived indirectly through the critical method. They had to be applied to possible experience.[90] We must reject therefore the *cum more geometrico* and the exclusive *à priori* methods in philosophy.

Shall we then use the polemical method? Shall we defend the propositions of pure reason against dogmatical negations?[91] This is foolish. The defense of the notions of God, freedom and immortality against those who deny them is useless; for both asserter and denier fight their own shadows.[92] These conceptions are pure ideas; they cannot be presented either in actual or possible experience. The battle will consequently always be drawn from the speculative viewpoint, but we need have no concern from the practical viewpoint.[93]

There is no room for the polemical method in the sphere of pure reason.[94]

Even skepticism does not satisfy the demand.

Hypotheses must also be avoided in this department. These rest upon the possibility of the hypothesized objects, therefore they depend upon conditions of possible experience; but reason has no right to assume the purely intelligible qualities of phenomena.[95]

Philosophical proofs must be confined to the understanding. If reason desires to apply its concepts to objects, it must prove the objective validity and the possibility of the *à priori* synthesis of these concepts.[96] But in the exercise of reason in the realm of ideas this is not possible.

The highest speculative reason is concerned with three problems—God, freedom, and immortality. But the speculative interest in these is very small; yet, since the moral laws are given by reason entirely *à priori*, it is probable that a canon of their use may be valid in this department.[97]

The entire interest of reason is contained in the three queries: what can I know, what should I do, what may I hope? We cannot know the supersensible; speculative reason can be used as corrective only; we must seek for its positive content in the practical sphere of life. Something is because something ought to take place; and this "is" in turn becomes the basis of my hopes.[98] The "ought" introduces us to moral laws, and these demand a moral kingdom, and this in turn demands the existence of God. Further, the ought within us demands a *summum bonum* which we can never obtain in this life. That involves the notion of immortality. The *Critique of Pure Reason* answers what we may know. The moral laws direct what we shall do. But what shall we hope? All that a faith resting upon moral laws justifies. That is why Kant removed knowledge to make room for faith. Faith is a necessary practical knowledge, the objective conditions of which are insufficient.[99] It is by means of faith that we may gain what speculation has sought in vain.

Theory of Knowledge in the Critique of Practical Reason

Little need be added here, for Kant has outlined his position already. The *Critique of Pure Reason* dealt with the contributions of the mind, which are independent of all experience from the speculative viewpoint; the *Critique of Practical Reason* will indicate what these contributions are from the practical viewpoint. He will therefore deal with ideals and principles of conduct which have not been derived from experience.

In the practical reason there is an unconditional law not derived from experience and yet which forces itself upon us in a practical way, controlling our will and conduct. This is the categorical imperative: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." This pure law of reason constrains us, and makes it an obligation to obey it.

But this is also consistent with freedom. Freedom is a transcendent notion. The pure will is not subject to causality at all. If it were, it would not be pure; it would be determined according to the law of causality. The subjective will of the individual is so determined, but the pure will never. The categorical imperative may be looked upon therefore as the self-legislation of the pure will. It is a law of moral and not physical necessity. It legislates irrespective of happiness or self-love. Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* had made causality one of the categories of the mind, which gives meaning to the phenomena of experience. Freedom had to be assumed as an antinomy to causality. It is otherwise in the practical, pure reason. The moral law is here giving its mandates and thus demonstrating the possibility of freedom to carry out its mandates; for otherwise we would not be blameworthy for disobedience. Freedom then may be regarded as the causality of free agents. It is thus a moral necessity. So is immortality. The moral law urges us unconditionally toward perfection as our greatest good. That is to say, the realization of the *summum bonum* is a necessary object of the will determined by the moral law. This involves the possibility of fulfillment and therefore demands an endless life and progress. God by the like token becomes a moral necessity. He must exist as the condition of the possibility of the *summum bonum*. For there must be an adequate cause to this urge for perfection.

Criticism of Kant's Theory of Knowledge
(a) Violation of Unity and Harmony of Individual Consciousness

With proper acknowledgment for the monumental piece of work done by Kant (for all philosophy since his day is indebted to him), there are very grave defects in his system.

First, he fails to observe the unity and harmony of individual consciousness.

The general elements of consciousness and their unification by it are not properly recognized when one of them is selected for discussion. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* we are asked to consider both the subjective and transcendental phases of intellection; in the *Critique of Practical Reason* the subjective and transcendental phases of volition are developed; and in the *Critique of Judgment* he emphasizes both the subjective and transcendental phases of emotion. In each *Critique* Kant proceeds to discuss the particular psychological element to his purpose as if the others had no effect upon the element under discussion. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* the emotional and volitional elements are ignored; they do not seem to him to be essential to knowledge. The intellectual processes of sensibility, understanding and reason are self-sufficient. But the intuitions of space and time, the categories of the understanding and the ideas of reason would be valueless to a purely intellectual consciousness. It is outside the present discussion to show that there could be no purely intellectual consciousness; our contention is that whenever the process of consciousness is exercised it involves volitional and emotional factors and is meaningless without them.

All intellective processes, to say nothing of the other elements of consciousness, are involved in the act of perception. The intuitional activity of the mind cannot be confined to sensibility; even Kant failed to so confine it; he was compelled to take the intuition of time over into the processes of the discursive understanding. And by what right, to mention only one example, does Kant confine the categories of relation to the understanding? Is his phenomenal world of sense perception a fabric of accidents without substances? Or a multiplicity of effects minus causes? Or a conglomerate without any reciprocity between the active and passive phases of the phenomenal interplay? After plunging into an analysis of the analytic, he admits that intuitions are blind without concepts, but why did he proceed in the Aesthetic in total negligence of that fact? The Aesthetic proceeds on the assumption that we gain a perception of things on two considerations; that is, the stuff of perception is somehow given through experience *à posteriori,* and the form is intuitively imposed upon it in *à priori* fashion by the mind. But such a scheme would be utterly inadequate to the process of sense perception. No account is taken here of representative and imaginative forms, association of ideas,—and, in fact, all the past wealth accumulated by individual consciousness, to go no further, is concentrated in the act of perception. An ignoring of the past, and a past which has been the scene of development, makes perception impossible. A perceptive process composed of two intuitions and a sensational stuff, acting as if shot out of a gun, is not the actual sense perception characteristic of human beings. And even the intuitive forms for most part are nothing but rapid inferences gained throught experience. I apprehend that to give an adequate account of the process of perception the whole machinery of both the understanding and reason would have to be employed. That there is an element in these forms native to the constitution of the mind, is as unquestionable as the presence of such an element in all mind processes. If this element be called intuition, certain qualities of the categories must be regarded also as intuitive,—that is to say, the sense of unity and harmony pervading them.

Kant's right by analysis to discover the distinctive features of sensibility, understanding and reason must of course be conceded. What must be insisted upon is that no analyst is allowed to proceed as if they were separate compartments of the mind. This, Kant does. No theory of knowledge can ignore the fact that in the process of knowledge one mind is acting. The parcelling off of its activities is for purposes of analysis only.

The force of this remark is felt when we consider Kant's notion of the speculative and practical aspects of reason. He clearly saw the unity of reason, for throughout the *Critique of Pure Reason* he kept the practical reason in mind. He deliberately intended that practical reason should clear up the difficulties and antinomies of speculative reason.[100] But to this end it was unnecessary to make such a decided gulf between reason in its speculative and practical aspects; for these are merely two phases of the single process of reason.

From the viewpoint of speculative reason, objects conform to our cognition of them. *Macht zwar der Verstand die Natur aber erschafft sie nicht.* And this material which it does not create is given in the impressions of sense. With the stuff of sensation in hand, reason proceeds to impose its own laws upon it and to make contributions from its own resources to its enrichment. The unorganized multiplicity of sense is thus moulded by the pure understanding through intuitions, categories and general principles into objects of thought proper. Thus reason in its operation is confined to the moulding of the object of thought out of the phenomena presented to it. Reason is thus the slave of phenomena both as to the commencement of its activities and the limits of its achievements.

But in practical reason it is otherwise. Here reason is not the slave of the phenomenon. It needs no phenomenon before it acts. The categorical imperative dictates its activity to the psychological ego, thereby modifying the behavior of the individual. In one case then pure reason is unable to act without the phenomenon, and in the other it can and does send its mandates to the phenomenal ego. Such a conclusion could never be reached, except on the assumption of a bicameral pure reason. It would appear that Kant could get along without a phenomenon in the one case as in the other? If practical reason can act without a phenomenon, why not pure reason?

The unjustifiable separation of the speculative and practical reason appears from the psychological attitude supposed to accompany each of them. Knowledge belongs to the former; faith to the latter. Knowledge has a certainty about it; in its constitutive work it is necessary and universal; but faith is characterized by uncertainty; through it we accept things without sufficient objective basis. But as a matter of fact, there is no more certainty in the moral than in the speculative departments of reason. The need of faith is patent in both cases. Sense perception without faith is impossible; this is equally true of all intellective processes. There must be a reliance upon the processes in all cases; there must be an acceptance of results in such fashion that no proof whatever can be attained except what is afforded by the general feeling of harmony and unity.

But the greatest injury to the unitary working of reason is done when Kant admits that reason is allowed to enter the unknown and unknowable territory of the *Ding an Sich* by one path only, all other approaches being forever closed. We can make the entrance only by means of the category of existence. The more Kant discusses, however, the unknown territory, the more he wittingly or unwittingly admits the possibility of entrance by other path- therefore added the qualifying category of causality. *Dinge-an-Sich* are not therefore dead existential facts, but cause of sensations in us, and if we go through the *Critique of Pure Reason* we shall find that the *Ich an Sich,* the *Welt an Sich* and *Gott an Sich,*—though upon the presumption of Kant's theory as worked out in his critical philosophy all of them are unknown and unknowable, and all we can assert of them is that they exist,—yet they are so causally related to actualities as to be responsible for all their processes. To the category of existence he has therefore added the qualifying category of causality. *Dinge an Sich* are not therefore dead existential facts, but make a difference; they are dynamical powers and bring about the actualities of the known and knowable world. That reveals the fundamental weakness of Kant's system. He endeavored to base it upon an insufficient theoretical ground. He is compelled to repudiate its initial poverty and admit that there were riches in the possession of his reason that only needed to be brought forth from the treasure house. Reality in all its departments forms an indivisible unity; Kant has divorced what should have been forever united. The gulf which he excavated with such titanic intellectual labor was unnecessary. The thing in itself is never separated from our knowledge of the things. When we indulge in an exercise of the imagination which forms or endeavors to form a thing in itself, we are indulging in the efforts of Alice in Wonderland and trying to reach the impossible by an effort to imagine the grin of the Cheshire cat without the cat. Kant in other words formed his *Ding an Sich* by the identical instrument of knowledge that he used in forming all his knowledge of the so-called phenomenal world. The capacities and incapacities of knowledge in relation to *Dinge an Sich* are identical with those in relation to phenomena. Knowledge is limited in both cases; an equal amount of faith is needed in both cases; knowledge grows from more to more in both cases. How absurd it was for Kant to mark out a territory and call it a thing by itself unrelated to all other territory! He marked it off by means of the knowledge he had. He then informed us that no person living now or hereafter should know anything of it except that it existed. And later he had to admit that there were indeed also certain causal relations between the forces operative in the territory and processes on the outside.

But these admissions of Kant, meager as they are, play havoc with the notion of the unknown and unknowable thing in itself. In order to confine the insights of reason to the phenomenal department, seeing that a phenomenon must be an appearance of something, he is compelled from the start to admit the existence of this something or thing in itself. It must at least then possess the bare fact of existence. But the *thatness* or existence thus ascribed to it is a category of the understanding; for being an existential fact, we must bring it under the affirmation of quality and assert reality of it,—otherwise, it would be non-existent. So far therefore, a category of the understanding supposed to be confined to phenomena only has forced its way into the unknown and unknowable territory of the *Ding an Sich*. And when from sheer necessity of thought Kant speaks of the thing in itself as the cause of phenomena in us, he has given his whole case away. In the conclusion of his remarks in the Aesthetic regarding space and time he says: "Hence, so far as their form is concerned, much may be predicated of them *à priori*, but nothing whatever of the things by themselves on which these phenomena may be grounded." (*Das diesen Erscheinungen zum Grunde liegen mag.*) The application of the two categories of reality and causation to the thing in itself has opened the floodgates and the whole territory of the unknown, and the unknowable becomes flooded with all the categorical sea of reason. These two categories involve all the rest. The *Ding an Sich* therefore has been brought under the categories of the understanding—categories which are applicable only to phenomena; that would be horrible to think of to an orthodox transcendentalist, for by this subsumption transcendentalism disappears. The unknown and unknowable *Ding an Sich,* by the very discussions of its acute creator, disappears in reality and leaves nothing but a name on our lips. Claiming to be a disembodied spirit dwelling among a world of sensations and yet uncontaminated by them, related to them indeed, but maintaining its unsullied purity in all its transactions with them, it turns out after all to be an embodied mortal sharing all their failings and contaminations; nay further, it is discovered to be a very diseased mortal—diseased, anaemic and emaciated, a danger to human society,—and like the lepers of old, must be driven beyond the limits of the city so that its contagion might not spread. The region of healthy and normal knowledge is no place for abnormal *Dinge an Sich.*

The *Ding an Sich,* in other words, was merely a notion devised by means of knowledge in order to incapacitate knowledge itself. Reason thus plays hide-and-seek with itself, endeavoring to persuade itself that when it plays *hider* it is unknown and unknowable to itself as *seeker.* The fact is that all knowledge valid for phenomena is also valid for things in themselves.

Kant's treatment of analytic and synthetical judgments is also a violation of the principle of the psychological unity of these processes. No analysis can take place without synthesis; no synthesis is possible without analysis. Nothing can be separated unless it be united; nothing can be united unless separated. We are not here calling attention to Kant's claim that in the act of synthesis *à priori* elements are added, whereas in that of analysis contained, but merely pointing out that he has separated what is essentially one process; and while it is clearly permissible that the separation be made for purposes of analysis, there is no justification whatever of the absolute isolation in which Kant posited them.

(b) Violation of Principle of Harmony and Unity in the Notion of the Relation of Mind to Matter

Secondly, there is a violation of the principle of harmony and unity in Kant's notion of the relation of mind to matter. He assumes the existence of the exterior world, both as a phenomenon and as a thing in itself.

The material of all knowledge comes to us immediately through intuition; the object is here given and given only through a certain affection of the mind.[101] This given object of phenomena enfolds a double contribution, its matter given *à posteriori* and its forms imposed upon it *à priori.* The matter contributed by sensation possesses impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., together with the qualities of substance, force, divisibility, etc., given to it by the understanding; to these must be added extension and form, the contributions of pure intuition. So far as such an object is concerned, what is of interest to us is its appearance only; what it is in itself, we know not. The thing in itself may of course be the cause of the sensation we experience. This of course is a guess. When the object of sensation comes into the awareness of our mind, the appearance is always in the form of a manifold which the mind immediately proceeds to unify.

From this description, it will be seen that Kant has sublimated the object into complete subjectivity. Drops of rain, to take his example, both as to form and matter as well as the space in which they fall, "Are nothing by themselves, but only modifications or fundamental dispositions of our sensuous intuition, the transcendental object remaining unknown to us."[102] It is difficult to see how Kant can avoid being a subjective idealist, even by calling himself an empirical realist and transcendental idealist.[103] But that right, so far as we can see, is purely subjective. Objects are merely the product of psychological functions. In this contemplation of objects there is an easy and necessary transition from the psychical states to the agent whose states these are; but there is a failure much as Kant desired it, to make a transition from these states to the object. He failed to overcome Berkeleyan idealism, although the entire *Critique of Pure Reason* is written upon the assumption that he had. The only quality of the object which Kant has not swamped in subjectivity is the *Ding an Sichheit* of it. But that, so far as the object is concerned, does not enter consciousness at all, for we know nothing of it. We have already shown that Kant's intention respecting the thing in itself was not commensurate with the accomplishments. Even the *Ding an Sich* in spite of all Kant's efforts, was irresistibly consumed by the swallowing monster, consciousness. The last vestige of Kant's external world therefore disappears completely.

Kant could have easily prevented such a catastrophe if he had conceded from the first that the material and spiritual universe are really one and indivisible, or at least two aspects of one process. He could have benefited much in this respect by his study of the Cartesian thinkers, especially Malebranche and Spinoza. They endeavored—though as we now see, imperfectly—to escape the irrational dualism which Kant has incorporated into his system. The intelligible extension of Malebranche would not be a conception of course that he could entertain, but it would suggest to him the possibility of grasping existence in the folds of one comprehensive generalization and thus enabling him to escape the contradictory dualism to which his system became the victim. In some fashion, the world of nature around us is of a piece with ourselves. How to give adequate expression or attempt an adequate expression of this truth is the purpose of this treatise; that is the goal which must lie in the direction of speculative endeavor. Always, I presume, at any stage in human thinking just because that thinking is finite and one-sided and because of the nature of the subject itself it will never be free from contradictions; but we have implicit confidence that such a unitary conception will be freer from contradiction than any dualistic or pluralistic system we can invent. Monsieur C. C. Dunan in an article entitled, "Pour le Progres de la Metaphysique," in the *Revue Metaphysique et de Moral,* reminds us: "Parce que la Metaphysique pui est un effort de l'esprit pour penser l'absolu, et que l'absolue ne peut être pensé qu'absolument, jamais relativement." The contradictions of the critical system arise from its irrational dualism. The bisection of the object known into a thing in itself and a phenomenon, of knowledge into subjective and objective, of reason into pure and subjective on the one hand and speculative and practical on the other are examples of a dichotomy perfectly permissible logically but utterly inadmissible when such a cleavage is considered to be absolute. A unitary conception of reality would have avoided these errors.

(c) Violation of the Principle of Harmony and Unity in the Relation of Individual Consciousness to the Spiritual Principle of the Universe

Thirdly, Kant fails to relate the individual mind and its psychoses to a spiritual process or principle which includes them. The ideal of reason, as he conceives it, is far removed from actuality. The pure concept of the understanding may be applied to phenomena, but the idea of reason is denied this privilege. In fact, when the ideal of reason, which is an idea of the substratum of all reality, is applied to things, one of the great illusions of reason is indulged in. It cannot be applied to things. Therefore, we are compelled to say, the ideal of speculative reason in the Kantian system is a piece of useless ornamentation. But reason is doubly helpless. It is compelled to so posit an *omnitudo realitas,* which is utterly valueless for its purposes. Such an ideal is as valueless to reason speculatively as the King of Siam is to the onflow of the waterfalls of the Yosemite. Why should reason be compelled to assume a substratum of all reality under these conditions? It is passing strange that in the very constitution of reason is an impelling urge toward an idea which gives a summary of all its operations. It is small consolation to say that the ideal of reason is logically necessary and throughout logically consistent; but that reason in its metaphysical or ontological application only gets into the inextricable difficulties through illusions.

Reason, it must always be remembered, contains within itself the fragments of a larger process which includes it. Its activities are indices to this process. It is driven of necessity to a consciousness of participation in it. It cannot rest without a conviction of the ultimate basis which gives meaning to all its work and sustaining all its ratiocinations both in the individual and the race. Here, then, is a suggestive line of thought. Reason finds it necessary to assert a metaphysical and logical ultimate which gives meaning to all its processes unavoidably. That consideration takes us into the precincts of the temple of truth. If Kant had not erred in considering this ultimate in purely logical terms and thus conceiving a riven reality and instead had seen the unity and harmony of reality through the ideal of reason, he would have attained a notion of the utmost value to his theory of knowledge. In place of a cleft reality he would have then seen that the metaphysical and logical phases were only two aspects of it. Individual reason is not only incomplete in its processes, but the processes themselves are impossible without assuming something which includes them both from the metaphysical and logical viewpoints. Thus the process of reason is involved in the process of a higher reason; and the agent assumed in the process has its being in the being of the universe. Reason is not a logical machine but includes a wealth of psychological life involving all that a soul is. Kant not only deals with an abstraction but an abstraction of an abstraction. His treatment is not merely an isolation of the intellective process of reason but also an isolation of the logical phase of the intellectual process. He drives this abstracting to a still higher degree of absurdity when he isolates the psychoses from the agent whose psychoses they are. This wealth of psychical life, suggested in the barest fashion in the logical process, has its roots in the psychical life of the universe and is meaningless unless so considered. We have already pointed out that the difficulties strewn on Kant's reflective pathway came from the isolation of the psychical processes from each other and the isolation of thought and existence or the metaphysical subject from its own psychoses, all of which should never have been isolated except for purposes of analysis. We now also see that another prolific source of his difficulties was the isolation of the individual consciousness from the universal consciousness which includes it.

Defect of Kant's Notion of Space and Time

Kant's treatment of the intuitions of space and time and the categories of the understanding is an illustration of this point. Space is fundamentally something more than a mode of the operation of an individual consciousness; it is the manner in which the spiritual life of the universe manifests itself in the material universe. To say that it is the way in which we perceive extramental realities both as to their relation to the perceiving mind and to one another, is only a part of what is involved. A complete account of what takes place through the intuition of space would indicate that there is a conflux of a finite and infinite process in the very perception of space. The life of the infinite manifests itself through nature; the processes of nature are its expressions. Our sense perception therefore meets the resistance of this process; a psychical process within us meets a psychical process in which we share not only in the internal workings of our mind but also in its operations in the processes of nature extending beyond our minds. It is the attrition of process with process, of the finite with the infinite, of a soul process with a larger soul process. Now it is in that conflux, that meeting, that resistance, that we experience the perception of space. This is what makes the experience possible to us. It is not merely a form of thought. A form of thought is an abstraction of just a phase of the intellectual process involved, to say nothing of the volitional and emotional phases. It is a real process of a psychical being in contact with the real processes of the psychical being of the universe as they manifest themselves to us. The fallacy of Kant's theory is that he conceives a dead logical form on one side and dead extension on the other. There is thus a confusion of the notion presented by Euclidian geometry with actual space experience; in other words, a confusion of the actual psychological experience with some of the particulars of this experience, and in the case of geometry, abstractions of certain phases of these particulars.

Space may therefore be defined as the *subjective experience of an individual consciousness when through the act of perception it reacts to the manifestation of the infinite consciousness both in itself and in nature: Thus in a secondary way it is the mind's method of arranging and locating corporeal existences both in relation to itself and to each other.*

This view of space, making it an experience of the individual as he comes into contact with the infinite, accounts for the quality of infinity characteristic of our notion of space. It is impossible for us to conceive any limit to our spacial experience. We come to believe the experience could be duplicated endlessly. The only explanation of this phase of the experience is that after all individual experience is only a segment of our total possible experience. It is our experience within the life of the infinite.

A similar criticism may be made of Kant's theory of the intuition of time. This also he considers a form of perception for individual consciousness, "Nothing but the form of the internal sense, that is, of our intuition of ourselves, as of our internal state."[104] This notion, as in the case of space, is nothing but an abstraction of an abstraction. Time is defined not merely in intellectual terms but also in the formal, logical phases of the intellect and that intellect considered as a movement in an individual consciousness. This realization of our inner states under the forms of simultaneity and succession involves all experiences of which the individual is capable and more. In fine, all categories of thought are in the same case. They are fundamental modes of thought, whether we speak of space, time causality, reality, or any other. If time be the inner look of the mind upon itself from the special viewpoints of simultaneity and succession, causality, reality, etc., are the inner look of the mind upon itself from the special viewpoints of dynamism and existence, etc. A later analysis will show that when the categories of cause, reality, etc., are applied to nature, it is the inner look of the mind upon itself in the second remove. But the germ out of which all the categories grow is the sense of unity and harmony not only of our individual experiences but in a larger sense of our experiences as individuals in relation to the universe of which we form a part. Time therefore may be defined as *the subjective experience of an individual consciousness when through the act of perception it reacts to the manifestation of the infinite consciousness within ourselves; thus in a secondary way it is the mind's method of locating and arranging its inner states according to the realization of succession and simultaneity.*

It is unnecessary to go through all the categories. All of them indicate experiences of the individual in his contact with the infinite; all of them possess the characteristic of infinity; all of them are soulful experiences containing all the wealth of psychical life; from all of them of course certain abstractions may be made for scientific and philosophical purposes; but there is laid upon us the necessity of reinterpreting over and over again these experiences in the light of all they involve if we are to keep fundamental thinking in touch with the actuality of both our experiences and the world process.

In a word therefore, our estimate of Kant's solution of the problem of knowledge is that he made invaluable contributions to many phases of the problem, especially the contribution of the mind in knowledge, but he failed to grasp the problem in the light of its larger unities and harmonies.

CHAPTER THREE

GREEN'S METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE

Theory of Knowledge in the "Prolegomena to Ethics"

WHAT IS THE PHILOSOPHY of knowledge in the Prolegomena to Ethics by Thomas Hill Green? How is it possible for us to know things? How may we know reality? The world presents a single and unalterable system of relations.[105] Everything, if we think of it, is related to everything else. Every fact, whether new or old, which presents itself to us is bound up with other facts; or every fact and the principles which it involves are bound up with every other fact and the principles involved in them. The category of relation is therefore fundamental. We cannot think without it. To think is to relate. Thinking even in its simplest form expresses a relationship between subject and object. A fact of any kind expresses a relationship, which is always the same between the same objects.[106] In general, therefore, what we mean by objects is that these particulars of our knowledge are always the same in the same relations. Nature is "a consciousness of events as a related series."[107]

Our knowledge of nature, therefore, depends on the action of ourselves as spiritual beings or as beings of conscious mind. So far as knowledge is concerned we manufacture nature; nature is the product of our own intelligence. "Macht zwar der Verstand die Natur."

Green's Metaphysical Theory

To the sentence, "Macht zwar der Verstand die Natur," Kant added "aber erschafft sie nicht." Granted, then, that through the presentation of our experiences with nature to ourselves,—that is to say, through a complexus of relationships,—we are able to manufacture objects or nature; "aber erschafft sie nicht," we do not create the stone in particular, we do not create nature in general. When our mind or understanding presents an object, say a stone, to itself, the presentation is in the shape of a single system of relations. Strange enough, this single system of relations wears an objective phase; the object seems to be there over against me here. The query arises naturally whether some objective understanding does not create the system of relations known as a stone or nature in general, just as we manufacture the stone or nature in general on the subjective side?

Let the answer to the question be postponed until we consider the components of the query. What is the essence of the stone? What is its reality? When we ask this question about reality it involves a demand or a possible answer involving a conviction that the stone or any other bit of reality has an unalterable system of relations, if we could only find them out.[108] What principle is it that can best account for a system of relations? It is apparent that any relationship involves the mystery of the one in many.[109] Whether we say that one stone has many relations or that the stone is one relation among manifold things, matters not. We are in either case affirming the unity of the manifold. The stone could not be one without the unity of the stone. What kind of power is able to bring about these relations? "A plurality of things cannot of themselves unite in one relation, nor can a single thing of itself bring itself into a multitude of relations."[110] Something combines these relations; relations cannot combine of themselves. This something indeed capable of so combining the manifold is very familiar to us, for "With such a combining agency we are familiar as our intelligence."[111] A self-distinguishing consciousness is the only principle which explains the uniform relations which nature presents to us both as noetic reactions and metaphysical realities.[112] The reality of nature is a self-distinguishing consciousness; that is to say, God is the essence of it.[113]

Nettleship's Interpretation of Green's Philosophy

R. L. Nettleship, the biographer and expounder of the philosophy of Green, contends that "The central conception," in his philosophy, "is that the universe is a single eternal activity or energy, of which it is the essence to be self-conscious."[114] Complete reality for our author is, "A system in which every element, being correlated to every other, at once presupposes and is presupposed by every other."

To learn what experiences are, we must analyze them; to learn what we are, we must analyze experience. Experience is an expression of the sentient organism. A fact of experience is our interpretations of an occurrence in the terms of the unity of our self-conscious life.

The Relation of Man to the Spiritual Principle of the Universe in Green's System

Green has expressed his philosophy in such form as to make imperative the question, is man merely a phenomenon, just an appearance of the all-inclusive reality? Or must he be considered a reality in himself related in some way to the reality which includes him? Green has demonstrated that the only reality we know is a self-distinguishing consciousness. That surely man is; that according to him the spiritual principle in nature must be. The question is, then, how are we related to this larger consciousness? We must look upon ourselves, of course, as animal organisms, originating in time, therefore with a definite history gradually becoming "the vehicle of an eternally complete consciousness."[115] There are two consciousnesses in one in a human being, a blending of the finite and the infinite; or it is one consciousness looked at, because of the limitation of our conception, from two different viewpoints.[116]

Does, therefore, the operation of the infinite consciousness within us carry all before it, leaving not a vestige of freedom to our own soul? Are we playing second fiddle to the infinite mind? Is our consciousness of freedom the mere pretense of phenomenality, a delusion of our limited and subservient self? Not at all, contends Green. As a reproduction of the infinite, man is a free cause. By a free cause is meant "The action of a single principle to which all events and facts are equally present and relative, but which distinguishes itself from them all and can thus unite them in their severalty."[117] The agent must act absolutely from itself. In the knowing act is contained a process for which we ourselves are entirely responsible. We unify facts into relationships and distinguish ourselves from the facts and all else.

One feels, despite Green's effort to unite the infinite and finite consciousness, that they are united only at certain points of their interaction. The universal consciousness turns its attention to these processes of the infinite within itself, it recognizes itself as the *causa cognoscendi,* the action of the self-originating mind of the universe which is the *causa essendi* of this same process.[118] Man, then, is in the position of the engineer whose hand is on the throttle of the locomotive. The engineer does not create any of the forces which hurl this piece of machinery through space at a terrific rate; he simply controls them. Now it is impossible to differentiate between the *causa essendi* and the *causa cognoscendi* in such cases. There is merely a difference of name. It is very proper, of course, to speak of the mind as capable of knowledge; if this capability be meant, then it would seem that the universal consciousness has nothing to do with the actual process of knowledge; it is concerned merely in giving to the human being a mind capable of such an act. Green undoubtedly believed in the cooperative unity of the human and divine consciousness, but at this point he has not made it clear.

In fact, there is a contradiction here. If freedom consists in accepting the divine process within us as our own, there is certainly a suggestion here of an operation of the two consciousnesses independently, and if the finite consciousness goes to the extent of rejecting the divine process and refusing to accept it as its own, the disparity is still further emphasized. When the individual consciousness either accepts or rejects a line of action, is the divine consciousness foreign to the transaction? When as Nettleship suggests, in the eternal world or in the web of heredity wound around the individual, he discovers laws he has not made and accepts them as his own and thereby asserts his freedom, has the divine consciousness nothing to do with the transaction? That is impossible from the viewpoint of Green's theory. There is really only one action of a single principle, an agent which acts absolutely from itself. And yet both in the difference made between the *causa essendi* and the *causa cognoscendi* of a process of knowledge and defense of a human creature from being the slave of nature in enabling him to select the action of the divine in nature and appropriate it as his own, Green seems to depart from his theory.

Andrew Seth's Criticism of the Spiritual Principle in Green's Theory

Green's "Whole system centres in the assertion of a Self or Spiritual Principle as necessary to the existence alike of knowledge and morality."[119] But Professor Seth feels that the nature of this self is left vague and not properly defined.[120]

Green as a Neo-Kantian or English Hegelian shares in the fallacy committed by Kant. Against Hume, Kant asserted a permanent subject of knowledge. There is a consciousness of succession in the mental process which supposes a grasping of before and after. A self must be assumed which is other than the changes in mental processes serving as their permanent background and capable of apprehending them in their different phases. This act of knowledge is named by Kant the transcendental unity of apperception or self-consciousness. The phenomena of consciousness are unified as belonging to the unifying self. This self is transcendental as contrasted with the empirical or subjective self. Our concern is with the latter only; this only may become the object of our knowledge; the transcendental self is static, permanent, unchangeable and identical.[121] Hume made the mistake of abstracting particular items of knowledge and of treating them as if there were no knower; Kant on the contrary errs by supposing an abstract transcendental self having nothing to do with the actual self of experience or the empirical self, while admitting that the transcendental can do nothing without experience. If the transcendental self is so dependent upon the empirical self, both must be treated as departments in the complete whole of knowledge, and thus Kant's view of the subjectivity and relativity of knowledge disappears.[122] "The self and the world are only two sides of the same reality."[123] Only from the point of view of the self may this identity be grasped, but this does not confer upon the self a separate existence. This is precisely what Kant and the Neo-Kantians fail to see.

Green failed to see it and therefore proceeds to transform Kant's theory of knowledge into a metaphysic of existence. Kant's transcendental ego was an abstraction, a unifying logical principle which is nothing apart from the things unified.[124] Green goes to the extent of taking Kant's abstract logical principle, as will be seen from the passage quoted and of making it a real or the real metaphysical principle of the universe. "Such a focus or principle of unity enables us to round off our theory with an appearance of personality, but it does not satisfy in any real sense the requirements of Theism."[125]

It seems to me that Professor Seth does justice neither to Kant nor Green. His criticism has point only from his expectation of what these thinkers should have done. Kant should have merely given us a logical *Bewusstsein überhaupt* which was demanded by his peculiar theory of an *Ich an Sich* existing and acting independently of experience; but Kant refrained from such a presentation. Kant's transcendental unity of apperception is a constitutive principle, creating nature, making experience possible, even creating, if we may be pardoned the expression, the *thinghood* of the thing. It is therefore not a logical but a metaphysical principle; it makes a difference. Without it, our entire world of experience would disappear, for it alone makes experience possible.

Green did not therefore mistake the drift of Kant. He himself follows his example. He does not present us with a logical, formal consciousness in general, but places at the basis of the universe a spiritual principle of which an index is found in the metaphysical principle revealed to us in the process of knowledge.

Nor do I think that Green has left the nature of the self vague and undefined. It is true he writes much of the spiritual principle as if it were an abstraction; but when he defines what he means, which is done over and over again, even to the point of painful reiteration, a very positive self both human and divine is conceived. Green says: "Personality, no doubt, is a term that has been fought over without any very precise meaning being attached to it. If we mean anything else by it than the quality in a subject of being consciously an object to itself, we are justified in saying that it necessarily belongs to God and to any being in whom God in any measure reproduces or realizes himself."[126]

The spiritual principle realizes itself in persons. Our personality consists in the fact of "our consciousness of ourselves as objects to ourselves." This is the only sense in which we may ascribe personality to God. It is this sense of personality so understood that intimates to us the conclusion that there is a self-realizing principle in the world, that the world is "an object to a single mind" and therefore "a connected whole," that we cannot reduce our self-consciousness to anything else, that it is not an effect but "the presence in us of the mind for which the world exists."

The Seth-Balfour Criticism of Green's Theory as Destructive of Human Personality

Both Seth and Balfour have criticized Green's theory on account of its treatment of human personality; that the human has been swamped in the divine; and in fact that the divine loses all which properly comes under this notion. We have already touched upon the last point. The argument of Seth is, "There is no deliverance of consciousness more unequivocal than that which testifies to this independence and exclusiveness. I have a centre of my own —a will of my own which no one shares with me, or can share,—a centre which I maintain even in my dealings with God Himself."[127]

With Seth's view as to the relation of the human and divine consciousness, Balfour is in substantial agreement.

The Reality of the Personality of the Human and Divine Being

Seth seems to be satisfied with a theory which asserts the absolute metaphysical isolation of the divine and human personalities on the one hand and the isolation in the most complete fashion of human personalities on the other. The isolation of the latter he conceives to be analogous to the impenetrability of matter; indeed this is but a faint analogue. But when we grant that two portions of matter may be impenetrable, this does not exhaust their relationship. In fact, impenetrability is only an abstraction of one from the many relationships they bear. The two bits of matter are a part of a universe of matter. They are metaphysically identical and are separated by the logic of physics under the notion of impenetrability for a specific purpose. If the two bits of matter be gold, they will be of the same specific gravity and atomic weights; they will enter into combination with other elements in precisely the same way; both their physical and chemical laws will admit of being stated in identical intellectual terms; and both will bear such a relation to all portions of matter throughout the material universe as to enable us to view them as essential and contributory parts of the whole. In other words, when we consider two portions of matter in their isolation, we must not forget that they bear also a relation of unity and harmony to the whole.

It is thus with personality. Each self is of course "unique"; has a "centre" of its own; a "will" of its own; there we agree with Professor Seth. But that is only one phase of the relations of personality, an abstraction from its total relations. We are able to write books of psychology and theory of knowledge because of similar laws operative in the human mind, scattered through individuals. We are forced to the conclusion that similarity of operation declares identity and unity in the metaphysical basis. In our conception of the divine mind we are simply extending principles known to be valid for all mind, insofar as we know it. We have a center of our own and recognize our unity with God. Our personal isolation is only an abstraction of this relationship. Consciousness declares equally for separation from other minds or our unity with them according to its particular mood or necessity. Both these aspects must be considered if we are to give a complete account of the declarations of consciousness respecting these phases.

Professor Seth in *Hegelianism and Personality* drops out of view some of the larger issues of the problem of personality. How came this self-centered and isolated personality of ours into existence? Does it bear any metaphysical relationship to the divine personality or to the universe? He has defined the human and divine personality in such a way as to make any relationship impossible between them except a noetic one; and I think by not recognizing a metaphysical relationship this also would be impossible. Even if we grant the imperviousness of human souls we certainly need a statement of their metaphysical relation to an order of existence upon which they are dependent.

They did not bring themselves into existence. Is it possible for them to exist by the force of their self-sufficiency? These are old and worthy questions; they cannot be dismissed by any theory of isolation. But Professor Seth gives no intimation of anything other than a divine personality dwelling in isolation, a being absolutely worthless for ultimate purposes. Such a being could not account for the origin and sustenance of either man or nature of which being they form a part. This would lead us to assume an indefinite number of self-activities characterized by all the defects of Leibniz's monads without the assistance of a supreme monad to give virtue to their coördinations.

It may be added in conclusion that Green is as firm a believer in the personality of God and man as are Balfour and Seth. What is personality? A person is a self-conscious being functioning emotionally, intellectually and volitionally. The essence of a person is that he possesses a discriminating consciousness, distinguishing himself from all else and from his own processes.

Through self-determination he is able to make himself an object to himself. Green asserts this sort of personality to be characteristic of the divine being also; and that this sort of personality is the essential existence of the world. And this sort of personality can be characteristic of a human being only upon the assumption of the unity of the divine and human beings.

Balfour's Criticism of Green's Metaphysics of Knowledge

Balfour subjects the use of the category of relation in Green's system to the same critical analysis to which the categories of existence and causality in Kant's critical philosophy have been subjected. He states that Green's "Theory of relations consists mainly of these two propositions: First, that objects are constituted by relations; Secondly, that relations are the work of the mind."[128] As to the first, it may be readily granted, he contends, that objects are nothing to us except in relations, but what is related? Relation is nothing unless there be something to relate. Green contends that it cannot be the unrelated, the simple sensation of Hume, unqualified by thought; this would be a meaningless abstraction. But this is not the only alternative. It is perfectly reasonable "To suppose the existence of a non-spiritual principle which should be the source of that between which the relations are."[129] He meets the objection that this non-spiritual principle is not an object of possible experience by asserting that neither is Green's spiritual principle.

"In short, if that which is related, apart from its relations, an unthinkable and therefore non-existent abstraction, not less and therefore equally non-existent must be relations apart from that which is related; and if relations require a source, so must that which relations qualify."[130]

Kant made the pure ego, which is at a par with the spiritual principle in Green the source of relations or the categories, thus confining them within the realm of the known; this is more consistent than Green's endeavor. And if Kant be guilty of taking the category of causality from the knowable realm and applying it to the unknowable, to which by his own theory it is inapplicable, what shall we say of Green who contends that "nature results from the activity of the spiritual principle"?

The proposition that relations are due to the activity of a self-conscious intelligence and the argument by which he endeavors to establish it are equally unsatisfactory. They may exist for such only, but that is far from admitting that they are due to it.

In analyzing what makes experience possible, Green commits the error of substantiating his claim by separating those elements in experience which are really inseparable and then deducing a conclusion from this process on the assumption that they are. How does he know that without the combining intelligence phenomena could never unite themselves without bringing themselves into a *featureless identity*? How does he know that phenomena are manifold and in order to make experience possible for us must submit to our combining them? Phenomena are the product of mind, not it of them. But to the transcendentalists no element of experience is unrelated; one cannot be the cause of the other; together they form a whole. "If the mind and nature form one inseparable whole, if they cannot be put asunder without at once becoming meaningless abstractions, then one cannot be before or after the other, and it becomes in the highest degree inappropriate to describe the indivisible whole as specially the product of either of its essential members."[131] If we did, why then phenomena might cause mind or nature might cause God. The passages in which Green assigns a causal relationship to intelligence in spite of his protestations are convincing proof that this point is well taken.

Equally unsatisfactory is Green's theory of consciousness and its relationship to the universal consciousness, or the relationship of the empirical ego which is in time to the pure ego which is timeless.

The timelessness of individual consciousness may be arrived at only by *illegitimate abstraction*. Green is not right in assuming that if the conscious subject be not dissipated into a stream of thought or fleeting psychoses, it must be outside time and therefore without a history.

Consciousness itself testifies against the identity of individual and the universal consciousness.

Green's view of ego is too abstract. We only know the eternal consciousness as "a principle of unity in relation." We, as an expression of the eternal, are something more than this; the eternal consciousness must also be more.[132]

Another difficulty is met with upon Green's theory. Everything known is constituted by relations with which the knowing subject qualifies it. The object is nothing to us except under these conditions. What about the eternal consciousness then? Green's very definition of it makes it impossible we should ever become acquainted with it.

Remarks upon the Position of Balfour

It is evident to me that Green's theory of relations is too abstract. He shares the error of Kant in selecting the intellective element, which of course plays an important part in the discursive understanding, to the neglect of emotional and volitional phases. Objects conceived as consisting merely of intellectual relations become high and dry abstractions just like the creations of mathematics. It is rather strange, therefore, that Balfour should be willing to share with Green the sin of abstraction by granting him that objects may be "constituted by relations." He takes exception merely to the proposition "that relations are the work of the mind" and proceeds to indulge in another abstraction, which if anything is worse than anything Green ever dreamed of. To his notion, Green had not supplied us with the particulars to be related. Balfour makes up this deficiency. What is to be related is a "non-spiritual principle," which cannot possibly come into our experience. He advances two arguments in support of this theory. First, rational consistency demands that there must be something to be related. Objects are nothing apart from relations, argues Green; relations are nothing apart from something to be related, was the retort of Balfour. Secondly, if it be contended that this non-spiritual principle is not an object of possible experience, neither is Green's spiritual principle. Thus the spiritual principle of Green, which makes nature possible, and the non-spiritual principle of Balfour, according to which he endeavors to rescue nature from becoming in the hands of Green a fabric of intellectual relations are "implied in the existence of the world." It seems to me, however, that the method of both ordinary and scientific knowledge would favor Green's approach to the problem. Balfour claims no spirituality for his principle; it is outside all relations and therefore not a single category can be applied to it. It shares the inabilities of Kant's *Ding-an-Sich*. Consistently, Balfour has no right to assign to it an inferential existence. But unavoidably it seems he is compelled so to do and thus falls a victim to his own logic. He accuses Green of separating elements of experience which are inseparable and of basing conclusions upon this impossible separation. Now, let us inquire, what is the non-spiritual stuff present in related objects which by description are not related? How is it possible to confer upon them even the poverty-stricken qualification of existence? Is not existence a category of relation? Balfour has very successfully shown, I think, that a timeless spiritual principle cannot express itself in a consciousness under the sway of time. In other words, Green according to Balfour's interpretation has placed the spiritual principle of the universe outside relations and then ascribed the relational categories of time and causation to it when it expresses itself in man and nature. But this argument can be equally directed against Balfour's non-spiritual principle. Abstractly he conceives of it as possessing no relations whatever, for relations are intellectual construction and this principle is non-intellectual. How, then, is it possible for a non-relational principle to enter into the composition of objects whose relations Balfour concedes are the work of the mind? The mind under such circumstances would be utterly powerless to construct objects, for it would have nothing to build upon; it could not possibly use non-spiritual ingredients.

Green has improved on Balfour's way of treating his non-spiritual principle in two respects. First, if we grant for a moment that objects are constituted by relations, these relations being intellectual are germane to us; we find an index to them in our own mind. They are not aliens from the commonwealth of souls. But the non-spiritual principle is an absolute alien. I do not see how it is possible even to guess at its existence. It is unthinkable. Secondly, Green has not left the object in the air as of a group of relationships only. He has, in common with all thinkers upon fundamental principles, found it difficult to express properly and adequately the thought in his mind. But an analysis of Green's position reveals distinct and unmistakable pronouncements concerning the spiritual principle present in objects; it is none other than a discriminating consciousness similar to our own.

This takes away from the critics any excuse for interpreting Green's spiritual principle in the terms of Kant's *Ding-an-Sich*. He endeavored to state it in the most comprehensive terms of our experience; that is to say, in those of our own self-conscious life. From the viewpoint of a theory of knowledge, it is "a principle of unity in relation;" metaphysically it is a discriminating consciousness. While Balfour might refuse, as I certainly should, to regard this discriminating consciousness any more "The object of love, reverence or indeed of any emotion whatever" than a mere "principle of unity," the former comes nearer the desideratum for such a purpose. Nothing can fill the place of such an exalted being but one who, however he may transcend a complete psychological content, cannot certainly descend below it.

I might add that all the arguments which were directed against the Cartesian conception of matter may be urged against Balfour's non-spiritual principle. The Cartesians even improved a little upon his position. With both, matter is a dead, a non-spiritual principle, but the Cartesians endeavored to give it a positive content by regarding it as extension. Balfour contaminates it with negativity; he merely denies spirituality to it. And yet the qualities which may be called spiritual are those which Balfour or any of us can ever know; even Balfour would agree to this. That is quite a confession to make. The brute force of his theory therefore is the residuum left after all spirituality has been subtracted from objects. But as a matter of fact, there is nothing left but an abstraction of thought, a void in which reason finds no resistance to its wings. In comparison with this, the chaos of the Greeks would be as rich of wealth for reality as the cave of the forty thieves which Ali Baba discovered according to a story in the *Arabian Nights.*

The difficulty of applying the categories of time and causality to the relationship existing between the spiritual principle and its expressions arises, it seems to me, from a defective notion of these categories. Both Balfour and Green regard them as qualifications of intellectual consciousness and deny that they have any effect whatsoever upon the universal consciousness. Balfour applies them to the entire individual consciousness. In both cases they are purely intellectual. Both these acute thinkers dropped out of sight the fact that we are living in a universe full of activity. The mind possesses a volitional dynamism that cannot be ignored, reacting against a nature which, according to the story of modern science, is a fairyland of wonderful forces. All categories in the last analysis are intellectual appreciations of the clash between our wills and the will of the universe. They are a manifestation of the function of human consciousness within the divine. Both Kant and Green separated the individual consciousness from the divine and then, having brought about this illegal divorce, proceeded to reunite them. The categories of space, time, causality and the rest held sway in the individual consciousness only. To this, the category is an intellectual tyrant becoming a necessary condition of thought, while it really is the incidence of a process, a resultant of forces. Time is merely a historical, psychological account of the resistance of these forces; space is an account of their reciprocal action; causality is an interpretation from the viewpoint of action, and/or better the active and the passive phase of the action. In fine, a complete analysis of all fundamental categories would yield the result that they are intellectual interpretations of the conflux of psychical, individual activities as they come in contact with the larger environment of which they form a part. They are therefore explanations of partial processes from the viewpoint of the unity and harmony of the whole.

It may well be questioned indeed, whether a discriminating consciousness, as such, in its reproduction in us, could ever form a proper and adequate basis for our ethical life. Having very carefully analyzed nature as a system of unalterable relations and forced himself to the conclusion that there could be no such system of relations unless there were a relating power and finding within his own soul a key to its interpretation,—that is to say, since he could think of nothing which was able to act as a relating agency but a discriminating consciousness,—it was clear to his intellect that there must be a discriminating consciousness present in nature responsible for its unalterable relations. Was it not incumbent upon Green to indicate, taking his clue from the ethical nature of man, that the spiritual principle of the universe was ethical as well as rational? This, I think, he has failed to do.

Similar criticism on the score of intellectuality may be urged against Green's theory of knowledge. Emotion and volition claim a larger part in knowledge than Green gives to them.

BOOK III

ULTIMATE REALITY INTERPRETED AS A UNIFYING AND CAUSAL PRINCIPLE

Attempts to give an account of the universe as a whole and to regard it as an interrelated and unitary system have to contend with three factors: God, the material universe and man. Each of these from time to time has been made inclusive and determinative of the others, with the result that a variety of theisms, materialisms and humanisms have appeared. Our effort is in the direction of inquiring whether there is a unitary system, which will do justice to our deepest conceptions of God, our emotional and scientific approaches to nature, and to man as a self-conscious soul. Our theory of Ultimate reality must be broad enough to include all existence and activities, all phases of life and thought. In the interpretation of reality as a unifying and causal principle, we introduce a philosopher who has compelled the fundamental thinker to take his cue; he was the inspirer of German idealism; and he must always be reckoned with by those who would cherish the possibility of a unitary conception of the world. This thinker is Baruch Spinoza.

CHAPTER ONE

SPINOZA'S ATTEMPT TO UNIFY EXISTENCE AND ACTIVITY UNDER THE NOTION OF SUBSTANCE

The Conception of Ultimate Reality

WHAT IS SPINOZA'S notion of ultimate reality? Has he succeeded in including God, nature, and man under one, all-inclusive conception, while retaining all that is most precious to thought and ideal? The notion of God centers in the category of causality. God as cause is not merely a static being or a logical abstraction. It is not a fair treatment of Spinoza to select two or three definitions and consider them final as to his doctrine. They are merely starting points. It is true, of course, that God is a substance,[133] and a substance is a conception "which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed,"[134] but a further perusal of his works will demonstrate that by substance he meant something dynamic and not static, the complicated activity and existence of the universe and not merely an intellectual arachnidium. The notion of causality, which was his inheritance, came from Descartes and the Scholastics—*ex nihilo nihil fit.* To the Aristotelian fourfold division of causation, material, efficient, formal, final, Descartes adds eminent causality, which contains more reality or superior quality than is contained in the effect. He criticized Gassendi for introducing the time element into the relation of cause and effect. He also believed we have no knowledge of final causes concerning the physical universe, for the purposes of God are incomprehensible. Both Koening[135] and Schopenhauer[136] interpret Descartes' theory of causation on purely epistemological grounds—that is to say, that he fails to distinguish between reason and consequent, and cause and effect.

Since Spinoza did not take the trouble to analyze thoroughly the category of causation but accepted it ready-made, he lays himself open to severe criticism; but he certainly transcended the position of Descartes and did not confine causation to reason and consequent. There is, of course, much to support the other theory. But this arises from the nature of the category itself, which is only a commentary upon observed changes; and in Spinoza's writings as elsewhere, the dynamism of the change and the reason therefore must be taken together. Spinoza meant them to be together. Great violence has been done to his theory by overlooking this. It has been interpreted as a statistical sum total of being from which by logical deduction he obtained all created things. This was very far from his thought. The notion of *causa sui* probably more than any other has given occasion for the misinterpretation. This is a very awkward phrase of course to express the idea of causelessness or the reason of self-existence. But all he wished to emphasize was that the essence of substance involves existence just as the notion of a triangle involves that of two right angles. In that reasoning the notion of dynamism is entirely absent; it does not enter into the relation of essence to existence; this is merely a rational inclusion. Spinoza should not have used causality in this connection at all, for by so doing he put himself at the mercy of his critics and led even those who sympathized with him astray.

Doctrine of Substance in "God, Man and Human Welfare"

Spinoza's short work, *God, Man and Human Welfare,* makes an important contribution to his theory. Here are all the germinal thoughts that were developed later in the *Ethics.* God is described as an immanent cause, for there is nothing outside him.[137] In a remarkable passage,[138] Spinoza destroys for all time the attempt to interpret him as denying dynamical causality to his all-inclusive substance; "It can never be said" of God that "He has the imperfection of passivity, because he is not acted upon by anything else."[139] "Substance can be called active with greater right than passive because it is the principle of all its modes."[140] He also gives an analysis of efficient causes.[141] God is the effluent or productive cause of his works; the immanent and not the transient cause; a free and not a natural cause; a cause by virtue of himself and not by accident; a principal cause; an originating cause; a general cause; and a "*proximate* cause of things which are infinite and unchangeable and which we say have been created directly by him, but in one sense he is the *ultimate* cause of all individual things."[142]

God cannot avoid doing what he does.[143] This follows as a consequence from his perfection. We may properly speak of the freedom of God in all his activity, for he is not constrained by any force exterior to himself.

All qualifications of God must be confined to those attributes which appertain to the nature of substance. Three attributes are enumerated: perfection, which includes all possible qualifications of the infinite; providence, which means that there is a tendency in particular things and nature as a whole to "the maintenance and guarding of their own existence," and even to reach a better condition than the present; predestination, which means that there is nothing accidental in nature. The accidental has no cause,[144] and is therefore a figment of the imagination.

God under the notion of *natura naturans* is creator. Under the notion of *natura naturata,* nature is presented as a creature, or "Modes of creatures which depend immediately upon or are created by God, and these are motion in matter (*Stoffe*), and understanding in the thinking thing."[145] These modes have been known from eternity and will remain eternally changeless. Motion can only be understood through extension.[146]

Good and evil do not exist in nature. They are relative, mere *entia rationis,* our peculiar way of looking at things by comparison.

This *Short Treatise* was written somewhere between 1657 and 1662. The *Ethics* was published in 1677. The positions taken in the maturer work are identical with those outlined.

Spinoza's substance is dynamical throughout.

Herder's Interpretation of Spinoza's Substance

During the century following the publication of the *Ethics,* the opposition to Spinoza was very bitter; he was maligned as an atheist and a pantheist. But in 1787 Johann Gottfried V. Herder defended him in *Gott, Einige Gespraeche ueber Spinoza's System, nebst Shaftesbury's Naturhymnus.* Herder contended he was not an atheist[147] because God was all in all to him; not a pantheist because he makes power the essence of substance and God the immanent first cause of all things. He meant to imply by substance the fact that it contained all causality.[148] It is no more objectionable to consider human beings modifications of substance than it is for the Leibnitzian school to hold that matter is an appearance of substance. "The central point in the Spinozistic system is that power is the essence of being."[149] Thought is the expression of this in the spiritual world and movement in the material realm. "The eternal power of God creates, created and will create, because it, the eternally energizing power, is never at rest and never could be at rest."[150]

Relation of Substance to Man and Nature

God, the dynamical substance, the immanent first cause of all existing things, has an infinite number of attributes, —that is to say, an infinite number of those qualities which the intellect conceives as constituting his essence; but only two of them, thought and extension, are actually conceived. The critics demand, why only these two are knowable among an infinite number. What justifies the guess at an infinite number of unknowable attributes minus two? Is it because the perfect substance must have an infinite number? But such guessing has no foundation, for an attribute unknown and unknowable means nothing; and an infinite number of vacuities is absurd. Tschirnhausen in his correspondence with Spinoza asked if we were "To suppose those attributes to constitute other worlds perceived by finite creatures who have no notion of extension?"[151] And we might add, since substance consists of infinite attributes, "Each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence," it is passing strange that this insight is not able to furnish a clue to more than thought and extension! And not only are thought and extension among the knowables but their connections also are, but why are they disconnected in thought from the others?

A mode is an affection of substance and is always conceived through something other than itself. Material objects are modes of extension; psychical activities are modes of thought: in each case the totality of modes is infinite.

The two general *naturata,* motion in matter and understanding in thought, were created by and are immediately dependent upon God.[152] These in turn become the mediating causes of their several effects.[153] Here Spinoza follows Descartes very closely.[154]

The Nature and Origin of Mind

Spinoza explains the origin of mind necessarily issuing from the nature of God, with the practical end in view of obtaining "A knowledge of the human mind and its highest happiness."[155] Any explanation of it must take note of the fact that man is composed of mind and body; and correlated with this is the principle "that God is an extended thing"[156] as well as thought. And this bifurcated aspect of God and man must be comprehended under the principle that "The order and connexion of ideas is the same as the order and connexion of things;" nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that the thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same.[157] The parallelism between mind and body must not blind us to their absolute unity. Mental activity is absolutely dependent upon bodily activity,[158] and that the mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God.[159]

Human bodies differ from one another in respect of motion and rest.[160] The motion of other bodies impinges upon them in numerous ways. The aptitude of the mind in perception increases in proportion to the ways in which the body can be disposed. It may be safely inferred that Spinoza accepted Descartes' theory of the interaction of mind and body by means of "animal spirits," the direction of whose motion, though not the motion itself, could be changed by a purely mental act.[161] Sensation is interpreted after the manner of Hobbes. Objects by their pressure upon different parts of the body give rise to sensation; the mind is passive in sensation. A sharp distinction is made between sensation and perception, between images of things formed by the imagination and the conceptions of the mind.[162] Ideas are not "dumb pictures on a tablet;" they belong to a world of their own, ranged under the attribute of thought, while images belong to the other world of extension.[163]

Reason, from its very nature, considers things necessary and not contingent.[164] The necessity of things follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature.[165] Since the human mind is a mode of the thought of the infinite, it is not absolutely free. Its volition is causally determined through a series of causes, which find their ultimate source in God. This doctrine should elevate us to the pitch of religious fervor. "It teaches us that we do everything by the will of God," and are partakers of the divine nature. It gives us repose and indicates that our highest happiness and blessedness come from the knowledge of God alone. Through it we can more easily bear the "fell clutch of circumstance," knowing "that all things follow from the eternal decree of God." It gives us social guidance to bear goodwill toward all, help all and be content with our lot in life. Society will thus greatly benefit from this noble conception, since we are always guided by reason in our conduct, that we "may freely do those things which are best."

Spinoza's Substance Too Contracted

Spinoza had a passion to see things whole while appreciating their diversity. His difficulties in the formulation of his doctrine were of necessity very great; these were inherent in the nature of the subject and also contributed by the immature scientific notions of his time.

But the greatest difficulty came from the theory of substance, which he accepted from his master, Descartes. Spinoza puts too great a strain upon this bare, dynamical substance. He needed a richer, more inclusive and thorough-going concept. Substance, we are informed, is the principle of all its modes. But what is the nature of such a principle? Psychical activity as the cause of psychical modes; mechanical activity as the cause of mechanical motion in matter. But these two aspects have not been shown to be identical beyond the assertion that somehow they are so in infinite substance. Each series of modes is always referred to its particular attribute, so that the assumed underlying unity of them in substance turns out after all not to be real; substance invariably is a cleft reality. Then, if we endeavor to attain this unity by going back of the attributes, the attributeless, substantial substratum would be utterly valueless for purposes of thought, a night in which all cows are black. For it would be absolute negation, which would be neither active nor passive, kinetic nor dynamic. It would be useless to apply the categories of causality or development to it, because an absolute nonentity could not become causal or evolutional. Spinoza would have fared better if he had cast aside entirely the two substances of Descartes; they always lingered with him in his own conception of a unitary substance. In order to accommodate his thought to the cloven reality of Descartes, he was frustrated in conceiving his unitary reality in such a manner as to satisfy critical consistency. He should have emancipated himself from this tradition and sought a common basis for both psychical and material activity. This may be asking too much in view of the physics and psychology which he found to hand. Mechanical activity has in these later days been enriched by the developments of chemistry, biology and psychology. No mechanical action can possibly give an account of that transaction in the cortex of the brain, where awareness emerges through neural disturbances. Granted with certain modifications that mechanical action may account for the transmission from the end organs of sense, neural stimulations, to the cortex, but when this is reached that is its *terminus ad quem.* Doubtless some day, we may be able to take it beyond this point, but in order to accomplish this we must invest mechanical action with a psychical quality; then when the neural disturbances approach the processes of the cortex they must be acknowledged as members of the same family. On such a theory there is no difficulty in working out the implications of a continuous and homogeneous activity. But Spinoza did not make this approach to the problem, although the necessity of it is apparent for his unitary conception.

Theory of Perception

Spinoza's cloven reality appears also in his theory of perception. The ideational process—that is to say, sensation, perception, reproductive and creative imagination—is confined to "the images of things formed by our imagination," which are referred exclusively to bodily movements. They are "dumb pictures on a tablet." They fall short of the glory pertaining to conceptual knowledge. They remain in the lower region of extension, thus separated by a gulf from the domain of thought. Concepts, on the contrary, belong to the higher region of the intelligible world. Perception must always be referred to the attribute of extension and conception to the attribute of thought. But there is no such hard and fast lines between conception and perception. It is apparent that if imagination is to be of value to the process of perception, it must at least involve recognition by the receiving subject; otherwise the image could not enter consciousness at all, nor would it be possible to relate this image to past images. Perception is impossible without both creative and historical imagination or memory; it involves both presentative and representative elements; it draws its treasures no less from the accumulations of the past than from the immediate data of consciousness; it involves all that can ever be meant by thought or the conceptual process. It is one mind that functions in all its processes. If sense perception be compelled to emphasize presentative phases of a world in space, in that recognition is involved with varying degrees of stress all the wealth of the operations of a thinking being. The method of abstracting a particular psychological operation from its connection in the total ongoing of consciousness is permissible for the purpose of analysis only. Even then it must not be treated as if it were a metaphysical entity. Great strides in psychological theory have been made since the time of Spinoza; the faculty theory of mind, sectioning off its several functions as if they acted, if not independently, yet with a minimum regard for other factors, naturally led to the separation of the perceptive and conceptive processes; this has now been completely abolished. Spinoza had no basis in fact for stripping perception of its psychological characteristics. He should have placed it under the attribute of thought.

Further, the psychical activities of imagination are not "dumb images on the tablet" but active creations of the mind. If it be reproductive imagination, the mind through the recognition of the present image must recall a past experienced image of the present; if productive imagination, the mind must go through a similar process with the difference that it exercises a freer method in the arrangement of its material. In the process of imagination, as indeed in all other mental processes, it is merely a question of emphasis in order to attain the immediate purpose in view, that compels us to speak of perception or imagination apart from the total ongoing of the psychical flow. In perception the emphasis is upon the presentative elements, but all the other processes are silent partners or like undertones in a musical composition; in conception the emphasis is upon thought or general notions abstracted from experience past and present, but again all processes including the presentative are there as undertones.

Spinoza's motive in his psychological theory was altogether commendable. He desired a unifying principle for thought and extension in the psychological activities of the soul. But in order to bring this about, it was unnecessary for him to *depsychologize* perception. It would have been far better from the viewpoint of his theory, had he retained the unity of the mind in all its processes. He might have made the attempt to unify thought and extension in the universal substance operative through the individual consciousness after the manner of Père Malebranche, but this did not occur to him. Then perception and conception would be processes in the infinite being, the reservoir of all psychical processes; or to give another angle to this consideration, the infinite substance would in such a case perform the thinking for the individual in such a way as to make individual and divine processes one and the same.

No Metaphysical Entity Known as "Mind"

Spinoza's conception of finite mind as a mode of the infinite dispenses entirely with the metaphysical subject of the psychical states. Mind is nothing but a psychical process whose definite content is some particular material object. The difficulties arising from this theory are insurmountable. Some sort of a unifying power, an apperceptive unity, for the whole psychical field of operation must be supplied. To assert that this unifying and linking of the states of consciousness take place in the infinite, simply throws us a step further back, but does not fully answer the question of a unifying principle. Is this supplied also by the infinite? Spinoza committed the error here of sacrificing the principle of unity to that of process; unity is attained through process. He could have relegated his statistical, psychical entity without sacrificing the real entity present in and through the processes.

Man's Moral Nature

It is well to remember that mind does not act upon the body, nor body upon the mind. Neither controls the other.[166]

The first thing that constitutes the essence of the mind is the idea of "an actually existing body."[167] All ideas are either adequate or inadequate. All actions of the mind as a mode of intelligible substance follow from adequate ideas; in all actions of the mind in consequence of inadequate ideas, it is acted upon and suffers.

Each thing endeavors to persist; that is, to struggle for existence, and the struggle or effort is the actual essence of the thing itself. In the mind this is will; in the body it is appetite. This struggle is a moral struggle. But it must always be remembered that everything which influences the mind acts from within the mind itself.[168] The affections of the body are confined to it and to the attribute of extension of which it is a mode. Nevertheless, mind essentially is partly at least an idea of the body.[169]

Under "Affects" Spinoza treats the moral nature of man as it emerges into conduct. The notions good and bad, approbation and disapprobation, and the ideal of conduct receive new values. Perfection is the accomplishment of what is proposed. *Perficere* means to make entirely or completely. Through mental construction we form typal objects such as houses, castles, etc. Insofar as objects fail to reach this type, they are regarded as imperfect. But we cannot apply this notion to nature, since nature never acts with an end in view such as a human being has in the erection of a house.[170] God or nature exists for no end and acts with no end in view.[171] Perfection is a way of looking at things, but there is nothing imperfect in nature. Perfection and reality are one and the same thing. Certain actions through a sense of an increase of perfection give us joy or pleasurable excitement, but when they give us a sense of diminished perfection, they produce sorrow. Similar tests are applied to the notions of good and bad. These are comparative terms of designation, subjective interpretations of the useful or hindering quality of things.[172]

The highest good and virtue of the mind is to know God. Of course there are objects which are good on a less exalted plane. Insofar as an object agrees with our reason, it cannot be evil.[173] The great test of social good is that men live in conformity to reason.[174] Both social and religious good are knit together. And "Everything which we desire and do, of which we are the cause insofar as we possess an idea of God, or insofar as we know God, I refer to religion."[175] Piety is the desire of doing well; honor the desire to join others in friendship: both piety and honor are of course guided by reason.

It is by the highest right of nature that each person exists and performs those things which follow from necessity from his own nature. It is by the highest right of nature also that each person judges what is good and evil. Life according to reason gives every one the privilege to enjoy the right of consulting his own advantage as he thinks best, of avenging himself, of endeavoring to preserve what he loves and destroy what he hates without inflicting injury upon any one else. For social advantage, men must relinquish their natural right and agree not to injure one another. Society to this end must establish law and enforce its mandates for its own preservation. Citizens are thus protected by the right of the state. In the natural state there is no good or evil, since each is obligated to look out for himself alone; sin is a social product. Violation of the social compact is sin; obedience to it is merit. Thus justice and injustice, sin and merit, receive their value from society. Man's freedom is gained by living according to reason in the state, far more than he is able to gain leading a solitary life.

Summary of Ethical Tenets

In a summary way, then, all our efforts or desires follow from the necessity of our nature. Those which are understood through adequate ideas pertain uniquely to the mind and are called actions; those which are understood through inadequate ideas pertain to the body and are called passions, and the mind is concerned with these insofar as it possesses inadequate ideas of them. The former, being determinations of reason, are always good; the latter may be good or evil. In a life of perfect reason is the highest happiness or blessedness. "For blessedness is nothing but the peace of mind which springs from the intuitive knowledge of God." What furthers intelligence or the life of reason is good, what hinders it is evil. No evil can befall a man from within; it must always come from external causes. When a man lives with those who are congenial to his nature, he is satisfied in his efforts to follow the common order. We are allowed the highest necessity of nature to remove what hinders a rational life and accept what advances it. Men must be taught to be guided by reason.

When men live according to passion, they are contrary to one another. Minds "are not conquered by arms, but by love and generosity."[176] It is profitable for men to form communities and friendships. To bring these about, skill and watchfulness are required—at least in the case of government—to select men who shall be guided by reason. The great advantages of communal unions must always be borne in mind. Justice, integrity and honor beget concord. "In order to win love, those things are chiefly necessary which have reference to religion and piety."[177] Concord may come with fear but not good faith.

Charity, the sexual relation and marriage must be conducted for the advancement of reason and the state. Flattery, the appearance of piety and religion, shame and indignation are to be avoided, for they ultimately tend to disunion. The grace of affability is good insofar as it enables men to live more in accord with reason. Everything in nature must subserve the uses of man. The mind being dependent upon the body, it goes without saying that the body must be furnished with all that it needs, and these needs can be best provided by social togetherness.

Let us bear with equanimity the circumstances over which we have no control and always remember that we are possessors of the better part—reason.

The way of liberty is the way of reason. How may reason control the affects? Both the Stoics and Descartes believed that the mind could control them, but this is an error.[178] A clear and distinct understanding of oneself and one's affects teaches us to love God and to love Him better as we have a better understanding of these things.[179] The love of God above everything else ought to occupy the mind.[180]

There are three kinds of knowledge: First, an inadequate idea of things; second, an inadequate idea of certain attributes of God; third, a knowledge of the essence of things. The latter is intuitive knowledge.[181] The more we understand things, the better we understand God. The knowledge of the essence of things is the highest effort and virtue of the human mind. The profoundest peace of mind comes from it, for it gives the highest human perfection and joy. From it springs the intellectual love of God; God is the cause of it. It has the mark of eternity upon it; it never originated and will never end. It is really a part of that infinite love with which God loves Himself.[182] In the strength of this love the wise man remains unshaken in mind, "being conscious by a certain eternal necessity of himself, of God, and of things, never ceases to be, and always enjoys true peace of soul." This way of salvation is difficult and "All noble things are as difficult as they are rare."[183]

Spinoza's Failure to Overcome the Dualism of Descartes Most Conspicuous in His Ethical Theory

Spinoza's theory always had an ethical bent which is very proper. His speculations as to causal substance were to serve as intellectual bases and inspirations for practical living. He would have human beings experience "Constant and eternal love toward God," and the effects in conduct which form an integral part of his ethics.

We have seen that the essential unity of thought and extension was not justified by the account which Spinoza gave of them. His ideal unity could not have been obtained without a *psychologized* extension or a *depsychologized* thought. He failed in his effort because he could not possibly make Descartes' two distinct and independent substances any other than distinct and independent. This inability is very conspicuous in his ethical theory. The age-old problem of good and evil, for example, presents itself for solution in the light of his theory. The universe he holds is essentially good. The infinite substance is essentially good; good in the sense of being rational. Insofar as finite minds conform to reason, so far forth are they good or rational. But as the author of the book of Job, the Greek dramatists and all ethical writers have discovered, there is a tough element, an irrational factor in the form of physical and moral evil, in life. Spinoza takes full note of this. The tough element is any hindrance to the rational and divine life. But how comes this? What is the origin of it? Did it enter the world through some garden of Eden or Promethean error? No, replies Spinoza, it belongs to the constitution of things. Its origin is found in the attribute of extension. From this source comes all that baffles us in reaching the ideal goal of rationality. Could we live fully and purely the life of the mind, we should be perfect individuals and perfect social beings, and all trouble and sorrow would flee away. But 'There's the rub." We act contrary to reason, and dire consequences both to the individual and society follow. The disruptive forces arise by necessity to defeat our best intentions. They arise from the nature of things; nothing in the universe can prevent their operation. They inevitably emerge from the attribute of extension.

All our evils thus come from an extra-mental cause. Thus the cause of the tough element in life, inadequate ideas, maladjustments and what-not, is an attribute of God called extension, of which our body and all externality are modes. There is no help for us, therefore. We are doomed to these inconveniences; we cannot escape our own body in particular or the external world in general. The affects of our body are our great moral problem; and insofar as we are able to master these are we free from the bondage of evil. Let us therefore love God with whom we have affinity, for herein lies our peace of soul and our happiness. By thus spiritualizing ourselves more and more, shall we escape from the crass and deterrent influence of extension upon our mind. This is the way of salvation.

The infinite being is therefore like a house divided against itself. One section of it, through its modes, acts as a deterrent force against the other section. Since "Substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute and now under that," how is it possible for these two attributes to be inimical to each other? And yet, there is no escaping the conclusion, Spinoza makes them antagonistic. Aside from this, the moral doctrine enunciated is to be commended for its consistency and thoroughness. Moral inconsistencies must be settled from within. Both the antagonism and solution are in reality itself. No distribution of responsibility, according to dualistic or pluralistic schemes, can eliminate this necessity. When the tough element is supposed to come from a source other than the ultimate, the irresistible query is, what is the relation of the ultimate to this source? If a fallen angel be responsible for evil, who is responsible for him? How came he to be evolved in such a manner as to make it possible for him to become a deterrent force? All sorts of makeshifts have been resorted to in answering this question. But Spinoza places evil in the very heart of things. Its source is in the extended part of God; this extension is tough, inefficacious, non-moral. The infinite mind is essentially linked with this. There is no escape for the infinite; there is no escape for the finite. This ultimate fact is the basis of the moral problem of the universe as it appears at least in the attributes and modes of infinite substance. It is thus both a divine and a human problem. It is true, of course, that

Spinoza contends that all distinctions fade away in the infinite. But since the tough element owes its origin to the attribute of extension and an attribute is what we are able to perceive of substance, even Spinoza would not contend that we perceive what is not there or what has no basis whatever in fact. Not only, therefore, does evil originate in man when the self-maintaining principle asserts itself through him, but prior to this it is imbedded in God Himself. In spite of all that Spinoza said to the contrary, he has shackled the infinite illegitimately with dead extension. It is impossible to preserve the unity of mind and matter without *moralizing* and putting a psychical element into extension.

The moral problem can, we think, be so grounded in a metaphysical theory as to make it easier of solution than by the method of Spinoza suggested. But he made permanent contributions to such a solution. Even a small fraction of the debt which reflective thinkers owe this Portuguese Jew has not yet been paid. His intuition was as unerring as his metaphysical judgment was acute. He was a great prophet in metaphysical theory, and the burden of his message was that a monistic system of metaphysics with all its difficulties is a better basis for ethics, religion and science than dualistic and pluralistic notions of reality.

CHAPTER TWO

SCIENTIFIC NOTIONS OF UNITY

Unity in Ordinary Knowledge

DEEPER REFLECTION UPON any of life's problems reveals a demand for the unification of its diversities. In unreflective thought, the human race presents a hopeless diversity. Different bodily forms, psychological attitudes and habits, language, political institutions and nationality leave an impression upon the unreflective of chaos and irrationality. During the earlier years of life, all human beings are doomed to insularity because of their dependence upon family life and environment. As they become acquainted with other families and communities and enter the cultural processes of school and university, insular attitudes are replaced by more comprehensive outlooks. With the consequent enlargement of knowledge and sympathy, the individual unity discovers a remarkable unity between himself and other human beings, especially if they be on a similar social and educational status. Going farther afield, he discovers striking unities in the attitudes and thought of ancient and modern peoples, and far-off lands and times begin to stir within him a singular warmth and charm. In fine, the individual through his enlarging life begins to discover his own inner life as an interpreter and containing elements to enable him to understand not only races on a higher plane of development but also the backward peoples of the world. Culture thus gives a deathblow to his provincialism and insularity; and the deeper his insight the profounder his conviction that the creator "Hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth."

Scientific Quest for Unity—Biology

The history of science illustrates the passion for unity which its devotees have manifested. During the 19th century the science of biology made a great contribution to the concept of nature as presenting a unity. All phenomena of life came to be regarded as diverse manifestations of living material. In the animal and vegetable kingdoms, not only were forms discovered, which have varied during long periods of development, according to a definite scheme,—let us say, that of natural selection as either outlined by Darwin or Weismann or their schools,—and which can be according to structure and environment classified and reduced to a few original if not to a single form, but a unity was discovered in the chemical and physical constituents of all organisms which will account for their structure. Huxley gives a clear statement of this view. "I suppose that, to many, the idea that there is such a thing as a physical basis, or matter, of life may be novel —so widely spread is the conception of life as a something which works through matter, but is independent of it; and even those who are aware that matter and life are inseparably connected, may not be prepared for the conclusion plainly suggested by the phrase, the physical basis or matter of life, that there is some one kind of matter which is common to all living beings, and that their endless diversities are bound together by a physical, as well as an ideal, unity. In fact, when first apprehended, such a doctrine as this appears almost shocking to common sense."[184]

Protoplasm is the physical basis of life—life not apart from it but an immanent power in it. We must not think of it, said Tyndall, as an outside force, as we think of the slaves who built the pyramids, but rather as if the pyramids had been built by the resident forces of the materials out of which they were constructed. The resident forces of protoplasmic molecules are the causes of the divers forms and expressions of life known to us. Whatever may be the exterior manifestation of life, its physical, protoplasmic basis has an underlying unity. It possesses unity of power. All protoplasm strives to maintain and develop the particular body of which it forms a part; to affect changes in the relative positions it occupies; and has a tendency to maintain the species. These functions belong to both plants and animals; animals are more organized forms of protoplasm than plants. The main difference between them is that plants manufacture protoplasm from mineral compounds and animals take it ready-made from plants and animals. Then protoplasm has unity of form. What is this form? Human blood contains small discs or corpuscles, which give it color and others of irregular shape with a nucleus in them. These nucleated discs are protoplasm. The form of matter found in all living things is this nucleated protoplasm. And since life at the lower end of the scale is deficient in nuclei, we are able to state that all living matter so far as the physical form is concerned is composed of nucleated and non-nucleated masses of protoplasm. Finally, protoplasm has unity of composition. This is protein, composed of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen and nitrogen.

Life, therefore, originates by the building up on the part of the vegetable and animal the compounds carbonic acid, ammonia and water derived from the basal atoms already mentioned. Of course, Huxley admits that these atoms combine in a manner unknown to us to form life. Tyndall traced all energy manifested in organic life back to the sun. He reminds us of the maxim of the scholastics; out of nothing, nothing comes. No power is produced either in the organic or inorganic world without the expenditure of power; there is no creation of force upon this earth; it originates in the sun. "It is the sun that separates the carbon from the oxygen of the carbonic acid, and thus enables them to recombine in the furnace of the steam-engine or in the animal body, the origin of the power they produce is the same. In this sense we are all 'souls of fire and children of the sun.' But, as remarked by Helmholtz, we must be content to share our celestial pedigree with the meanest of living things."[185]

Professor Schaeffer, in an address as President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science on "The Mystery of Life," contended that the problems of life are the problems of matter.[186] Living beings are governed by laws identical with those regnant in inanimate matter.[187] He proceeded to show that the line between organic and inorganic chemistry has disappeared; that the chemistry of the living organism is passing every day from the biologist to the pure chemist. We may even hope for the day when the material of the cell, which is not very complicated, may be prepared synthetically. Life has evolved from lifeless material by a gradual process of change, arriving at "the borderland between inanimate and animate, to material which has all the characteristics to which we attach the term 'life.' "[188] Even questions of heredity, according to Professor Schaeffer, must be referred to chemistry for solution.

The notion of life as an inherent force in matter is both scientifically and philosophically justifiable. There are no external forces. To consider life as an element super-added, a demon ready at all times to enter the uninviting abodes of dead matter is fascinating mythology but hardly commends itself to the fundamental thinker.

Nor is the scientific thinker able to rest with the identification of life and matter. It is very apparent that there is no life without the accompaniment of consciousness. If life be made a function of matter, how shall we relate consciousness to it? Is it also a function of matter? Are life and consciousness inherent forces of matter? It would appear that the arguments which are valid for refusing to consider life an external force to matter are equally valid for making consciousness also an immanent force. Tyndall felt the consistency and cogency of this line of argument. Speaking of natural evolution, he stated: "For what are the core and essence of this hypothesis? Strip it naked, and you stand face to face with the notion that not alone the more ignoble forms of animalcular or animal life, not alone the nobler forms of the horse and lion, not alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that the human mind itself—emotion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena—were once latent in a fiery cloud." Yet, while accepting this hypothesis from the historical viewpoint, making consciousness a metaphysical fact of the material universe and holding that matter is "the promise and potency of all terrestrial life," he conceived the passage from the physics of the brain to consciousness to be an impassable gulf, at least from the viewpoint of knowledge. The law of continuity compelled him to believe the passage is made. Ultimately, of course, this is not a problem for physiological psychology; it lies deeper. Tyndall saw this. He contended that to account for both life and consciousness we must not only seek their origin in the nebulous womb of matter but in a spiritual principle. Matter wore to him two faces,—a spiritual and a material. Matter must thus be exalted; it is not merely brutal, it is the garment of God.

Huxley also accepts this consistent conception of the unity of matter, life and consciousness. He held "Materialism to involve a grave philosophical error." He was not alarmed lest causation and materialism should drive out spirit and spontaneity. Matter to him was an unknown, hypothetical cause of states of consciousness; and spirit an unknown and hypothetical cause or condition of states of consciousness. Both are hypotheses. They are both assumed "substrata of groups of natural phenomena." Necessary law is also a fiction. Law does not possess the element of necessity. In the last analysis we have no knowledge of the nature of matter and spirit. But "the materialistic position that there is nothing in the world but matter, force and necessity is as utterly devoid of justification as the most baseless of theological dogmas." Huxley thinks that the man who contends that materialism has the last word is in the predicament of the mathematician who confounds his symbols with the realities they represent. The symbols of the materialist, atoms, forces and laws are indicative of a spiritual reality.

It is passing strange that an intellect so keen as Huxley's could be satisfied with the type of agnosticism which he espoused. The inner essence of the material and spiritual, however important it may be, is something of which we know nothing and can know nothing. It were as foolish for us to discuss the politics of the inhabitants of the moon as to discuss matters which are utterly beyond our ken. Nevertheless, against this position, it is proper to contend that spirit in its very essence comes within our ken. Our inner spiritual life is our absolute possession. It is the only thing we really and truly know. All else is known by second intent and through our knowledge of our own spirit. The very essence of spiritual life is to be the very self-conscious beings that we actually are. To realize the actual ongoing of the stream of consciousness in its conative, intellective and emotional aspects, and to realize that in all parts of its onflow, there is a unity as well as a difference,—that and that only is the essence of the spiritual life. This does not of course exhaust the account of it, but it indicates what it essentially is.

The Heel of Achilles

There is liable to be a vulnerable point in the argument for the unity both of life and consciousness with matter which some scientists put forth. Violating the law of continuity, they expect life and consciousness to issue forth from the lifeless and consciousless atoms of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen and a few salts as Minerva came fully panoplied from the brain of Zeus. All analogies of experience demand that antecedent provision be made for what comes after. *Ex nihil, nihil fit.* If there be nothing originally in matter capable of producing life and consciousness, then it must be introduced at a subsequent period in the process of its development, If so, when? But an interpolation of this sort would subject nature to the play of *ab extra* forces; of such intrusions we know nothing so far as the ordinary performances of nature are concerned. The rational consistency involved in the principle of continuity rules out all extraneous interferences with natural processes.

Professor Schaeffer seems to have overlooked this important point; for he regards life as having been developed by a gradual process "from material which was lifeless" and not by sudden alteration, "whether exerted by natural or supernatural agency."[189] But apparently he had endeavored to extract something from nothing. The scientist should know nothing of creation *de novo*. He only deals with transformations. But there is surely something more than a transformation when Professor Schaeffer endeavors to deduce life from lifeless matter. By what process of magic could such a result be obtained? Now, if we are to cast out all Cagliostros from the field of scientific endeavor, and science has gone very far in this direction, we must adhere to that conception of nature which holds to the consistency and rationality of its processes. When an investigator fails to obtain a general statement in the form of a law, descriptive of certain phenomena, he must await a fuller knowledge of their recurrence, believe that ultimately he will discover, in spite of all indications to the contrary, their amenability to law. The progress of science has been made possible by the application of more and more generalized notions to natural phenomena. The phenomena of eclipses or the appearance of comets are no longer regarded as either irrational or supernatural, simply because the laws affecting the relative movements of heavenly bodies have been stated and verified. This is typical of the progress made in all departments of science.

Unity of Matter and Force—the Atomic Theory

In the struggle to unify matter and force reflective thinking has been divided between the conception of a rigid, unchangeable body and the notion that matter, which may seem rigid and unchangeable to sense perception, is the expression of dynamical movements. The atom as a rigid body or as a center of force was the problem confronting the early atomists. Democritus bequeathed to modern scientific thought a notion of matter from which it has been gradually extricating itself. He conceived two material realities, the full (plenus) and the void (vacuus) or as we should say, atoms and intervening space. The atoms were infinite in number, differing in shape, order and position. They had different magnitudes and their weight was directly proportional to their mass. They had no qualitative but only quantitative differentiations. They were ultimates and uncaused. The heavier atoms were forced downward, causing the lighter ones to move upward and the collisions encountered by some of the atoms caused the lateral movements and vortices. These vortices in turn became the beginning of the formation of worlds. The motion of the atom was also primordial and uncaused; that is to say, both the atom and its motion were eternal. An extended atom possessing the quality of motion is the result of this early reflection.

Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) in his dispute with Peter Cazraeus, the Jesuit, denied that atoms had secondary qualities or accidental forms. This was a rejection of the Aristotelian theory of substantial forms, which held that over above the accidental forms such as heat, color, etc., of fire, for example, was the substantial form capable of producing fire. This distinction was valueless to Gassendi, although under the pressure of ecclesiastical authority he was willing to make it at a later date.

Gassendi contended that the changes which take place in matter are merely mechanical displacements. Atoms are self-moving and this original movement is the cause of all motion in bodies. But this motion is not eternal; God imparted it at creation and constantly renews it. Atoms are never at rest; they always move at the same speed, even when they are in combinations. Their motion is the source of the energy of the world. The force of gravity in atoms may be derived from the magnetism of the earth.

Gassendi also reversed the scholastic doctrine of matter and form. Matter to the scholastics was a passive lump, but form gave it actual existence. To Gassendi matter was the important factor; form was of no consequence. Form comes and goes; matter remains constant in bulk, older than all things, surviving when forms pass away. Thus he conceives the atom as extended in agreement with the Greek atomists. But he differed with them about the origin of motions, which they considered to be eternal. Motion to Gassendi was a supernatural endowment. Otherwise Gassendi is in entire agreement with the Greek thinkers.

To Robert Boyle (1627-1691) the atoms had various shapes which influenced the stability or laxity of their combinations. They are sometimes brought into violent motion and torn asunder by a similar process. They adhere to each other because of rough surfaces, projections and teeth. He also conceived of pores or empty spaces between atoms.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) made the motion of atoms relative. There are also atoms of different orders and imponderable atoms are lodged in the inter-spaces of gravitative matter.

Isaac Newton (1642-1727) made the rough surfaces and manifold shapes of the atoms superfluous. By his theory of attraction, they could be securely fastened together, even without hooks or teeth. God imparted to atoms their initial motion. Newton laid the foundation of molecular physics by his theory that the gravitation or attraction of a whole planet was but the sum of the gravitation of all its parts. Naturally the followers of Newton proceeded to assert that gravity was a fundamental force of all matter, but Newton repudiated this notion.

Johan Jacob Berzelius (1779-1848) accounted for the affinity of atoms because of their electrical constitution.

Lange, after canvassing carefully the views held upon the subject of matter and force, concluded: "The progress of the sciences has led us more and more to put force in the place of matter, and that the increasing exactness of research more and more resolves matter into force."[190] Both physicist and chemist are certainly able to dispense with the notion of matter and are thus verifying Lange's prediction. The chemist at present is not only satisfied with the electrical constitution of matter, but he proceeds into further subdivisions of it into protons and electrons. Further, the eternal atom of Democritus and Leucippus is now seen to be amenable to time, and like living matter obeys the law of evolution. Atoms are evolved, run their course and disappear, to reappear in the endless cycle of atomic life. The physicist therefore seems for the present to dominate chemistry, for all material objects are specific concentrations of electricity. What need is there of an atomic theory at all? Is it not a piece of outworn speculation? That question probably will be answered by scientific investigators upon the basis of utility. The atomic theory will serve so long as it may be convenient for orientating certain facts and principles. The significant result of this substitution of force for matter is that scientific workers are inevitably led through many contradictions to seek a higher unity in their theories.

Luminiferous Aether

The physicist could not rest with hypotheses which only accounted for the local expenditure of energy. Newton had introduced a splendid unifying principle into the physical world through his theory of gravitation, thus giving coherence to masses both infinitely large and small, placing bands around Orion and a molecule. But so far as solar masses in particular were concerned in their influence upon each other, another question had to be answered. How was it possible for the sun at a distance of ninety-three million miles to exert its gravitative influence upon the earth? Was there a medium to transmit it, or did the force of gravitation shoot across the intervening space without the aid of a conveying medium? Scientific speculation hesitated not in its answer; an all-pervading aether was requisitioned to fill the chasm and bear the burden. Tyndall's imagination gives us a picture of this substance. "It is almost infinitely more attenuated than any known gas, but its properties are those of a solid rather than of a gas. It resembles jelly rather than air."[191] "A body thus constituted may have its boundaries; but, although the ether may not be coextensive with space, it must at all events extend as far as the most distant visible stars. In fact, it is the vehicle of their light, and without it they could not be seen. This all-pervading substance takes up their molecular tremors, and conveys them with inconceivable rapidity to our organs of vision. It is the transported shiver of bodies countless millions of miles distant which translates itself in human consciousness into the splendour of the firmament at night."[192]

But the transmission of energy either in the form of gravitation or light expresses only a part of the function of the aether. It must be regarded as the all-pervading energy of which all physical phenomena are specific instances. The aether transmits light, heat and sound on the principle of vortexing in a fluid; atoms are also vortex rings within the aether.

This universal aether, therefore, would form a background for Newton's gravitative force, a desideratum which Newton himself felt, for molecular energies of all sorts as well as acting as a carrier of energy through space.

Such a notion, if it can bear the strain put upon it, is very much needed in the realm of science. It does not dispense with any hypothesis of value in any particular department of nature while it affords the best means of coördinating the various natural forces. The atomic theory might still weather the storm on this expanse of oceanic energy and could even accommodate the theory of the evolution and devolution of the atom. Gravitation, the attraction and repulsion of electricity and magnetism, would find ample scope within it. It is for the scientist, of course, to determine his need of the aetheric hypothesis; but if he found its provisions adapted to his labors it would give more consistency and coördination than any theory thus far advanced. Sir Joseph Larmor believes that the combining of experimental science and theory in the hypothesis of the aether "has elevated our presumption of the rationality of all natural processes, so far as we can apprehend them at all, into practical certainty."[193]

The Law of the Conservation of Energy

The scientist, although no longer interested in the continuance and indestructibility of an extended atom, is nevertheless anxious to maintain a definite quantity of energy in the universe, despite all the transformations this energy might undergo. Experimentally the law of the conservation of energy is found valid. It finds quantitative equivalence between various natural phenomena of a measurable type, and when the energy passes from one physical type to another the energy is conserved in unaltered amount in the new type. Thus the sum of both potential and kinetic energy is a constant factor in nature. From the theoretical viewpoint, this notion of the quantum of energy is also necessary in order to form an equilibrium which will constantly insure equivalent exchanges of energy.

If the aether, therefore, be conceived as suggested above as an indefinitely extended ocean of energy and a certain portion of it be stimulated to activity, the work expended is not lost; rather must this portion be considered a vortical movement pursuing its swirl at this definite point in space, which when it ceases to perform its cycle of activity is found in an equivalent quantum of activity performing another aetheric swirl at another definite point of space.

The hypotheses of the aether and the conservation of energy continued until recently to be the most generalized notions of science respecting the physical world. They are consummate expressions of the desire for a larger and more inclusive unitary conception of nature and her processes. This desire is a hidden prophecy in all scientific theories. They also express the supreme effort of the scientist to escape the inevitable contradictions in the consideration of any partial physical process.

This is indicated even more emphatically in recent scientific developments, especially in connection with the notion of a space-time continuum. This theory as developed by Minkowski and by leading scientists becomes an omnivorous monster devouring all previous scientific generalizations. Euclidian geometry and Newtonian gravitation are easily disposed of. Matter, mass and even energy, which disinherited the concept of matter, are now viewed as curvatures or aspects of space-time. Electromagnetism follows the fate of gravitation. J. C. Smuts stated that into the scientific scheme, either previous to Minkowski's developments in 1908 or subsequently, "It has been difficult, if not impossible, to fit entities like life and mind; and the scientific attitude on the whole has been to put them to a suspense account and to await developments. As to the supernatural, science is or has been agnostic, if not frankly skeptical."[194]

Whatever consolation the scientific generalizer might derive from this theory, it leaves the metaphysician hopeless. It is based on mathematical abstractions. It is certainly impossible to fit metaphysical entities into such a scheme—impossible because the theory of the fourth dimension, however plausible it may seem to the mathematical physicist, has no metaphysical basis. It is merely a principle of the mathematical explanation of events and the conversion for this purpose of all entities into events. This mathematical conundrum may be used extensively by scientific men, who care nothing about realities so long as their pointer readings justify them in obtaining mathematical formulae. Upon these they base an astounding superstructure of mathematical physics. But it is not the present intention to criticize this theory as much as to point out that it bids fair to become the most comprehensive generalization of present-day science. Thus, more and more, the trend is unmistakably toward a greater and still greater unitary conception in the scientific interpretation of nature.

The quantum theory discovered by Max Planck, for the time being, however, challenges the supremacy of the space-time continuum theory. Scientists are busily at work in the endeavor to reconcile them. This very urge for reconciliation, once more, comes from an undeviating belief in an underlying unity, which is yet to be defined and which will continue as a great ideal luring the scientific mind. As this ideal becomes gradually actualized, it will not only include a reconciliation of many diverse theories, which are at present entertained, but will include many aspects of life which at present seem alien to the scientific scheme of things. "An adequate world-view would find them all," we fain would believe, "in their proper context in the framework of the whole."[195] That is to say, we heartily agree with General Smuts, who reposes his faith in a holistic universe, in which "beauty and holiness are as much aspects of nature as energy and entropy."[196] Science and ethical values as well as those of art and religion will thus find their place in the context of the whole. In this way, we must conceive of the world of atoms, electrons, protons, radiations and quanta as in a genetically evolving universe advancing from stage to stage as it emerges assuming different aspects and behaviors which makes new concepts and laws necessary for their explanation. Beneath all this there is a fundamental unity of plan or organization, which not only binds the different stages of the evolutionary process together but reveals itself in both process and product.

S. Alexander in his work, *Space, Time and Deity,* makes an attempt at a holistic universe, but on a very different basis from that of General Smuts. To him, the stuff of the universe is space-time. This is the womb in which all things are produced. Space-time must not be interpreted as a spiritual principle: it is space-time first and last. It is the space-time of experience conceived according to the mathematical formula of the fourth dimension. This is the basic principle of all being, from it issues mind and material things. In two volumes, Professor Alexander leads us by tortuous and intricate ways, in which we must observe infinite details, passing through emergent, categorical and empirical configurations of space-time; then through emergent primary and secondary qualities; until we finally come to life and mind and through them emerge the tertiary qualities of truth, beauty and goodness. At length we reach the climateric point: Deity is reached as the last term in the series. This is an astounding process and a most astounding result. Out of a space-time, mathematical conundrum, nothing could emerge so far as the ordinary mind could make out; but this philosophical Cagliostro produces a whole universe from it.

Mr. Alexander's method is very defective philosophically. He identifies scientific procedure, which cares nothing about the subject-matter and is concerned only with basic mathematical formulae, with metaphysics, which is compelled to deal with the subject-matter. Thus the fourth dimension becomes a reality. This is the reality which Mr. Alexander, the realist, regards as other than mind,—a reality, therefore, which should have been amenable to sense perception. But no man hath at any time seen the fourth dimension. How can anything emerge out of this unreality? How can a universe of physical and biological material emerge from a mathematical formula? To say nothing of a universe of minds and Deity! It must be admitted that the attempt is a magnificent one and is conceived on a very inspiring scale, but to conceive of deity produced in the matrix of a fourth dimensional formula is a contradiction in terms and a very sad confusion of thought. What producing or emerging power can a mere formula possess?

Nevertheless, Mr. Alexander is a true interpreter of the persistent quest of the Scientist for a comprehensive unity in the interpretation of nature.

The Struggle for Unity in the Science of Psychology

The struggle for unity in psychological interpretation has assumed two aspects: One, the discovery of unity among states of consciousness; another, to establish the presence of a unitary subject of the states of consciousness.

It has already been indicated that whatever may be regarded as a psychosis, any fact or process of consciousness, involves an intellective, conative and emotional phase. It is permissible of course to describe the intellectual aspect without reference to the other phenomena; but such a description is an abstraction for analytical purposes, for all phases are constantly and inevitably involved. In the psychical life one or the other may be stressed but never eliminated. The way in which a certain aspect of a psychical act is viewed is comparable to the treatment of the material universe by students of the particular sciences. The chemist regards it as a complexity of interrelated atoms; the physicist as a concourse of centers of forces: but both atoms and forces are admitted to be phases of one, identical universe. When the chemist is dealing with the groupings of oxygen and hydrogen in the element of water, he assumes the existence of all other atoms or indeed the fact, it may be, that the element of water is only a chemical process in the unified stuff of the aether. He is merely emphasizing these particular vortices within the all-inclusive aetheric substratum. Likewise in the emphasis upon certain groupings of psychoses, it must always be assumed that they are partial processes in the all-inclusive activity of consciousness.

This viewpoint, now the common property of psychology was not always accepted. The faculty theory treated the phenomena of consciousness as a system of processes separated into distinct compartments operating in relatively independent ways. Such a naïve attitude cannot now command scientific approval; and yet it is assumed today as the basis of a stupendous system of theology and as the foundation upon which the sectaries of religion very largely differentiate themselves. The advocates of the volitional and emotional attitudes in the religious life are by far in the majority; those accepting the intellectual foundation are in the minority.

The supreme problem for the psychologist is the unitary nature of the subject of the states of consciousness. Or it may be better to state the problem differently. The psychologist tries to avoid metaphysical assumptions as to the nature of the subject of psychical states, and this has driven him often to the extremes of endeavoring to psychologize without a subject. Psychology without a soul has become the battle cry of the newer developments in psychology. But despite worthy intentions to keep psychology within proper bounds, it becomes impossible for the psychologist to avoid the principle of unity which manifests itself in the phenomena of conscious life. A systematic unity indicating a single substratum constantly demands an explanation from his theory.

William James would only assert that consciousness tends to be personal. "It seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not *thought* or *this thought* or *that thought* but *my thought,* every thought being owned."[197] He preferred the modest phrase, "Tend to appear," rather than "Appear" on account of those facts of subconscious personality, automatic writing, etc., which indicate the presence of secondary personal selves. In these secondary selves the stress of consciousness is split off from the main current, but even these rivulets—albeit inferior offshoots of the main stream—also tend to be personal.

Consciousness to James *is a sequence of different feelings,* thus agreeing with Shadworth Hodgson and even borrowing his phrase. He believed "No state once gone can recur and be identical with what it was before."[198] We cannot have two sensations alike. As every sensation is correlated with cerebral action, it is likewise correct to say that we cannot have two brain states alike. We never, from either the nervous or mental viewpoint descend twice into the same stream. What we know of submaximal nerveirritations indicates that they are not physiologically ineffective and presumably they are not bare of psychical results. A permanent idea such as the simple idea of the school of Locke, constantly appearing and disappearing in consciousness, is as much of a myth as the Jack of Spades. Consciousness must be viewed as a continuous stream of processes with past processes merging with the present, only in the sense that the present process uses the past through present recollection or other processes.

The stream of consciousness has also a fringe composed of half-hidden pools and sporadic sprays; in other words, there are inarticulate states of consciousness.

James contended further that human consciousness appears to deal with objects outside itself; it may in the act of knowing distinguish between itself and the object known, but it need not of necessity so do.

Consciousness, I think, may very well be pictured as a stream. It is always a process; it is never stationary. It is not characterized by static and unchangeable elements, either as ideas or thoughts. The stream of consciousness, however, differs greatly from any stream we know, for its references are backward as well as forward, lateral as well as longitudinal. In fine, to change the metaphor, consciousness radiates in all directions from a given center. The only value in the metaphor of a stream is to indicate that consciousness is a process. Further it cannot go, for the details of this process are far too complicated to be comprehended under this figure. It possesses spiral movements in all directions; and while these are going forward a thousand reverse movements may be made at the same time. And yet through it all this complicated process is aware of its activities. But the awareness is always confined to the present. Whether the past be recognized as its own peculiar possession or by anticipation, it endeavors to anticipate the future, which is not yet within the range of its experience, both these memories and vaticinations take place in the strength of the latest conscious process. And strangest of all, the latest conscious issue carries both an epitome of its own conscious life as well as an epitome of a consciousness or something to which this is an index which includes it.

The truth, therefore, of the stream metaphor is that whatever reference may be made by consciousness, no two of its references can ever be alike. It cannot duplicate itself. When in memory we try to relive the past experience, we are not reliving it but reconstructing it from present experiences. If we have the delusion of living the past over again, it is only because we are supplying the dead carcass of past experience with present living experience. We are not and cannot live in any past moment; that is gone forever. The present experience alone is ours. Thus in a very real sense we never dip into the same stream twice.

Now it is impossible to split a section of consciousness from itself. A *split-off consciousness* would be as foreign to the main stream as if it were the possession of another distinct personality. These splittings off must be regarded as the work of consciousness itself. It is possible—nay indeed, individuals actually so do—to personify these isolated fragments. Theories contending for the presence of distinct personalities in the same individual mistake these personifications of fragments of consciousness for actual individualities. To this difficulty, another must be added. If the split-off consciousness be still regarded as a rivulet from the original stream, whose processes nevertheless are participated in by the parent stream, then in reality it cannot be split off.

As to subconscious states, we need a better analysis and description of them. All possible experience is subconscious in the sense that it has not yet emerged into consciousness. Consciousness when analyzed is always seen to be a process in a larger process as indicated. This is true of any stream. The stream flowing at our feet is compounded chemically from oxygen and hydrogen; but are not these in turn parts of an inclusive material universe? Or, if you will, are not the forces represented by these atoms and those operating upon them parts of the universal material force whose operations are coextensive with the material universe? A stream wherever found is not a cut-off segment of matter. It embodies the history of the solar system, our globe and other matter throughout the universe. Thus it is with the stream of consciousness. It is not only a process in animal life, but also a process in the universe. In the individual it is not cut off from the rest of existence. It does not appear *de novo* either in a human being or in sub-human life. *De novo* appearances are beyond the range of our knowledge; we can deal only with transformations or modifications of existing processes.

The facts of religious experience testify in a pre-eminent way to the participation of the individual in a life which includes his own. The ideal of the religious soul is to merge itself more and more into the life of God. The great religious souls of the world became preëminent because to a higher degree than ordinary mortals their life was hidden in God; they lost their lives in order to gain them; they lived, moved and had their being in God. The followers of Jesus could not conceive of a more sublime experience of the master than to cause him to say, "Nevertheless not my will, but thine, be done." Human consciousness being a process in the divine consciousness, a more complete coördination between them would not only add to the experiential content of the individual but would increase very materially his influence among men to lead them into the larger life.

The notion of personality must, therefore, be revised. It must not be conceived as the unchangeable subject of the processes of our psychical life. The science of psychology presents us with a unitary subject of psychical experiences. Consciousness is a process aware of itself. But as we contemplate it in this guise, we must avoid confusion. Metaphors seem to indicate a subject superadded to consciousness. If consciousness be spoken of as a stream, then inevitably something like a spirit brooding over the stream, flitting back and forth from source to mouth supervising its movements, supplying us with connecting links of information between the upper and lower parts, is thought of. But there is no such supervising agency. All that can be said from the genetic point of view at least is that the stream of individual consciousness flows out from its source, and while it threads its way along its course it becomes conscious of itself at particular stages, involving in that consciousness a reminiscence of its past experiences. Even such an acute thinker as John Stuart Mill committed the error of assuming a supervising agency. "If therefore we speak of the mind as a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, *ex hypothesi,* is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series."[199] The mind, then, to Mill is something possessing the states of consciousness.

But a subtle fallacy lurks in this distinction. We are dealing with a single process; consciousness must not be thought of as a process and a state of consciousness as another process. These distinctions may be helpful in filling up the lacunae of descriptive language but have no basis in reality. When we are conscious of a process of thought, all that can be meant by the term mind or ego is involved; it includes all the wealth of psychic life and all that this psychic life really is. To think of mind as something other than the process, an ego, a substance, a metaphysical entity or what not, is at a par with distinction between matter and force in the physical sciences. As matter is interpreted in terms of force, mind must also be interpreted in terms of its forthputtings. Consciousness is the essence of mind. Consciousness is the general state of mind. It is allowable, of course, to select any part of the process of consciousness for discussion and interpretation, but it is quite erroneous to think of the part selected in terms of process and the remainder in the terms of a static ego. The ego is the actual process of consciousness considered in its generalized form; it is a dynamic process. In describing any process of consciousness, the ego is thereby described.

In this sense, though the mind may not be identified with a series of states of consciousness, it is identified with all its states, not in the sense of a mathematical but rather a metaphysical totality. This will not be difficult to see when we reinterpret our physical analogies. The distinction between the moon and its phases is clear. The phases are the relations which we conceive the moon to sustain toward other objects. A revolving moon in relation to the revolutions of both the earth and itself and the effect of these upon the incidence of light passing from the sun to the moon are what is meant by the phases of the moon. But there is no such spacial basis of comparison for consciousness; its phases are the actual realizations which it essentially is.

Consciousness as a Mathematical and as a Metaphysical Unity

Much confusion has arisen in conceiving the kind of unity consciousness really is. The deliverance of consciousness as to its unitary grasp is unmistakable. Its sense of unity in spite of all its changes, its conviction of identity through all the passing phases of its history is undeniable at least under normal conditions of mind. But is the unity of consciousness mathematical or metaphysical? If mathematical, then it consists merely in adding together the states of consciousness. In the act of perceiving an apple on a tree, the experience, however, does not consist in simply adding sensations and past experiences. Roundness added to redness, hardness, etc., would not yield the perceived apple. A sensation cannot amalgamate or associate itself with other sensations, much less call up the wealth of representative experiences entering into the act. Still less is it able to summon to its aid those processes which are always present and which cannot be traced to experience. Here is not meant certain categories as space and time, which many argue are the result of accumulated experiences, but that unique ability of knowledge itself, which is able not only to command the entire wealth of consciousness in the perception of an apple but the recognition of it as such among the infinite variety of experiential objects. Nor is a sensation able to search the stored up experiences of the past and select from them what it actually needs for the purpose of perceiving an apple, to say nothing of adjusting the interactions of consciousness to a system larger than itself, a universe which includes it and operates through it. Whence then comes the *gentle force* which unites sensations to all experiences and processes entering into the perception of an apple? Our reply is that it comes from consciousness and the forces operative through it. Consciousness is the substratum; that is the most feasible hypothesis. This is the spiritual reality operative in all the phenomena of consciousness imparting unity and consistency to them. It is therefore a metaphysical and not a mathematical unity.

There is notwithstanding a common ground which the metaphysical and mathematical theorists may occupy. The mathematical viewpoint, though less satisfying philosophically, makes a more thoroughgoing attempt to regard mind as an immanent cause in the phenomena of consciousness; whereas the assumption of a spiritual principle expressing itself through the phenomena is often considered *ab extra* to them. A parallel to these attitudes in psychology and theory of knowledge is found in the discussions of vitalism and the theory of living matter in biology. The newer attitude in biology has successfully demonstrated that the hypothesis of a superadded vital force is erroneous. Life is an inherent force of matter.

David Hume attempted to accomplish for psychology what has thus been realized for biology. He tried to solve the problem whether knowledge could be accounted for without assuming a metaphysical entity, a mind or a soul. Is knowledge an inherent characteristic of the phenomena of consciousness themselves? Hume's solution is acute, if unsatisfactory. The problem of knowledge is more complicated than matter and force in physics or vital force and living matter in biology. These are purely metaphysical questions. They deal with the content of consciousness; whereas a theory about knowledge has reference to both the content of consciousness and the nature of that unique process which results in knowledge. Hume's adventure, commendable as it is, would have been more far-reaching if he had not confined his investigations in such an exclusive manner to psychological considerations. Consciousness is not able psychologically to give an account of itself.

Hume's theory centered in his notion of impressions. These strike upon the mind or make their entrance into it. They are impressions because they "make their way into our thought or consciousness,"[200] and differ from ideas, which are but pale reflections of them by "the degree of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind."[201] From these impressions all knowledge is built up according to the mathematical principle of compounding. They cause ideas; these ideas proceed independently and create by their inherent qualities all the diversities of psychological experience in the higher reaches of thought, emotion and volition. But ideas do not behave capriciously, uniting or separating themselves at will as if controlled by a juggler, but are guided by universal principles, which give them uniformity of procedure in all times and places. "Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone would join them; and 'tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do) without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another. This uniting principle among ideas is not to be considered as an inseparable connexion; for that has already been excluded from the imagination; nor yet are we to conclude, that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty; but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails."[202] This gentle force, which commonly prevails as a uniting or associating principle is an inherent characteristic of ideas themselves. There are three assumptions, therefore, upon which Hume builds his theory: First, his particular interpretation of impressions, composed of sensations, passions, emotions, which enter the mind or loom up in consciousness; second, his theory of ideas as faint images of impressions reflected in the higher processes of thinking and reasoning; third, the notion of a gentle force or bond of union, which unites these ideas and accounts for their uniformities.

What becomes, therefore, of a self, which some theorists posit as the only explanation of the phenomena of consciousness and contend against Hume that this metaphysical entity is the only hypothesis which will furnish a rationale for his bond of union among ideas? From the viewpoint of psychology there is no such entity. All knowledge originates in impressions, and when we fail to find knowledge respecting any object of thought at least in an incipient form in them, it is useless to look elsewhere. There is no impression of a self given; therefore there can be no idea of it. "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other of heat, or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is further requisite to make me a perfect nonentity."[203]

Personal identity may be explained by the principle of association linking together related experiences and thus suggesting it to us. But this suggestion causes much confusion because personal identity is merely an error of the imagination. Once having committed the error, we resort to all sorts of hypotheses to bolster it up. There is a confusion here of identity with relation, and this leads to posit the notion of a soul, self or substance to justify the confusion.[204]

Hume's failure, however, to explain the phenomena of consciousness without the aid of something akin to a unifying self is disappointing. After asserting that successive perceptions only constitute the mind, he asserts that these are related by a bond of union or gentle force. If the notion of self cannot be found among impressions or ideas, neither can we find the bond of union or gentle force among them. The principle of the association of ideas is as much a figment of the imagination as the notion of personal identity, if we depend as we must according to the Humian criterion upon the deliverance of consciousness. Consciousness testifies to both the principles of association and personal identity, but the theory respecting them may be of the mathematical or metaphysical type. The assumption of a bond of union indicated clearly Hume's conviction that an impression or idea could not associate itself to another; but when he requisitioned the principle of a bond of union or association to help out, he introduced a method of explanation for which he had made no provision in his philosophy. Having cast out the self from his immanent perceptions, it returns to laugh his theorizing out of countenance. The psychological criterion is insufficient. Since he had to assume the principle of association independently of psychological experience, he should have seen the necessity of assuming other necessary principles of explanation on the same basis.

Hume has indeed many principles of explanation not discoverable experientially. Sensation-impressions arise "in the soul originally from unknown causes;" they arise "immediately from the object, or are produced by the reactive power of the mind, or are derived from the author of our being." He further acknowledges the physiological antecedents of impression of the sensational type in either "the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs." Here are a group of fictitious assumptions about unknown causes of sensation which are certainly not given in experience. It is therefore, from Hume's viewpoint, useless to discuss whether these unknown causes be in the objects, in the reactive power of the mind or in God, for they are not revealed in experience and must be ruled out as principles of explanation. But Hume was forced to see that they could not be uncaused. And yet a discussion of these causes is as legitimate as a discussion of a gentle force or bond of union among ideas, for they all belong to the non-experiential.

The underlying defect in Hume's treatment is his adherence to the principle of mathematical unity. In order to destroy the notion of metaphysical unity, he invites us to look within in order to catch this unitary being in operation. But no soul could be discovered by this method. What must be considered is a metaphysical being present in all psychical experiences but as undetected in the process as are the forces of nature in the production of a flower. A failure to discover a diminutive spiritual being at work in its formation is not a conclusive proof that it was brought about by nothing; the producing force of the flower must be part and parcel of the processes themselves. The metaphysical principle present in human experience alone makes it possible. It cannot be caught at work because the mind acting is the mind trying to catch itself. The only way in which any mind can catch itself is through the realization of its own experiences through which it is able to grasp successive phenomena in a related whole and in claiming them as belonging peculiarly to itself. This sort of self is easily discovered; what Hume tried to discover was a fictitious self invented by his own imagination for the purpose of eluding his introspective self.

Physiological Psychology

The new science of physiological psychology has forced the psychologist to seek a higher unity than merely the relation of the phenomena of consciousness to a unitary subject. This science deals with mind and matter in the most intimate and intricate interactions. Psychology is a scientific study of the pre-conditions, development, activities and results of conscious experience and by inference of similar phenomena wherever found. Physiology deals with the functions and processes of living organisms. As psychical phenomena, so far as the present limitation of the science of psychology is concerned, always occur in physiological organisms, the efforts at explanation of the phenomena of consciousness must come from two sciences, psychology and physiology; or, to put it more accurately, these two sciences endeavor to describe and explain a physiological process which issues in a psychological experience.

In a phenomenon of consciousness, in a sensation for example, there is a double reference: one to the stimulation of an end organ of sense and the transmission of this stimulation along afferent optical fibers to the cortex of the brain, where apparently the intimate connection between the neural disturbances and consciousness takes place; the other refers to the awareness or consciousness of the physiological stimulation by the mind of the person in whose organism the neural disturbance has taken place.

But there is a third reference to which the science of psychology has paid little attention because chiefly of the limitations placed upon it,—that is to say, to the physical cause which starts the neural vibration. To this we shall recur later. We are concerned for the present with the physiological process. In the case of visual perception, light cannot act directly upon the optic nerve without destroying it. It is too intense. The stimulation from light, therefore, must be toned down and transmitted in a less intense form by the optic fibers to the brain. In order, then, to realize a sensation of light and color, an image must pass through the eye, which must be regarded as a camera obscura, and thrown upon the retina passing through eight divisions of it until it reaches the rods and cones. Here by a photo-chemical process, the image affects the optic nerve, which transmits the stimulation to the brain. The mental realization of this stimulation is what is called vision. It is not to our purpose to trace the complicated neural processes through neurone and synapse, because we are interested chiefly in the nature of the stimulus which is transferred through this process.

The human body is surrounded by a universe of energy. When a modicum of this affects the eight or nine end organs of sense, the excitation set up in the nerves is transmitted by them, as we have seen, to the cortex of the brain. The end organ is thus adapted to receive the energy-stimulation, and the nerves are constructed in such a manner as to be able to transmit it. There is a great deal to be done in determining whether the conductivity of the nerves is a chemical or electrical process. In either case what is transmitted by the nerve is the activity set up in the end organ. To put the question in its most general form, the end organs of sense are stimulated by disturbances in the universal aether; and what finally issues in consciousness is a reaction to aetheric disturbances. The same consideration obtains, even if we drop out the notion of aether and substitute a universal force like electricity. Now, according to the law of continuity, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universe of energy or force around us is essentially of the nature of consciousness; for the energy transmitted through nerve fibers issues in consciousness when it reaches the cortex.

The sciences of physiological-psychology and biology through their combined effort will throw a great deal of light upon the relation of consciousness to living material; and the amalgamation of their results with the fundamental notions of physics and chemistry will afford the philosopher a splendid vehicle for the thought that the universe is suffused with a psychic life of which our own is a suggestion and an index.

CHAPTER THREE

SUGGESTIONS FROM THE HISTORY OF CAUSATION

Causation in Science and Philosophy

EXTENSIVE USE HAS been made of the causal notion both in science and philosophy. By means of it, science has achieved brilliant success. When the principle is examined, it "is found to be a certain quantum of Force, combined with certain collocations,"[205] according to John Stuart Mill. He refuted the theory that mind is a force or the cause of force. The seeker after a first cause will always be disappointed, for "The will does not any more than other causes create Force."[206] Volition merely transfers force already existing. In fact, "Force has all the attributes of a thing eternal and uncreated."[207] A large number of scientific investigators have agreed with Mill that force is a non-psychical and material phenomenon. Many of them confine the category exclusively to the scientific field.

Philosophy also has demanded exclusive possession, regarding it now as a metaphysical entity or a category of the understanding and again as a law governing the relation of mind and body, the Ultimate and the universe. In virtue of it, the universe is regarded as under the dominance of mechanical forces or directed by teleology.

Some philosophies dissect the first cause out of the world and submit its ongoings to secondary causes; others seek an immanent or a transcendent cause.

It is for us to inquire whether both science and philosophy have not borrowed a purely psychological principle. Is it not a subjective interpretation? What light does it throw upon existence as a whole?

René Descartes (1632-1677)

Descartes accepted the scholastic dictum: "Ex nihilo, nihil fit." Final, efficient, formal and eminent causes find place in his system. A final cause is the end which God or nature proposed to effect in the creation of natural things. Natural light makes it clear that there must be as much reality in the efficient cause as in the effect. The more perfect cannot therefore be the effect of the less perfect. In formal causality we need only assume sufficient reality to bring about the effect; in eminent causality there is more reality in the cause than is necessary for the production of the effect. Thus the mathematical or quantitative dominated Descartes' theory of causality.

He condemned Gassendi for introducing time into the causal notion.

It is fair to infer that Descartes distinguished between the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of causation.

Final causes are useless in the explanation of the physical universe. We cannot discover the impenetrable ends of Deity,[208] which is the efficient cause of all things,[209] which by the light of reason we cannot assign to other agencies.

This theory is very naïve, merely an elaboration of scholastic abstraction. Koenig[210] interprets Descartes' position as regarding cause and effect as merely reason and consequent, merely a logical relation. Schopenhauer agrees with this. But God created man and implanted the idea of his existence in man's soul; that goes beyond reason and consequent.

The theory leaves out all inconvenient particularity. He refused to acknowledge the reciprocal action of body and mind. This fact naturally led to the interpretation of Koenig and Schopenhauer.

Arnold Geulincx (1625-1669)

Geulincx's occasionalism did not enrich the theory of causality. He sought a workable coöperation between the two isolated substances of Descartes. To make this possible between body and mind, he introduced a supernatural *tertium quid*. He acknowledged their interaction and the inability of Descartes' substance to account for it; the easier way, therefore, was to interpolate a supernatural agency to perform the office of a go-between. This of course is an unnecessary violation of the principle of continuity. This makes a stop-gap of God. He should have endeavored to conceive the essential unity of mind and matter. He shouldered his philosophy with an unnecessary burden.

Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715)

Malebranche united with Geulincx in disbelieving that the principle of natural causation held between mind and matter, or the two substances of Descartes. His problem, then, was this: Mind substance and body substance being entirely different with no possible interaction between them ontologically, how is it possible for them to interact noetically? Mind in the act of perception seems to hold commerce with extra-mental substance. To make this possible, he makes an abstraction of the phenomena of consciousness and thinks of them as ready-made noumena deposited in the supreme being, much as the coin of a new country might be piled up in the mint ready for circulation. When the mind deals with an idea, it has borrowed one of these noumena. It must be remembered, however, although Malebranche spoke of the infinite as a place of ideas, he conceived of a very intimate relation between the infinite and the human mind. Both act together. It is the archetypal action of the infinite upon the human mind.

Malebranche inserts a necessary bond between cause and effect.[211]

There is nothing, therefore, added to the theory of causation, except possibly a prophecy from the side of mind at least of the operation of a unitary power in the universe. The *liaison* inserted between cause and effect is a figment of the imagination. He committed the error of trying to separate the inseparable for the purpose of joining them in what to a proper conception of cause and effect is utterly unnecessary. Cause and effect are aspects of one process and cannot be separated except for purposes of analysis.

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677)

We have already contended that the causal notion is central in Spinoza's system. Dynamical causation is the very heart of it. Yet Schopenhauer takes sides with the misinterpreters of Spinoza. He accuses him of being "true to his master in confounding and interchanging the relation between reason and consequence with that between cause and effect."[212] That was the foundation of his pantheism; that was his notion of the relation of God to the world. But as we have seen, this relationship was far more than a logical construction. It is better conceived under his terms of *natura naturans* as related to *natura naturata.*

John Locke (1632-1704)

Locke investigated the causal concept in thoroughgoing fashion from the empirical viewpoint. He traces the genealogy of cause and effect by means of his universal principle, "Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu."[213] The senses take note of the vicissitude of things and find that particular qualities and substances begin to exist and receive their existence from the due application and operation of something other than themselves. "From this observation we get our ideas of cause and effect."[214]

Locke was so intent upon the analysis of the phenomena of consciousness that he overlooked the important rôle, which consciousness itself played; so intent upon sensation and reflection that he neglected the sensating and reflecting mind. It is apparent that impressions can do nothing of themselves; they cannot amalgamate themselves into a percept. The unifying power of consciousness is necessary to such a result. In Locke's illustration[215] the impressions derived from both soft wax and heat would remain forever disconnected if there were no connecting activity of the mind. This is tacitly admitted by Locke, but he fails to realize it in connection with causality. Had he realized it, he would have seen clearly that the relation of cause and effect is not given in sensation. Experience cannot be the mother of all knowledge, if by experience be meant that sensation-data are the exclusive foundation of it. To say nothing of the emotional and volitional qualities, consciousness supplies a wealth of activities, among which the unitary conspectus is the most important.

The notion of power completes Locke's theory of causation. The mind is constantly informed of changes in simple ideas, of their beginning and cessation as well as its own modifications consequent upon sensation and reflection. It infers that like changes shall be produced by similar agents in uniform ways. Both the possibility of making a change in simple ideas and the fact of their changing gives us the notion of power.[216] Power may be either passive or active.[217] The idea of it refers to action or change. It is a complex idea because it involves relationship; but since it is a common factor in all ideas it must be regarded as simple, argues Locke, and complexity must be denied to it.[218]

The continual flux in the qualities and substances of sensible objects enables us to deduce passive power; the inference is that they shall always be liable to similar changes. The clearest notion of active power is obtained from the operation of the mind. The power of thinking and of motion we gain by reflection.[219]

If Locke had kept in mind the relationship of causation to events in nature more vividly, his theory would have been more comprehensive. In a series of events a b c d, why do we proceed to explain b by a, c by b, and d by c? Because of experienced association; and this association is predicted for the future. This is true only for passive power, but the clearest insight to active power is gained from our experience with ourselves as conative agents. That is a true insight and applies equally, it seems to me, to passive power.

The clearest idea of both active power and of power in general is elicited entirely from our experience as active agents. The causal notion is an inference based upon our experience as forth-putters of energy or possessors of voluntary power. Thus what Locke has given as an incidental reflection upon the notion of power might well have been placed as the central consideration of cause and effect.

George Berkeley (1685-1753)

Locke studied the impression made by external objects upon the mind; Berkeley, the subjectivity of these impressions, holding that we are eternally deprived of dealing directly with extra-mental objects. Our sole possession is the subjective reaction of things. The *esse* of things to us is their *percipi*. Objects produce ideas in the mind, said Locke; God is the only cause of ideas, contended Berkeley. Our ideas are inactive and powerless; one idea cannot, therefore, produce another. An idea cannot be the cause of anything.[220] Yet ideas continually succeed one another; some are excited anew; others change or disappear totally: there must be a cause to these successions and variations. This cause must be an incorporeal, active substance or spirit. It is, in fact, the spirit that directs and actuates the world; this is the real and only cause of all things.[221] All other conceivable causes are subsidiary to this. There is no proof whatever that mechanical causes are ultimate.[222]

As to secondary causes, Berkeley distinguishes between the immanent mind of the universe and the human mind; the latter is merely instrumental in its activity, the former ultimate. Secondary causes are essential to human beings, but not to the governor of the world.[223] The material world is merely a phenomenon, whose being consists in being perceived;[224] the only real cause therefore is a final cause. Phenomenal causes are the signs by which final causes reveal themselves to percipient minds.

The theory that God created the seed of vegetation and germs of animals at the beginning, imparting to them all the energies and self-sufficient qualities to bring them to their present status, is absurd. No such evolution could have taken place without the constant, orderly agency of a directing mind. Phenomena cannot cause phenomena. Attraction, for example, is not able to produce any of its phenomena, for it is a phenomenon itself.[225] The law of attraction gives us the rule according to which certain phenomena act, but does not furnish the producing agency.[226] Causes, then, are not objects of sense.[227] Sense and experience acquaint us with the course and analogy of appearances or natural effects only. Reason alone introduces us to the knowledge of causes.[228]

Berkeley's phenomenalism stood in the way of a thoroughgoing theory of causation. A phenomenal world, merely a subjective interpretation, could make no pretense of reflecting the real world in Berkeley's system,—because he has made a breach in the continuity between the real and phenomenal worlds. But are they not one world? Berkeley commits the error of Kant; both these thinkers assumed two worlds—a real and a phenomenal world, making the latter an appearance of the former, and then proceeded to build their systems on the assumption that the world of appearance did not reflect the real world. Berkeley thus confines efficient and final causality to the real world and makes the causality of customary connection serve the phenomenal world.

David Hume (1711-1776)

Hume forced Berkeley's theory of customary connection to its legitimate conclusions. He dispensed with the real world of Berkeley altogether and with it efficient and final causes. The phenomenal world and customary connection are the *residuua.*

"All our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.[229] All further processes of the mind are the result of compoundings from simple impressions. We discover from the constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions that one may serve as a cause to another. The priority of impressions prove that they are causes of ideas and that therefore ideas could not cause impressions.[230] Sensation impressions are caused in the mind by unknown agencies. Reflection is not only based upon impressions but also in a large measure upon ideas. Memory and imagination assist us in recalling ideas.

We must seek for the origin of causation in our experience of the relation of objects. As its conditions these objects must be contiguous in time and place; the cause must be prior in time to the effect; and there must be a necessary connection between cause and effect. Causes, therefore, have their birthplace in impressions. There is a constant conjunction as we pass from one object to another; in this passage or conjunction is revealed the only notion of cause we may ever possess. Certain objects are conjoined and inseparable in our experience.[231] When we pass irresistibly from one impression to another, we exercise the faculty of belief, which is "A lively idea related or associated with a present impression."[232] This process is important, for it enables us to assign particular causes to particular effects and to proceed beyond the immediate impression.

But what can be meant by necessary connection between cause and effect? What correspondent impression has this idea of necessity? Hume answers that the mind upon the appearance of a certain object is determined by custom to consider its usual attendant,[233] and to regard it in a stronger light on account of its relation to the first object; it is this impression or determination which yields the idea of necessity. Efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connection, productive quality, are nearly synonymous terms. When we observe several new productions in matter, we infer that there must be somewhere a power capable of producing them.[234] Thus we obtain the idea of efficacy, but there is no external impression to which it corresponds. The only source of causation, therefore, is in reflection, arising from that propensity which custom produces. Necessity cannot be found in any object; it is the creation of the mind itself.[235] All roads thus lead to customary conjunction. "A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other."[236] Thus efficient, formal, material, exemplary causes, moral and physical necessity are merely customary conjunction. There is no absolute or metaphysical necessity.

Hume's analysis is less thorough than Locke's. Locke relates causality to both intellective and conative processes; Hume leaves it in the sphere of intellection. He follows Berkeley by transferring force or energy from the object to the mind and goes further by transferring necessity to the mind also. The introduction of space and time into the category of causality is unjustifiable.

The vulnerable point in Hume's theory is the fact that an impression of sense does not give the notion of causation. To say that objects coupled with their relation are present to the senses is meaningless, since the senses give nothing but impressions. The relationship of objects is injected by a relating consciousness. Relationship undoubtedly is always tied up with sensation, but it is not an object of sensation. Sensation never takes place alone. A groping after this truth without a full realization of its source misled Hume. He supposed that all the wealth of a relating consciousness was always present in sensation.

Psychologically, sensation may be separated from other processes for purposes of analysis only; it is always escorted by all the categories of thought. Sensations of heat and fluidity in wax, using the illustration of Hume, could lie side by side for eternity without the action of a relating mind; but the moment the mind relates them, causality or any other category may be brought into consideration.

As we have already referred to Hume's principle of association, it is only necessary to mention it at present. To say that ideas are associated, or have a bond of union, or are held together by a gentle force, explains nothing. This association has no correlate in sensation. Hume, therefore, introduces it unjustifiably though inevitably into his system. We must assume an associating power, and this can only be furnished by a consciousness which comprehends its phenomena in a unified way. It associates cause and effect through the inference that a cause is an active agent manifesting activity similar to its own activity in the act of volition, and effect is a suffering object or the object upon which action is inflicted. Neither Hume nor any other thinker can proceed very far after denying the action of a unifying consciousness without calling to his aid a gentle force or bond of union to hold together the discrete objects of experience, which is just another description of consciousness.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716)

Leibnitz possessed no consistent theory of knowledge. Reality is conceived under the notion of monads, ultimate, uncompounded, veritable unities, which are not *modi* of a universal being as Spinoza made out, "but independent powers, causes of their own changes, living principles, souls."[237] Each monad, then, possesses its own active principle or primitive entelechy and mirrors the whole universe in itself. All monads are equal in content of being, but there are, nevertheless, certain variations, in fact gradations, ranging from those devoid of consciousness to those possessing full selfconsciousness. The ability of the monad to mirror or reproduce relations which are found in the real world is called perception. Knowledge, therefore, is an internal development. Apperception is the monad turning in upon itself by an immediate or intuitive act; this self-knowledge is not given to all souls.[238] All reasoning is based upon the principles of contradiction and of sufficient reason.[239] These are the source of all knowledge. Leibnitz should have mentioned another principle—that of continuity, which seems to be as necessary to his system as the two mentioned.

How shall we relate Leibnitz's theory of causation to his monadology? All things are determined ultimately by final causes or the will of God. Both mechanical and final causes are needed for the explanation of events. Particular effects in nature may and must be explained mechanically; but we must always remember their dependence upon sovereign intelligence. All monads or substances contain in their nature the *legem continuationis seriei suarum operationum* of all that has happened or will happen to them. All activities originate in themselves and are independent of all other monads except their dependence upon God.[240] But all monads interact with others by a perfect mutual accord, expressly established when monads were created.

Force or power of acting in matter forms a transition from metaphysics to nature, from immaterial to material things.[241] This force derives its principle not from absolute or brute necessity, as in the case of mathematics, but from perfect reason. Nature, then, has a kingdom within a kingdom, a double kingdom of reason and necessity, of forms and matter.[242] This kingdom or republic of reason is the kingdom of God making the universe throughout. These realms are governed by their own peculiar laws without the slightest confusion. The reason of perception and desire is not found in any modification of extension any more than the reason of nutrition and organic functions can be found in the realm of spirits. The highest monad of universal cause has ordained that these distinct series of physical and metaphysical processes are referred to the same corporeal substance, and that perfect harmony should exist between them just as if one were controlled by the influence of the other, although of course this is not the case. The necessity of matter may be traced to the order of efficient causes, so that nothing happens without a sufficient reason. All is in accord with the mathematical laws of mechanism, and from the other viewpoint all is in accord with the forms of thought in the intelligible world.

Force is inherent in all things and was impressed upon them at creation. Corporeal and spiritual substances never cease to act.[243] As already suggested, the action of one monad or substance upon another comes not from the emission or transmission of energy but from a perfect harmony, which was preëstablished. This is a rejection of the mutual influence theory of the physicists and the *Deus ex machina* of occasionalism.

This dynamical view is that of Spinoza. All monads from the simple monads (*monades reines*), which are devoid of self-consciousness, organizing monads (sleeping monads), conscious monads in animal souls (dreaming monads), to self-conscious monads in complete personalities, are metaphysical centers of force. The Cartesian notion of matter as an extended mass is inadequate.[242] Matter possesses a true unity as well as a continuum, a substantial form as well as extension. The substantial form is a dynamic monad. Substance is being capable of action.[245]

Monadology Unsatisfactory

When we come to the concerted action of monads, Leibnitzianism becomes very unsatisfactory. It gives us another *Deus ex machina,* the error for which Leibnitz condemned occasionalism. He held that his metaphysical atoms were self-sufficient, containing all the activities necessary to the prosecution of their mission in unorganized, organized and conscious nature; then we are told that they but exercise a delegated power. They were created. Occasionalism believed in a perpetual miracle to coördinate the mind with bodily impressions, Leibnitz contended that a miracle was performed once for all at creation, when God imparted to things their peculiar nature.[246] "It is quite manifest that the agreement of so many substances, of which the one has no influence upon the other, could only come from a general cause, on which all of them depend, and that this must have infinite power and wisdom to preëstablish all these harmonies.[247] Thus God alone is the primitive unity or the original, simple substance, of which all monads, created or derived, are the products, which come into being from moment to moment by the continued fulgurations of divinity, limited only by the receptivity of the creature, to which of course limitation is essential.

God has power, which is the source of all—and will, which effects changes in things according to the best. These find their replicas in monads in the perceptive and appetitive faculties with the difference, of course, that God is absolutely infinite and monads are only imitations proportioned to their perfection.

Therefore, the influence of one monad upon another is purely ideal, taking place through the intervention of God at the commencement of things when each monad was created with due regard to all other monads. The internal constitution of the monad was such that it would harmonize with all other created monads.[248]

Such a notion of causality is unwarranted by present-day thought. It may be permissible in historical but certainly not in physical science. The placing of the efficient cause of the processes of nature at a point of time remote from the actual activities of the monad is a separating of cause and effect forbidden by a proper conception of their relation.

Finally, monadology is confronted with two difficulties of far-reaching concern. First, how was it possible for the Ultimate Being to delegate powers to monads, which in the very conception of an Ultimate could be exerted by it alone? It is beyond the province of the scientific thinker to invent methods whereby nature may be able to proceed without the aid of an Ultimate Being; it should be his ever-present thought to discover the immanent power ultimately responsible for its processes.

Secondly, how would it be possible for an Ultimate Being, which had delegated its powers to monads, so that they became ever after self-sufficient, to continue to exist except as an alien in the creation, living a life in which nothing happened, and incapacitated through the original act of creation to share the activities of the humblest monad? With this theory "A sort of society with God"[249] would be impossible. God, the original monad, locked up all the activities of monads within themselves to such an extent that they have no influence, as we have seen, at all on each other. This debars the original monad from affecting their present interior life. How, then, can there be anything in the nature of a society? This is only possible by bursting the theoretical assumptions of monadology as worked out by Leibnitz. It is too limited to do justice to the many-sided facts of nature.

Christian Wolff (1677-1754)

Bilfinger, a disciple of Wolff, calls the system of his master, Leibnitio-Wolfiana. His philosophy is really a combination of Leibnitzianism and Aristotelianism. The main principles in Wolff's ontology are those of contradiction and sufficient reason.[250] Like Baumgarten, he gives the proof which establishes these principles beyond doubt; but the proofs, as Koenig points out, are a *petitio principii.*

By the causal relation, Wolff holds that something, A, is linked of necessity to something, B. The dependence of one upon the other must be intuited. The sufficient reason must be more than the cause. Leibnitz explained causality as an impulse of reason to ask the question, why?—and later to seek for a causal necessity. But to Wolff, the ground of things is something objective. Sufficient reason must, therefore, be distinguished from certain defined causes. Magnetic power must be hypostasized as the cause of magnetic attraction, but this would not be the real objective ground of it. He thus makes a vicious distinction between cause and reason and transfers sufficient reason into the realm of ontology. Both cause and effect thus refer to an underlying substrate. A change means a change of something. What is it that changes? Change always refers to some previous ground; cause and effect have to do with modes of changes. Wolff enumerates four principles of determination:

1. *Principium cognoscendi,* gives the premise in relation to the conclusion.
2. *Principium fiendi,* gives the reason of becoming,

which is the original cause from the reality of which the reality of another being becomes known.

3. *Principium agendi,* endeavors to account for the motives of the actions of self-conscious beings.
4. *Principium essendi,* enables us to know possibility.

Koenig gives Wolff credit for a further development of the principle of sufficient reason and the distinction between real and conceptual dependence, a series of definitions for physical and metaphysical relations drawn partly from experience and partly from speculation, and a slight hypothetical development of metaphysical problems which had been left over by previous thinkers.[251]

However, Wolff left the problem of cause and effect in the realm of abstraction. To attempt a proof of the principle of sufficient reason is absurd, seeing that the principle itself is an attempt to rationalize nature, merely an effort of the mind to harmonize these changes in the light of its experience. We might as well try to prove perception by the senses as to furnish proof for the principle of sufficient reason. In the proof of the principle, the principle itself is involved.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

Kant accepts the general statement, "All which happens has a cause."[252] The notion of a happening is empirical and is therefore an analytical judgment and involves time. But the causal notion is synthetical and *a priori.* How can we, therefore, predicate of events that they are causally related, when the category of causality is extraneous to the event itself?

Causation is central in Kant. It was a revulsion against Hume's treatment of causation that aroused him from his dogmatic slumber and caused him to write the *Critique* *of Pure Reason.* These two thinkers occupy opposite poles on the subject. In case of A (cause) plus B (effect), both Hume and Kant assert the plus to be necessary; but they differ as to the meaning of necessity. Hume explains it as a matter of association of ideas or customary conjunction. To Kant, A and B are connected always and at all times by an absolute necessity arising from the very constitution of the mind. It thus supersedes any experiential association for the universality, and necessity of the relationship may be asserted.

It is always a hypothetical judgment.[253] Yet effect follows from cause by an absolutely universal rule.[254] It is thus a pure concept unsullied by experience, a synthetic act which makes the apprehension of objects in the temporal relation possible. Without the causal concept, there could be no succession in time, and therefore no permanent unity of consciousness.[255]

The intuition of time bridges the chasm between the pure concept of causality and a temporal happening, for it partakes of both the experiential element of succession and the pure category under which it is subsumed. The pure category of causality finds its application to the same fact of succession by the help of this pure category of time.

Causality is applicable only to changes, but the understanding tells us nothing about the cause of these changes. This cause, of course, must be unchangeable.[256]

The universal principle of judgment is that all phenomenal objects are subject to the synthetical unity of possible experience. It is this principle that enables us to assert that "Everything that happens presupposes something on which it follows according to a rule."[257]

All phenomena, therefore, are apprehended under the form of succession, but causality is more than succession. Changes are not only rationally connected but dynamic-ally related. A phenomenon is different because of this relationship. Thus the mind imposes the dynamism of its inner life upon phenomena in order to give them a causal explanation. We deduce customary connection from experience because we have already injected it into experience. This, Hume failed to see.[258] Causality and all other pure categories of the understanding are the necessary presuppositions of all experience.

Kant makes the principle of causality supreme in the procedure of the mind in general.[259] This view presents a dilemma. Does Kant mean that the time relation is an appendage of the causal relation? In fact, causality is not so pure as Kant would like to have it. It certainly involves substance as well as action.[260] An effected change assumes a substratum in which these changes are but *modi*. The substrate does not change, for if it did it also would become a *modus*.

Causality must be confined to the phenomenal world; it is not applicable to *Dinge an Sich*. In solving the antinomy between freedom and causality, Kant assumes a will-causality not subject to natural causes. This enables us to say that an event has come to pass because it ought to have happened. Thus on the side of practical freedom a power is assumed independent of and contrary to natural law. The same restriction applies in the physico-theological argument to a proof for the existence of God.

In the practical use of causality, Kant held that the causality of rational beings is contained within themselves in a unique autonomy of the will—that is to say, in its freedom. The will is a law unto itself.[261] It issues its categorical demands with an imperative and challenging ought.[262] This involves an idea of an order and system of laws different from those of the mechanism of nature, which belongs to the world of sense. We are compelled to consider rational beings in their innermost nature, their *Selbst an Sich*. From this viewpoint, the intelligible, unknown ego in itself gives laws to the phenomenal ego in the ethical life. This pure practical reason is just as real as the pure speculative reason. In fact, this self-assertion of the pure reason in its issuance of categorical imperatives proves its reality. The intelligible will is just as real as the empirical will. It is this imposition of its mandates upon the empirical self that enables practical reason to accomplish what theoretical reason utterly failed. It gives a moral law which does not merely establish the possibility of freedom but its reality. This moral law is the law of the causality of free agents. The transcendent is thus converted into the immanent use of reason.

In the process of judgment, Kant discovers the *a priori* principle of purposiveness. He is here dealing with aesthetical appreciation. In all aesthetical pleasure, serving indeed as its cause, is the idea of purpose, which the mind introduces in a sportive way into nature. We bring nature under the teleological judgment. We explain it as if it were purposive. This is analogical explanation of nature under the lead of causality. Is final causality, therefore, a mere subjective play? Has it no basis in the world of things in themselves? Yes, the purpose we introduce into nature is an *a priori* synthesis; it dips into a world of real values, an intelligible order, which is both aesthetical and moral.

The notion of nature as purposeful does not interfere with the Kantian conception of nature as mechanical.[263] Whenever the principle of teleology is used in natural science, it must of course be regarded as a *principium peregrinatum* and not a *principium domesticum*. We overstep the limits of science into that of metaphysics in its use.[264] Science is not concerned with purposiveness but only with explanations according to natural law. Both explanations are valid, although purpose is the internal principle involved in the mechanical explanation. The two avoid becoming antinomous because the teleological principle is reflective and not constitutive.

Both the mechanical and teleological are necessary explanations. Exclude the teleological and nature becomes visionary.[265] But the two principles can only be reconciled by assuming a ground of explanation extraneous to both; that is, a supernatural being,[266] who legislates supremely in a kingdom of moral purposes.[267] This being alone can be the final cause. Thus a human being endowed with freedom becomes the key to the real constitution of nature. For the moral law implanted in man's nature urges him to seek the supreme good through freedom and to strive to be worthy of happiness; but this urge is valueless unless the being of God is assumed, and it must be assumed for these practical purposes as the *Critique of Practical Reason* pointed out.

Now the teleological proof of the existence of this being should be convincing, since all teleology must culminate in moral teleology, which gives us a practical faith.

Criticism of Kant's Causal Theory

Kant's treatment of causality was logical and not psychological.[268] If he had considered knowledge in all the wealth of its content, the deficiency of logical necessity as a comprehensive principle would have appeared to him. Logical concepts are so deficient that they cannot express adequately even the intellectual processes involved in them. Kant should have revealed all phases of knowledge instead of riding an abstraction to death by seeking simply the sources, extent and limits of "that whole class of knowledge unassisted by experience." He extracts the absolute in knowledge from the relative and proceeds as if the relative were non-existent. Living experience ever in process of movement, ever developing must be the basis of all abstract logical notions. If pure, logical concepts are assumed to be prior to and independent of all experience, it is ludicrous to speak of them as the condition of all experience. Kant could only be consistent here by becoming an absolute rationalist, which he was not, and holding that logical concepts are real relations. An enduring theory of knowledge must be based on psychological experience.

Kant held that "every event must have a cause"—but why? Because reason demands universality in its explanation of happenings. And this demand could not be supplied according to transcendentalism by experience. But the "must" is, after all, psychological. There is no absolute necessity of causality. Necessity is always relative and based upon the hypothetical judgment. Speaking of the confusions between the concepts of contingency in earlier philosophy, Schopenhauer stated: "Earlier philosophy has applied abstraction to the following mistaken use. It was clear that that of which the reason is given inevitably follows, *i. e.*, cannot be, and thus necessarily is. But philosophy held to this last determination alone, and said that is necessary which cannot be otherwise, or the opposite of which is impossible. It left, however, the ground and root of such necessity out of account, overlooked the relativity of all necessity which follows from it, and thereby made the quite unthinkable fiction of an absolute necessity, *i. e.*, of something the existence of which would be as inevitable as the consequent of a reason, but which yet was not the consequent of a reason and therefore depended upon nothing; an addition which is an absurd *petitio*, for it conflicts with the principle of sufficient reason."[269]

We derive the notion of necessity from the relationship subsisting between states of consciousness in intellectual processes. Certain states of consciousness are conditions of others. Causality involves an explanation of events not only in the terms of reason and consequent but also in those of an active and suffering mind. Dynamic rational consistency is the only necessity we know in causality.

Kant failed to do justice to the principle of the association of ideas. He assumed a very fundamental principle by refusing Hume's theory that causality was the result of the compounding of ideas and reflections by association and by regarding it as an activity of a self-conscious mind. It is the unity of apperception, not as a transcendental but an actual psychological principle that gives us the category of causality. Kant should have recognized the conative and emotional aspects of apperception as well as its psychological actuality. From this viewpoint, the associative process of the act of perception can readily be seen and Kant should have seen this. The simple, uncompounded categories of Kant are as unreal as the simple, uncompounded ideas of the School of Locke. The causal relation is rich in associations of all sorts. In spite of Kant's heroic effort to keep *Dinge an Sich* exclusively free from any application of the categories of the understanding, causality defeats his intentions, for they are regarded as the causes of phenomena. This proves the superficiality of his system.

There are two series of causes running through Kant's three *Critiques,—Critique of Pure Reason, Practical Reason, Judgment.* One series refers exclusively to things in themselves, another exclusively to phenomena. Phenomenally, nature is viewed under an unbroken chain of causation; and since causality is a synthesis of that which follows in temporal succession, we are able to affirm that nothing happens here without a cause. Causality thus relates to changes reported in our experience, but reveals nothing about the real, unchangeable cause of these changes. Both Kant and his disciple Schopenhauer considered it an amphiboly to apply causality to transcendent objects, which are the causes of phenomena but are never themselves phenomena. Kant also makes a conflict between the phenomenal and transcendent cause in the case of human freedom. A true insight into the causal notion would have dissipated this conflict. All causality is one. A thousand causal series might be enumerated, but the activity of the mind involved in the causal notion is one. Noetically, therefore, there could be no conflict; even from Kant's viewpoint there could be no conflict between a known and an unknown cause. Kant made an unnecessary gap between the phenomenal and the real; but once he had assumed it, he could then bring an unbroken series of natural causation into conflict with an unconditioned totality of conditions. Reason, utterly helpless to reach this totality in our phenomenal experience, creates the idea of freedom or spontaneity out of sheer necessity.

The mediation which Kant attempted between empirical realism and transcendental idealism vitiated his theory of causation and led him into all sorts of contradictions. At one time we find him pleading ignorance of things in themselves; at another, with dogmatic fervor manifesting much knowledge concerning them. In one mood all causation is purely subjective, in another it is an ontological existence coming into formidable conflict with the phenomenal.

Nowhere is the contradiction arising from a false distinction between real and phenomenal causes more glaring than in Kant's treatment of intelligible and empirical character. The intelligible is the ground of the empirical. Kant illustrates his point by the example of a malicious lie "by which a man has produced a certain confusion in society." In trying to determine responsibility for the act, the man's empirical character is investigated, such as wrong education, bad society, viciousness of disposition, etc. Yet the offender is held responsible, as if none of these were valid. We ignore the empirical conditions and hold a man responsible from the viewpoint of his intelligible character. The noumenal self told the lie, and this *Ich an Sich* must be held to account.

But the hereditary factor will not down so easily. In ordinary dealings, extenuating circumstances are noted; empirical conditions make all the difference in the world. Transcendentalism becomes extremely superficial in its separation of the phenomenal from the intelligible character. It is unnecessary in order to blame a man for the malicious lie; for it adds a superfluous factor. There is no objection to the consideration of man as an expression of something larger than himself, and therefore his character as an expression of this copartnership with the universe; but this is not the thought of Kant. He merely refers to a real self expressing itself in the phenomenal self; and the real self is the responsible agent. Now here is a noumenal self, of which we know nothing except that it exists, made the cause of all our empirical, multiform activities, causing us even to tell a malicious lie; thus the *Ding an Sich* or the *Ich an Sich* becomes an ethical cause, and we consider it blameworthy. It was the *Ding an Sich* that really lied. This makes a saint of the empirical character and a devil of the intelligible character. Do we wonder that Schopenhauer took this cue and enthroned all the evil and out-of-jointness of the universe in its *Ding an Sich*! Kant makes it the source of wrong and shame in the individual.

Having followed out the natural interpretation of Kant, he at once repudiates it by holding that the category of causality pertains only to the discursive understanding and is not applicable to the *Ding an Sich*. In other words, Kant assigns to the intelligible self all the moral activities of the empirical character; then, because of a transcendent divorce between the real and the phenomenal, denies the causality so assigned.

A similar weakness appears in his treatment of the supreme reality. He very properly riddled the dogmatic proofs for the being of God. But aside from this, he assigns causality over and over again to the supreme, which of course his own philosophy forbade.

Result of Suggestions from the Historical Survey of the Principle of Causation

Whatever inferences may be drawn from causality as to the nature of reality, the principle itself is purely subjective. A great deal of confusion in reflective thinking, not only in the philosophy of Kant but throughout the history of philosophy, could have been avoided by remembering this. Kant was right when he assigned the principle to the discursive understanding, coming under the hypothetical judgment and therefore yielding mediate and not immediate results, and belonging essentially to the functioning of reasoning. His contention that it is a pure concept, free from the tarnishings of experience cannot hold. In his ontological implications, Kant overlooked the fact too often that causation brings nothing to pass but is simply an endeavor to explain that which occurs. It is a commentary upon the happenings of the universe. Of course, under the guidance of causality, we may learn a great deal about the metaphysical nature of that which brings about changes. In fact, there is no possible objection to regarding reality as a causality of the changes in the world, provided it be always borne in mind that our causal explanations are purely subjective. This is true, whether we accept the abstract logical principle of Descartes, the epistemological theory of Malebranche, the psychological association of the School of Locke, the immanental view of Berkeley, the mechanical and non-psychical force of many thinkers or any other theory. Causal uniformities and necessities, its teleological and mechanical aspects are always aspects of that psychological and epistemological effort of the mind to explain the mysterious changes of the universe, and shall always remain subjective commentaries upon our experiences of changes.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PSYCHOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION

The Perceptual Origin of Causation

DR. WARD STATES that we must distinguish three things in the causal notion: (a) perception in a definite case; (b) the so-called law of causation that "Every event must have a cause;" (c) that such-and-such particular causes have invariably such-and-such particular effects.[270] Psychology, he contends, is only concerned with the first and has nothing to do with the other two. And by this, we must mean the actual process and content of the perceptual act. To say with Kant that it belongs to the constitutional functioning of the mind, is too vague and wide of the mark. For it amounts to saying that all functioning of the mind takes place because it is the nature of the mind so to function, which is veritable tautology. Causality could be referred to a constitutional act of the mind only in its contentless form, emptied of all psychological experience. It must be filled in by what actually takes place.

Hoeffding agrees with Kant that causation is a fundamental property of our thinking and cognitive consciousness.[271] It is the urge of the mind seeking for similarity and unity. But it must be reiterated that the full intellective act must be taken into account with its conative energy and emotional coloring. There is always an activity imparted and a recipient who suffers. The volitional element is fundamental; without it, the cognitive consciousness would be powerless to note causes and effects. Psychical activity and suffering are the birthplace of causality. Explanations are made in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, and reason is satisfied to explain all changes after the analogy of the active and suffering self. Water is compelled to go downhill because something similar to the active energy of the mind so makes it. If we say gravitation forces it, we are simply using an abstract term for a real psychical process. Therefore, Hoeffding's view confining it to the practical interest of reason cannot be true. We know certain things must be done to attain certain ends; there is an indispensable middle term, and here is the germ of causation, he contends; "and when this idea obtains a comprehensive content, and becomes the object of an independent interest, the causal concept comes to be emancipated from the concept of the end."[272] This would make causation an abstraction of the means necessary to accomplish practical ends, and therefore removes it from the domain of psychical experience.

Professor Ladd finding the origin of causation in the impulse to explain,[273] Professor Sully in the observation of self-activity,[274] and Preyer[275] in movements followed by sense perception,—all make substantial contributions to the understanding of the genesis and growth of causation.

Shadworth Hodgson argues[276] that the element of necessity cleaves to the act of sensation and perception prior to logic and thought; and to every instant of them. Observation merely reveals this inherent necessity. In a conscious state, efficacy and causal order are found as rudiments of a more developed necessity and uniformity. This irresistibility and continuity of the stream of consciousness is the *fons et origo* of causation. The author is to be commended for his effort to find a psychological basis for causation, but the intellective element is too exclusive in his theory.

To Herbert Spencer, the notions of force and motion have a parallel origin. We experience resistance in our sensations of muscular tension; this yields the consciousness of force. To obtain the notion of external force, we must abstract and generalize our own experience. "We are disabled from conceiving mechanical force in itself under a form different from mechanical force as ordinarily presented to consciousness."[277]

Now, if we take the muscular tension theory of Spencer and follow it up through the complicated processes of self-conscious volition, we are verily standing at the birthplace of causation. For it is in that unique self-activity of the mind known as the forth-putting of energy in the volitional act that we find all causation and the germ of judgments, order, necessity which cling to it. A theory of change is involved in every postulated cause. Causality in every form is a mapping out of the extra-mental world after the pattern of our inner world of complicated activity. These divers activities of our inner life are related or unified in our consciousness; and when we protrude this unification we obtain the dynamical world of sense perception. Our external world is merely an ectype of the dynamism of our mind. This is true, whatever be our metaphysical theory about the nature of the external world; from both the viewpoints of psychology and epistemology we project our causal world. But both a thorough-going psychology and epistemology forbid us to hold with Spencer that our internal sense of dynamics is a symbol of an external, unknown reality. To psychology there can be no subtle, unknown and unknowable reality. The psychological world is the perceptive world in the largest sense. By the causal notion, we endeavor to explain changes which are psychically known. Nevertheless, Herbert Spencer has given a true account of the origin of causality.

Specific Mind Activities Concerned in the Causal Notion

The judging activity is called into play whenever effect B is referred to cause A. To judge, is to think. Judgment permeates the whole mental life. All psychical processes are involved in it. Logical must always be distinguished from psychical judgment; the former embodies dead processes; the latter, living experience. Causality proceeds under the hypothetical judgment, expressed by the formula: If A is B, then C is D. In the last analysis, there is a combination of two categorical judgments here: (A+B) + (C+D). This judgment is of great value in the pursuit of scientific and philosophical knowledge.

The causal judgment, as we have seen, makes a draft upon our self-activity; we cannot dispense with conative terms in describing it. Even theorists who reduce causality to associational aggregations are compelled to use the notion of dynamism. Martineau's criticism of the principle of uniformity, because of its inability to account for causation, is excellent.[278] Coexistence and succession cannot possibly contain all that we mean by causality. The language of dynamism is prolific—cause, effect, energy, volition, tendency to motion, force, power, attraction, and whatever other term pertaining to the world of change; but it all leads back to the headquarters of psychical activity.

It embodies a strong anthropomorphic element. This is not peculiar to the child or savage, religion or poetry, but is equally present in the most abstract scientific terms.

It was Hume who first called attention to the element of belief in the causal notion. We exercise belief when we pass from effect B to cause A. B is a present impression from which we reason to the existence of A, which—though essentially connected with B—is yet different from it. That is why belief is necessary; for according to Hume, the distinguishing feature of memory as contrasted with imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity. It thus approaches nearer to the characteristics of the first impression. This vivacity in sense perception is the element of belief or assent.[279] The function of belief, then, is "to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions."[280]

Here is a great truth; no belief, no causation. Causality in its lowest terms being a rational attempt to account for changes, there is a transference of our rational and volitional experience into the world of events; this transference involves the element of belief; we intuitively rely upon it. Let alone, the mind assumes this correspondence, and it requires a cultivated skepticism to raise the question of the disparity between internal experience and external changes or changes of any kind.

Belief is also a complicated element, involving all that mind is. With it, we have the open sesame to reality. "The *fons et origo* of all reality, whether from the absolute or practical point of view, is thus subjective, is ourselves."[281] Belief contains a rich, metaphysical soil. The unity and connectedness of things, through this reliance, may give us a clue to the interpretation of the core and substance of this marvelous universe.

Association of ideas has been sufficiently emphasized.

The element of necessity is also accessory to cause and effect. Every event must have a cause, but the "must" is an inference derived from association of ideas, from the-always-has-been-in-my-experience. There seems to be an irresistibility in the onflowing stream of consciousness. There seems to be a uniformity in the way in which we relate things. Similarity and difference pervade all our processes. Upon this basis, innumerable experiences in the intellectual and practical life of uniform results from uniform causes yield the notion of necessity. The analysis of Shadworth Hodgson is correctly made. But this is not all. The principle of necessity is involved in all mental operations. It is no more characteristic of causality than of the simplest element of thought. The necessity in causation comes from an inquisitive, cognitive consciousness in its quest for a rationale for the changes of experience, which it discovers in the uniformity and irresistibility of its mental operations.

The principle of identity is fundamental and involves resemblance and contrast. It is beside the mark to discuss the priority of resemblance and contrast; they are both parts of one process. Things resemble one another because they are not different and differ because they lack points of resemblance. The principle of identity or sufficient reason denotes a process of an advanced consciousness having its roots in more elementary experiences. When this is stated in the mathematical formula of a logician, it cannot possibly express the wealth of a living, developing, ever-varying and intellective-conative-emotional life.

Whenever we assert "Whatever is, is" utterance is given to the dogmatism which characterizes knowledge. Knowledge ultimately is always a taking for granted. As such, it makes a draft upon the element of belief. It involves also a choice of alternatives between this and that. A selection must be made from an infinite variety of knowable objects. Thus processes solidified in our reasoning are ultimately based upon the primary consciousness of resemblance and difference. Our psychological world is complicated, in constant flux, and no element is simple or uncompounded. We endeavor to account for change by saying that the present change came to pass because another change occurred and the difference between the two may be phases of the same occurrence. In fact, in causation we recognize the identity of the two. The principles of identity and causation must be regarded as correlates; they always involve each other in the explanation of the world of changes. Cause and effect are two phases of the identical process and are inseparable except for purposes of analysis.

Finally a word must be said upon causation as a category from the psychological viewpoint. Since Aristotle, certain fundamental and irreducible activities of the mind have been classified as categories. Much difference of opinion as to the number and quality of these categories has been manifested. Schopenhauer, Leibnitz, and Sir William Hamilton made logical necessity the criterion; John Stuart Mill, universality; Spencer, inconceivability; James McCosh, self-evidence, necessity and universality; Schelling, intuition; Hegel, reason; Kant, necessity and universality; Professor G. T. Ladd, originality, necessity and universality.

Is causality a fundamental and irreducible form of thought? Thinking or judging is, of course, a fundamental activity, but we must not transfer this except in a secondary way to any particular thought or judgment; for this would make every judgment a category, which is absurd. Now causation is a relation arising from a particular hypothetical judgment; has it such originality as Professor Ladd claims for it? Certainly not. Our analysis has shown that it is a complicated and mediating process of reason. The element of necessity is accessory and does not belong to it essentially. As to universality, once more this can only mean the general native intuition of the mind urging it to explain the world of change. In referring consistency to the causal judgment, we merely relate it to the principle of identity, which again characterizes all human thinking and is just as true of non-causal as of causal judgments. Causation is, therefore, not a category. In its larger issues the fundamental and irreducible element in causation comes from the universal tendency of the mind to believe that the universe is interpretable in terms of self-activity; that there is unity in things in the sense that there is unity in the processes of consciousness; that the universe is dynamical from core to circumference as there is dynamism in volitional outputtings: in fine, that the universe is explicable according to the most general aspects of what is suggested in our self-conscious life. That is the only thing categorical about causation.

There is also a certain order pertaining to causation. The time relation is not essential; but causality always bears a certain orderly relation to effectuation.

Causation is preëminently a subjective principle, originating in voluntary processes and marshalling to its aid all the weavings of reason and consequent. Does it throw any light upon the secret of the universe? Undoubtedly it does, but that is not a question for psychology; this must be handed over to philosophy. Psychology simply describes and explains its complete subjectivity.

The Metaphysics of Causation

After we have demonstrated the subjectivity of causation from the psychological viewpoint, there lurks a suspicion that the whole story has not been told. Causality explains changes as the results of self-conscious activity. Is there a suggestion here as to the possibility of something similar as the basis of the changes in nature? Before answering this question, the import of our psychological analysis must be borne in mind. We have seen that logical statements such as "Every event must have a cause" of *"Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, quam non sit"* are very inadequate. Schopenhauer gives us the roots of the principle of sufficient reason thus: "Our knowing consciousness, which manifests itself as outer and inner Sensibility (or receptivity) and as Understanding and Reason, subdivides itself into Subject and Object and contains nothing else. To be Object for the Subject and to be our representation, are one and the same thing. All our representations stand towards one another in a regulated connection, which may be determined *a priori,* and on account of which nothing existing separately and independently, nothing single or detached, can become an Object to us."[282] This is excellent so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. It is passing strange that we are compelled to condemn Schopenhauer for neglecting the dynamical aspect of mind, because he placed will at the center of his universe and has compelled modern thinkers to think in dynamical terms. Since causation is a subjective interpretation of changes, it will bear the imprint of all the subjective processes. Sensibility, understanding and reason would be entirely ineffective without the dynamical element; all of these, on the contrary, manifest will-force as well as intellective relationship. In them the forth-putting of energy is as prominent as ratiocination; attention and choice as prominent as perceptive intuition and discursive deduction. They are bearers of purpose as well as directors of logical conclusions. Certain factors of the psychical process cannot, therefore, be isolated as unrelated to serve as the basis of a philosophy without doing violence to the others. Causation makes a draft upon the whole of the inner life.

Final and Efficient Causality

This violent isolation becomes apparent in the discussion of final and efficient causes. All causality is in reality final causality, since it is the interpretation of changes after the manner of self-activity, which is purposive in its essence. Causality is a study in purpose, a judging of the effect from the viewpoint of a cause, which we regard analogically as purposive. But the following statement is an overlooking of this principle: "If I contemplate the chain of the Alps and the universal, strange and complicated forms, which the peaks composing that chain have taken, the law of causality forces me to admit that each of them, however accidental it may appear, has its determinate precise cause, but I'm in no way forced to admit that each of these forms here pointed, there sloped, there rounded has an end and an object."[283] We may not be able to ascribe the ulterior purpose of every Alpine peak, but if each according to Janet's theory has "its determinate and precise cause," purpose is involved in that very fact. And though the determinate and precise cause may not be discovered, this does not dispense with the causality of them and therefore of their purposiveness. Final, efficient, and all other types of causality may be isolated for purposes of analysis, but it is well to bear in mind their underlying unity. Janet, by accepting Bossuet's description of indications of purpose, gives point to our contention. "All that shows order, proportions well chosen, and means fit to produce certain effects, shows also an express end. Consequently a formed design, a regulated intelligence and a perfect art."[284] This statement needs much qualification, but in accepting it Janet could not without contradiction divorce purpose from causality.

As an illustration, let A B C D to Z represent a series of changes. If D be explained by C or B, these may be called secondary causes; if D be explained by A, we have a first cause—that is to say, first logically and not in the order of time; or, if D be explained by Z, a final cause is called into play. But all these differentiations are only moments in the causal explanation. A B C D to Z are simply a cross-section of a few particulars from a world of infinite change. There is nothing rigid about it; it will change with a changed viewpoint. We may view B as an effect of A or as its final cause. Analysis would doubtless reveal an indefinite complexity of causes in A, which might be regarded either as first, secondary, or final. In any intelligent meaning of final and efficient causality, no hard and fast lines can be drawn between them.

The separation of final from efficient causes has much historical respectability in its favor. Descartes regarded final causes of no avail in the explanation of physical nature. It were presumption to attempt such an explanation, he thought, for how could we fathom the divine purposes respecting the natural world or any of its particulars? We may, of course, be unable to describe the purpose of a particular part of the mechanism of a watch, but this does not force us to conclude that there is no purpose at all in the construction of it. Causality does not give us a clue to the particular purposes of Alpine peaks taken in the abstract, but under its lead dynamical geology may even be able to decipher this. What we are insisting upon is that a causal explanation of any kind is an explanation in terms of purpose; a cause is always a purposeful activity.

Alexander Bain makes an entity of causation. The law of the conservation of force, according to his view, is the highest expression of cause and effect. Causation means always the forthputting of force in given circumstances "and the law in question states with exactness what becomes of the force."[285] Every cause has two aspects, a certain amount of power and a certain arrangement of circumstances as the field of its activity. But Bain has no justification for making this force a metaphysical entity; it is merely a subjective explanation of the changes which take place in the given circumstances. Phrases like "conservation of force," "putting forth of force," "what becomes of force," "an embodiment of moving power in given amount," etc., are meaningless abstractions, from the metaphysical viewpoint. Even Bain burdens the law of the conservation of energy with purpose against his will. An analysis of the notion of force would show this. The notion of cause as a moving power and a collocation or arrangement of circumstances, in which the power may operate is a confession of faith in final causes. It is fully understood that the mechanical way of explaining occurrences attempts to distinguish between two things,—the general scheme or plan according to which occurrences together with their diverse combinations are accounted for, and the individual moments in the realization of such a scheme or plan. But no explanation of the general scheme can be offered merely on the assumption of motion and position. It is not outside the province of the scientist to take account of final causes; if he use a causal theory at all, it is incumbent upon him to assume a cause adequate to account for his results. Motion and position are too weak a foundation for the superstructure that he erects upon them.

Lotze labored to reconcile the mechanical and teleological views. Opposed to the attempt of tracking events back to their original position and motion with its extreme rigidity is the "conception of an organic or dynamic impulse,"[286] which laughs to scorn, thought Lotze, the notion that nature is bound up with unbreakable bonds of necessity. For example, human beings are not condemned to the perfunctory performance of duty which they cannot resist but are able to prohibit and check the onflow of experience and then restart it. And all this may be done in accordance with law. Both the mechanical and teleological explanations need a common standard of unity.[287] How does Lotze provide this? Instead of holding that the Infinite incorporates himself in nature in such a way as to satisfy the seeker for the workings of mind in all its warmth and life and to satisfy the mechanist by holding that the Infinite incorporates itself in the forces, substances and laws of nature and of holding further that mechanism deals with the ontological manifestation of the Infinite under the guise of mechanical notions, as Lotze did, it would have been far truer to indicate that the reconciliation between mechanist and teleologist would ensue from a proper view of causation. Both are only using principles of psychological explanation; both assume ontological realities correlated to these explanations, which are justified on grounds other than the distinction between mechanical and final causes. A causal explanation must not be confused with the being or beings operating through the changes which we endeavor to explain. Neither mechanical nor final causes have extra-mental reality. They are both explanations of phases of reality which come under the category of change.

The interpretation of nature in terms of motion and force must be brought face to face with the correct notion of the nature of force, which makes drafts upon purpose. It borrows the element of volition and must take with it all that this means. It is alive with personality and is extremely anthropomorphic; it involves the wealth of human experience. Once admit this, and we are called to task by further reflections. If force be nothing but a commentary upon changes, changes which make a difference, what is it that is really responsible for the difference? A subjective notion cannot urge forward the majestic river or hurl a thunderbolt. This is true. The point of emphasis is that our causal explanations are in the realm of subjectivity. We must distinguish between particular changes and the cause of changes, but in both cases the causality we assume is subjective. Notions of gravitation, force, energy, are merely explanations by the analogy of our experience with the activity of our will. And the meaning of this is a validification of the dictum, no final causes, no mechanical causes. The mechanician cannot escape teleology even by chopping his universe into electrons and protons obedient to law.

Schopenhauer's Theory of Causation and Its Fourfold Root

To Schopenhauer, the will is the metaphysical principle at the base of all existence. The will has various grades of objectification, finding its highest expression in man. Here by chance it attaches itself to a knowing consciousness. "The world is my idea" is in full accord with Berkeley's view that *esse=percipi*. Existence and being perceived are convertible notions. But things become objects under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason in its fourfold form, of *fiendi, cognoscendi, essendi, agendi*. Causation is simply reason and consequent. The fourfold root of the principle does not violate the unity of consciousness, for it finds its origin in it. Consciousness alone gives our representations a regulated connection.

The principle of becoming (*principium rationis sufficientis fiendi*) may be applied to intuitive objects. To Kant's stuff and form of sensation, Schopenhauer adds another form—causality; he therefore has the stuff of sensation and space, time and causality as its forms. Kant made space and time intuitive forms and causality a category of the understanding. Schopenhauer eliminates the division between the intuitive and discursive; he also eliminates all the categories of the understanding except causality. All perception is, therefore, intuitive, and the only intuitive forms are space, time and causality. In fact space, time and the matter, which fills these forms, are only aspects of causation. We are consequently introduced to the objective world through the aspect of the principle of sufficient reason known as becoming.

In the second root, there is an application of causation to knowing (*principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi*), to conceptions as based upon intuition.[288] These generalizations about objects lose much of the wealth of perceptive experience; "to conceive therefore, is to think less than we perceive."[289] As conceptions increase in abstractness, they diminish in perceptual content. If any judgment is to express knowledge, it must have a sufficient reason in virtue of which it is true; thus truth is the causality of sufficient reason of any judgment.

The third root applies causation to being (*principium rationis sufficientis essendi*): that is, to space and time as the pure forms of intuition. All the parts of these stand in causal condition to all other parts.

In the fourth root is an application of causation to volitional activity (*principium rationis sufficientis agendi*). Here we deal not so much with the act as the subject acting, which is perceived by the inner sense alone; the subject acting revealed in self-consciousness is a volitional and not a cognitive self. "Now, the identity of the willing with the knowing subject, in virtue of which the word 'I' includes and designates both, is the *modus*[290] of the universe, and therefore inexplicable."[291] How is causality then related to this subject of volition? With respect to every volition, "we assume that something must have previously occurred, from which this resolution has resulted, and we call this something its reason, or, more correctly, the motive of the action which now follows. Without such a reason or motive, the action is just as inconceivable for us as the movement of a lifeless body without being pushed or pulled."[292]

Schopenhauer has a great truth here; he has traced causality to self-activity and pushed it further back to an ultimate expressing itself through self-activity. In view of this, it is rather surprising that he left causality in the first three roots in the ratiocinative realm. It is a principle of sufficient reason involving always the dynamism of the commentator. But causality can never be applied to spacial, time or logical relations for reasons already sufficiently enumerated.

Ultimate Reality Revealed

It is evident from our study of causality that we are forever confined to our own subjectivity. We cannot outstrip the subjective self any more than outrun our shadow. We cannot leap to anything outside. All attempts to understand what is considered extra-mental is meant something independent of us and severed from us. The nature (*phusis*) of the Stoics was but a reflex of their subjective states, whether regarded as a single physical or spiritual principle. The assertion of the law of universal reason or logos was a superimposition of a subjective commentary upon things. Plato thought he had discovered a spiritual nature embodying the highest human ideals, a nature not amenable to space and time and of which the nature described by Darwin, Tyndall and Huxley is only an expression. The archetypal patterns of Plato, which materialized themselves in seascape, landscape and the ethical life of man, were after all the poetic constructions of a remarkable imagination; its possessor not only in common with all idealists but with the religious soul of man everywhere would fain believe that the ideals constructed by thought and imagination are actual metaphysical realities. I am not confuting Plato; beauty, truth and goodness may be objective relations in the universe, or at least they may be indices to something similar; what we must insist upon is that these ideals were constructions of the mind and could not escape the imprint of Plato's subjectivity. The archetypal ideas were his subjective commentaries upon existence.

The deductions respecting the law of nature which the Roman jurists made were apparently subjective. They deduced a law common to human beings, which they were able to apply to people varying widely in civilization and habits; thus human law could obtain where Roman law failed. They simply availed themselves of what was "permanent, essential and characteristic" of man. They also conceived this common human law to be identical with the law of physical nature; and this was as subjective as the former.

Kant had great confidence that he had emerged from subjectivity, if not by means of intellectual constructions at least through the ethical needs and ideals. Through practical reason, he found the *Ding an Sich,* the objectively real, the fundamental principle of the universe giving validity to freedom and immortality. But Kant's ethical commentaries are no more objective than his intellectual interpretations. His *Dinge an Sich* from any viewpoint are mere names for intellectual concepts, even in spite of the ethical urge for their existence. The *Dinge an Sich* of his *Practical Reason* were as much manufactured from thought and imagination as any elements of the theoretical reason. Kant did not get at objective existence which was other than or independent of subjective creations.

When Thomas Hill Green used the category of relation to discover the real and objective, a world as a single system of relations, he was certainly in a high and dry subjective world. Even when he made an heroic effort to avoid subjectivity by following the suggestion of Kant's famous dictum: *"Macht zwar der Verstand die Natur aber er schafft sie nicht,"* he did not succeed. Very true, nature is there, there before we appeared, but it is there only for us as we grasp it subjectively. The inference that we did not create it is subjective. In fine, any deductions concerning nature, its inner constitution and laws, its beginning or persistence make a draft upon subjectivity.

Even scientific generalizations, when they pretend to deal with absolute objectivity, are not only purely subjective but from the limitations of the scientific attitude, uncritically so. Scientific laws and principles, atoms and subdivisions of atoms, are subjective creations of the imagination. The principle of causation, the most widely used notion in scientific procedure, after careful analysis, was discovered to be a subjective commentary upon changes in phenomena.

This fact of the exclusive subjectivity of all knowledge, with no possible escape from it, will be apparent to anyone upon reflection; it is the most demonstrable fact in our experience. This being the case, our conceptions of ultimate reality as well as of the universe must be developed in and through our subjectivity. We must look within. If we cannot discover God in and through our own soul, we cannot possibly find him elsewhere. Schopenhauer had a true insight: it is through our own subjectivity that we are able to interpret the inside of causality: that is to say, to determine the nature of any event which is causally interpreted. Our subjectivity possesses the world; and this subjectivity is volitional as well as intellective. This is the center from which our universe radiates. This is the source of any theory of the universe. This subjective source we have described under the comprehensive notion of self-activity, which is a system of complicated processes aware of themselves. These activities are not unrelated and independent; they are always a part of a system which includes them. So far as human knowledge can fathom, nothing is unrelated, nothing stands alone. It would be meaningless and worthless if it stood apart from a universe of activities as an essential part of it. Knowledge, as we have seen, is that realized reliance of the mind upon the validity of facts or processes when they are seen to be in harmony and unity with other facts or processes in the general scheme of our experience. Further, knowledge is most intimately related to existence; the noetic fact is locked up with the metaphysical fact. Knowledge is the act of an existent subject and reveals the essence of that subject as self-activity. That is the profoundest fact of existence. All things are interpreted by means of it. It is the key with which we unlock nature. It is the residuum after we have removed all else from knowledge by the acid of criticism. By means of it, we introduce unity and harmony into the scheme of things. The atoms, electrons and forces of science are only dispersions of self-activity; they are dispersonalized self-activities. Thus scattered, we cannot consider them only in their manifoldness, for the moment we reflect they betray a common action, an identity of procedure, known to all in self-activity. So uniform is the action of self-activity in things that it impresses us as comparable to the ether of the scientist immanent in all things. We see nothing outside self-activity; we cannot conceive anything outside it, except bare abstractions. That is what is meant by the unity of knowledge. There is only one subject that can be known fundamentally and ultimately; that is self-activity.

Self-activity Only an Index to the Infinite

As we apply the category of self-activity to the Ultimate, it must be done in a suggestive and not in a comprehensive manner. It is the truest index we have to the Ultimate, as indeed to the knowledge of any fact whatever. We must take note of the gradations in our estimation of the expressions of self-activity.

Our fellowmen express self-activity, which is both superior and inferior to that which we possess. But neither in the upper and lower ranges are they able to elude our understanding of them through the clue given us by our own inner life. No differentiation in thought, language, civilization, geographical position or custom is sufficient to convince us that we cannot understand the inner principles of life from which they act. We gain an insight into the minds of children and less civilized people by a process of reduction. We strip off the more abundant developments of the spirit, interpreting them through a minimum of intellectuality and a maximum of instinctive, emotional experience. We also interpret those who are more developed than we by assuming that we have a true index into their life, so far as it goes. In all cases there is a common ground of understanding, in the insight gained through self-activity.

Individual experience is also an index to the social consciousness. Herein is an exceedingly great extension of the range of individual experience; but the individual understands his social self. Common ideas, emotions and activities are possible in groups, nations and aggregates of nations because each individual has a basis for understanding the whole. In fact, it is easier for the individual to understand his social self than to interpret another individual, since the group expresses more of those qualities which idealize and satisfy his longings. He enters more readily into agreement with a law which expresses the will of the community rather than the caprice of an individual; he sympathizes more readily with the thought which expresses the sentiment of a whole people than that which gives merely an individual opinion.

But a greater difficulty confronts us when we consider ourselves an index to the physical universe. Living material presents no greater difficulty than the understanding of a savage. Botanical life expresses at least partially our self-active life and the lower animals are almost what we are. But what have we in common with a stone? We are not now referring to physical objects elevated by art into the realm of man's idealizations in sculpture and architecture; nor to precious stones which give ideal satisfactions; nor to the artistic use of metal which appeals to the deeps of man's spirit; nor to physical nature under the spell of aesthetic appreciation as when the "Baechlein, silberhell und klar" becomes to Goethe the bearer of thoughts and emotions which perish never; nor to the ruins of an abbey or castle which engage the historical and the aesthetical imagination. The reference is to a bare stone or lump of clay. To the eye of common sense, neither appears to manifest self-activity. But when the scientist reveals the possibilities of these objects and describes them in the classic notions of a particular science, he reveals to us the most extraordinary activities, giving us a vision of the eternal silently and effectively at work in these lowly objects. Have they not within them a power and a soul? Are they not instrumentalities in the manifestation of the Ultimate from which both they and we ourselves have been evolved? Therefore when superficial reflection fails to see the presence of self-activity, deeper reflection reveals it in all its fulness.

But the reach from the human to the Infinite is more natural. Faith in the extension of our own self-activity indefinitely is generated with less strain than its extension to sticks and stones. We are accustomed to soar toward the infinite along many of our categories of thought. Our experience of momentary succession may be stretched to historical and even infinite time. Space and causality may also be thus extended. The necessity has already been forced upon us to define categories of thought not only from the viewpoint of individual self-activity but also from the viewpoint of the limitless self-activity which the universe manifests. The account of space, time and causation is not exhausted by assuming them to be either forms of thought or generalizations of experience. The objects to which they are applied must be taken into the account. Otherwise they are empty abstractions. Space is too readily assumed to be the way in which the mind arranges extramental dead objects, whereas as a matter of fact there are no such dead objects. In spacial perception a selection is made of a small amount of limitless activity, thus regarded as bearers of activity outside the mind in their relations to one another. Space consciousness, in fact, is our reaction to the infinite, whose self-activity is immanent in all things. It is the perceptive circumscription of limitless self-activity. Space may thus be defined as the conflux of an individual perception with the manifestation of infinite life at a particular point in the material universe. The category of time is the viewpoint we assume at the conflux between the processes of our consciousness and infinite self-activity, which manifests itself in us. Thus the categories become our teachers respecting the extension of thought and experience to infinite self-activity.

But we must re-emphasize the fact that our self-activity is only an index; it is merely a starting point to the inexhaustible life. In our skeptical mood, the query comes naturally: why think of the infinite in terms of circumscribed self-activity, a self-activity conditioned by a physiological organism? Is it not absurd to measure the infinite by its imperfect expressions? Certainly, if by measuring be meant the attempt to exhaust the infinite in terms of self-activity. It must be used merely as an index and there is no other way left to us mortals. The nature of any being can only be studied through its manifestations, and nothing is completely revealed in its manifestations. The Parthenon did not completely exhaust the soul of Ictinus, its chief architect; he also designed the temple of Apollo at Bassae and the temple of Demeter and Persephone at Eleusis. But a study of the Parthenon is certainly an index to the ideality of his soul. But we should have a much more complete index if the Parthenon were a visible expression of his actual self-activity. If this ideal temple as it stood on the Acropolis was at each moment an expression of his soul in such a manner that an instant withdrawal of his presence in each atom of its marble and other material would cause it not only to collapse but to disappear off the face of the earth, a far more profound insight into the workings of his mind would be gained than is afforded by the study of the ideal arrangement of the molar masses of the Parthenon. But even from the viewpoint of the ideal arrangement, all the work of Ictinus with which we are familiar is, after all, only a partial expression of his mind. How far these temples are able to express his development, disappointment, longings, hopes, skepticisms, loves, friendships and the total activities of his life in the Greek civilization of the fifth century before our era, is of course a matter of conjecture. Undoubtedly, many of the general attitudes of the mind of Ictinus may be revealed in his work, great reserve, poignant sorrow, reverence toward the divine, and many other qualities; but it is a very restricted revelation. But we are considering the world as a Parthenon, the whole animate and inanimate universe, the souls of men and women, as the expressions of the soul of the divine artist. The universe is an extension of God's self-activity. When we say this self-activity is limitless, we are only suggesting that the divine thought comprehends ours and all intellective processes in the universe and comprehends our volition and emotion and all volition and emotion in the universe. Human souls are more veritable expressions of the infinite and therefore more complete indices to it than the Parthenon could have possibly been to the soul of Ictinus. We are particular embodiments of the infinite.

Conclusions of Book III

Our effort in this book has been, through an analysis of causation, to indicate that all interpretations of the energy of the world, whether spiritual or physical, focus themselves in the unity of consciousness. Self-activity is revealed to us as the mainspring of the universe of things as well as the mind of man. It is the inner soul of all. The diversities with which our experience familiarizes us are the scatterings of the inner self-activity of things. A faint analogue of this process is given us in the life of man. A man may express himself in divers ways, making a difference at a thousand points of contact. Radiating from his home, the center of his jural and domestic relations are numerous and complicated social connections. He effects social life in his contacts of friendship, religion, ethical relations. If we could conceive him to be actually present at these points of contact as an immanent and effective reason instead of an incidental contributor, we should have another illustration of the self-activity of the universe in its multiform expressions. As the diversities of the universe are interpretable in terms of unity and causality, they indicate self-activity as their ultimate source. Diversity is meaningless otherwise. Divers things cannot of themselves issue in unity. No compounding of mindless stuff can ever result in the unity of self-consciousness. Mind cannot appear as the result of the jostling together of material forces. To obtain this result, there must be an assumption of the presence of germinal self-activity in the antecedents. The universe is here; all its metaphysical existences are to hand. Our philosophy merely endeavors to explain them. Nothing so far as our experience goes appears *de novo*. When self-activity appears, it simply declares its ultimate source. In our study this principle of self-activity has protruded itself wherever we turned, no less in the conceptions of modern science than in the immanent causality of Spinoza. Nature lends herself most readily to explanations in the terms of self-activity. No other principle enables us to explain the uniform and rational behaviour of its phenomena or why each particular activity respects its total ongoing. The inner meaning of any activity must be ultimately sought in self-activity. That is the final resort of human thinking. That is the most satisfactory and comprehensive explanation of all the facts of the universe.

We have thus endeavored to look at existence in the fulness of the best explanation possible to us. Self-activity has not been defined in a narrow way but taken in all the wealth of its suggestion. It is in its richness that it must serve as an index to the infinite life. What is beyond the grasp of this principle fascinates us as unexplored territory, but it also baffles our attempts to enter it. It is confessedly infinitely inviting and compelling, but always illusive. How things may look or what takes place in a region beyond self-activity, we cannot even guess. It is impenetrable darkness to us. Self-activity is the only candle with which we are able to illumine the dark places of existence. But there is nothing in this fact to discourage us from a firm faith which rests upon the fact that there is nothing beyond the pale of self-activity. What our imagination has mistaken for a region wherein there is an absence of self-activity is, after all, filled with it when it is properly and comprehensively interpreted. Infinite self-activity will always be a challenge to our finite minds. There is always a beyond to our circumscribed vision but never a beyond devoid of this energy. And the interpretation of self-activity grows clearer and more complete with each generation, because of the developing life of the individual and the race. To the limits of our understanding of self-activity we have a right to check the vagaries of modern theories. When they interpret reality in the terms of partial self-activity, which are nothing but unreal abstractions, they must be condemned. We must take the full consequence of our hypothesis. Some thinkers have a preference for explanations in the terms of partial self-activity; thus ultimate reality is conceived as an element of volition such as impulse, desire, non-rational will, or in terms of full volition; others prefer an element of intellection, such as sensation, perception, thought or fully developed intellection. The motive for these explanations in the terms of partial self-activity is difficult to find, unless it be a desire to approach as near a mechanical theory as possible without the acceptance of it. But there is no virtue in a minimum of indispensable hypothesis. Explanations based on mechanical or extra-mental theories are the worst abstractions of all, since we know nothing about matter and motion or the extra-mental except in the terms of the experiences of ourselves as self-active beings. If the motive be the avoidance of anthropomorphism, there is no success in this direction; for there is no less anthropomorphism in the use of a part of the process of self-activity. How is it possible for sensation or impulse in any meaning of these psychological terms to be less human and more purely mechanical than full-orbed self-activity? Are they not respectively abstractions from intellective and conative processes? Have they not been excised from the onflow of consciousness? They indeed have no meaning except as they form a part of the whole. And they have absolutely no meaning apart from the process from which they were taken except for purposes of analysis. There is no way to escape except to accept the principle of self-activity at its full and comprehensive value. If philosophical respectability comes from the manufacture of basal principles for the explanation of existence from non-human or partially human processes, we are doomed to take our place forever among those who dwell in outer darkness where science, philosophy, poetry and religion shall ultimately perish.

BOOK IV

ULTIMATE REALITY INTERPRETED AS AN ETHICAL AND AESTHETICAL PRINCIPLE

CHAPTER ONE

THE ETHICAL INTERPRETATION OF ULTIMATE REALITY AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS

Ethical Relations Interpreted by the Notion of Natural Law

We were compelled to caution ourselves concerning the inadequacy of our principles of interpretation. As finite beings, we are unable to advance beyond the index to the volume of the universe; but to this as an indication of the contents of the volume, we have an indisputable right. Our task in the large is to explain the universe from the viewpoint of the religious consciousness, regarding man as an essential and contributory process in ultimate reality, humanity and nature.

When modern reflection became mature enough to address itself to ethical problems, the notion of natural law, borrowed as we have seen from the Ionic philosophers and developed in its application to human relations by the Roman jurists, influenced very largely both the foundation and superstructure of ethical theory. Ethical in common with philosophical inquiry struggled to emancipate itself from the slavery of external authority by directing its attention to the principles of conduct revealed in self-consciousness. Ethical thinkers based their theories upon facts of human nature, not in its individuality but in the ramifications of its social structure.

International Law

Eminent thinkers addressed themselves to the ethical interrelations of sovereign states and prepared the way for the notable work of Hugo Grotius, *"De Jure Belli ac Pacis,"* 1625. Grotius deduces international law from nature and rejects the skepticism of Horace:

"By naked nature ne'er was understood
What's just and right."

He grounded international law in man's desire for society or what the Stoics called domesticus, as stated previously[293] the domestic instinct or feeling of kindred. This tends to conserve society and is the source of *Jus* or natural law; for it cannot be preserved without our leaving to the other what is his and giving to him what we owe.[294] Such a law may be ascribed to the will of God,[295] which implanted it in man. Human nature, therefore, is the mother of right or natural law and "The mother of civil laws is obligation by mutual compact; and since mutual compact derives its force from natural law, nature may be said to be the grandmother of civil laws. But natural law (which impels us to society) is reinforced by utility."[296]

Ethical relations as developed in society became the keynote to the ethical systems of Hobbes and Cumberland.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)

Hobbes followed the naturalistic thinkers. He thought in terms of human society and applied principles discovered in human nature to the relations of human beings within the state. The individual is always considered as an integral part of society.

In his psychology Hobbes underestimated the most conspicuous characteristic of human nature, the creative power of self-consciousness. In his endeavor to gain a unitary notion of nature, placing man and the visible universe around him in a continuous process, it was unnecessary to minimize the importance of the human factor in such a scheme.

During the seventeenth century the leading principles of nature were being formulated. Motion was held to play an important rôle in the economy of nature. Hobbes seized upon it as a centralizing and harmonizing principle. Motion in the physical world must be correlated with psychical motion. Motion was the main characteristic of the human mind. The equation between extra-mental and psychical motion may be thus stated: the motions or pressures of the world beyond our bodies cause motion in the end organs of sense. These pressures reach the heart and brain where they meet with resistance and counter-pressures are set going. This counter-pressure is an "endeavor of the heart to deliver itself which endeavor because 'outward', seemeth to be some matter without. And this 'seeming' or 'fancy' is that which men call sense."[297] The motion thus impinging upon our body sets up motion within the internal organs, the brain and the heart, and the appearance of this motion to us is what we call fancy or sensation. Sensation, therefore, upon which the entire structure of knowledge rests and from which it is compounded, is the psychical correlate of motion. The naturalism of Hobbes is thus consistent; and notwithstanding its crudity, it is a splendid effort to find a unitary principle in motion bearing a physical and psychical aspect. It is rather strange that Hobbes did not deduce the logical consequences of his psychical theory by investing motion with psychical qualities. He admitted that motion produces nothing but motion and sensible qualities are in the objects which cause motion; it would appear, therefore, that there must be some cause in motion or moving objects to account for sensation.

Nevertheless, the psychological theory of Hobbes is more consistent than his ethical theory. The great ethical principle which he discovered in human nature was self-preservation; but the natural association of men in a state of nature prior to their entering the condition of organized society was such as to make for the destruction of each member of the natural association. As an escape from this predicament, self-preservation compelled them to form commonwealths for mutual protection. A visible power was necessary to keep them in awe, release them from the miserable condition of war and possible annihilation. Is it not strange that men were able to resist their natural passions for destruction before the race of men had completely disappeared! And why did not the instinct of self-preservation assert itself before the instinct of destruction became prominent? Both the instincts of self-preservation and destruction are equally natural and imperative and Hobbes has not indicated why that of self-preservation embodying itself in commonwealths ultimately prevailed. In other words, the principle of development is entirely overlooked both as respecting the evolution of man and of governmental institutions. The assumption of Hobbes is that man existed historically in an ante-governmental state and passed in some inexplicable way into orderly life in a commonwealth.

Hobbes, however, provided for the development of the cardinal virtues. He did not assume that these were imbedded in human nature as fully formulated principles. They developed through the type of social attrition found in a commonwealth. In a state of warfare they found no place; right and wrong, justice and injustice, developed under the restraint of law and order. Neither are these qualities such that an individual may possess apart from society; they relate to men in the social order and not to men in solitude, and are discoverable by reason. Of course from the Hobbian viewpoint they are all phases of self-preservation. However we may criticize this main principle,—and of course it is open to very serious questioning,—Hobbes made valuable contributions to the theory of ethics, especially by calling attention to the actual ethical relations. Oftentimes these have been formulated in *abstracto*; but they have no meaning apart from actual social relations.

Hobbes also gave impulse and direction to modern ethical inquiry. We are still searching for natural laws imbedded in human nature for the guidance of our complicated social life,—and searching for them as he did in the social aggregate, in organized human society.

Ethical Interpretation Since the Time of Hobbes

Richard Cumberland (1632-1718) championed natural law in the seventeenth century. He reasoned about "the standard of virtue and society taken from the nature of all things." The laws of nature are impressed upon the mind by the nature of things sufficiently clear to indicate the possible conduct of rational beings, which will promote the common good and make for happiness. While thus relegating the ultimate reason for ethical action to the first cause of the universe, yet the keynote of his system throughout is the common good. The common good is revealed to us by the nature of things chiefly through our institutions. The principles productive of the common good are not, therefore, made clear to us by the play of social forces as Hobbes would have it, but are revealed directly by the will of the first cause in these social forces and always promote not private but public good.

The third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) took a similar position. He grounded his ethics in cosmic principles. It was in the whole of things or the universe that he found a good order and evil arises when the individual acts irrespective of the whole, or we see it as evil when what happens to the individual is considered in its isolation from the whole. Indeed, the ill of the individual may contribute to the good of the whole. This good of the whole may be discerned through both a moral and aesthetical sense. The wisdom of the ruler of nature has also dictated that the private good of every one is best obtained by promoting the public good. "So that virtue, which of all excellencies and beauties is the chief and most amiable; that which is the prop and ornament of human affairs; which upholds communities, maintains union, friendship and correspondence amongst men; that by which countries, as well as private families, flourish and are happy, and for want of which everything comely, conspicuous, great and worthy must perish and go to ruin; that single quality, thus beneficial to all society, and to mankind in general, is found equally a happiness and good to each creature in particular, and is that by which alone man can be happy, and without which he must be miserable."[298]

At present the predominant note in ethical life is the good of society variously interpreted. The emotional aspect upon which utilitarianism laid so much stress is not so prominent; and the greatest happiness for the greatest number has been exchanged for the slogan of the greatest service to the community. The finer emotions, to be sure, find full scope, but a new sense of community interest is predominant. There is an effort made to preserve the health of the community by better housing, general sanitation, and the elimination of all social diseases, to stimulate general and practical education and the special education of college and university, to sustain recreative, moral and religious agencies: and all this is done, not consciously at least, for the greatest happiness to the greatest number, but in order that human life may be lived more efficiently,—that is, with less detriment to the community and make the greatest contribution to its life. Those who enter most largely into the work of human welfare are captivated by the thought of service. Duty and moral satisfactions for them are blended in the service they are able to render. The good of the community in the sense of the efficiency of each member in it has become paramount. Utilitarianism is having its way. In fact, there is a recrudescence to Hobbes' theory stripped of its egoistic phase. Men are finding their duty, ideals and satisfactions of conscience in the common action and service of the community; and the notion of the community is rapidly enlarging and bursting national boundaries in the endeavor to secure the concerted action of many peoples and indeed of the whole world, and thus serving the community has come to mean serving the whole world of human beings.

The notion of the common good has received an interesting interpretation by evolutionists under the stimulus of biological conceptions. They present to us the inspiring thought of biological life emerging from the heart of nature and man appearing at the end of aeons of biological modifications. Since his appearance the process of differentiation has continued its work and is still operative and has resulted in the ethical living together of human beings in various complex forms of social groupings. Ethical principles, therefore, which are operative among men developed neither in the individual nor in society but must be regarded as the outgrowth from inorganic nature, spreading itself into organized life and from life in general to its specific form in man. This suggests that there must have been something in the original homogeneous stuff of nature of an ethical quality which accompanied all its differentiations through animal life until it reached man, something that became more specific until it found its full fruition in the splendid ethical idealism of human beings.

Another significant confluent found its way into the Hobbian main stream, that is an endeavor to found a theory of ethics upon the principles revealed in human nature considered from the viewpoint of the individual. This type of theory was well represented in the work of Joseph Butler (1692-1752). He enunciated that man was made for society; made to do good to his fellow-men; but the principles according to which the good must be dictated and guided are found within each individual. The principles of both benevolence and self-love are implanted in our nature. In the second and third moral sermons Butler deals with the problem of the supremacy of conscience. Despite many diversities of moral attitude, the faculty of conscience within, which leads us to do good, is supreme. Men are by nature a law unto themselves. We find within ourselves the rule of right and the obligation to follow it. This principle of reflection or conscience distinguishes between the internal principle and the external act, passes judgment upon both, classifies some actions as just, right, good, and others as of the opposite quality, acts of itself magisterially in approving and condemning. It is always a natural principle and always anticipates "a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own."[299] It is this principle of natural conscience that makes a man a moral agent.[300]

The Cambridge Platonists

But notwithstanding the prevalent tendency to construct an ethical theory upon principles found in the individual or society or both, the urge to consider the antecedents of these could not be resisted. Man evidently is a product of processes for which neither the individual nor society is ultimately responsible. He has been evolved from nature, and it is legitimate and natural to inquire into the processes and the ultimate conditions of his evolution. This was done by the Cambridge Platonists. They continued the work begun by Hobbes and accounted for ethical relations on natural grounds. They opposed his fundamental principle of self-preservation and gave a different interpretation of what is meant by nature; nevertheless, they were Hobbian naturalists. Hobbes founded a system of ethics on human nature as organized in society. Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688) believed that moral distinctions arose from a nature, which is independent of the will of God, an archetypal nature, of which the nature revealed in our experience is the ectype. Ethical relations are, therefore, immutable and eternal. In fact, archetypal goodness is in the very nature of things and independent of the deity; that is to say, it is an essential quality of deity independent of his will.[301] This desire, even older than Plato, to account for the actual, dynamical and changeable by reference to something unchangeable, is perfectly normal. It is the Eleatic endeavor to gain permanence at the cost of a fluctuating world, stationariness at the cost of life. If such a condition obtained, we should have a moribund universe. But from the ethical standpoint, there is no such existent abstraction. Ethical relations, as we know them, are neither immutable nor eternal. And certainly they are not as definite and abstract as the principles of geometry and cannot be so treated. Yet, in spite of these valid criticisms of the Cambridge Platonists, it must be granted that the effort they made to search for the foundations of ethics in the ground-work of the universe is very commendable and unavoidable, although it is not necessary to conceive of this ground-work as an abstract principle underlying the nature we know.

Samuel Clarke's (1675-1729) attempt to find a basis for ethics in the cosmic principle of the eternal fitness of things, a principle to which deity, man and nature must conform, is very similar to Cudworth's system. But the fitness of things is both very abstract and subjective. There is a fitness in things and acts because they fall in with an environment, which either we have created for them or has been created for us. Thus, for example, we hold that certain acts are appropriate under certain circumstances but not under others. Why? Simply because they meet our subjective demands. When we apply this principle to nature and its ultimate reality, we are making an abstraction of an intellectual and moral demand for consistency, not in the actual terms of our self-conscious processes but in the terms of an abstraction of these conceived after the manner of the fitting together of notions in Euclidean geometry or of the pieces of cloth sewed together by the tailor in such a manner that it will fit the human body. Every candid thinker must acknowledge the difficulty of emerging from the subjective interpretation to an objective reality, but the pathway is not made easier by abstracting certain phases of our subjective processes.

The Ethical Ideal Defined

The end for ethical action may be thus conceived: a striving for the development of the individual and social groups as self-conscious beings exercising intellection, volition and emotion, and a more perfect harmony of the individual with the processes of which he is an essential and contributory part; that is to say, with ultimate reality of which he is an expression, with humanity in all its interrelations and with nature in whose processes he is enmeshed.

Such notions as right and wrong, good and bad, duty, obligation and responsibility must find their interpretation in the light of this ideal.

From the psychological viewpoint, a partial and one-sided account of the processes involved in ethical action and ideal must be avoided. There is no more reason for basing ethics exclusively upon the hedonistic principle than upon the exclusive principle of reason. The totality of self-consciousness must be taken into the account, not in the sense that one psychological process must nullify or keep others in subordination, but in the sense that all must find their utmost exercise in that blending of the whole which makes human life normal and efficient. In any ethical deed the entire psychological man is involved. The ethical question to be determined in each act is not to discover what particular impulse, motive, thought, desire moved the man to a certain action, but whether the act made a contribution to the evolution of self-conscious beings. The psychological basis is never a single quality apart from the total ongoing of consciousness; it is an element in the larger process. The ethical act carries with it the total psychological man, whatever the particular emphasis happens to be.

It is equally true that the psychological aspect must be studied in connection with the group. When in the course of biological development man appeared, he was already a social being. He had been compelled to live both defensively and offensively among his fellow-prehuman creatures. He had managed somehow to pull through and thus preserve his kind from complete destruction. At this stage he also possessed the rudiments of an intellectual life. His thinking of necessity was crude, but it was a beginning. As he reacted against his environment, his thought processes were intensified. But the capacity to think was there from the beginning; otherwise it could not have been intensified. These intellectual and ethical capacities came with him out of the heart of nature. Judging from his subsequent history, they were absolutely necessary for the purposes of his life.

Further, as a member of a group he reacted in certain ways toward it. If he stole, he found the practice at length becoming inconvenient, as others would indulge in similar acts; he also discovered that killing the husband, wife or child of another meant retaliation. There gradually dawned upon the consciousness of primitive man, especially as his emotions were intensified, the rightness and wrongness of certain acts. On a particular day, we might well suppose, he returned home after killing a fellow-man, with downcast eyes and a condemning soul; on that day the fall of man occurred: that is to say, barbaric man had fallen and ethical man had risen.

From such a dim insight there has been a refinement of ethical judgment and sentiment through all the stages of civilization. Human laws and codes, warfare and compacts, institutions, science, art, literature, philosophy, religion, ethics and innumerable other interests have intensified and developed the moral reactions of the race. The history of the human race has been a record of moral training.

In course of time moral judgments have been solidified. The mind judges of its motives, intentions and actions in the light of the growing ideals of conduct. The individual came to realize that he ought to do certain things and refrain from doing others. Sidgwick names these the "ought judgments," or jural judgments. They deal with rights and duties. They refer either to the conduct of rational beings or its preconditions as the result of choices. The peculiar type of ethical reaction under certain circumstances will depend, of course, upon the total makeup of the individual. Judgments of approval and disapproval are very similar to the ought judgments. Judgments pronouncing certain acts good or bad, named "aesthetical judgments," take in a wider range than the ought group and refer to things as well as persons. These moral judgments, like judgments in general, are not apart from the general procedure of the mind. They differ merely in view of the class of objects to which they refer and the peculiar emotional and volitional reactions which accompany them. Conscience from the viewpoint of intellection, consists in ethical reactions, which are coextensive with the intellectual nature. Every judgment has an ethical quality, which may be intensified the moment a new set of considerations appears. The ethical judgments are also preëminently social. They are reactions which arise and always have arisen in connection with our group life.

Moral sentiments may be classified in a similar way; in fact, they are emotional phases which accompany these judgments.

Moral volitions are, of course, the mainspring of ethical conduct. What is the motive of the choice? What is the intention of the act? What are the general considerations accompanying the act? How shall we decide? How shall we carry out the decision? All these may have an ethical quality.

When we speak, therefore, of a self-conscious being exercising himself morally, the reference is not to a fragment of his psychical process but to its entire range. Whatever part of the process be emphasized for particular purposes, the entire psychical man is involved in a moral act. Conscience, therefore, is not a name for a restricted process of the mind sectioned off from the rest of its activities, but covers its entire ethical reactions.

Egoism and Altruism

The egoistic and altruistic elements must be combined in our consideration of the ethical ideal. Guizot taught us long since that civilization means a perfect man in a perfect society; that at least is the ideal. The individual must never be separated from society in any theory, for without the individual, no society; without society, no individual.

Society may be properly regarded as a biological organism. Auguste Comte familiarized us with the organic structure of human society. It is a biological process. Society is composed of individuals who are biological animals, and there can be no rational explanation of society without reference to this fact. The laws of life are imperative in a human being. Human beings present the phenomena of growth, structure, function, in common with all living beings; therefore, society will be largely colored by these facts. In the social organism there is a mutual dependence of parts. Like all organisms, society is modifiable, and many modifications may be inherited. The human group adapts itself to its environment; in fine, all the notions which biology has so splendidly worked out may be applied to human society just because it is composed of biological beings.

But the biological description does not exhaust the account of human society. It is also composed of groups of individuals who are under the dominance of psychological life. Psychical and moral aspects must not be overlooked. The phenomena of consciousness, while organic with the biological, are certainly distinct from them. They may be introspectively studied; they are phenomena of my consciousness with which I come into immediate contact; my biological life does not so reveal itself. Society in its deepest aspect is a product of personalities. It is the visible form in which man's spiritual nature expresses itself. It is the interaction of self-conscious souls. It is also the product of a force over which society has no control, the self-conscious principle of the universe. It is not merely a corporate consciousness, something inclusive of and yet larger than the individuals which compose the group, but something which both the individual and the group express.

If we ask about the *modus operandi* of society—that is, the particular principle by which society has evolved into what it is—there is a difference of opinion. Professor J. Mark Baldwin holds that the social and individual self develop together. "Society, we may say, is the form of natural organization into which ethical personalities fall in their growth. So also on the side of the individual we may define ethical personality as the form of natural development into which individuals grow who live in social relationship. The true analogy, then, is not that which likens society to a physiological organism, but rather that which likens it to a psychological organization to which it is analogous, to that which is found in the individual in ideal thinking." The social group is, therefore, welded together as concepts are in ideal thinking and the welding power is imitation.

But Professor Baldwin should not have remained in the courtyard of a great truth; he should have entered the palace. We fully agree that it is an ethical and a psychological being that acts upon the group and the group, possessed of the qualities, acts upon him. But the principle of imitation, which he borrowed from the French thinker Tardé, is not sufficiently broad to account for society. Why a partial process of self-activity? Are not other processes just as important overlooked? Society is the product of complete self-conscious beings, all that they have been, are, and hope to be. Neither Baldwin's principle of ideal thinking transmitted by imitation, nor Durkheim's principle of sympathy, nor Gidding's consciousness of kind can give a complete account of the fact of society. All these are good, but they are only partial processes. The material of society, its warp and woof, is composed of all the wealth and complexity of expression of self-conscious souls, self-determining personalities. Into it is poured their experiences both individual and collective, actual and accumulated, the ideals they have cherished, the mistakes they have developed, their historic backgrounds and prophetic anticipations. The methods of its formation will be as diverse as the psychical processes of human beings; for society is formed to meet the felt needs of personalities.

The ethical ideal, therefore, concerns itself with the development of personalities thus amalgamated. Such an ideal cannot be intuitively discerned; it is gradually formed from the experiences of the individual and the race. Each generation gains a clearer notion of it; it is infinitely flexible and constraining. Its flexibility arises from the fact that progress is a matter of life; improvement cannot by its very nature be static. The urge to improve and improvement itself become interpreted through the experience of the race. The ten commandments are a summary of centuries of moral development. The uniformity as to an ethical ideal reached by different people, so that in the language of Cicero it "is the same for you and me, here and at Athens, now and forever," is accounted for by considering the ultimate principle of which human beings are expressions and incorporators. But it is evident that this universal ideal cannot be intuitively discerned. G. E. Moore contends that we know what is good just as we know what is yellow, and we cannot define either. But the color yellow is an object of visual perception, ranging between green and orange, and of course it will so appear to any human eye in which the rods and cones are normal. But the good is an ideal constructed by thought and imagination and becomes an object of rational choice. Browning makes Paracelsus say: "I have converted my life into one idea, whereto I ordained it." The ideal is always of the conscious choosing and ordaining of human souls. It is the result of the mature processes of the mind and therefore is neither intuitive nor static.

The ideal always involves a struggle for the simple reason that there is always a disparity between it and accomplishment. The evolution of ourselves and humanity means that a great deal must be overcome. There will be much attrition, much wrestling, to attain the better, to say nothing of the best. In that struggle, the ideal becomes gradually realized. The life of the lower animals illustrates this. How superfluous to say that a lion could not be what he is without the struggles of his life; his very struggles made him king of the jungle. Both the form of his body and muscles are largely the product of his necessities. Give him the vast jungle; let him day by day be compelled to obtain his food; let him often become faint with hunger; let him use all his ingenuity in capturing his prey, bringing into use all his mental and physical apparatus: these conditions fulfilled for such an animal in the biological scale, and a lion such as we know him is the result. On the other hand, incarcerate a lion in an iron cage, supply him with all his needs, deprive him of the processes of struggle, and in a few generations he will cease to be the terror of the jungle.

This is equally true in man's intellectual life. How trite the saying, there is no royal road to learning, but how true! The mind develops through struggle. There are no easy methods of learning a language. The students who are searching for short cuts are missing both the intellectual and moral values of study. When the student wrestles with a book which is tough to tackle, he is in contact with a mind brighter than his own, and by mastering the author's viewpoint he is bringing his mind up to the level of the author's. By and by when the strain of thinking is put upon the student's mind, he will be able to stand it because he has obeyed the law of struggle.

The conditions of life are such that we cannot become good without struggle. The ideal is always ahead, and the reaching after it means the mastery of all obstructing forces. The struggle to obtain it brings it ever nearer. Sacrifices for great causes are stages in both the progress of the individual and the race toward the ideal.

The Ethical Interpretation Purely Subjective

Modern ethics, of which Thomas Hobbes may be considered the father, is accurate in its explanation of phenomena under the notion of natural law. An ethical act is just as natural as the gravitation of a falling stone or the freezing of water at 32 degrees Fahrenheit. The intellectual progress of a human being cannot be regarded as more natural than his ethical progress. But it must be remembered that the ethical interpretation of human conduct is at a par with the causal. Man ethical is just as much a product of nature as man intellectual; both types of reaction are imbedded in the humblest beginnings of animal life; both play their part in the lower animals and emerge into greater distinctness in the fully conscious human being, and as centuries rolled on, complexity in the application of them to various phases of life has been attained. The ethical is always the expression of man's essential nature, however diverse or contradictory the application of his ethical notions may be. But both the causal and ethical reflections are purely subjective.

The relation of cause and effect, as we have seen, is an interpretation of events according to the pattern found in our own volitional life as active and passive agents and sufferers. Ethical causality follows this identical method of explanation. The difference lies in the fact that the latter refers to an ideal standard. Causation is the interpretation of events in nature as if they were actual processes of self-conscious beings; ethics simply adds the measuring rod of the ideal. The demand for causal explanation is satisfied when an act conforms to an intellectual scheme constructed from the past and present experiences of the individual and the race. The ethical demand is only satisfied when an act anticipates a better state than either the past or present reveals. But in neither case do we escape subjectivity.

Thinkers have endeavored to reach objective or extramental existence in devious ways. They felt the need of an ethical force in nature independent of our existence. But in all such attempts they have merely sublimated noetical processes into metaphysical existences. Plato took the ideals of truth, beauty and goodness, creations of the human mind and of the Greek mind in particular, and converted them into metaphysical realities, making them both the archetypes and causes of all forms of existence. The Cambridge Platonists, pursuing the prolific thought of their master, grounded ethical relations in the nature of things. We cannot escape subjectivity, however, by the use of another set of terms. When the meaning of the nature of things is demanded, resort must be taken to subjective constructions of thought. Nature to the Ionic philosopher was merely the recognition of a universal force present in nature, comparable to the force he recognized as present in the mysterious process of birth, a force other than and greater than individual volition. But as we have amply demonstrated, the presence of this power wherever felt is subjective, both in the act of recognizing it and in the comparison of it to the force present at birth. Of course we feel there is something objective, something other than we, bringing about the event of birth, but our only index to it is within ourselves. This amounts to saying that it is not other than we in the sense of being outside us but in the sense that it includes us. Now, if there were a nature or fitness of things metaphysically existent and independent of us, an ultimate reality other than we are, two considerations would protrude themselves. First, how is it possible to gain a notion of a principle called nature, which is other than the ultimate and independent both of the ultimate and ourselves? Second, assuming that the nature or fitness of things is identical with the ultimate, are we not compelled to demand that it contain all the qualifications necessary to account for existences like ourselves and all the wealth and interrelations of experience with which we are familiar? An adequate answer to both these questions would compel us to fall back upon our own self-conscious life as affording the only key not only to the mysterious force present in every birth but also to the interpretation of this force as ethical.

We frankly accept this subjectivity; it is not detrimental to any interest we can conceive. Our inability to escape it is not a calamity but a magnification of our privilege as being on the inside track of the universe rather than being spectators viewing things from the outside. Rather than inventing impossible ways by which thought may indicate the way of escape from this conclusion, better far that we should spend our energies to become worthy of our heritage. There is no disgrace attached to our inability to reach an extra-mental being who is supposed to be responsible for the present moral order, for there is no such being. The ethical spirit of the universe is our absolute possession. It is a self-conscious ethical life of which we are essential and contributory parts. Ethical relations are involved in our dealings with our fellow-men, and it is readily admitted that we are constituent parts of humanity. We are incontestably sharers in its biological life. The workings of self-consciousness in human beings is so similar as to make it possible to state general laws of its operation. Similar unities may also be discovered in the actions of ethical beings. As already suggested, golden rules and categorical imperatives do not leap forth fully armed from the brain of their enunciators; back of them are centuries of living, wrestlings with conscience, sinning and repenting, painful learning and partial achieving: and when they are stated they are the veriest abstractions of a real life which has been lived. Intellectual and moral laws are formulated by great leaders, and they find them forged out by the ethical and intellectual living of the whole human race and thus have their foundation in an inner life common to all.

Now, this common life of humanity is none other than the expression of the life of God. In the most real sense we are not only his offspring but verily his embodiment. We are expressions of nature's mysterious force. The ultimate becomes most effectively visible in us; we are more complete expressions of it than anything else on this planet. Neither the dust of the earth, nor its fascinating botanical expressions, nor its still more wonderful manifestations in all forms of animal life, can measure up to our self-conscious life—a life of looking before and after, suffering and rejoicing, loving and hating, thinking and imagining, reasoning and intuiting, praying and hoping, wondering and sacrificing, longing and achieving, indulging in thoughts and emotions which perish never, sharing infinite life, and even in the hour of death looking forward to life. Verily, there is an ideal life manifested in the life of man as an individual and as grouped into society of which he is an essential part.

Disparity between Ideal and Accomplishment

The ethical spirit of man is only finite, a part of the spirit of the universe, an incomplete part within its possibilities. No one will deny the disparity between ethical ideal and accomplishment. The unethical acts of individuals and groups are matters of common observation. But while we give due value to ethical failures, the insistent progress of ethical ideals must not be overlooked. The world war both in its initiation and progress violated all the ethical codes ever written and all the ethical ideals ever formulated; but the defense of ideals by most of the nations engaged in it was conducted on such a scale and guided by such motives as was never before witnessed during the known history of man. The world, to be sure, is still in the making, and the idealist would fain believe that the economic and political life of the race will continue to reflect to an ever increasing degree the ethical ideals which every right-minded man cherishes.

The student of international and general social relations within the national unity will see great progress, even within a short period such as five thousand years.

In spite of ugly facts, which appear in human relationships, the ethical ties which should bind human beings together are consistent with the deepest sense of justice and brotherhood. The leaders of the race under the guise of all civilizations have given utterance to these; there is an inevitable and unique unanimity in their attitude. They have voiced the common soul. Moses is merely a name for the conscience of the Jewish tribes becoming vocal. Hammurabi is merely a name for the Assyro-Babylonian amalgamation of peoples as manifested conscience. The leaders have thus expounded and revealed the ethical sentiments immanent in the life of humanity. Ethical codes are attempts to write on tables of stone what was already written on the tables of the heart, or what is already written in the heart of the universe. They make manifest the ethical life of the universe. *"Mais la loi de vie n'est pas seulement la loi de l'indivu et de l'espèce, elle est aussi la loi génerale et universelle d'où resulte la solidarité de l'indivu et de l'espèce avec l'univers."*[302]

Is Nature in General Ethical?

Our ethical life is an index to the ethical life of the universe, but only an index. It must not, therefore, be held that the infinite must conform to the petty notions which frequently bear the name of morality. If, for example, we ask about the morality of nature, we must not take a particular and local example of moral conduct and hold this to be an expression of nature, but rather we must study the general and universal principles which underlie all conduct to see if these be incorporated in it.

Does nature, then, conform to an ethical ideal? We have defined the ideal as a striving for the development of the individual and the group. This is a fact in self-conscious beings. In such, it is characterized by thought and will, so related as to form a unity in a single life, finding their field of operation in both a social and physical environment. Are there, therefore, evidences that nature strives for a development such as is witnessed in the ethical strivings and accomplishments of human beings? Discounting the metaphorical terms used, we answer in the affirmative without hesitancy. The presence of the ideal strivings in man is the proof of it. Both the individual and humanity and all their ethical ideals and accomplishments are the product of nature. Recent theories of evolution present to us ascending scales of perfection in the strife of organisms; the notion of nature selecting organisms, which she has developed with so much care by the gradual accumulation of certain qualities, which will cause them to survive and consequently the refusal of those qualities, which would disqualify them in the efficient fulfillment of their existence, are an illustration of the principle. Without entering into the discussion of final cause, this conception which underlies all theories of evolution, to say nothing of final cause, involves as clear a pursuit of the ideal of betterment as could be enunciated.

This is equally true in the larger developments of the theory. Since the days of Darwin, the theory of evolution has cast off its swaddling clothes. In its maturer form we have been led to see that we are in an evolving universe on the largest scale. This is just as true of the mind of man and all its concerns as of the solar system or animal life in general. When, therefore, the ethical ideal is recognized to be none other than the fulfillment of the being and purposes of self-conscious souls, we are at once identifying it with the natural law of progress prevalent everywhere in the visible universe.

In our effort to determine the ethicality of nature by applying to it human virtues or those recognized characteristics of a good man, it is obvious we must take a comprehensive view. If we consider, for example, the accusation of cruelty against nature, the meaning of our remark will become clear. Injustice is alleged against nature, in that it does not render to each his due; nature is also lacking in the element of tenderness or brotherly love as preached by Christianity.

The law of prey is included in this indictment. Carnivora do not live upon herbage but obtain it second-hand by slaughtering animals, which have stored it away in their own bodies. Thus is presented the spectacle, horrible to contemplate, of a large proportion of life both on land and sea supported at the cost of other life, and nature thus "red in tooth and claw" violates if not always the sense of justice certainly the human emotion of kindness. The indictment also carries with it of necessity the accusation that the whole scheme of nature is faulty; that to evolve higher life at the cost of the lower is atrocious. To this, no answer can be made except that contained in the recital of facts. Nature follows the law of prey; and it is difficult to conceive how by slow gradations, involving long ranges of time and educational processes, animal life, which originated in a very humble manner, could reach the heights of self-conscious souls to which physiological processes are organic, without what appears to our human vision to be a long and painful process of evolution. For two factors are necessary to the production of ideal life, one involving the education of the individual; another, summarizing in the life of the individual the results of previous life processes and experiences. There are no short cuts in the production of a human being. This animal through the conditions of its life epitomizes the story of all animal life. In order to reach the goal of self-consciousness, all the painful processes had of necessity to be undergone; otherwise, it is fair to assume, that nature would have found the better way.

As to cruelty, there is obviously a transference here of the subjective emotional experiences of self-conscious beings, fully developed and refined souls, to a sphere to which they are not applicable. To animals on a lower scale than the human, such realizations, however actual these emotions may be in them as prophetic impulses, mean nothing. We are wasting our sympathies by scattering them in a region desolate and irresponsive. It is also interesting to observe where our sympathies stop. If we think of the long trail from non-living material to self-conscious life as an ascending scale, our sympathy does not reach very far down the scale. It is confined for most part to the higher mammals. Whatever theory may be entertained as that pervading mind of the universe resident in all matter, indeed, of which matter is the visible form (I refer now to non-living matter), not much sympathy, if any, is expended upon it. The waves may be lashed to the heavens by furious winds; rocks may be split asunder by terrifying earthquakes, but our sympathy is reserved not for wave or rock but for the animal life which may be affected. And as animal life approaches ours in companionship and intelligence, our sympathies are intensified. But why do we not sympathize with the most self-conscious life of all manifesting itself in nature, when we witness storms, mountain splittings, upheavals, earthquakes?

The inhumanity of man to man also appals us, but we do not issue indictments against nature on this score, although man is the most complete and best product of nature we know. We blame man apart from nature for wars, social and economic atrocities; and although the less developed in religious philosophy blame God for these, nature in their thinking escapes blamelessly. But man is a part of nature, and nature is the expression of the ultimate. These are some of the inconsistencies in the exercise of sympathy; and when sympathy is extended toward the animals which are destroyed in order to contribute to the life of animals higher in the scale of existence, it is wasted sympathy for most part.

But the most severe indictments against God come from a consideration of man in relation to natural forces. An interesting series of articles touching this point appeared in the Hibbert Journal.[303] In discussing catastrophes and the moral order, the general problem considered by the writers was a justification of the moral order in view of the eruption of Mont Pelée on the Island of Martinique, causing the death of forty thousand people; in view also of the destruction of Pompeii and Herculaneum in 79 A.D. and the engulfing of Lisbon by a tidal wave in 1755, destroying property valued at that time at a hundred million dollars, and forty thousand human beings.

Professor Howison's Philosophy of Physical Evil

Howison contended that traditional theism could not explain in a satisfactory manner how the enumerated catastrophes could have been brought about by a God of mercy, justice and goodness. Such a being certainly could not be in control of nature with its apparatus for torture and destruction. These evils resulting in human agony and despair could not emanate from such a God if he had anything to say about it; for it is incredible that a God of perfection, justice and love could be the responsible agent for them. Traditional theism, insisting upon assigning the cause of such atrocities to God, originated in Plato and the Hebrew prophets. The doctrine of the older East evaded the difficulty by calling the world an illusion; the younger East evaded it by the atheism of Buddhism on the one hand, which denied that a changeless cause could bring about suffering, and on the other, by Zoroastrianism, which surrendered a part of the moral order to Ahriman, the evil principle, making this responsible for all the moral and physical evil of the world. The best historical solution, thought Howison, came from Jesus, who gave the world the conception of the God of love. But this God of Jesus could not have destroyed Pompeii, Herculaneum, Lisbon and wrought such havoc on the Island of Martinique, just because He is a God of love.

Howison is, therefore, forced to accept a theory of a plurality of beings in the universe, beings other than God, who may bear responsibility. He preached a new idealism, which does away with literal creation and refers nature and all its woes to beings other than God, God Himself assuming a position which is purely ideal or final-causal in relation to these beings, and the system of nature dependent upon them. That is the only way, according to this thinker, to save the goodness of God and the moral order.[304] These beings other than God form a community of original existences or ultimates, according to Professor Howison's theory enunciated elsewhere. "All existence is either the existence of minds, or the existence of the items and order of their experience."[305] Again, these beings or minds are the efficient causes of all things, temporal and spacial, and are eternal and uncreated; they all exist independently of each other but have a logical reference to each other. "They exist only in and through their mutually thought correlation, their eternal 'city' and out of it would be non-existent."[306] They are absolutely free, but each thinks the other being as an essential complement to himself and knows that he cannot realize his own being except as he realizes all the rest.[307] So that the logical reference which each of these minds makes to the other is not an occasional or perfunctory logical act but is a "Logical implication of each other in the self-defining consciousness of each."[308]

God then, shorn of efficient causality in nature by these ultimate beings, acts as the fulfilled type of their being, the living bond of their union, and reigns supreme by light and love. This is also the relationship which God bears to every mind. Creation so far as minds are concerned simply means the eternal dependence of minds upon God, in such a fashion that his non-existence would mean their non-existence; He "is the essential supplementing Reality that raises them to reality."[309]

Thus God remains in His universe in ideal aloofness except in regard to minds. But as regards nature, not only its catastrophes but its laws and forces, its inherent reason and stuff must be referred to minds other than God; they have caused its existence and are responsible for its ongoings and are the efficient causes of all its happenings. Thus atrocities in nature, both those of the dramatic type and those which mingle in ordinary human life, must not be laid at the door of the infinite. He always remains in the universe as its ideal perfection toward which the whole creation moves, an attractive ideal withal, drawing the universe of minds toward himself as its final cause, not by authority, but by moral suasion for all minds are as free as He, as eternal as He; He is merely a moral *primus inter pares* in an eternal and indissoluble circle of souls.[310] This, then, is the kernel of Howison's pluralistic idealism.[311]

Criticism of Howison's Philosophy

Howison's philosophy is a transcendentalism avowedly inherited from Kant and partakes of the faults of its progenitor. The weakness in bifurcating reality into *Dinge-an-Sich* and phenomena has already been pointed out. What justification can there be for uniting these to serve the purpose in hand and to separate them absolutely for another purpose? When noumenal reality is stripped of the categories applicable to phenomena, it ceases to be an object of thought altogether, for it is beyond our power of description. It may be permissible to limit evolution to phenomena as Howison did but unjustifiable to strip noumenal reality of all provisions for a phenomenally evolving universe. This would make reality static and therefore worthless for the purposes of life; because the dynamism in the world around us would be utterly, upon this theory, unrelated to reality. What function is there left for reality to perform? Expression seems to be as eternal and inherent a fact as noumenal reality. We cannot separate reality from its expression. If we philosophize in the presence of the facts of existence, we must recognize an inseparable connection between reality and its phenomena. An expressionless mind is a contradiction. An infinite without a universe expressing him is unthinkable. Embodiment must have taken place before the unseen reality could have become an object of thought. On the other hand, it is natural to conceive new phases crystallizing themselves within the eternal of which they form a part.

The separation of final from efficient causation can only be made for purposes of analysis. The category of causation is only an attempt to explain nature after the manner of our volitional life. Final and efficient causality are, therefore, inseparable in actuality. Howison has formed his philosophy upon the assumption of the actual separation of them. If we strip final causality of efficiency, the causal notion disappears entirely, for it is only applicable to that class of phenomena in which one event makes a difference to another; it is not applicable at all to events like day and night, which are merely successive. Even with careful circumscription, Howison has not been able to banish efficient causality from his system of thought. The face value of his philosophy makes God a helpless, inefficient being in a universe in which he has no share except to act as an ideal toward which it is aspiring. Stripped of efficient causality such a being effects nothing. The phenomenal universe both in its origination and direction depends upon a plurality of beings other than himself. But even these beings need a harmonizing bond; otherwise, anarchy would become rife in the city of God. Leibnitz was brought to a similar pass when he found it necessary to institute the office of the supreme monad to supply the other monads with the harmony and unity indispensable to any scheme of coördinated activity. The Howisonian, uncreated souls are not allowed to wander fancy-free about the universe; they possess an inherent tendency of a logical reference to each other: thus a social consciousness grounded in the constitution of their reason saves the day. Caprice could not very well give us the process of evolution; in fact, solar systems and numerous other scientific unities would be impossible on such a basis. Howison espouses the unitary notion still further. We must regard original souls and God as forming a great company, and God is the bond of union to such an extent that they could not exist without him. Any spiritual monist will agree with Howison in this. This bond of union destroys his pluralism completely. And this pluralism was entirely unnecessary to save man's freedom; that was his excuse for accepting pluralism—that is to say, the fear that monism would swamp man's freedom. But we shall show that only insofar as man takes his place in the bond of union between him and the infinite can he be free in any proper sense of freedom. That is the splendid efficiency of the bond of union.

That Howison's philosophy moves in the region of the abstract, paying no attention to experience or the order of experience, will appear from two further particulars. First, our knowledge of logical reason is derived from experience. It is a function of the mind and cannot exist except in this relation. Any logical reference which any mind may make to other minds is performed through a conscious direction of that mind, consequent upon a very elaborate process of deduction respecting those minds. We say elaborate, for the logical reference which Howison has in mind is ethical as well, and the person making it must respect the rights of other personalities and pay them what is their due. However valuable and suggestive this federated conscience and logical reference may be, the processes involved are those of rational beings and have no existence apart from them; they are functions of beings. Yet Howison assumes them as original endowments of finite souls. They represent the divine or ideal rationality distributed in many souls and this is eternally native to them. Now, such a distribution of rational experience could never have been among these souls except consequent upon the realization of them as processes of their own mind; but this is impossible from Howison's viewpoint, for the reference is an eternal possession of free spirits anterior to and independent of any experience. This is certainly a violent conversion of noetical processes into pre-existent entities or experiential references devoid of and prior to experience.

Secondly, if minds other than the divine be originators and sustainers of the order of nature, how is it that they are unconscious of originating it and seem to have no control of it at present? There can be no question about the fact that we create nature noetically; that we do so physically, however much such a belief may be grounded in the unity of the ultimate and ourselves, is not quite so clear. If it be argued that our participation in the evolution of the cosmos has been submerged into the realm of our unconscious life, what shall be said of the fact that most finite beings living at the time Mont Pelée poured forth death and destruction were totally oblivious of their responsibility for the catastrophe? To meet this objection, a system of Philonian demiurges must be called into being to complicate our problem still more.

From such vagueness, it is well to recur over and over again to the dictum of Kant: "Der Verstand macht die Natur aber er schafft sie nicht." Even if it were true that historically we were the efficient causes of nature, provision must be made for the constant efficiency which nature demands daily. But we have an overpowering feeling that solar systems and the processes of life and death are utterly independent of us. Facing the capital questions of life, birth, growth, death, a sense of helplessness masters us similar to that which overpowered the Ionic thinkers when they gave the name of *Phusis* to the processes of nature. In spite therefore of Howison's sincere attempt to remove responsibility from God for the actual universe, it was a complete failure.

The Ethical Aspect of Physical Catastrophes

Any reflection upon physical catastrophes must not overlook the fact of an evolving universe, a world, which is the progressive manifestation of the infinite and in which universal and unexceptional laws obtain. The solar system, for example, is composed of six or eight hundred bodies, which have been evolved from an original nebular mass. All of these bodies have been in the molten condition and have gradually solidified. The earth has been gradually cooling from a seething mass of matter resembling pig iron as it oozes from the blast furnace. During the cooling process an atmosphere appeared and a separation was made between sea and land. The mountains were puckered up by the lateral pressure of gravitation and the surface of the earth was affected by all the physical and chemical forces brought to bear upon it. During this process eruptions of lava, tidal waves and earthquakes have been necessary incidents, taking into account of course many factors such as its motion around the sun, etc., as well as its formative processes.

At some point life appeared, and from this man emerged into a full, self-conscious life. When he appeared, the laws operative in the physical universe were not and could not be changed. The great sea was here for his instruction and mastery. Countless human lives were lost because of their inability in mastery. At present voyages on the ocean in times of peace are safer than traveling by railroad. Volcanic eruptions are occurrences to be mastered also. Man has been rather slow in learning their ways. Herculaneum and Pompeii were built too closely to Vesuvius and suffered a consequent destruction. But even that warning was insufficient. Towns are clustered all around Vesuvius today and are built up the mountain. If Vesuvius should repeat its performances of 79 A.D., bitter complaints against God and the wickedness of nature would be forthcoming. Similar criticism might be made about the location of the towns on the Island of Martinique in their relation to Mont Pelée.

Reflections concerning earthquakes teach the lesson that we must learn their ways and accommodate ourselves to these growing pains of the earth.

Disease must be averted similarly. Parasites must be kept away from the human body. A human being must keep himself at the highest pitch of resistance both mentally and physically against the ills which befall him. The lessons of health must be persistently learned and nature must not be blamed for our own negligence.

Nature is thus the scene of activities which are classifiable as general laws; thus there is a rational procedure on such a comprehensive scale that it is man's duty to inform himself about them and accommodate his life to them. There is no magic escape from his negligence and ignorance. It is inspiring to reflect that the processes of education are under way, and it may be reasonably hoped that through his growing knowledge man may be able to avoid the catastrophes of nature and the ravages of disease. At any rate, no other way than that of evolution and education has been ordained by nature for our improvement.

In answer to the question why the physical order was not arranged so that human beings would appear on this planet after the era of earthquakes, tidal waves, volcanic eruptions and all other physical ills had passed away, it is pertinent to say that it is better to philosophize facing the facts than to construct theories as if facts were nonexistent.

Moral ill-adjustments are amenable to the same treatment. Individuals are essential and necessary parts of the infinite—dynamical and self-conscious parts. The infinite expresses itself through their self-conscious life; but this expression is a process of evolution, a process of learning, of aspiration and attainment, in which satisfactions come from the sense that the less perfect has given place to the more perfect, which in turn is only a higher elevation on the road that leads toward the ideal of perfection. Suffering is the accompaniment of this process. The gold is being refined, and the heat of the furnace is an inconvenient incident. The problem which many try to solve is how to obtain refined gold without the refining process: that is, a fully developed self-conscious life without the process leading thereto,—which is absurd. Attainment without process is impossible.

These considerations will reveal more fully the fallacy in the theory of Professor Howison. The motive of his thinking was altogether admirable. He wished to save the ethical character of God; but there is a disparity between his motive and accomplishment. On the contrary the method used in such an argument would convert God into a non-ethical being. The fundamental conception underlying ethics is the measuring of conduct, which is the expression of a self-conscious being, by an ideal. But Howison assumed an expressionless or non-acting God, a being which does nothing but only serves as an ideal of perfection toward which we may aspire. Is not this the veriest abstraction? Here is a conduct-less being incorporating the ethical ideal for the whole universe of rational and active souls, who from the earliest dawning of self-consciousness have converted their thought and volitions constantly into their deeds. Such a God could not possibly be ethical; He could not possibly incorporate the ideal or be the ideal-real, expressing Himself in a moral universe, for this is denied Him by this theory. The theory also violates our sense of justice in assuming that souls other than God brought about both the system and particulars of nature and therefore receive all the blame for its ills, while a being which had nothing to do either in evolving or sustaining the universe is nevertheless held up as the perfection of existence,—the ideal toward which these souls must reach. That is too great a reward to confer upon any being for non-participation.

John Stuart Mill's View of Nature

According to John Stuart Mill, nature is absolutely unethical. To follow nature, is a meaningless injunction, whether we consider nature as the entire system of things or regard it as it would be apart from human intervention. In the former instance, the imperative to follow nature would be meaningless, since we are compelled so to do willy-nilly, being a part of the system of things; and such an imperative to follow nature in the sense of following our instinctive and spontaneous impulses would be irrational and immoral.

For Mill, nature is imperfect; all praise of civilization, wherein man endeavors to correct or mitigate nature, is a condemnation of it. It might, of course, be imperfect and innocent at the same time, but on the contrary it is positively and aggressively evil. In fact, we must "face the undeniable fact, that the order of nature, insofar as unmodified by man, is such as no being, whose attributes are justice and benevolence, would have made, with the intention that his rational creatures should follow it as an example."[312] Next to the vastness of cosmic forces the absolute recklessness of them impress us. They care not whom they may crush on the road. Optimists try to maintain that it would be very absurd for nature to turn one step aside to avoid trampling human beings to destruction; "Whatever is, is right." When Pope asked, "Shall gravitation cease when you go by?" he expected a negative answer and we always should. But if the question were between two men instead of between a man and a natural phenomenon, that triumphant apostrophe would be thought a rare piece of impudence. A man who should persist in hurling stones or firing a cannon when another goes by to his injury or death would be held responsible and tried for a serious crime if not for murder. Nearly all the crimes which men are hanged or imprisoned for are committed by nature every day.[313] She has hundreds of hideous deaths in reserve, such as the cruel ingenuity of a Nabis or Domitian never could have surpassed.[314] Burnings, starvation, freezings, poisoning, plagues, anarchy, injustice, ruin, death by every form of cruelty are laid by Mill to nature's account, and it administers them with utter disregard to desert. How can such a nature be the moral and religious guide of men?

In view of these atrocious performances of nature, Mill is forced to conclude that God, while benevolent, must be limited in power; that is the only consideration which will save the moral character of God.[315]

Criticism of Mill's Indictment against Nature

As to partial and general laws, Mill infers that because gravitation does not cease when a man passes by and allows the tower to fall upon him and kill him, nature is committing murder and nature should have held the tower back until the man was out of danger. Nature thus would save its moral character by suspending the action of gravitation. Or, failing in this, nature at least should have meted punishment according to desert and refrained from punishing the innocent.

Pope raised the same question:

"Shall burning Aetna, if a sage requires,
Forget to thunder, and recall her fires?
On air or sea new motions be impresst,
O blameless Bethel, to relieve thy breast?

When the loose mountain trembles from on high,
Shall gravitation cease if you go by?
Or some old temple, nodding to its fall,
For Chartres' head reserve the hanging wall?"[316]

Pope answers:

"... the Universal Cause
Acts not by partial but by general laws."

So that the blameless Bethel and the profligate Chartres are treated alike, irrespective of the piety of the former or the vice of the latter.

"Think we, like some weak prince, th' Eternal Cause
Prone for his favorites to reverse his laws?"[317]

The irregularities brought about by Mill's scheme, were it put into operation, would work great havoc in the practical affairs of life, since the laws of nature would be subject to unexpected caprices, and no undertaking could be ventured upon with any degree of assurance. Indeed, so far as we can see, the Ultimate itself would be liable to be overwhelmed by his Frankenstein universe. In a state of the world in which the laws of navigation, locomotion and gravitation would be constantly interfered with, both on account of the sin of some and perfection of others, there could be no pretension to civilization; and it is very much to be doubted whether human life would be possible at all under these conditions. God himself would be reduced to benevolent impotency.

Mill found the adaptations in nature to be of such a character as to yield a large balance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence.[318] In assigning attributes to this intelligence, he contends it cannot be omnipotent, for it uses means to accomplish its ends: that is to say, God "was obliged to adapt himself to conditions independent of his will, and to attain his ends by such arrangements as those conditions admitted of."[319] The deity, then, does the best he can with the matter or force eternally operative independent of his will, for he is thwarted at every point by it; it is always his *bête noire*. Available evidence would show that God desires the happiness of his creatures, but his benevolence is unable to overcome the obstacles thrust in his way by the oppugnancy of matter.

We have already enumerated our objections to this Cartesian dualism, and it is unnecessary to repeat them.

Mill failed to grasp the notion of an evolving universe, which is the progressive manifestation of the ultimate. Why this fact of development, we are unable to say, any more than Mill is able to account for the intelligence of the universe, except by an examination of the facts. As a rule, Mill was a lover of fact; why did he not respect it in the department of evolution? Nature is not only rational, but subject to process of development. The demand that self-conscious life in the full possession of its capabilities appear like a shot from a gun, or spring forth like Minerva fully panoplied from the brain of Jove, is incompatible with conditions as we know them. How different such a life would be from that which we actually know? Its perfection would not be the result of the processes of education and suffering. How could such a being adapt himself to his environment? Our common experience gives us ample illustrations of the misfits of life, in spite of all our educational advantages. How much more ill-adapted would be the suppositious being we have been considering! Against the argument that the results attained by human beings counterbalance "the suffering and wasted lives of entire geological periods," he urges that if God could have endowed a Bosjesman or an Andaman Islander with the capability of raising himself to a Newton or a Fenelon, he could certainly have made Newtons and Fenelons from the first and thus avoided the painful and heartbreaking processes of development and its worldwide evil.[320] What a crude notion of creation this involves! So far as we can make out, nothing is created according to Mill's theory. Neither a Bosjesman nor Andaman Islander, nor anything on a lower scale of existence, is called into being by a leap. Creation means the evolution from cosmic dust not only of sidereal systems but also vegetable and animal life by gradual processes of development through long stretches of time. How useless to base an argument on a supposititious case when there is not a shred of evidence to back it up! The principle of development is so widespread that the application of it to man is even more than a probability. Direct creation is a relic of the notion of a magical world which is rapidly disappearing and should not have appealed to a man of John Stuart Mill's acumen. As he had espoused the theory of the eternity of matter and force, instead of making them independent of and even repugnant to the ultimate, he should have regarded them as essential expressions of ultimate intelligence—expressions of such a moral and rational order as to make it useless to demand of the ultimate that gravitation cease or Aetna recall her fires when pious Bethel passes by, for this would be seen to be a violation of its essential quality.

But Mill's world is not entirely unethical; he concedes that there must be the germs at least of all the virtues implanted in human nature; otherwise, we should never acquire them. But the rank weeds of evil, which dispute the ground with these germinal virtues, even then stifle and destroy them except in one case out of a thousand. But a nature germinally moral on even so limited a scale is a candidate for a position in the realm of moral values;

and it may turn out that even the weeds may have a soul of goodness.

Huxley's Theory of the Unethicality of Nature

Nature is also unethical to Thomas Huxley. "Cosmic nature is no school of virtue," as the Stoics thought, but the headquarters of everything unethical.[321] He admits, strangely enough, that he is in full agreement with the propounders of the ethics of evolution.[322] But as non-ethical sentiments have also been evolved, there is as much sanction for the one as for the other.[323] Cosmic evolution may show how good and evil originated, but not why good is preferable to evil. Thus the survival of the fittest does not mean the survival of the best morally, because in that case the ruthless self-assertion of nature would give place to self-restraint. Ethics demands that, instead of thrusting aside or trampling down competitors, we should help our fellow-men;[324] it thoroughly repudiates the gladiatorial theory of life,[325] and the supreme selfishness involved in the processes of nature. The struggle for existence is unethical to the extreme. The cosmic process has no sort of relation to moral ends; the progress of society does not come from imitating nature but by going contrary to its unethical ways.[326] Man through his efforts has built up an artificial world within the cosmos, a world of ethical action, in order to combat the wicked world which is the sphere of his activities. It has already taken millions of years for man to subdue his cosmic nature, and he may look forward with confidence to an unremitting battle with "a tenacious and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts."[327] But Huxley sees no limits to ethical conquests and the consequent betterment of man.

The admission that moral sentiments have been evolved from nature gives the whole case away. It is patent that the ethical nature of man could not have been developed from a cosmos which was altogether unethical. In holding that nature also evolves the unethical sentiments, Huxley commits the error of believing that nature develops a negation. Let us consider his treatment of justice. As a pack of wolves could not hunt without at least a tacit understanding that they should not attack each other, so in primitive society: "This observance of a common understanding, with the consequent distribution of punishments and rewards according to accepted rules, received the name of justice, while the contrary was called injustice."[328] After a long period of development, the motive as well as the act was taken into the account. Righteousness, or acts from right motives, became at length synonymous with justice. Now, the question whether a sentiment be moral or immoral is subjective and must be measured by an ideal of conduct, in order to determine whether it belong to the negative or positive side of the moral equation. This is equally true of the ensuing act. In its highest form of development, Huxley acknowledges that both motive and act must be right in order that they may measure up to the virtue of justice; but we are left in the dark as to what he means by the right.

Justice is meaningless unless it is judged in the light of an ideal standard. Justice relates individuals to each other and to the group. It is something more than a common understanding with consequent rewards and punishments, for it involves a line of conduct issuing from the conviction that it is good for the individual and the group, whether this conviction be a conscious or an unconscious urge. Purity has often been insufficient in a social order in which individual conduct exerts a retarding as well an an advancing influence. An act may violate a common understanding and may yet be for the good of the group whose common understanding has been set at nought.

The question, therefore, to be put by the cross-examiner of nature is, whether in her dealings with human beings her processes are for the good of the whole social order. The individual has to suffer frequently from natural processes regulated by law, just because they are designed for the good of the whole. The action of gravitative force may be seen to be good for human beings in general, yet the individual and even groups may suffer from its operation. But suppose we assumed a special gravitation, as the theologian assumes a special providence, justice would be impossible on such an assumption. The indictments against nature, which Huxley marshals from the book of Job, the Buddhistic Sutras and *Works and Days,* the Psalmist, the Preacher of Israel, and the tragic poets of Greece, are largely those of individuals against the procedure of nature under general laws. Another division of these indictments is against a social order, whose maladjustments resulted in the observation of the Psalmist: "I have seen the wicked in great power, and spreading himself like a green bay tree."[329] But such anomalies are capable of correction. All schemes of society leading to such results ought to pass away and shall. To an evolutionist, there should be no more reason for a wholesale condemnation of nature on account of human economic maladjustments than there is on account of his maladjustments in respect to his physical or intellectual well-being. As touching our entire life, the general problem is the progressive adjustment of human life to its environment.

While we are estimating the evils of man's life in the scheme of nature, many things must be considered. Huxley quoted the passage of the Psalmist about the green bay tree as a condemnation of nature for so rewarding a man with ill-gotten wealth, but omitted to quote the sentences which follow it: "Yet he passed away, and, lo, he was not: yea, I sought him but he could not be found." "Mark the perfect man, and behold the upright: for the end of that man is peace."[330] But the most profound argument for the ethicality of nature is man himself. He has come, and no one has made this clearer than Huxley, out of the heart of nature with the dynamical urge and possibility not only for intellectual but also moral attainments. He became capable of acting upon general ethical principles, and when so acting he was not building up an artificial world within the cosmos but expressing his innermost nature and that larger nature of which he is an essential and contributory part; indeed the nature in which both Stoic and Evolutionist so firmly believe. It was because this ethical ideal was working unconsciously in Huxley that he could "See no limit to the extent to which intelligence and will, guided by sound principles of investigation and organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence, for a period longer than that covered by history. And much may be done to change the nature of man himself."[331]

Truth in the Indictment against Nature

The physical and moral evils which are the portion of human life are not the results of the limits of the ultimate, his delegation of power to others, or the inherent unethicality of nature itself. They are the incidence of growth, of the fact that both the individual and group find themselves not in a world which is static but dynamic and evolving, in which they are involved in the swirl of development. Evil of every form is an imperfect adjustment to environment, which in turn is the expression of general order in the cosmos rather than the expression of the specific needs of individuals. No thorough-going thinker is prepared to give over the entire visible universe to the sway of the principle of evil or caprice. Even Schopenhauer could not go to this length; for he asserted that the phenomenal world was causally related, and all its phenomena must be interpreted in accordance with this principle. The check preventing us from considering the world altogether evil comes from our ethical nature. For this ethical nature expressing itself in individuals and society must be explained. Huxley had to admit, in spite of his general theory of the unethicality of nature, that the ethical sentiments had been developed from this very nature. An unethical nature was abhorrent to John Stuart Mill, and he hit upon the plan of retaining the ethicality of nature by limiting the power of God. Howison and others had to take recourse in a pluralism in order to justify God in his relation to nature.

The ethical element of nature is implicit in the rational order. A rational order of society means obedience to law and order: that is to say, an ethical order. Such order makes for justice. The impartiality of natural happenings dispenses with a vast amount of injustice, while of course it often seems cruel. In human affairs impartiality *is an ideal difficult* to be obtained in courts of law, governmental and military administration, the church, the field of labor and in society in general; but such an ideal is considered worthy of striving for. This we get absolutely in nature.

The ethicality of the universe is seen in the evolutionary process. Man emerged finally from his ape-like ancestors and started upon his candidature for self-consciousness and ethicality. In his upward movement, he had slept in the mineral, become dimly conscious in the plant, awakened into a richer conscious life in the animal and at length entered into the heights of self-consciousness. But even this goal is not the highest reach; a man may possess self-conscious powers and put them to ignoble use, detrimental both to himself and others. The man rational and ethical is the best asset to his kind. It was evidently, judging from the result, the aim of nature to produce such an one. It is a creature of this type that has been developed from the dust of the earth. Much of his moral self is doubtless the result of experience, the product of environment, and so far forth the environment is credited with the ethical product. Be this as it may, there is always a residuum after we have stripped man of his empirical accretions. For the facts of his behavior cannot compound themselves into his ethical self or personality, just as his sensations cannot compound themselves into the rational being that he is. Facts of conduct are facts of an individual self; and even more than this they are facts of a larger self, the hidden self, which is not far from every one of us. If we rightly understand the metaphor, the voice of God always speaks through conscience. Or, better, God in the fulness of his being is speaking through a human ethical personality. Every act of man, the institutions of government, law, philanthropy, education and religion are as much expressions of the ultimate as they are of the human soul. They are expressions of God just because they are human, for man is an essential and contributory part of God. Of course, as we shall see, certain qualifications must be made to this truth, but no qualification can dispense with this, the deepest of all truths. Herein lies the mystery of life. Every fact of experience implicates more than is apparent; for a profounder insight finds a soul in cold stones and expressions of goodness of the ultimate, even in the moral wreckage of human beings. It is in virtue of this deeper principle of life that man has been climbing upward in the scale of civilization. The whole of civilization may be regarded from the viewpoint of this deeper insight as the gradual evolution and progressive expression of the divine reason and ethicality in the entire life of the individual and society. This expression is characterized at certain stages by retrogression, but at the end of each comprehensive epoch the betterment of both individual and society becomes apparent. It is a progress brought about through the instrumentality of free souls attached to the moving spirit of the universe. The conditions of its realization are individual initiative and the physical and ethical togetherness of human society. Such a conception makes apparent the meaning of the imperfection which both Mill and Huxley detected in nature. It is there,—there just because it is a process, and all processes in the nature of the case are always imperfect. The expressions of the infinite in all finite forms must of necessity be imperfect; all the more so when this expression takes place gradually, as we are taught to see it through modern empirical evolution.

Conclusion of This Chapter

Therefore reflective thinkers, working in different spheres and approaching the problem of the ethicality of nature from widely different angles, nevertheless conclude that nature is ethical. That is the profound lesson to be learned. Grotius founded international law upon the natural domestic instinct or feeling of kindred. Cumberland grounded his ethics in the nature of things, which operates in human beings as an intuition directing us to act for the common good. Nature is ethical when considered as a whole, was the conclusion of Shaftesbury. Evil is characteristic only of a partial process and appears as such only in its isolation; when viewed from the consideration of the whole, it is seen to be good. The whole of things is good, the part only is evil. Evolutionists have traced ethical elements from their pristine, inorganic source to their full fruition in man; this development carries with it not only the original source but also the tributaries and confluents of the historical stream. Butler stands for a type of ethical thinkers, who find both the source and sanction of the ethical life in a loosely constructed principle of conscience. It is a natural principle in the individual which directs his actions, both for his own good and that of society.

All these theorists may be classified as phenomenalists in ethics. They confine themselves to man and to society. Notwithstanding, this reflection as by an inner compulsion has reverted to the immanent power of both society and the individual. What is it that ultimately produces both? May it not be possible that the force to which they owe their existence has imparted to the man ethical bent? Cudworth does not so think. He would have us think of the ultimate principle of ethics as something other than the producing cause, something to which the ultimate itself must conform and something that expresses itself in both nature in general and man. Samuel Clarke's principle of the fitness of things is another attempt to formulate the same thing. The principle is very highly abstract, even more abstract than the Platonic ideas and bears no relation whatever to the ethical realities of our experience. Nevertheless, these thinkers were on the right track. Ethical distinctions take place in ultimate reality, and we are essential and contributory parts of it.

Even when our attention is directed specifically to nature other than human, ethical relations were found to obtain. The fact of imperfection in the general order of nature could not be overlooked, especially in the connection between human life and natural processes. The question, therefore, of the relation of this imperfect order of nature to ultimate reality became pertinent. Both Professor Howison and John Stuart Mill were firm believers in the ethicality of the ultimate, but this can be maintained according to the former only by making God an ideal, static and inefficient; and according to the latter by depriving him of infinite power. Howison applies the principle of evolution to phenomenal existence, but failed to see its larger implications; Mill failed to apply it even to the phenomenal. Both these thinkers, therefore, lacked a criterion for a study of nature from the viewpoint of an ultimate as an evolving principle in the universe. All processes were seen to be incomplete when viewed from the coign of vantage of the whole or ideal result. In spite of this, both John Stuart Mill, the non-evolutionist, and Thomas Huxley, the evolutionist, believed that the germs of virtue were implanted in nature.

The lessons from these considerations are obvious. Whenever any thinker undertakes to consider facts of human conduct, he is compelled, even sometimes in contradiction to his theoretical assumptions to acknowledge that the germs of ethical life are imbedded in human nature. This inevitable conclusion certainly throws light upon the nature of ultimate reality, of which the world is a visible expression. Man's ethical nature is at least as true an index to the nature of things as his intellectual nature. Nature in its entire range is just what man is in his specific expression of it. The microcosmos is our only means of interpreting the macrocosmos and of making rational and ethical the whole of which we form a part.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

The Problem of Freedom Stated

If, as this treatise assumes, we be essential and contributory processes in ultimate reality, then our critic contends our freedom is gone, we are merely cogs in the cosmic machine, we are swamped in the infinite. We are thus deprived of spontaneity of action and must therefore escape responsibility for the results of our ethical deeds. This spiritual determinism is at a par with the mechanical determinism of the scientist, who relegates everything to the control of forces and laws. How useless, thinks a Tyndall, to offer prayer for rain, when we know that rain is entirely controlled by mechanical forces; how useless to lay hands upon an Alpine glacier and pray to God to keep it from hurling itself into the valley below to destroy the life and property of the valley dwellers, when we know that the glacier is in the keeping of the force of gravitation! When the instant comes for the glacier to descend, it shall be hurled irresistibly below and nothing can prevent it. In these instances, both rain and Alpine glacier are controlled by forces operative in them. Speaking in terms of psychical and moral relations, neither rain nor glacier can be responsible for its act, because it was controlled by something working through it, which compelled it to behave as it did. It could not under the circumstances behave otherwise.

But this does not exhaust the indictment. Not only does this theory release a human being from responsibility, but it also converts his life into a constant process of self-deception. Compunction of conscience, all shadings of the feelings of approbation and disapprobation, confessions of sin, expressions of contrition, which have played a prominent part in the religious life, become meaningless. For if the individual has no responsibility for his deeds, if he be always and entirely controlled by a force other and greater than he, he could well dispense with the uncomfortable processes of self-condemnation. Since these are well-nigh universal in one form or another, it would appear that this widespread self-deception must be the result of false training. There must have been a universal contamination by imitation or some other principle to bring this about.

Institutions as well as individuals have suffered from this deception. A court of law, appealing to the conscience, is nothing but an organized form of the cumulative processes of self-deception practiced during the centuries. Laws of states and edicts of governments thus become instruments of convenience for those exercising control; decalogues of Hammurabi and Moses become meaningless jargon to an individual, who in the last analysis does not perform culpable moral acts. Indeed, both moral lawgiver and observer are victims of a state of mind that has no reason in reality for existing.

Meaning and Consequence of the Unity of Man with Ultimate Reality

The first position to be clearly established is that man is not a separate and independent unit from any viewpoint; in fact, he could not exist as such. The biological sciences have made a brilliant success of late in demonstrating the unity of man with all terrestrial life. He sustains, therefore a unity not only with his forebears, the number of which in forty generations back runs into millions, but also with the humbler forms of life stretching back through aeons of time. Thus the physique which any individual may possess is a precious inheritance containing within itself largely an epitome of terrestrial life. Otherwise, man could not be man. He cannot exist other than in unity with his progenitors, however much his present biological life might be regarded as independent.

This is equally true with respect to his intellectual and moral life. Whatever contributions the individual may make during his lifetime to the intellectual and moral stock-in-trade, much of it upon analysis will be found in previous thinking, moral attitude and accomplishment. Original contributions are small in comparison with results incorporated from the past. So true is this, that a book in literature or philosophy cannot be understood properly, except in relation to the Ionic thinkers; Spinoza is understood in the light of Descartes and the Schoolmen. Shakespeare is the flowering of the English literature of his time. The decalogue of Moses is the result of centuries of moral living and reflecting.

Man's physical life must be lived in harmony with its environment and is dependent every moment upon it. The air he breathes, the food he eats, the social order that sustains him, the earth that gives him his footing, the sun that warms him, are all indications of a life that is a part of an environment and cannot be lived independently of it.

The meaning of these suggestions consists in the fact that man's unity with physical nature and biological life, with intellectual and moral development, is not destructive of his life as an individual; nay, on the contrary this unity becomes its absolute *raison d'être*.

Man is in unity with the universe or ultimate reality, which is the same thing. If he were not, he could not be man. Rather than being destructive of his freedom, this is the absolute condition of his freedom. He could not be free otherwise. Physical health consists in living in harmony with the laws of health. Let a man assert his so-called liberty and violate these laws whenever he pleases, and the consequences are inevitable. He will thus lose physical liberty. He will become a prey to parasites, incapable individually and worthless socially. Could there be a worse type of slave!

The prodigal son in the Gospel of St. Luke is a case in point. The moral and economic restrictions of the home became irksome to him. He procured the portion of his estate and went into a far country where he wasted his life in riotous living. The result was that he lost his economic independence and his moral self-respect. But the impulses and intentions which led him away from home prophesied a larger liberty. At home he was "cribbed, cabined, confined;" in the far-off country he could do as he pleased, become master of his own destiny. But he exercised unrestrained liberty, which is license. He failed to see that the free man economically is not the spendthrift but the rational conserver of wealth. His riotous living damaged him physically and morally. He became a physical, moral and economic slave. On the day that he came to himself he aspired toward a renewed unity with God and his family. Repentent, full of determination to live once more the life of true liberty, he returned home. The homeland of liberty is always the dwelling place of law and unity. The reconciliation with his father, productive employment, a clean moral life, gave him the larger liberty of which he was in quest.

This is suggestive of the deeper meaning. Only as man is able to say, "I and the Father are one," does he realize his true liberty. If on a Deistic scheme God and man were disparate elements, I concede no liberty would be possible; for man's necessary subjection to the universe, a subjection which is a fact and not a theory, would be the worst type of moral slavery before which the unbridled authority of kings in relation to subjects would pale into insignificance. On the other hand, when we consider man as necessary part of the ultimate, he is a subjective constituent and there is no external force to interfere with his divine liberty. He is part of the concern. He is a divine element, and neither powers nor principalities can deprive him of his divine birthright.

The Mystery and Conditions of Process

The incursions of the infinite into processes in space and time is a primordial and fundamental fact. It is a necessary process in the divine being. It were vain to philosophize in the absence of this fact; we shall never satisfy a thoroughgoing metaphysic by making process non-existent until the infinite awoke from eternal slumber and proceeded to create a world of process. If there were no conditions of process in the infinite, there never could have been an awakening from an eternal slumber or self-contained life. It has been quite a diversion among theologians to give time estimates about the commencement of temporal processes. All these estimates are at a par, whether they take excursions into the thousands or billions of years, for they assume the temporal order to have commenced as a definite act in time. Previous to this, nothing was existent save God, a universeless God. Then in an unaccountable manner, the temporal order leaped into existence. Worlds on worlds in phalanx deep leaped forth. The miracle of creation had taken place. And so far as this small world of ours was concerned, it was set in order, and a being in the very image of God was called into existence to dwell upon it. This assumption of a non-existent universe is absurd. This drives thought to the ignoring of the universe of fact and to construct a theory to account for a universe thus made non-existent. We must philosophize in the presence of a really existent universe. The universe is eternal; this we must assume. And we are at liberty to discuss a relationship of logical priority of God in relation to the universe but not a time relation. Every atom and every force and every form of existence known, whether physical or psychical, is an unmediated, direct relationship of God. They are his modes of expression. They are as closely related to the infinite as the thinker is to thought. Without thought, the thinker is non-existent; without the thinker, thought is impossible. Both must be comprehended together. They can only be separated for analytical purposes.

Creation *de novo* is a figment of the imagination. This Aladdin's lamp conception of the universe is the product of imaginations that brooks no obstacles for unlimited power or power unrestrained by existent facts and processes. This must give way entirely to a conception of transformations. Our modern knowledge endeavors to explain, as far as in it lies, the transformations of the known universe, and a brilliant story of them has been written during the centuries of reflective thought. Of course this does not remove the mystery of the universe. It is still there. Why the infinite makes incursions into the finite,—that is to say, why any universe at all,—is still and shall be still mysterious; why solar and other systems; why biological, chemical and physical transformations, is a problem apparently insoluble so far as we are concerned.

This being so, how is it possible for the Infinite to be transformed into finite processes without being contaminated with finite processes in all their deformity? It is not possible. Human beings are self-conscious processes in the Infinite. Each act is an act both of the individual and the Infinite; they cannot be unrelated for a moment. Does the Infinite partake of my sin and shame? Of my contrition and moral conquest? Unquestionably. And herein consists the profound philosophy underlying all religion. When these individuations of the Infinite, these finite self-conscious beings go astray, that is act irrespective of their total life in God, the process of reconciliation is described as an atonement under many metaphors. The prodigal son returns home, the lost sheep is found, "that they all may be one in us"—are examples. The meaning of course is that a process becomes in harmony with the whole. When a finite being violates the will of the universe and acts as if he were an unrelated segment, he is out of harmony with his deeper self. This is the only meaning of sin. But even this act of individual self-will is not, and never can be, unrelated. The possibility, therefore, for these processes to take place must be presumed to reside in the constitution of things—that is to say, in God Himself.

Metaphorical Attempts to Set Forth the Relationship of God to Man

But before we outline fully the problem of evil and its bearing upon the question of freedom and the responsibility of the universe for the imperfection of life, the relationship of God to man must be more closely conceived.

There are two types of thought naturally demanded by a consideration of the relation of God to the evil of the world. The first type we may name, the non-participating. If God be considered an efficient cause of the world, He brought it into existence, but when it left His hand both nature and man were in a state of perfection. Man was perfect and free, complete master of himself and circumstances. But somehow man fell from his pristine state. So long as he obeyed the law of his nature and the laws of the universe, all was well; but the moment disobedience came, both man and nature relapsed into a state of disorder. But the act of disobedience was entirely man's act, his free, deliberate act. God had nothing to do with it. God still maintained his absolute perfection. His garments were not soiled. He metes out punishment according to his eternal justice upon sinful man,—though in some schemes He makes provision for the closing in of the breach, for the return of the sinner to ways of obedience and ultimate perfection.

This non-participating type has demanded a variety of theories. Sometimes God is entirely isolated from the world, having so far as we know nothing to do with its imperfections. Again, He may be connected with it in a noumenal way, but it is beyond the ability of our reason to fathom what the relationship is.

The second type concedes some sort of connection between God and the world, but He has no relations to its imperfections. God retains final causality within Himself as an eternal condition, efficient causality being in other souls than Himself, although these beings and the whole universe are ideally referred to Him and receive from Him the condition of their existence. Thus God is the ideal center of all, the standard of reference of each human and all other souls. All souls are ultimate realities as primordial as God Himself, as free as God Himself. It was these souls other than God that created the temporal order and are entirely responsible for its imperfections.

The Persian attempt at a solution of this problem, an attempt also reflected in the Greek logos theory, did not take away efficient causality from God, although this was confined to the creation of a few original beings or Amshaspans, who in turn became the efficient causes of the world order and thus of course of its imperfections. But this attempt to save the perfection of God by assuming His aloofness does not quite succeed. For the moment He called into being these finite mediators and efficient causes they had within them, as finite creatures, the germs of imperfection; nothing finite certainly could be perfect. If, therefore, God's perfection be saved by the theory so far as direct participation in an imperfect world is concerned, it does not succeed in preventing God from an indirect participation in it.

But a more thoroughgoing metaphysic will bring in all the processes of the world order. He is not and cannot be shut out from atom or soul. He is immanent in its forces, laws, beings. He is the author of its imperfections in the sense that He is the efficient cause of the phenomenal world,—although the concerted action of God and man must, if possible, be made clear at this point.

What is the relationship of the infinite to man? The soul of man was never created, it has existed always as a constituent part of ultimate reality. We must conceive the ultimate under the terms of a society, the city of God, though great care must be taken to avoid the fallacy lurking in the metaphor. A society of any kind is a loosely organized aggregate. Generally speaking, it is composed of independent personalities. Thus, while its members may be obedient to a similar ideal and course of conduct, the privacies of each soul are hidden for the most part from the rest. A nation may be a society of this type. It may be moved by a common ideal. Its members may be obedient to the same laws, cherish the same traditions and be prepared to sacrifice their lives for the defense of the fatherland. Yet here, let us say in France, many a peasant living in Brittany who has never seen his Parisian compatriot, is not only ill-adapted for the life of the metropolis but is entirely out of sympathy with it. In fact, his habits, his occupation, his friends and associates isolate him from the brother in the great city. So much so that there is nothing in common in thought, taste or circumstances between them. They talk dialects of the same French language and are members of the same Republic, but outside these general relations there is nothing that binds them. Yet there is a far-off suggestion in the notion of society of a common spirit animating the group.

But our notion of ultimate reality is intensified further when we conceive a society of human beings, living, moving and having their being in God. God is the substratum of their souls. They cannot exist except as essential and contributory processes in the infinite soul. The non-existence of the one would involve the non-existence of the other. Let us imagine the most beautiful statue in the world formed by the self movement of the atoms, these atoms in turn being the multiple expression of one common soul, so much so that if the animating and sustaining power of the common soul were withdrawn the statue would dissolve and cease to exist. So it is with the universe. The atoms of chemistry, whether reduced to centers of electric force, or conceived according to any interpretation of the atomic theory, would dissolve like the baseless fabric of a dream, if the common soul could withdraw its support, a condition of course impossible to bring about. Neither atom nor soul can ever exist alone. They are phenomena essentially connected and essentially embodying a deeper reality, revealing within their particular sphere so much of its inner reality.

The Mystery of Freedom for Finite Existence

We have seen that there is no freedom except relatively speaking. It is always a freedom within given conditions. To speak of unconditional freedom is, to use a phrase of Schopenhauer, to speak of wooden iron. Unrelated and unconditional freedom exists nowhere. Man's life and acts are always segments of a greater whole, processes in the world movement. And yet we must assign freedom to man; for otherwise his life would be a cheat and a mockery. He has a sense of freedom. He feels responsible for his acts. He has a categorical imperative, not in the sense of a formal law as stated by Kant, but in the sense of a feeling and judgment partaking of the character of obligation or "oughtness" with a thousand different shadings of responsibilities. His moral act is peculiarly his own, and his self-approbations and disapprobations are particulars of it. With this individualistic attitude, how can he be a part of the universe without having at the same time a consciousness of this relationship? The reply is at least partially given when we consider that man's biological ancestors are as established a fact as can well be found, and yet it is only upon reflection that he thinks of his unity with them. When an individual uses a piece of money, he is often ignorant of the fact that he has participated in the economic forces of the world. Into that transaction have gone all the complicated processes of international exchange, the market values of commodities, the conditions of supply and demand and much more patent to the economist but which do not enter into the consciousness of the actual purchaser who gives a piece of money for a loaf of bread in any country. These reflections enter only into the minds of the few trained persons in political economy, but the facts are there. Thus it is with any considerations which we might put forward. The concrete act—that is, an act dissected from the body of processes of which it forms a part —is always more apparent than its connections. It is not strange, therefore, that in the sense of freedom man should not be conscious of the larger implications of his life.

But the mystery of freedom still remains. The sense of freedom does not eliminate the processes which condition the individual. But a consideration of the processes compels us to change our attitude toward freedom. Still further, our logic compels us to think of each act as an act of the universe, an act of God. Each act of mine is God's act; or rather, it is my act as an essential and contributory part of God. And here enters the moral consideration, which is a stumbling block to many and the cause of the creation of many systems of thought to save the character of God. Limitations have been placed upon the power of God, so that evils in the realm of nature and the sins of man occur because He has not the power to prevent them. Or God has been limited as to His creative power, so that having created a few beings, these by delegated power become responsible for all the good and evil in the world. Thus the intervening agents exonerate the Infinite and in a world of shame and sorrow, earthquake, flood and storm, whatever the results, whatever the distress, the Infinite remains pure and undisturbed at the heart of endless agitation. Or, again, a separation of God and man after the manner of an extreme Deistic type is insisted upon; so much so that man is entirely responsible for all his acts. God created man in His own image. He became a living soul. He partook of the divine perfection, a perfection which he must sustain by his own individual power. He must obey the laws of his being. But he did not obey. His act of disobedience was his own sin. He was, therefore, out of accord with the divine. He must as a consequence bear the full penalty of the law and there is no extenuation. This is not the place to discuss theories of substitution, for such a consideration does not change the case. The full penality must be suffered on the supposition that the perpetrator of the act was individually responsible for it. Even when this consideration is made social and the group concerned, or indeed when the entire race of man becomes responsible for the act of the individual, the case against God is not altered. It is man that sins against God: God remains in his perfection over against the sinner. There is a gulf between them. Man has become an alien from the house of his Father, he has gone away into a far country. Beneath this metaphorical description, of course, lurks the conception that the divine and human personalities are distinct and the transaction between them is like that between father and son or master and servant.

The Problem of Evil

Theorists have been greatly concerned with the method of justifying God in view of the evil in the world. This would be a work of supererogation, were it not for the fact that our reason demands partial satisfaction at least in its interpretation of the phenomena of existence. Imperfection is a fact of life; can it be accounted for? Since it is always incidental to any process, it were vain to seek for its origin, for is not the universe itself a process? The ancients felt that the element of curiosity in man's processes of knowledge was the avenue through which sin entered the world, for this in turn led to actual disobedience or wrong doing. But in order to justify such a theory, all previous processes of development in the individual were cut away. It was necessary to assume that a perfect, processless human being had existed previous to this fact. Then reflection turned to the possible prevention of the act taking place. Thus a moral philosophy has been erected on the false principle of the denial of the fact of process. Therefore, God could have prevented the entrance of sin; but in his infinite wisdom he permitted it to enter the world: that is to say, permitted it in a negative way by creating a being with a will in a world of temptation. How, then, justify God? He can only be justified on the theory that he could not create this free-will being and make conditions otherwise. However unsatisfactory this view may be, the theorists that justify the ways of God to man by making evil an illusion present a still less satisfactory method.

Evil is a stubborn fact of life. When we explain it as incidence to a process of development, this does not minimize the sternness of its reality. Imperfection is a racking process for the soul. With the onward urge toward perfection, as a native possession of souls, which is an aspiration to realize the fulness of the divine life of which they are a part, and the constant conviction of failure to reach the goal, it is easy to grasp the dissatisfaction with life coming from a long-range of circumstances from the discouragement over the day's accomplishments, through moral delinquency to the *Weltschmerz* of a Schopenhauer. This consciousness of imperfection is intensified by its dire results. Physical and mental ills resulting from individual and social maladjustments running through the warp and woof of the human story such as the inadaptability of the individual to family life, a failure to secure a proper vocation; lack of constant and sufficiently lucrative work, a failure to control the appetites, lack of adaptation to the social whole, physiological and neural disturbances, grim poverty, black crime and the complicated consequences arising from all these are stern realities enough to stagger human souls. If there were geniuses enough to go round, thousands of tragedies could be written daily in drama and novel to depict the bitterness of the human struggle and the catastrophes of our moral world. If evil be regarded as negative, and it is from the viewpoint of philosophy merely a failure to reach the whole, it is a terrific reality in the experience of individuals and the race.

The admission of the reality of evil, however, does not compel us to think of it as an entity. It did not enter the world at a certain point, and it will never leave the world. It is imbedded in the constitution of reality. We cannot conceive a processless God. If the category of time be reserved for our interpretation of the visible world, reflection compels us to seek a basis for this in the supreme reality of the world. If supreme reality be interpreted in terms of mind, then indeed we must apply, even if it be only an index and it cannot of course be much more, the processes of logic to its ongoing. There cannot be experiences before the fact. That is the philosophy underlying George Eliot's remark that God could not make Antonio Stradivari's violins without Stradivari. The content of the individual consciousness becomes richer as it experiences. As conscious experiences are processes in the ultimate, God himself must become richer through them. The ultimate is not static; it has a life history. If so, there is something added; God is not the eternally complete, which is a worthless conception, but he is the eternally fulfilling. The ultimate is the eternal law of reason in the change. Thus the infinite is evolved into worlds in their endless complexity, into myriads of atoms playing their myriadfold drama in every particle of matter, into numberless forces, and best of all into untold numbers of finite souls, which by development become more and more Godlike, as self-mastery and self-expression become more perfect.

Imperfection, therefore, is a necessary phase of the visible universe, having its groundwork in the Ultimate itself. God cannot help it. It belongs essentially to the fact of divine expression. The moment the invisible emerges into the visible, it is an emergence of process, because it is the expression of the whole in the part. If we are to write theodicies, though it seems unnecessary so to do, this fact must be taken into account. Most of the theodicies already written proceed on the theory of the creation of the world in time. As God therefore considered all the possibilities, he selected the best possible world; or as God contemplated making man, he did the best he could; his power being limited, he could do no better, although being good, he naturally desired to do better. These theories sum up practically all the attempts made at a theodicy, a theodicy called into being by the logic of the creation of the world in time. It is useless, it seems to us, to justify the existence of the world. It is an eternal and necessary expression of God, eternal in the sense of being timeless, although of course particular expressions may come within the time range. Justification only becomes necessary when a choice of alternatives is presented; when this condition is removed, the need no longer exists. No, creation of the world in time eliminates all theodicies. The view presented does not tend to weaken moral effort toward the betterment of the life of the individual and the race. Imperfection must be fought at every step. Sin must be overcome. The world in which we live is our moral world, a world of tasks and challenges, of temptations to be overcome, of mistakes to be corrected, of the more perfect to replace the less perfect. It is a school in which the divine life is taught, a school in which the individualizations of the divine life are ever reaching after perfection, in which the sinner feels the divine anguish when he comes to his fuller self, in which there is ample and constant inspiration for the urge toward the more abundant life. From this viewpoint, books of Job and books of the type of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* are unnecessary, although from another viewpoint, as we have already admitted, they are fully justified. How absurd it would be to stand over the child in school and bewail its imperfection, write pessimistic strains because at the age of six its letters are ill-formed, its arithmetic is full of errors, its geographical notions are vague and footless; rather let us stand over the child with reverence over its developing soul. Tomorrow the child shall have advanced, tomorrow the divine life shall flow more freely and strongly within it. The child is a candidate for perfection in knowledge, and as in knowledge thus also in its moral life.

Conclusion of this Chapter: *Mechanism and Morals*

Thus our moral problem is at par with our intellectual problem. Our reflections upon Ultimate Reality from the viewpoint of ethics is a look at it from within. Self-activity is a commentary here as elsewhere; it is the reflection of the finite ethical soul upon his infinite self. When, therefore, a human being has appreciation of any ethical values, he is entering through this act into the very core of the universe. This method of approach illumines the pathway of ethical reflection. It makes clear ethical determinism, for all moral acts are at the same time the acts of the universe and freedom receives a new setting and interpretation. The development of ethical conduct and ideal through the ages is supported even from its lowliest beginnings in physical necessities and is anticipated even in pre-human or sub-human beings. If the universe be a mechanical process from core to circumference, there is no greater mockery than our human life. Whatever the conveniences of living together by respecting the rights and claims of another; whatever the urge to give to each his own in the language of Justinian's Pandects, the ideals which these impulses presuppose become a sheer mockery unless they be imbedded in the life of the universe. The emotions and thought of the race have been dedicated to the principle that every human right was a divine right; that the performance of the simplest act of justice is the performance of the justice of God. The moral law was given on Sinai by Jahweh, that was the belief of a primitive people; and however this belief may be glazed over with legend and superstition, it has the underlying reality of truth. The collation of ethical facts becomes meaningless when unrelated to ideals, and ideals are a mockery unless they receive meaning from the reality of the universe. What inspiration could there possibly be to live a life which would ultimately be destroyed by a mechanical, soulless machine! Our analysis, however, gives us a more inspiring outlook, our ethical ideals are expressions of our larger life. The freedom of the human self is the freedom of the divine self. The ethicality of the human being, despite many of its unpromising expressions, many of its mistaken institutions, is the ethicality of the spiritual and ethical principle of the universe. This is the final declaration of both the intuitive and reflective, moral and religious life of man in both the individual and society.

This, it would appear, will solve the antinomy between mechanism and morals. It is not possible to solve it by

Kant's attempt to make the world of mechanism phenomenal and the ethical world the real world, for this involves us in hopeless confusion. That was the fate of his transcendental philosophy. The only solution possible, it seems to us, is to regard the moral world as real and the world of mechanism, with its numerous forces, its numberless atoms if we may speak of them at all in terms other than force, its laws or methods of procedure, as an expression of the one, ultimate principle of the universe. And these expressions must not be divorced from it in terms of secondary causes; they are its immediate expressions just as thought is an immediate deliverance of consciousness.

CHAPTER THREE

THE AESTHETICAL INTERPRETATION OF ULTIMATE REALITY

Appreciation of Nature and the Fine Arts

THE BEAUTIFUL with varying degrees of development in the individual makes its universal appeal. This is involved in the process of perception. In the act of the mind constructing an object for itself, there comes an impression of beauty or its opposite. The faculty of imagination, while constructing its intellective object, places it at the same time in the realm of aesthetic values. No imagination, no object for the mind; no imagination, no beautiful object for the mind. The reactions are immediate, of course, and range from the vague awakenings of aesthetic stupor to the most cultivated taste.

Human beings have never been quite satisfied with ephemeral appreciations of the endless appearances of nature through the botanical ranges of flowers, shrubs and trees; through the physical features of brook, river, lake and ocean, a thousand hills, majestic mountains, fascinating valleys: but as by a common urge the fine arts have been developed so that man's impressions of nature might be quickened and made permanent. Through them we are able to catch, if we have the proper equipment of interpretation, the artist plus the phenomenon. For after all, a painting, for example, is nothing other than a reflection of the ideal construction of the painter's own mind upon the object under consideration. Every painting is an autobiography of the painter's soul. This becomes immediately apparent if we study different schools of painting, and especially the development of painting in different countries. The principle to which we are calling attention is equally true for the entire range of the fine arts: for the visual range of landscape gardening, architecture, sculpture, painting, literature; for the auditory range of music; for the combined appeal to the emotions and volition, through audition and vision in the opera and drama. In all these arts there is always an embodiment of the attitudes of the artist as well as the impressions of the object. The artist also embodies his time and civilization, to say nothing of the entire experience of the human race of which he is part. The impulse to artistic expression is very old and appears very early in cave scratchings, picture writing and crude attempts at sculpture. It is interesting to ask, why this urge for artistic expression? And probably the answer lies in a deeper consideration of the reason for any aesthetic appreciation whatever. This must come from philosophical reflection, for psychological analysis of the aesthetic consciousness deals only with the fact of appreciation and not with the deeper problem of a universe in which this fact is imbedded. But psychological analysis has its suggestiveness.

Suggestiveness of the Appreciations of the Beautiful and Sublime

There is no distinct line of demarcation between the appreciation of the beautiful and sublime. In general, when the sense of the beautiful is concerned with an easily comprehended content of consciousness or with objects on a small scale, the experience may be called a consciousness of beauty, as of a rose, brook, small lake or house; on the contrary, when the object is baffling to the imagination either in magnitude, as in vast mountains, or in power, as in great waterfalls, we experience the sublime. As a subjective process, we may pass from the beautiful to the sublime at any time. Even the same event or object may be either to the same person at different times or to different persons at the same time. A wedding in a magnificent cathedral may be pretty to the beholders and sublime to the participants. These experiences may vary according to the complexity of moral and associative forces entering into the experience. King Arthur's Castle in Tintagel, Cornwall, in its ruins may be very pretty to one and sublime to another. This sublimity would be intensified to a Tennyson or any one else, who could picture King Arthur, the ideal king of Britain, riding over these huge cliffs or standing on the deck of a Roman ship wrestling with a terrific storm off the coast. We associate with the sublime massiveness, great expanses, over-mastering dynamism as in Niagara Falls or a storm at sea; magnificent moral qualities of self-sacrifice and self-denial "in acts of daring rectitude."

The sublime, therefore, baffles comprehension while it is aesthetically satisfying. As we view a storm at sea or a tragedy in the theatre, there comes a sense of something overwhelming, unavoidable, defeating our powers, defying our ordering; we stand helpless and yet satisfied, defeated and yet victorious, baffled but not dismayed. This satisfaction, victory and undismayedness come through the sense of the sublime, and this introduces us immediately into the very heart of the universe. Our sense of the sublime is an index to the sublime presence surrounding us, for we live and move and have our being in it. In fact, we could not have this experience unless we were a part of it, as I think will be seen if we consider tragedy. Tragedy could not be aesthetically satisfying unless there was a feeling, however vague, that beyond defeat and catastrophe all would be well, despite the heartrending and untoward circumstances.

The sense of the sublime is the key with which we unlock the profound mystery of the universe. Through it we are led into the vast region that baffles thought; and here there is ample opportunity for the profoundest skepticism and agnosticism as well as for the most sublime, rational faith. It was no mere incident that a great deal of modern organized religion came out of Arabia, where illimitable spaces and profound silences naturally lead to the contemplation of the universe as cultivated by religion—the contemplation of an interfused spirit with which man may hold relations and to which he might be faithful in his transactions with other human beings. From Arabia the great impulse of religion was carried into Egypt and later appeared in the religions of Palestine, culminating in the Hebrew and Christian religions; and still later it flowered into the remarkable religion of Islam.

How Shall the Aesthetical Ideal Be Defined?

Here, of course, we must advance beyond the psychological experience. The distinctions already made between the beautiful and sublime are not sufficient to enable us to define the aesthetical ideal, although they may point the way. The essence and soul of the aesthetical ideal is that through these unique experiences of the beautiful and sublime we have a sense of unity and harmony with the universe. The avenues to this consummation are a thousandfold. In art, whatever the object before the sculptor or painter, an incident from human life, a face, a landscape, unless it be suggestive of the ideal, it will not attain to the dignity of a work of art. And there is always, in a true work of art, a double reflection of the Infinite. The artist himself is the fullest reflection of it, for he is a living, self-conscious segment of it, embodying thus all the secrets of the universe in his own soul. Nature around him, nay the very object before him, whether a human form, a lake, or a few trees with the sun glistening through them, is also an embodiment of the selfsame Spirit. The artist is, therefore, dealing with subjective and objective divine life. Thus we are compelled to modify our definition and state that so far as art is concerned it is a double reflection of the Infinite as experienced within the soul of the artist and the suggestiveness of the Infinite in nature, which he catches and according to the measure of his ability transmits to others. These two elements are necessary. It is not to our purpose to define the means by which this is best accomplished. These are the tools of the trade, which must be learned as one learns to write. We are merely indicating the essential ingredient in our experience of the beautiful in every work of art. There is always a transaction with the Infinite. Many characteristics of this experience must be pointed out.

While admitting that artistic experience is quite unique, it nevertheless calls into play all functions of mind. It may be conducive to the contemplative mood, wearing an aspect of tranquility and passivity; yet the other functions of the mind are there, though in the background. We cannot, therefore, agree with Schopenhauer, that art is a way of viewing things independent of the principle of sufficient reason. We have already seen that the principle of sufficient reason or causality is our attempt to explain the world in the terms of our own self-activity, the essence of which is a thinking, volitioning subject aware of its processes and of their relation to itself. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer strikes the right note when he contends that art gives us the true essence of the world, a timeless essence known with equal truth for all time.

Art thus becomes timeless and universal. It may have the forms of expression characteristic of certain centuries and countries, but these are only its accidental garbs. Beneath these wrappings is the soul of art, the suggestiveness of the Infinite. A great work of art never tires the soul; we may return to it over and over again. Each glance at it is refreshing. It feeds the soul and quenches its thirst for the ideal. It is always a spring of living water springing up into eternal life; it is the bread of heaven, which satisfies and in turn creates a craving for more. The Venus de Milo will not grow old, neither will Leonardo da Vinci's Mona Lisa; these human forms in sculpture and painting gave forth the divine effulgence.

For these reasons appreciations of the beautiful are disinterested. They are not weighed in merchandising balances. A view of the sunset from the hilltop is spontaneous. Its beauty catches the soul unaware. It may flood through the Golden Gate and crown Mount Tamalpais with an aureole of glory, leaving prismatic effects all over the bay of San Francisco, and the beholder realizes an intense satisfaction without further consideration. Through such experiences man lives the life eternal and nothing else matters. All human gauges are inadequate to measure such an experience. It not only introduces us to eternal life, but it also expresses our own eternal life. And in it there is no consideration whatsoever of ulterior values to us, of what it will pay us, of what market returns may accrue to us. The value is interior, locked up in our own breasts, in that great secret of our unique relationship to the Infinite. Both the Infinite soul and ours are really one and enfolded in infinite love. Beyond this, there is no need of any other interest. All true love is self-sufficient.

There is much of intuitive leap both in the experience of the appreciator of fine art and in the effort of the artist. This, of course, may be over-emphasized. An intuitive leap is incidental to all processes of the mind. It certainly plays an important part in aesthetic appreciation, as it does in the emotional relation of love between the sexes and in love toward God. Intuition enables us to leap to the realization that we are parts of an all-included life, while the ratiocinative powers are lagging behind. The lover behaves in a way to shame his intellect; but his intellect, if the result be satisfactory, will justify his intuition. It is also true that the greater appreciation of art comes to the individual while he is in this mood; and the greatest accomplishments of artists are wrought under the same spell. It is a mystical dip into the greater self. To use the language of Eckhart: "As the little water drop poured into a large measure of wine seems to lose its own nature entirely and to take on both the taste and color of the wine, or as iron heated red-hot loses its own appearance and glows like fire, or as air filled with sunlight is transformed into the same brightness, so that it does not so much appear to be illuminated as to be itself light,—so must all human feeling toward the Holy One be self-dissolved in unspeakable wise, and wholly transfused into the will of God." This language, stripped of its religious form but not of its religious significance, describes what the artist experiences at his best and what we experience in all appreciations of the beautiful. We are immersed in these in the absorption of the soul while listening to great music or witnessing a great drama performed. Both artist and appreciator may well say with Keats:

"Be still the unimaginable lodge
For solitary thinkings; such as dodge
Conception to the very bourne of heaven,
Then tease the naked brain; be still the leaven
That spreading in the dull and clodded earth
Gives it a touch ethereal—a new birth;
Be still a symbol of immensity;
A firmament reflected in a sea;
An element filling the space between;
An unknown—but no more."[332]

It matters little what medium the artist may use to express the ideal, except that he must always take into the account the restraint imposed by certain materials upon the free expression of the spirit. Music and poetry have a freer range than architecture, sculpture and painting. Different arts naturally arise from difference in the materials used.

In art and aesthetic appreciation generally, then, there is a total response of an individual mind, under the lead of the aesthetic emotions, to a larger life of which it is an essential and contributory part. For, since the universe at any particular moment is the immediate expression of the Infinite, the aesthetic response deals with the source of all life. This is why the sublime approaches nearer the heart of the universe than the beautiful; this is why we are introduced through art to a timeless and universal experience; this is why the beautiful and sublime are always disinterested; this is why the artist and the appreciator of art take an intuitive leap into the larger life; this is why these experiences are satisfying, for the soul reposes here, through a momentary experience in its eternal home.

Profound Significance of Tragedy

But over against this theory of art and art appreciation as well as the aesthetic appreciation of nature—that is to say, that these experiences come to us as we intuitively or otherwise enter into the life of the universe of which we form an essential and contributory part, and thus the experiences are akin to the religious and ethical—is the apparently blighting fact of tragedy. In the case of an innocent individual, possessed of purity and moral integrity, the clashing forces of society so arrange themselves that he is sacrificed to the practitioners of deceit, ambition, and those lacking moral courage. And yet when all seems lost, in a drama or work of fiction depicting the case, there is a profound satisfaction aesthetically. And this is not diminished when all seems lost by catastrophe and death; when nothing in fact has been won and ethical principles as well as persons are engulfed in hopeless confusion. How is it possible to say that even here the aesthetic experience arises from our sense of unity and harmony with the whole?

Schopenhauer takes a different view. He regards the whole of existence as evil. The reason for aesthetic enjoyment is that it gives us an escape from the essential and deep seated evil of the universe. The irrational evil of the universe expresses itself in us as a will to live; art gives us an escape from this will to live, We escape from the principle of sufficient reason, which dominates our rational life. Thus in art we are suspended between two worlds; by pure Platonic contemplation, we escape the urge of the irrational will of the universe on the one hand and, on the other, the urge of the phenomenal life which binds us hand and foot to the process of reason and consequent. We thus see through art the essence of things, as it were by second remove. To Schopenhauer, then, for very different reasons from our own, tragedy is the highest form of art; it depicts the terrible side of life, "The unspeakable pain, the wail of humanity, the triumph of evil, the scornful mastery of chance, and the irresistible fall of the just and innocent, is here presented to us." Thus through tragedy we witness the innocent suffering, for example Ophelia, Desdemona, Cordelia, not for any wrong they committed but for the crime of existence itself, which is essentially evil. As Calderon puts it:

"Pues el delito major
Del hombre es haber nacido."

I shall not deal with the ethical implication of this theory, as this was done in the last chapter, but I wish only to point out the aesthetical features. There is no doubt that in the aesthetic experience of tragedy we peer into the heart of the universe. There can be little doubt also that evil is a characteristic of phenomenal existence. We may admit still further, that this being so, there must be some provision made for it in our conception of reality itself. But here we part company. With Schopenhauer there is no relief. What escape could there be when reality itself is an irrational will? How could there be a calm realm of Platonic, contemplative ideas into which the mind, through the aesthetic emotions, might withdraw from the omnipresent irrationality of the universe? Granted that in man the universe accidentally hit upon rationality, how shall we explain the orderly procedure of nature? These are so extensive and accurate as to enable investigators to write their manner of behavior in intellectual formulae known as the laws of nature; in fine, the great achievements of the nineteenth century came from the success in the attempts to formulate these intellectual statements. In their name, we may demand consistency from Schopenhauer. To talk of accidents becoming orderly and rational; to speak of grades of will and what not and of a universe of law derived by assumption, from an original irrational will, is the fundamental error in Schopenhauer's system of philosophy. It is not necessary to divorce oneself from the ultimate principle of the universe in order to enjoy art in general and tragedy in particular. The necessity is urgent that there be a closer identification with it. This indeed is the only escape from the tragedies of life and the only way in which the deep contradictions of life may be reconciled.

Nietzsche's Famous Distinction

This reconciliation of the tragic in life is profounder and deeper than most theorists appreciate. Professor Campbell's article on "Morality in Aeschylus"[333] brings out this point admirably. He is dealing with the ethical aspect of tragedy, but it will illustrate our point. He avails himself of Nietzsche's distinction between the Apolline and Dionysiac phases of human life. The Dionysiac is the wild, pristine, unruly element. This comes from our far-off ancestry. It is not only evidence of the beast of the jungle persisting in us, but also of the savagery and barbarism of early man. The Apolline phase is the orderly element in human life. The moral story of man has been a movement from the wild, orgiastic worship of Dionysus to the orderly worship of Apollo, the god of life. The article illustrates this principle from the tragedies of Aeschylus. In *Prometheus Bound,* Zeus is the central figure; he was tyrannical and arbitrary. But this was the old Zeus, who represented the Dionysiac element. The God of

Aeschylus is the new Zeus, who represents not only power but wisdom. This is the Apolline element.

But there is a deeper chasm in the universe than is indicated by a Dionysiac element, wild and unruly as this may be. This chasm lies between the Infinite and its finite expressions. A faint glimmer of this will be seen in the disparity between thought and expression in a human being. Thought at its best reaches out to an ideal realm with all its ramifications. The brooding of thought is so entrancing, full of warmth and color, compelling in conviction, broad, far-reaching, glorious; but when it is submitted to the formalism of language, it loses much of its charm and is always worlds distant from its first conception. In its pristine stages, conceptive thought may soar to the Infinite, but in expression it is seen in its poor, finite garb, and the greater soul seems to have left it. How much more cavernous must the distinction be between the Ultimate of the universe and its expression! The visible appearances in space and time are very meager commentaries on the wealth of the divine life, and therein lies the tragic element, especially when it comes to self-conscious life. It is impossible for the universe to be epitomized on this scale. Man knows and feels this. From this viewpoint, tragedy in art must be conceived as an endeavor to represent the disparity between the ideal and its realization in human life in such a way as to bring out its sad and destructive consequences. The tragic may confine itself to the individual, his disappointments in love, in mental accomplishment, in carrying out his schemes for life relative to a profession or his place in the economic and social order; or it may arise out of the social interrelations into which the individual may enter; or it may issue from the interactions of groups of individuals in the social order; or it may be experienced in the individual's relation to nature in its physical environment of storm, earthquake, sea and physical forces; or, again, it may be realized very acutely in the reflective broodings over the universe at large, in that *Weltschmerz* in which the thinker may feel that for him all the values of ideal life have disappeared. The tragic always issues in calamity and catastrophe,—mental and physical disease, financial and material losses, misfortune and unlucky situations, pain and defeat coming from non-conformity to current laws, thought or customs, loss of social or political prestige, destruction of property and loss of life—and other innumerable forms.

Yet as we view tragedy in any form of art, we derive aesthetic pleasure from it. Why is this so? Because apparently there is something within us which defies the blackest tragedy, a belief that human life is embraced in the life of the universe; that every tragedy is incidental to something more inclusive; that neither life nor death nor any other creature can separate us from the life and love of the Infinite: that, in fact, every tragedy shall finally be engulfed in the consummating comedy of existence. We could not enjoy tragedy in art were this not so. We should come away from it with unrelieved dejection. Great tragedy in art chastens us; it modifies a too easy optimism; it purifies, as Aristotle holds, our great emotions; it enlarges our sympathies with suffering ones of earth; and above all, it gives us a profounder meaning of life and of the relation we bear to the Ultimate, knowing that in all our earthly trials and misfortunes the divine life suffers with and through us.

The Larger Meanings of Comedy

In comedy we deal with another phase of the aesthetic, though it is, as we shall see, essentially connected with tragedy. The comic ranges from the lightest bit of witticism or humor to the profounder aspects of poetry, the drama and the hopes and ideals of religion. In the sense we have indicated, comedy is an aspect of tragedy and they cannot be considered apart. In tragedy we experience the failure of the ideal to express itself in finite forms and sad consequences ensue. In comedy is presented this identical disparity between expression and ideal but there is an emphasis upon the final reconciliation and an overriding of all untoward circumstances and consequences. That is why laughing and crying are so nearly akin. Laughing is crying veneered; crying laughing suppressed. In one case the ideal is seen against a background of finite contradictions in such a way as to appeal to our sense of humor; in the other, the ideal is presented as being thwarted by its phenomenal aspects in such a way as to cause sadness and in its extreme consequences, tears and heartbreaking.

Religion with instinctive insight cultivated both these essential features of the phenomenal life in its relation to ultimate reality. At times it has emphasized or over-emphasized comedy; at other times, tragedy. Christianity has been conspicuous for its emphasis upon sadness. The congregations throughout Christendom wear a sad and even a pitiful countenance. The passion of the Lord has been a central feature. Large sections of the church have suppressed the theatre, dancing, card playing and amusements in general. Yet through it all the underlying thought of Christianity has emphasized tragedy on the way to comedy; all contradictions shall be overcome, all contradictions shall melt away in the infinite love of God; all life's experiences shall be incorporated in an eternal life of bliss. Christian art has likewise brought out the tragic phase; paintings of Calvary and Gethsemane abound. In general, it is possible that Christianity has over-emphasized the tragic in its doctrines of sin and atonement. No one can reasonably deny the refining influence of a Christ upon his cross; but overcontemplation of suffering may have a very deleterious effect upon the mind, to say nothing of its incidental evils of creating animosity for a people on the assumption that it killed the Lord and Master. Yet, it must be admitted that in making the suffering upon the cross central, Christianity has followed the example of Buddhism in making clear the central problem of religion — namely, the appreciation and solution of the disparity between the ideal and its expressions. They have attacked the inherent contradictions of a finite universe and rendered consolation to men, notwithstanding. And thus theoretically these great religions—and indeed all religions may be included in this category—become exponents of a profound cosmic philosophy in an unconscious way for the most part, by depicting the incursions of the Infinite into the finite and practically by their ministries of consolation and hope in view of the contradictions and suffering of the present state of existence.

Christianity is just as profound in its emphasis upon the divine comedy. It believes in the aesthetic unity and harmony of human life with the whole of existence. The conception of reconciliation to God is an aesthetic principle and an urgent demand made by the human soul from all the religions of the world.

Unity of the Ideals of Beauty, Truth and Goodness

The ideals of beauty, truth and goodness have a common root. Unity and harmony with the whole of existence is the ultimate meaning of them. They are various interpretations of the selfsame principle, appealing, however, in each case to certain leading interests. As the ideal stirs aesthetic appreciations, especially through both the constructions of recognitive and creative imagination, beauty masters the soul; as the intellectual processes seek satisfaction and relative rest in the harmony and unity of the whole of existence, truth dawns upon the mind; as life is thrown into its practical relations to men, threading its way through many difficulties to deeds of right doing, goodness gleams upon the spiritual vision. Thus when we are in harmony and unity with the Ultimate, all the ideals of our life find at least their prophetic harmony. And they are all involved in this experience. The artist gives conscious expression to the aesthetic phase; the prophet to the life of rectitude; the scientist and philosopher to true relations. These ideals, therefore, are one, insofar as a human being appreciates what is fundamental in the universe and become diversified only in their expressions.

Conclusion of This Chapter

Here again, as throughout this argument, we are face to face with the subjectivity of the process of interpretation. The aesthetic interpretation of ultimate reality is entirely from within. But this must not be construed to mean that we are merely dealing with a play of words, lacking in all relations except that of subjective caprice. What must be insisted upon is the linking of the individual consciousness to the Spirit of the universe. Whenever the individual reflects upon the ideal or experiences it, he is in reality dealing with the larger life in which he is an inclusive partner. This copartnership is not capricious; it is life, the life more abundant; it is the deepest reality of existence. And whenever we deal with ideals we are making a draft upon the larger and truer meanings of life.

This view also explains the compelling aspect of great ideals. Truth is unswerving in its demand for true relations. We cannot play fast and loose with it. It does not vary with individual caprice; it cannot bend to individual convenience. Goodness is uncompromising, An evil deed has no place within its purview. The ideal of beauty is unswerving. The artist feels he must ever approximate it. It is infinitely alluring and constraining but never fully realized. This is why the scientific mood, the religious mood seeking for goodness, and the aesthetic mood will always be perennial aspirations of the human spirit; in them the finite seeks the Infinite, the individual seeks his universal self. Michelangelo, in carving out the figures for the chapel of the Medici, not only depicted phases of human life but entered very deeply into the life of the universe. That is the secret of Raphael's Sistine Madonna. That is the meaning of the music of Beethoven and Bach. That is the fascination of scientific investigation. That is the force in the prophet's message as he appears among men. All these dip into the life of the universe. They all give the larger meanings of existence to their fellowmen. The religions of the world are expositions of the coming forth of the Infinite into human life and of the entering of human beings into the life of the Infinite. Artistic expression is an exposition of the life of the Infinite in the variety of its beautiful forms. That is the inner meaning of art; that is the inner meaning of life.

BOOK V

ULTIMATE REALITY IN RELATION TO THE PHENOMENA OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE AND THE DESTINY OF MAN

CHAPTER ONE

THE PHENOMENA OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE

The Individual

When the individual contemplates any phase of nature in a manner to stir the aesthetic emotions, he has the foundations of art and art appreciation; when in the contemplation of human relations his sense of right and wrong is stirred, he has the basis for ethics and ethical appreciation; when he contemplates the universe in such a way as to realize that he is a part of it and in such a way that his religious emotions are stirred, he has a basis for religion and religious appreciation. The religious appreciation gives him the highest type of satisfaction, and without it he suffers acute dissatisfaction especially when he dips into his deeper self. When religion controls his soul, he is master of himself, whatever fate may bring; he defies the untoward circumstances of life, knowing that he is an essential part of that which is indestructible. That is why he is prepared to meet persecution and death rather than give up his deep religious convictions.

This deep seated religious attitude is human, appearing with the development of self-consciousness in man. It is not the result of his reason; in fact, not the result of his emotion or will, but, as we have seen, it arises from the great tides underlying the ripples of his life, and every ripple is essentially connected with every deep-lying ocean movement. At certain stages in the manifestation of religion, man is content to find religious experience in the expression of his will; thus he dances or performs ceremonies. At other times he is satisfied with emotional reactions. Again he rests in peace when his reason remains unbaffled. But in multitudes of souls there is dissatisfaction with all these attitudes and all souls at times will revolt against some or all of them. Any performance becomes fatiguing, all emotional reactions pall by repetition and only on rare occasions may the soul reach the heights of the Mount of Transfiguration, making the experiencing soul content to dwell there. Reason seldom finds a satisfactory resting place when it contemplates any of the problems of religion. Such dissatisfactions are normal. Religious experiences can never be perfectly satisfactory because of the fact that they are phenomenal and always imperfect reactions to man's infinite self. The everlasting tides are deeper than any reaction of man's mind. They are unfathomable either in feeling, volition or intellection.

This is the philosophy underlying all estrangements from the Infinite. Man is ever attracted toward his greater self, as the sparks fly upward. When he finds himself enmeshed in the phenomenal, disrupting experiences of life, he realizes that he is in a far country, estranged from his Father's house, alienated from God. He seeks methods of reconciliation. He would be converted, so that he could turn from his evil doings and be ever after mystically united to his divine self. Thus penitential Psalms have been sung all through the ages. Thus men and women have renounced the flesh, have chosen rather to suffer affliction with the people of God, so that they may gain that city of God, in which all souls are united in the great spiritual kingdom of reality. Oftentimes these processes of conversion and penitence have become superficial and unreal, but at their best they are genuine exertions of the soul looking toward a greater realization of unity with the divine.

These processes in the individual as well as those characteristics of groups have been explained by the presence of a subconscious element in men breaking through their conscious activities. The manifestation of this seems often irrational. Both the individual and the group under the stress of religious emotion act contrary to the orderly and usual procedure of human life. It has therefore been inferred that the subconscious is an irrational something after the fashion of Schopenhauer's will minus intelligence. This inference, however, is not justified. All great emotions have their systole and diastole; at one extreme they may comport with reason, at the other all the proprieties of reason and life may be violated. Religious emotion is not unique in this respect. The murder of Duncan II in Shakespeare's play unbalanced the mind of both Macbeth and his lady. It is not necessary to invoke an unconscious, irrational force to explain these phenomena; the mind in its ordinary activities of anticipation and emotional reaction and especially in its connection with the Infinite affords, it seems to me, sufficient explanation. There is no denying the presence of a subconscious force. It has been the burden of this treatise to make the nature of it clear. What must be denied is the essential irrationality of it. It becomes irrational oftentimes, it is true, in its phenomenal manifestations. In processes of religious conversion, deep conviction of sin, extraordinary devotion to the ideal, abandonment of all the pleasures and allurements of life, the eternal deeps well up into the soul, flooding the conscious processes and carrying all before them.

But the manifestation of Ultimate Reality in human life is not only in the extraordinary but also in the ordinary lives of millions of nameless and unnoticed human beings. These latter bear their testimony to it daily. They enter churches, synagogues, mosques, temples or stop at wayside shrines to unburden themselves and to commune with the Infinite. In the seclusion of the home they perform the daily task, bear the difficulties of life, endure its sufferings and trials stoically. They pursue their vocations in field, factory, mart, school and university sustained by a splendid heroism. They weave the fabric of civilization. A still smaller number address themselves to representations on canvases, or pour their souls into great music, or construct noble edifices, or carve masterly sculptures, or create a refined literature, or shape political destinies, or inspire men to ideal life. When the prophet seems possessed, when the artist outdoes anything before conceivable, when the saint outshines his generation in noble living, we have examples of the force of the universe breaking through finite life in extraordinary fashion. Oftentimes this breaking through disturbs all normal relations. The prophet may be beside himself; the artist may be regarded as insane; groups of dancers or crowds in revivals of religion manifest abnormal relations. That is the other side of the picture, the shadow that accompanies the divine light.

Great Personalities

A similar philosophy underlies the appearance in the world of great personalities. In all religions where the personality of the founder has been predominant, discussions have arisen concerning his deity. This is proper and natural. In our Christian religion the question has been raised in reference to Jesus of Nazareth. Verily, he was divine; verily he was the son of God. When men met such excellence in a young, Jewish prophet, they could not conceive it possible that God should be incarnated in a human being. Seeing the disparity between the Infinite and its finite garments, from the most exalted motives, men proceeded to dehumanize the Christ; his birth came about, they thought, not through the ordinary processes of nature; his biographers put complete literary sentences into his mouth, bestowed upon him an undisturbed calm and the mastery over men and nature. They made him move among the hills of Galilee as if he were a being of a higher order than man. Christian art has for the most part continued this tradition. There is a blending of the masculine and feminine in it. The masculine element alone is too heroic, too disturbing to the eternal calm. When Anton Lang, in the performance of the "Passion Play" at Oberammergau took the part of Jesus and drove the moneychangers from the temple, they were driven out with the gentleness a man might exercise in driving out doves. It is perfectly clear that men accustomed to the money market could not be so driven out. But Anton Lang was faithful to the traditional ideal.

This historical process, commenced by the Gospel biographers and continued by Christian tradition, was totally unnecessary in the case of Jesus. They should have retained his complete humanity as the highest manifestation of the Infinite. But the larger truth did not dawn upon them: that is to say, that every human being is an essential part of the Infinite. The notion of a divine humanity was too far removed from their thinking. And they did not suspect what they were doing in the process of sublimating Jesus; they were injecting themselves into a particular historical instance; they were finding the divinity of their own souls reflected in the man of Nazareth. Had this thought dawned upon them, they would have seen also that there was no need to minimize the truth they were feeling after. Here they saw through the years the best example it was possible for them to see of the divine in human form; they saw God in the vale of space and time. Because of this, the infancy of Jesus is surrounded by heavenly magnificence; kings bring their gifts and prostrate themselves; the heavens are opened and angels sing *Gloria in excelsis.* Verily, this is always true when the human child is born. For in each case are possibilities at least of another manifestation, mysterious and inexplicable, of the individualization of the Infinite; another expression of the one in many; another incarnation. The case of Jesus was a particular instance of a universal truth.

The biographers of Jesus and the dogmatists who followed them were groping after another great truth—the truth of gradation. There are qualitative differences in the manifestation of the Infinite. It may be possible that our vision is too narrow to discern adequately the manifestation of the Infinite in atomic life. There are doubtless marvels here still to be revealed. A psychology of atoms now appearing chimerical may some day be written. But at present we must regard atomic manifestations of the Infinite as the lowest grade of expression. Through the plasticity of living matter higher expressions are possible. In conscious life and especially in self-conscious life, we have still higher, if not the highest, expression of the Infinite. And it is apparent from present experience and a study of history that all human beings do not express equally the great ideals of life. Ordinary human life may be compared to bubbles on the ocean, the great souls are the waves, and a few choice souls are the tidal waves of the Infinite. Whatever the historical fact about the life of Jesus, there is no doubt about the impression it made on the minds of succeeding generations. In Christendom Jesus has stood as the supreme expression of God in human life. Other great souls in other civilizations have stood in a similar light. Jesus was a great tidal wave. His life opened a new vista into the divine life. His words lifted men from their problems and sorrows into a sublimity of experience It was the lowly ones of earth that became the followers of Jesus in the first centuries; they saw in him a light that was never seen on land or sea. Here was a bursting forth of infinite life into the relations of men. Is it a wonder that Jesus became unique to his disciples? Is it a wonder that they finally isolated him from humanity? But in all the reverence and interpretations of the Christ-life we discern the philosophical interpretation of every living soul. Each soul is eternal and uncreated, without beginning and without end. Each soul is a crystallization of the divine; each soul has the possibilities of a Christ. A beautiful illustration of the truth here declared of the relationship of great souls to the Infinite is found in the application of the Greek *logos* theory to Jesus. The writer of the Gospel of John had true insight. He saw in the man of Nazareth the light which lights every man who enters the world. Here was the first and only begotten of the Father, the primary and only expression of divine reason. We refer to the insight as true because, though he could not be regarded as either the primary or only expression of divine reason, he nevertheless was a remarkable expression. Greek thinking since Heraclitus realized the chasm between the Infinite and the finite, between God and man, and tried to bridge it over with intermediaries. The chief of these intermediaries was infinite reason or *Logos*. To this Christian writer Jesus was the *Logos* enfleshed, walking among men, giving them eternal water to drink, healing their diseases and ushering them into the kingdom of God. In later theology he became more clearly a mediator between God and men. But the *logos* theory bears a universal application. Each soul is an eternal *logos;* each soul is unique and bears the mystery of the universe. Every soul is a mediator between the Infinite and the finite, between God and its fellowmen. Every man, according to the measure of his personality, is reconciling the Infinite to others. Every man makes an atonement for the sins of the world, especially for the inability of the Infinite to express itself fully in the finite.

The Institutions of Religion

Man cannot live alone. Society is one of the deepest instincts. Without the group, he would perish. Religion is not for man the individual, but for man plus the individual in society. This gives the reason why religion becomes organized and incorporates itself into institutions. The deeper philosophy of the process is that any human group is a society of souls, who are in turn crystallizations of the Infinite. That forms their deeper bond of union. That is the real city of God which underlies all human society.

In all countries religion has been organized into sacred congregations under various names. These are very necessary, not only because of their educational value to the rising generation especially; not only rallying places in the interest of a great cause; not only as an opportunity to care for the various functions of the sacred society: but supremely because man united with his brother accelerates the force of inspiration. One soul catches the divine gleam from the other. A congregation is swayed by the undertides of the Spirit; and just as wave impinges on wave, each driving the other farther, soul touches soul and all feel the impelling urge from their deeper, diviner self.

The man who never worships with his fellows forgets the wide meaning of the divine immanence. No one can deny the inspiration of mountains and valleys, trees and flowers. Modern poetry is a witness to the presence of the Spirit therein. But human spirits are an embodiment of the divine on a far higher scale. Tongues of divine fire rest upon each soul in a congregation. Here are souls who have lived and sacrificed, trembled in the face of the universe that baffles thought and bowed in sorrow in the presence and experience of the tragedies of life: these souls mingled in the contemplation and worship of the Highest afford a cumulative inspiration to the individual. Therefore public worship will never die out. Does the forest manifest divine mystery? How much more do the children of God? Do flowers steal through the aesthetic sense to what is ideal within the soul? How much more the sweet faces of children? Does the gnarled oak preach to us of storm and stress of a hundred winters of biting cold and as many of savory spring and luscious summer? How much more does the aged human being declare the storm and stress of the profoundest aspects of life The wrestling with problems, the heroic facing of life's difficulties, and the mystery of the whole creation are reflected here in a form which all human beings most readily understand; for the best understood book to a human being is another human being.

The primary function of religious institutions cannot, of course, be fulfilled without the proper training of the young and a great deal of attention paid to the religious education of the adherents of the institution and its future leaders. A religious institution must perform for religion what an art school does for art. There must be a restatement of the religious ideal in the thought forms of each generation. Knowledge grows from more to more. This is as true for religious knowledge as it is for knowledge in general.

Religious Literature

Religious institutions have manifested a great weakness in the handling of their sacred literatures. It goes without saying that the Bibles of religion are among the most precious possessions of the human race. They record the original religious experiences of the people to which the literature belongs and especially those of the founders of their peculiar religious movement. Naturally these experiences became very precious, especially when they were attested by similar experiences in their disciples. The tendency has been to place them beyond the influence of interpretive development. The language in which the records were written becomes antique and cannot be understood by later generations without elaborate commentaries. This is readily seen and no objection seems to be offered to a revised version, provided that there must be no revised version of the religious ideas therein contained. Or to put this in another form, the mode in which man expresses his religious ideals changes from generation to generation because of the broadening of his knowledge respecting the forces of nature and the agencies operative through them. If the Hebrew Scriptures were written today in the light of archaeology and evolution, the accounts of the creation and fall of man would disappear completely as historical truth and would become more consciously symbolical than the narratives betray themselves to be. This would be equally true of the accounts of the birth and life of Jesus. The symbolical language is beautiful, the annunciation by the angel Gabriel, the child lying in the manger because there was no place in the inn, the angels singing *Gloria in excelsis* to the shepherds, the magi presenting the infant with gold, frankincense and myrrh,—all this is poetry of a high order. Such accounts in the light of present-day knowledge would be just as beautiful, but more consciously symbolical. The difficulty at present is that thinkers are able to penetrate through the symbolism to the reality, but the naive reader accepts the symbol for the truth. This leads to a confusion of values at a more developed stage, bringing about an unnecessary undermining of the believer's faith in the eternal realities.

Nor is this all. The system of Christian thought constructed on the basis of this literature is equally misleading. The legend of the fall of man as a symbol of the imperfection of the finite, of the impossibility of a perfect embodiment of the Infinite in the finite, is splendid. Every crystallization of the Infinite in the finite, is a fall of man from a previous state of perfection. But care must be taken not to drive this parable too far and to consider finite existence as a curse and the escape from it the goal of all endeavor; for finite self-conscious existence is the glory of the universe, the masterpiece of existence. The parable has been driven too far by Christian thinkers. Whole systems of theology have been constructed upon it. In fine, most of the thinking today underlying the Christian religion is based upon a mistaken substructure. In the interest of this false foundation, two departments of aspiration toward the Infinite have been created, a department for science and a department for faith. In one, a man is fancy-free to follow his ratiocinative mind; in the other, he must accept what contradicts his reason, on the assumption that all things are possible with God, but profound danger lurks in this attitude. We have already analyzed the notions of faith and truth and their relationship. Suffice it now to point to the danger of placing religious and scientific truth in two different categories, for it tends to undermine all truth. Whenever a contradiction is realized between the two efforts to determine the truth, the effort ceases by classifying the case in the faith category, where all questionings end. But who shall ultimately determine to which category a particular case belongs? How shall we avoid an arbitrary determination?

Theories of Revelation and Inspiration

To overcome these difficulties, theories have been constructed to safeguard the sacred literatures of the world, theories of special revelation and inspiration. These literatures may cover centuries of time, or they may be composed during a comparatively short period; that matters little. Once they are regarded as canonical, the material they contain is sacred and inerrant. The writers, it is contended, received special revelations of the truth contained in them and they were prevented by the divine Spirit from committing inaccuracies in the transcription of this revealed truth. Those who refuse to apply this theory of inspiration to the language used still apply it to the thought-content, making it infallible.

There is a sense, of course, in which all truth, dawning upon the human mind is a revelation from the Infinite. Is not the human mind an essential part of the divine mind? When truth dawns upon the former, it comes not only as a revelation originating with the individual but also as a message from his larger self. Truth in the realm of biology, astronomy, physics, chemistry, or any other department of human knowledge, is at a par with religious truth; it is all a revelation from God. It is always a reaction of the finite to the Infinite. It is a grasping of a larger section of the life of the universe. But the advocates of a specific revelation confine the influence of the divine upon the human spirit to religious truth, truth concerning the more intimate relations of the human to the divine. But religious truth is no exception to the universal procedure of nature. Truth is as universal as gravitation. We cannot isolate religious truth by calling it special; all truth is religious, not only in its derivation but also in the sense that ultimately it penetrates into the heart of the universe itself, if we carry it far enough. It is very apparent that when two particles of matter, either molar or molecular, attract each other and the name "gravitation" is applied to the process, no advance is made beyond nomenclature in explaining the process. It is sufficient for purposes of science to describe the fact, classify it under a generalization, give it a mathematical formula and apply it in a diversity of ways. But the deeper question concerning the nature of gravitation remains. When this is investigated philosophically, it will turn out in the end to be a religious question, for gravitation is merely a phenomenal aspect of what is ultimate in the universe. Thus all truth concerning the universe is one. The division of truth into scientific, philosophical, and religious is merely a convenience. No special privileges can be claimed, therefore, for religious truth; it also must be regarded as a statement of the general relationships of nature for the specific purposes of religious experiences.

The same general principle applies to the submission of thought to writing. Here again religious thinkers have put forth claims of special inspiration, either in the sense that the mind of the writer was inspired and directed along specific lines, leaving the matter and method of expression under his control, or that both his thought and expression were under the guidance of the divine Spirit. But all submission of human thought to the written form follows a general rule. It is all divinely inspired. The sacred literature of any people cannot claim superiority over its highest general literary expressions.

A New Bible for Each One Thousand Years—— Church Unity.

If erroneous conceptions concerning revelation and inspiration were cleared away and the truth of universal revelation and inspiration were fully appreciated, it would be possible to have a Bible written for each thousand years of the life of a particular religion. In the case of Christianity, there are great difficulties in the way at present. Certain branches of the church issue their interpretation of fundamental dogmas at intervals, thus assuming the authority of declaring precisely the meaning of their fundamental doctrines. But in turn these dogmas are based ultimately upon the canonical scriptures. Within Protestantism is found a sharp divergence of attitude between an extreme literal interpretation of the canonical scriptures and a liberal construction, which will take account of the scriptures as purely human documents reflecting stages in the civilizations and religious experiences of the peoples who produced them and at the same time asserting the right to give them such interpretations as will comport with the growing enlightment and conscience of the race.

These problems involve another set of considerations connected with the sectarian spirit of Christianity. This, of course, is not peculiar to Christianity. All religions are afflicted with it. A protest came forth against a particular doctrine, practice or organization. Around this protest as a rallying point, a society gathered and multiplied itself rapidly in proportion to the zeal and energy of its adherents. This particular group, as it differentiated itself from the rest, was liable not only to set itself in opposition but also in enmity toward those with whom it differed. Naturally in time the same spirit of animosity dominated the group against which the protest was made. Thus inimical attitudes were assumed, institutions were uselessly multiplied, and much evil in the world was left unremedied because the religious forces could not unite to combat it. Feelings of estrangement were developed by one section of the church against another, rather than a feeling of mutual confidence, brotherly love and coöperation. One of Christianity's greatest tasks today is to amalgamate divine forces into one grand church which will stand for the ideals of religion in such generous fashion as to include all who are willing to coöperate, which will overcome the theoretical and practical materialism of the times with a compelling idealism and which will marshal all the religious forces for the elimination of the ills of mankind.

When this comes about, it will be easier to create a literature which will voice the present religious attitude of the human race. A Bible is needed for each thousand years at least of the life of the race. It takes a long time to forget the past crystallizations of religious thought. Man is most intense in his religion. Because of this, religious controversies and wars are the most bitter. But if today a united church could agree upon a group of representative men to garner an account of the rich religious experiences of the race into a Bible, what a volume it would make! What a new revelation it would impart! What deep stirrings of the Spirit of God it would reveal! Thus all the believers in all the religions of the world would worship God in the unity of the Spirit and read together one great collection of religiously inspired and inspiring literature. Such a hope for a united church, broad as humanity, and a universal Bible doubtless seems chimerical at present, but they are ideals which must not be relinquished in the interest of the higher life of man.

Church and State

The church and the state are essentially one. The state safeguards the living together of individuals to the best advantage to themselves and others. It is an arrangement whereby the group protects the individual both from injury from within and from without the state. Religion cultivates principles of brotherly love and coöperation, thus by the inculcation of a moral attitude and practice affording protection to the individual in relation to his fellows either individually or collectively. It bids us treat our fellows as brothers, sons of the great universal Father. The principles of association and protection, so that men may pursue their vocations, be at liberty to advocate their convictions by voice and pen, sustain their families, be unmolested in all legitimate undertakings, are in reality principles of religion. The state is essentially a religious organization. The state and the church belong together, and in order to keep them together, there must be a universal conception of religion and of the state.

There is nothing finer than the acknowledgment of the deeper relations of man in connection with the great functions of the state. When a President is to be inaugurated, when a King is to be crowned, the ceremony loses much of its dignity and far-reaching influence by a failure to incorporate with it the fact of man's divine relationship, the fact that man is an essential and contributory part of the Infinite. This is equally true in the administration of justice and in the performance of all state functions.

The process of separating the church from the state has been proceeding in many countries for two reasons. Firstly, the state has endeavored to constrain the consciences of men, or denied them the proper religious liberty of belief and organization, and secondly, because the church has arrogated the dictation of certain policies to the state. Either of these methods of procedure will always be disturbing. Church and state must be amalgamated in such a way that the church will limit itself to its proper function of attending to the spiritual needs of man and the state will limit itself to its proper function of attending to the civil needs of man. Thus, and thus only, shall we render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's, without forgetting that in the deeper spiritual sense that Caesar's things also belong to God.

Here of course we are dealing with church and state as if they were functions of one country. It must not be forgotten that there are many political institutions in the world and many forms of religion and religious organization. What has been said applies to all. By the church, is meant all organizations of religion; by the state, all organizations of political society. The problems of a world political society, difficult as they may seem, will be solved sooner than the problem of a world religious society. But humanity is one; religion is one. The same spirit must animate all political society, the same spirit must animate all religious society. The realization of these ideals will take a long time, but we must work at long range.

Conclusion of this Chapter

The phenomena of the religious life drive us back to the same conclusion,—that is to say, they declare the unique relationship existing between God and man. Man is an essential and contributory part of God. When an individual estranges himself from the Infinite, there is no peace until he is *en rapport* with his greater self. He must return to his Father's house; he must be reconciled to God; he can only be saved by unity and harmony with his greater self. That is the burden of all religion, embodied in prophet's message, poet's hymn and word of Holy Writ. What marvelous transformations are brought about by the overflooding of man's soul by means of the influences emanating from his subconscious self! This is conversion; this is the conscious recognition of and participation in his divine self. When this experience becomes constant in any man and his life is thus pervaded by the divine life, he appears in history as a very God among men. Religious institutions and sacred literature exist to cultivate this relationship. Such institutions are the visible City of God, which is in both its visible and invisible aspects a society of souls, of self-conscious beings, who live and move and have their being in the Infinite.

Nowhere is the divine relationship more patent than in the revelation of truth to man in the inspiration, which comes to him while imparting his thought to his fellows. Because this divine relationship is so vital, ever fulfilling itself in the life of the individual and society, wearing the aspect of the centuries, colored by divers civilizations, given new interpretations by art, science, philosophy and practical living, men must not rely upon the verbal expression of it by a past age or by a restricted group even of trained men: it is a well of living water springing up into everlasting life. It is new each morning. It puts on new phases or modes of manifestation constantly. It is necessary if we must have Bibles, and they seem to be essential, to write new ones, after the old ones have served their purpose.

It has therefore been the burden of this chapter to indicate the unity of human life, a unity manifested in all its divers phases, both individually and socially, a unity which in the last analysis is the unity of the divine life.

CHAPTER TWO

THE HOPE OF IMMORTALITY; PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Statement of the Problem; the Question of Time

THE PROBLEM of immortality must be extricated, as far as possible, from the considerations of time and the relation of time to eternity. The question of the metaphysics of time is not germane to our subject; neither is the general question of the possible duration of self-conscious existence pertinent to the present discussion. The burden of this essay has been to contend that self-consciousness, or in more precise language, something to which our self-consciousness is an index, of which it is a faint expression, something which, while it is infinitely beyond all conception, is not inscrutable, for it is ourselves in our infinitude. This is the ultimate and irreducible principle of the universe. It expresses itself immediately in the forces of nature as well as in man's spirit. It is Ultimate Reality. It never became; while the universe constantly, in its various phases, goes through the transformations of becoming and of ceasing to assume a particular form. We are essential and contributory parts of this life. That is the meaning of our existence. We are a little below God, not below in the quality of self-consciousness but in the grasp of its intuition and the extent of its operation. It remains for us to discuss the great hope of immortality from this viewpoint.

This is the definite question: after the incident of death, shall the mind function as it now does in the full strength of its self-consciousness? At present there is a necessary correlation between neural processes and consciousness. The ideational machinery is dependent upon the afferent nerves and brain centers. Sensation has no meaning aside from the stimulations of the end organs of sense. Volition depends upon the automatism of brain cells and efferent tracks. When brain cell and nerve track have become dust, shall the mind continue to conduct processes of thought and exert volition? Shall the past be remembered as we are able now to remember it? Shall there be an activity of imagination? Shall nature in general, painting, music, poetry, the drama, landscape gardening and architecture, please us as they now do? Shall reason continue to move from premise to conclusion? Shall there be a unifying process of consciousness, something similar to Kant's transcendental unity of apperception? Shall the emotional apparatus be in full sway? If not the pleasure-pain series along the lower physical ranges, shall the emotions of love, righteousness, truth, joy of life obtain? Thus our problem becomes a very definite one. Immortality does not mean the possible duration of self-conscious life, whether it will continue to operate or disappear gradually by diminution, but it means the possible operation of self-consciousness at all after the incident of death.

Absorption into the Infinite; Ostwald's Theory

The question here is not of a possible absorption of the soul but whether this inevitably takes place at the incident of death. All analogies would indicate that nature discontinues what is useless, what fails to fulfill its functions. That is the story of the disappearance of many biological forms. I see no reason why the mind of man should form an exception. Why should the useless be retained on any plane of life? We cannot successfully prove *non posse mori* for the soul of man, when it has ceased to perform its functions in the economy of nature. Admitting, therefore, the possibility of non-existence, we cannot admit absorption for self-conscious souls. This physical process is not applicable to it. A sponge may absorb water or a cup of tea absorb sugar; these are processes easily understood, but when we speak of the mind being absorbed into the mind of the universe or into nature the physical metaphor is driven into a realm beyond its application. What we know of self-consciousness leads us to think of it, though an essential part of Ultimate Reality, as a distinct process, the exclusive possession of the individual, which admits of no transfer. There is nothing more unique than individuality. Life experience for each soul is isolated from the experiences of all other souls. Each individual is unique in the universe. There is only one of him. He cannot be duplicated.

Professor Wilhelm Ostwald in his discussion of *Individuality and Immortality*[334] has overlooked this. His analogies are physical and biological. The individual animal dies, but there is no death to the species or organic life. The species is immortal. Energy is eternal, but the individual forms of it may disappear. Mass is eternal though individual forms may vanish. Empty two glasses of water into the same bowl; refill them and the identity of the first separate glassful is lost. In these instances there is a failure to consider individuality in its psychological significance. An individual is not something cut off from other things like a glass of water, which loses itself when it goes into the mass. It is self-conscious life; it thinks, feels, puts forth exertion and realizes these processes as its own peculiar possessions. It is something that forms ideals and constructs religion, art, poetry, philosophy and science. It has no special quality; it is a spiritual process. It cannot be weighed or measured but only experienced.

Thus metaphors of absorption are highly inapplicable. It is readily admitted that there is a great difficulty in finding terms to describe individuality, but it can be nevertheless described in a way sufficiently clear to avoid the denial of immortality to it on the ground that it loses its particularity like a biological form or a quantity of mass like a glass of water. Either psychologically or metaphysically, there is no sense in speaking of one self-conscious entity being swallowed up by another, whether this other be human or divine. The notion of an absorption into nature is still more ridiculous. By the very terms in which it is conceived, a being conscious of its own processes cannot be absorbed by anything. Self-consciousness is unique; its relations to the universe, especially to what is ultimate, cannot be described, it is evident, in such a way as to destroy its existence at any time. If mass, energy and the species cannot be destroyed, neither can self-consciousness. Energy and mass are conceived to exist forever because whenever an attempt is made to destroy them they appear in another form, and of course the law of the conservation of mass and energy compels us to come to a similar conclusion. The species continues its existence in spite of the disappearance of the individual; but it is rather a stretch of scientific imagination to think of its continuance after the dissolution of the solar system. Self-consciousness, from its very nature, cannot be destroyed; it is ultimate. It cannot be absorbed into anything else upon its severing its connection with the body. It therefore must continue to exist in its own right.

There is much truth and beauty in Professor Ostwald's description of the relation of the soul to the universe. Our greatest happiness comes as we merge our individuality, he contends, in the will of the universe. We lose ourselves in the music of Beethoven and in the enjoyment of nature. Very true, but that does not come from a destruction of self-consciousness but from a vivid exercise of it as an essential and contributory part of Ultimate Reality. All souls are mysteriously and continually united to the sources of universal inspiration.

The Preëxistence of the Soul

It is this connection of the soul with the Ultimate Spirit of the universe that naturally led to the theory of the preëxistence of the human mind. It was difficult for the thinkers of the Aristotelian-Platonic School to contemplate the creation of the soul *de novo*. As we know of no creations *de novo* in the material world but only of transformations, we only know of such in the spiritual realm. Or to put it in another form, we only know the mysterious fact that the Ultimate manifests itself in individual personalities. As such, each personality is a part of the infinite, eternal, uncreated. This is the truth that Wordsworth was feeling after.

> "Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
> The soul that rises with us, our life's Star,
> Hath had elsewhere its setting,
> And cometh from afar:
> Not in entire forgetfulness,
> And not in utter nakedness,

But trailing clouds of glory, do we come
From God, who is our home."[335]

All this is true in a sense. But we must not infer from this intimate connection with the Ultimate that the soul existed in its individualized form anterior to its connection with the body. Our psychological science has demonstrated beyond peradventure that the mind develops with the body. The development of nerve fibres, of cerebral associations, control of the higher centers, and in fact the gradual development of the whole nervous system, conditions absolutely the development of the mind. Mind appears like successive dawnings. It reaches stage after stage. In other words, this is the process through which the Infinite individualizes itself in man. There is no other way. Mind is organic to the body. Therefore we cannot antedate this fact of mental development. There is no denying that the individual makes large drafts upon the universe. He comes trailing clouds of glory as well as clouds of blackest portent into the world. He does not emerge from nothing. His heredity imparts to him predispositions from the entire organized universe at least. Ultimate Reality reaches him in a greatly modified form.

Metempsychosis has been a prevalent mode of thought among practically all the savage tribes of the world. Greek thinkers, even in the golden age of Plato and Aristotle, were influenced by it. It was an elaborate system of retribution. The souls of men passed into animals, other human beings, and possibly into other-than-human-beings. Pre-existence here meant the occupancy of another body by the present tenant of a particular body. The present abode was determined by the previous moral character of the soul. In such a conception, the soul is not organic to the body; it does not develop with it and is not destroyed with it. It leaves one tabernacle for another. It may operate as successfully through the cortex of a sheep as through that of a man. The soul is absolutely an independent entity.

A very important problem presented itself to early thinking about the termination of this process. When should the wheel of rebirths stop revolving? When should karma release the soul from the domination of the law of cause and effect, which brought inevitable retribution? Theories of salvation grew out of this need. They provided a final escape through which the soul should be at rest.

From the viewpoints of present physiology and psychology, it would be very difficult to see how the human mind could function through the nervous systems of the lower animals.

Immortality as an Achievement

It is straining fact and theory too much to contend that immortality is forced upon each human individual. What is the natural world but an embodiment of the moral? An organism must be fit to survive. How much this fitness depends upon the effort of the individual organism is a question. We know that much depends upon it in the moral world. May not immortality be a prize conferred upon the individual for splendid living? Following the analogy from the general course of nature, only the morally fit should survive. Of what value would it be to the universe to sustain in existence souls who cannot enter into its interior life? Souls who cannot share the divine life? So far as we can make out, the intent of human life is that it shall become a conscious co-partner with God; that it shall strive for the best; that it shall be stirred by and feel the urge of ideals. There would seem to be no meaning to human life aside from the development of a being able to assume more complete participation in the great processes of the universe. Verily, now are we the sons of God and it doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that we shall be better sons, wiser in council, ampler in vision, intenser in enjoyment. This essentially is the vision of all religion. Even the cruder theories of salvation have as their kernel, salvation into an ampler life. Life more abundant is the goal of all human striving.

In all educational processes the mental basis is there, let us assume, alike in two individuals. One of them enters heartily into the preliminaries of education by book and teacher, the other cares nothing about it. Is it worth while to force this latter person to continue a process in which he is not interested and the results of which will be rather futile? More than half the money used in popular education at the present time is wasted. At any rate, the expenditure of money for the enthusiastic student would be considered by any educationalist as worth while. Even if it be argued that an elementary education is necessary in the former case for the protection of the state, it certainly cannot be urged that the forcing process should be continued until the higher education be completed.

The universe is rather rigid in its treatment of worthless lives. An eye is developed for seeing, but when animal life is confined to a cave the optic nerve becomes atrophied. Biological forms have disappeared from earth when nature needed them no longer for her purposes. Similarly with minds which are not worthy. Shall not the universe drop them into oblivion? The goal of evolution, at least of that evolution whose results are observable, is the production of a moral being. The human, moral being seems to be the last link in earthly, terrestrial evolution, of a complete self-conscious soul, which thus establishes its claims to rank as an ultimate being. Why continue in existence anything but the moral man? Analogy is profoundly in favor of conditional immortality along these lines; whereas a natural immortality imposed as a natural right upon the individual, irrespective of the use to which he directs his energies, has no evidence whatsoever in its favor.

Immortality as a prize for noble living and striving, in addition to its probability, is a very splendid conception. This throws the problem into the realm of moral values. But it is not to be understood as a doctrine which converts the future life, according to the theory of Bishop Butler,[336] into a state of rewards and punishments; it merely places existence beyond the earthly pale, on a plane of the natural and progressive fruitage of noble living, just as it is experienced here and now. The soul, therefore, is not placed in a certain locality or in certain assemblages, but receives in the wealth of its life that recompense which all lovers of the ideal know so well—a recompense of ideal satisfaction and fulfillment, to a measure at least, of the plans and purposes of their dreams. This would be a natural continuation of the real life here begun, just as today is a continuation of the inner life of yesterday.

Social Immortality

Those who discuss the question of social immortality are giving up the problem altogether. It is one thing to discuss the influence of a life upon others, whether in the present or future, another thing to consider the possibility of the existence of human minds after the incident of death. George Eliot has given an ideal worthy of any saint and expressed it in language of surpassing beauty in

The Choir Invisible, indicating how we may so conduct ourselves as to live in "minds made better by our presence." This is a worthy ideal. Each one should, during the short duration of his earthly career, so live that men shall here and hereafter call him blessed, but this is not immortality. Our author quotes with approval the words of Cicero: "Longum illud tempus quum non ero, magis me movet, quam hoc exiguum."[337] She has voiced the same sentiments in *A College Breakfast Party*:

> ". . . I abhor
> That battling of the ghosts, that strife of terms
> For utmost lack of color, form, and breath,
> That tasteless squabbling called philosophy;
> As if a blue-winged butterfly afloat
> For just three days above the Italian fields,
> Poising in sunshine, fluttering toward its bride,
> Should fast and speculate, considering
> What were if it were not? or what now is
> Instead of that which seems to be itself?
> Its deepest wisdom surely were to be
> A sipping, marrying, blue-winged butterfly;
> Since utmost speculation on itself
> Were but a three days' living of worst sort—
> A bruising struggle all within the bounds
> Of butterfly existence."[338]

Hence there is no more immortality to a human being than there is to a "blue-winged butterfly," which flutters above the Italian fields for just three days and then passes into oblivion and non-entity. Our quarrel with George Eliot is that either there is a refusal to discuss the problem of immortality because she hates philosophizing or there is a confusion of the problem with another—namely, the beneficent influence exerted by noble men and women upon their kind. These men and women are indeed an inspiration; their "deeds of daring rectitude," "scorn for miserable aims that end with self," "thoughts sublime," that urge "to vaster issues," are splendid and inspiring ideals to hold before human beings. But when these beneficent influences shall continue to exercise their power, after the human beings whose ideals they were, have passed the portals of death, George Eliot assures us that they themselves shall have passed into the oblivion of non-existence. Their self-conscious life shall have passed away. And these influences are all that shall remain. But decidedly a discussion of these influences is not a discussion of the problem of immortality.

CHAPTER THREE

SOME OF THE SOURCES FROM WHICH THE HOPE OF IMMORTALITY SPRINGS

The Character of Self-Consciousness; Longing for Immortality

It is an interesting fact that man from a very early date after his emergence from the beast began to hope for a life beyond death. This has been, if not universal among men, very widespread. This is very significant; significant when we consider that man is an essential part of Ultimate Reality. The hope of immortality, rising in some cases to a national movement, as with the Egyptians, becomes a declaration of the trend of man's self-conscious life. This of course does not afford proof of it. There are many splendid and genuine people who entertain no such hope. But these are, it would seem, in the minority. It may be that the desire for immortality is an expression of the soul's right and claim to continued existence.

> "To let the new life in, we know,
> Desire must ope the portal,—
> Perhaps the longing to be so
> Helps make the soul immortal."[339]

It is interesting to notice the development of this longing in connection with Greek thought. The Platonic-Aristotelian crystallization of thought was the result of much reflection, commencing with the Ionic thinkers. In Plato's writings the hope of immortality came into very distinct relief. In that remarkable conversation which Socrates held with his disciples before he was compelled to drink the poisonous hemlock, Crito said: "And in what way shall we bury you?"

" 'In any way you like; but you must get hold of me, and take care that I do not run away from you.' Then he turned to us and added with a smile: 'I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been talking and conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body—and he asks, "how shall he bury me?" ' . . . 'I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay our Socrates, or Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him.' . . . 'Be of good cheer then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only.' "[340]

This conception did not diminish in intensity among the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophers. The writer of the gospel of St. John was of this school. Jesus never said much about immortality. It is fair to infer, however, that he shared in the hope of continued life after death. This writer assumed that he did. He caused Jesus to say: "In my Father's house are many abiding places (mansions)." Jesus was gathered with his disciples in the upper chamber of a house; this meeting and the attendant circumstances remind one very strongly of Socrates surrounded by his disciples in the prison cell. The Athenian judges had condemned Socrates to die. His dearest friends were gathered about him. They could hardly suppress their tears. The great master was calm. Out of the depth of the soul's experience they all talked. Socrates had the inspiration of the great and last crisis of his life and talked to them of immortality. He took the poison while the sun was still on the hilltops. They carried his body out; but he had assured them that his soul would be in the realms of the blessed.

Similarly Jesus in the upper chamber discoursed about immortality. The shadow of the cross fell ominously across his pathway. He feared that he must die; this seemed to be the inevitable trend of events. Out of the depth of his soul's experience came the words: "Let not your heart be troubled," because for one reason at least—that he did not consider death as the last word in human, individual experience.

Both Socrates and Jesus voiced the longing of the human heart, a longing developed to an intense degree in the reflective thinking of the Greeks. This is worth emphasizing: for the hope of immortality is not confined to the dreams and superstitions of savage man, although this is significant enough, but enters of necessity into the profoundest reflective thought of the race. The longing is a common human factor.

Unlimited Capacities

The unlimited capacities of human beings make a demand upon the universe. They are an index and a prophecy. They betray the larger life in God and forecast the continuance of the soul's existence.

Intellectual striving knows nothing of full stops. One problem is solved as a preparation for the mastery of another. The thirst for knowledge is unquenchable. The student bends over his book, despite the decay of the body. Tennyson called for his Shakespeare on the day of his death and when he died *Cymbeline* lay open before him.[341] The urge of curiosity is never fully satisfied. Man is a never-ending investigator. The intellectual pathway of man is strewn with interrogation points from the cradle to the grave. The child is anxious to know the inside of the drum; the philosopher to know the nature of things. Charles Kingsley, when facing death, said: "God forgive me, but I look forward to it with an intense and reverent curiosity." This certainly is a God-given intuition, which drives man into every realm and makes him strive to capture the secrets of nature, explore the profound and unknown regions of thought in general and science and philosophy in particular.

The moral aspect of knowledge, that is to say wisdom, knows no limits. It ever recreates itself by exercise.

Human emotions know no limit. The idealizing power of sexual love is a declaration that it cannot be satisfied within the narrow limits of the actual. Every Romeo and every Juliet knows this. Who can set bounds to a mother's love? It bears the stamp of infinity. Thus the religious consciousness has also enthroned love, making it a leading characteristic of Ultimate Reality. In most religions, human beings are conceived as being a comprehensive brotherhood bound together by the love of God; in other words, it has idealized the tenderest human emotion, especially that between parent and child, and placed it at the heart of the universe. That is the daring metaphysical leap of religion. It refuses the last word to gravitative forces and cosmic powers. Despite destructive storm, merciless volcano, terrible ocean, engulfing flood, terrific earthquake, irritating social forces and subjection of the individual to the consequences of war, crime, disease, poverty, ugly facts of heredity, and the element of chance, religion lifts its head into the clouds and believes that nothing can separate the individual from the love of God. What could be more enterprising? What more daring?

All this comes from the fact, that within human consciousness is an unconquerable anticipation of the continuance of its operations. The aesthetical emotions bear the same stamp. The sense of the beautiful and sublime know no boundary line. Beautiful flowers delight us today and shall please us tomorrow. The starry heavens make a perennial appeal. We are able to enjoy a fine work of art over and over again. Nature also is a thing of joy, beauty and sublimity forever.

Nowhere is this sense of continuance, as related to the aesthetic interests of life, more potent than in the demand for completeness. It is demanded in the drama, in romance and all great poems. The philosophical impulse is largely an exercise of the aesthetical urge for completeness. Is there a life expressed in all life? Is there a unified and unifying principle expressed through man and nature? The philosopher endeavors to answer this question and thus satisfy his aesthetical nature. In virtue of this emotion, there is a refusal to believe that this fragmentary life, these partially fulfilled hopes and ideals, form the complete story. Life must be only a page in a book or a scene in a drama according to this inherent sense of beauty.

The feeling of awe and wonder leads to a similar result.

Human attachments are very significant, so significant indeed that to disappoint them would make the universe the supreme criminal. The mother's longing for her child, the desire of the lover frustrated by death to possess the beloved, is an instinct which came out of the very heart of nature. Are the tears of mother and lover shed in vain? Is there nothing but hollow oblivion to respond to their longings? Then indeed our existence is worse than a crime; it is a farce, and pessimism of the blackest hue would be the proper philosophy. Thus human affection protrudes itself beyond the grave; is it not a prophecy of reunion and continuation? In the Campo Santo in Genoa, one appreciates the remarkable exhibition of artistic funereal monuments; but in the center of the cemetery hanging at the headstones of the humbler citizens are small lamps always lighted. The loving souls who placed them here are afraid the resurrection may occur in the night and the lamps will enable the resurrected to pick their way in the dark. That is a humble conception; it does not rise very high in the scale of thought, but it is profoundly significant in the scale of the universe, from which these placers of the lamps have been evolved and in whose hearts has been implanted this capacity to protrude themselves into a future where their loved ones shall continue to live.

Unlimited Activities and Ideals

The mechanic gets tired at night and is ready for work on the morrow. The author always has another book he hopes to write; there is always some piece of literary work on the anvil to be constructed or reshaped. Plans for new undertakings in life are always to be made; new insights are ever opening up fascinating attractions: and thus life finds its greatest enjoyments not in accomplishment but in the insistent impulse to go on to new undertakings. "To me," said Goethe, "the eternal existence of my soul is proved from my idea of activity. If I work incessantly until my death, nature is bound to give me another form of existence when the present can no longer sustain my spirit." Goethe is typical of the whole human family. Man lives chiefly in the future. The unfinished, the unexplored, fascinates more than any accomplished project.

This amounts to saying that man is a creature of ideals; no complete account of him can be given when this is ignored. The ideal always projects into the future. It is never fully actualized. When one ideal is actualized, it only becomes suggestive of others undiscovered until that consummation took place. The ideal is a process of perpetual self-creation and revelation of the new meanings of the developing self. There thus arises, particularly in this connection, a demand which is in fact a supreme imperative of our faith, for reasonableness in the universe to the extent at least that there shall be such a perpetuation of human self-consciousness as shall enable us to fulfill some and to create new ideals. This is the declaration of our self-conscious life; and it is a manifestation of the nature of self-consciousness, which in turn has come out of the heart of nature itself.

Moral Considerations

Virtue and merit are very ill-balanced in the present world. Palaces and the life of abundance are frequently reserved for those who grind the faces of the poor. Be it admitted that there is much exaggeration of moral wrong. Descriptions of evil, as Gibbon remarked, are more readable than accounts of goodness; they are also more *writable*. But when all allowances are made, there remains, as we have seen, a large, ugly portion of life to the credit of evil-doers; what shall be done with it? And what shall be done ultimately with the evil-doers? Then there are lives in which virtue prevails; they exhibit splendid self-sacrifice, perform their daily tasks with heroism, meet all situations in life with noble courage: they are kindly, good, true. What shall be done ultimately with them? Must there not be a state of existence in which merit and reward must coincide? So impressive are these demands to many that a world has been conceived—a world beyond death, devoted exclusively to rewards for the virtuous and punishments for evil-doers.

The weakness of this theory is its artificiality. It bears no relation to the present state of existence and therefore cuts away from us all bases of comparison. Life in the future is worthless, unless it be a process of going on—unless a self-conscious life shall take with it all its processes, involving convictions and recognitive memory, there will be nothing to punish or reward. The future must be a continuation of the past, and if so, we must use the present as the basis of analogy. Life is a continuous process of satisfaction with rifts of remorse, to the reflective, for short-comings. No life is given over, except in abnormal cases to unrelieved despair and self-condemnation. No life is given over to ecstasy of bliss for well-doing. Into the best ordered self-conscious life there enters dissatisfaction and remorse, and this becomes more acute in proportion to the moral sensitiveness of the individual. The disparity between the actual and the ideal troubles only developed souls. It would appear, therefore, that the process of moral education must continue in the future after the analogy of the present, for otherwise there would be no basis whatever for rewards and punishments. Further, a life of nothing but punishment would also nullify itself. Under the conditions of either extreme there could not be either reward or punishment. Contrast is essential to the life of the mind. It cannot operate in any other way. Where all is dark, there can be no perception of light; where all is light there can be no perception of darkness.

It is perfectly natural to seek readjustments in the future and they will certainly come to pass. At present the economic life is the source of the greatest inequality and injustice among men. Men not only fail to receive just recompense for their labor but also suffer during their entire life from lack of education, social position and privileges in courts of law. This situation shall, of course, pass away. But what other social adjustments shall take their place, we are unable at present even to guess. These shall have their imperfections, for nothing finite can be perfect. The inequalities may be even more acute, just as we may suppose the individual conscience may function more intensely. But whatever shall occur, will be in accord with and within the range of the self-consciousness we now possess. Its present operation is a prophecy of its future performances.

Christianity and Immortality

The Christian religion has brought into prominence the notion of immortality. Had the influence upon Christianity remained preponderatingly Jewish, this would not have been the case, as for the most part the hope of immortality took a minor place in the ethical and religious thinking of the Jews. The influence of Mithraism upon the Pauline writers is very marked. Mithraism emphasized immortality and in the Pauline writings the resurrection and heavenly life of Jesus were brought out into very distinct relief. Theories of salvation were developed and immortality became an unquestioned dogma. Continuance in existence did not concern the orthodox Christian; his chief concern was as to the state of the soul in that future life. That is the prevailing attitude of Christianity today. In fact, great branches of the church assume the extension of their influence over the souls of men into the life beyond death.

The doctrine of immortality has had two controlling tendencies in the lives of men dominated by the Christian religion. One has been a remarkable inspiration toward a life of virtue and noble achievement. It has supported Christian people in severe persecution and in the most trying circumstances in life. Millions have been inspired by this hope. The other tendency has been rather deleterious. It has developed a species of otherworldliness. This causes the Christian, as in Bunyan's parable, to allow his city to go to destruction, so long as he may gain the heavenly Jerusalem. What matter cities, with their concerns of government, streets, sewers, parks, planning and a thousand other details! What matters the physical welfare of human beings? The important thing is to prepare for eternity; the important thing is the salvation of the soul. But this type is rapidly disappearing from the Christian world. Life is coming to be regarded even by the unthinking as a process of education. The soul is in the making. Physical environment is as important as any other element. A beautiful, hygienic and well-planned modern Jerusalem in which to live will not detract from the heavenly Jerusalem. In fact, it will prepare the soul the better for it. Association with beautiful things enables us to enjoy beauty. Developed aptitudes lead naturally to greater discrimination and also to greater appreciation.

Even aside from its inherent truthfulness, which is herein emphasized, the hope of immortality has been a great inspiration to human souls. It would be a supremely difficult task for the minister of religion to render comfort to the bereaved by exhortations to resignation in view of the assumed disappearance of their loved ones into nonexistence. Consolation does not lie in that direction, precisely because it violates our sense of unity with what is eternal and indestructible.

Conclusion of This Chapter

The hope of immortality has a purely psychological birth. It came into prominence very early in man's history. It may be coincident with his conscious life. Philosophical development in the history of the Greeks brought it into great relief. Man's unlimited capacities in knowledge, wisdom, emotions of the beautiful, true and good, the emotions of love, awe, wonder and attachments to loved ones bear the stamp of infinity; so do man's voluntary activities and ideals. These evidences are implanted in the human soul, which has emerged from nature; and these have forced themselves into his philosophy and science, his religion and morality, his art and institutions. It is one of the unique characteristics and one of the chief glories of Christianity that it has emphasized and brought into greater clearness and beauty the great hope of immortality, which is the most daring and is the crowning accomplishment of man's reflective and religious life.

CHAPTER FOUR

METAPHYSICAL RELATIONS OF THE FINITE TO THE INFINITE

The Essence of the World

OUR ANALYSIS so far would indicate that self-conscious beings hold the secret of the world and are essentially a part of it. The biology and chemistry of the human body do not exhaust the account of a human being. The evidence is beyond cavil of the activity of a self-conscious being operating in and through the biological and chemical elements. Extending our analysis to the universe, there is also evidence of a self-conscious life, operating in and through the mechanical and psychological forces. In fact, it is more accurate to state that these forces are merely its external forms. The universe and all its particulars are its essential expressions. An infinite without necessary expression—expression as an essential part of it—is inconceivable in thought and would subject even the appearance of the universe to the caprice of an arbitrary will. It would be difficult not to argue that a universe so conceived would always remain the creature of caprice, in which law and order would be lacking at certain stages of its procedure, a conception which is more and more refuted by the progress of science. Further, a self-conscious being is the highest expression of nature within the range of our observation. Therefore, there are gradations in the expression of the Infinite, reaching from chemical constituents to self-consciousness. Through all these grades, we must not forget, is expressed more or less of the self-conscious Ultimate. It is in self-consciousness that we find the essence and secret of the world.

But our self-consciousness does not exhaust the account of Ultimate Reality. It is, after all, but a faint, human reflection of it. We cannot refer the slow processes of development, the complicated and often painful processes of inferential knowledge, to the Infinite. But it may be that in the intuitive realization of the ownership of our inner processes, what Kant calls the transcendental unity of apperception, we have the best insight into the self-conscious life of the universe. Even this faint glimmer does not lead us very far in the understanding of the relation of the Infinite to the phenomenal world. To be the expressive and sustaining power of the chemical and physical elements, of all forces and laws or methods of operation, of the biological and psychical forces of the universe, is something that baffles our comprehension but something of which it is our greatest glory to appreciate to the extent of being baffled. We are copartners with the Infinite in the enterprise of life. We are indices to the profound secret of the universe. Verily, we are children of God, holding a more intimate relationship than is suggested even by that noble simile. Therefore, the essence of the world is found in us. The Infinite is most completely reflected in the highest expression we know—self-conscious life. In that unique power which human souls possess of appreciating the universe, of carrying on the flow of memories, of constructing ideals and holding themselves under the spell of what is true, beautiful and good, is the truest, most extensive and satisfying insight into the essence of the universe. That is God becoming man, living, moving and having fragments of his being in him. That is the meaning of the profound doctrine of the incarnation, the highest form of incarnation or manifestation in the universe, for self-consciousness is the last word as well as the first in the true manifestation of itself in the universe. Many philosophies have been constructed on the basis of some single and isolated quality of the self-conscious process. In Schopenhauer's great work, *The World as Will and Idea,*[342] he contends that the essence of the world is will; will, however, stripped of intelligence, thus a force of chance and caprice. This type of unconscious will is advocated by many thinkers, some giving it a minimum of intelligence and others giving it the full equipment of self-conscious life. But why endeavor to explain the universe by an impoverished self-consciousness? Why dissect from it a single process? Each psychical proccess involves all the others. Therefore, it must be true that a self-conscious being in the very fulness of its inner life has the best secret of the universe. This fulness is the essence of it. On the finite plane, this is what the universe is constantly striving to evolve. This is the climacteric point.

Meaning of Subjective Interpretations

We have seen in the course of this argument that knowledge, even of the external world, is confined to our subjective processes. We cannot escape subjectivity any more than we can outrun our shadow. This seems oppressive to some thinkers. But viewed rightly, it is by far the more inspiring philosophy, from the viewpoint of both fact and ideal. A human being is eternally doomed to the facts of his conscious life. He always deals with the content of his consciousness and nothing else. This subjective play, this construction of imagination and thought, this mixture of ideal and fact: this is the stuff of the world. No analysis can make it otherwise. What advantage could be gained by trying to prove that the objective world is other than or different from the subjective construction? The objective world is merely the outside; why desire to stand on the outside to look at it rather than view it from within? Inspiration and life are within. The objective is only the external embodiment.

Moral and religious interpretations are also subjective. Why long for divine, moral commands to be issued by Jahweh on Sinai? There is a sublimity attached to the setting here. The earthquake, volcanic eruptions, lightning and the reverberations of thunder were very impressive and especially so to semi-civilized man. Moral commands could not have been issued under more impressive natural phenomena. Nevertheless, far more profound is the issuance of the moral law within the soul. Here the divine mandates are native to the soil; they are an essential part of man's moral nature. They speak with the authority of nature, as imperative as maternal law, as mandatory as hunger. An *ab extra* moral law issued from Sinai would have been the command of a *Deus ex machina,* as unrelated to human life as the abstract mathematics of the theorists of the planet Mars. But when the God within talks, the moral law becomes self-legislative, a legislation in which God and man share. The only compulsion comes from within. External forces, however powerful, could never command reverence or obedience from man.

Thus it is also with religious yearnings and aspirations. In these the child is longing for the Father, the part for the whole. Religion is not an *ab extra* contrivance. Religion is not imparted by prophets and saints to others.

We learn it not from Bibles, religious leaders or institutions. Religion is an essential quality of the finite. God and man unite in the process, the part communing with the whole, the whole with the part. Man desires to become God-like—that is, to be more like the whole; the whole yearns to have the part enter more and more into the joy of its life, into the privilege of its insight, into the unspeakable inspiration of its being. The prophet's message is an expression of this. Bibles incorporate the experiences of prophet and scribe, but in this form they become the fossils of the religious life, helpful only as indications of past living experiences. These are very helpful if used aright, in stimulating the present, living experience of communion with the divine, but worthless as substitutes for the life of communion with God and the performance of moral obligations in relation to our fellow-beings. The religious cycle is from within out, and not from without in. The experiences are subjective primarily. Institutions also must ever express the living, subjective experiences of men.

This does not mean that moral and religious experiences are capricious. They are not the haphazard creations of individual self-conscious beings. They are the reciprocal action of the finite and the Infinite. They are thus grounded in the universe and have as much stability and meaning as any law or regular procedure of nature. They are not created by the individual, but are incidental to the life of man as a part of the life of God. How deeply shall man live this, how profound shall be his religious experiences depends of course upon himself. That part depends upon himself. That part depends upon his volition; but the operation of the relationship and the laws regulating it are beyond human caprice or control. Man's body never escapes gravitation. The law is irreflexibly applicable during every moment of his earthly career. But it depends upon his volition as to whether he will subject himself to certain circumstances of its operation—that is to say, whether he will stand, lie down or jump off a cliff. What, then, are the meaning and end of the ethical life? The end of the ethical life is to live in the essential relationship of the Infinite and finite to struggle to attain the life more abundant, to live with other human beings as companions in the great quest of attaining it—live with them as members of the same family, sharing equal rights and privileges. The end of religion is identical with it, except that in addition to this it cultivates a more conscious communion between the Infinite and the finite, between the human being and the larger self.

The soul therefore being a process in the Infinite, who can separate us from the life of God? In view of this relationship, the calamities of life and even the wrack of worlds lose their horror and the last word of victory is not to them. We are more than conquerors now and evermore.

Thus the subjective explanations are the profounder and truer ones. They come from the deeps within. They arise from a real, essential relationship. They give us the meaning of our existence, the key to the secret of the universe. They also throw light upon the problem of immortality.

The Lineage of Human Souls

It is a matter of common reflection to observe group occurrences that are coincident the world over. Literary, artistic and religious movements in particular countries seem to eventuate in great waves. We try to account for them by observing the conditions leading up to them in the national, economic, geographical and historical phases. Not only do these movements occur within national or certain geographical boundaries but often they cross these and great religious movements, for example, take place within a period of time close enough to give them an associative resemblance. The sixth century before our era witnessed remarkable developments in the religious, artistic and literary life of India, Palestine and China. These movements doubtless could be accounted for in one of the following ways. A certain coördinate development of mankind might be assumed. The race thus would move as a unit, and striking resemblances would naturally occur even where there was absolutely no intercommunication or influence of one country upon another. Taking the religious life as an example, when certain social, intellectual, and economic conditions had been fulfilled in India and Palestine, Buddhism and Hebrew prophecy came as an inevitable consequence.

Another method of explanation would assume an influence exerted in subtle, and to us at present mysterious, ways by one country upon another. Did not the thinking of India affect very strongly that of Greece and Rome? Are there not resemblances in thought and practice, amounting to evidence strong enough to place them beyond coincidence? But I hardly think this would account for the simultaneous outburst of religious fervor in India and Palestine and the great artistic and literary movements in Greece. That there was a great intermingling of people cannot be doubted; but this would not be an adequate cause to produce these effects. We might admit certain influences as contributory but not responsible for the entire result. Greek philosophical thinking came as the result of the colonization of Ionia, but it took something more than colonization ultimately to produce an Aristotelian-

Platonic philosophy. Religious movements similarly are never altogether new, but the new development is always unique.

The more natural theory is to assume a common cause stirring the hearts of men. It is this coördination between the divine and human in the last analysis which can account for the great, beneficent outbursts of human development which have occurred at intervals during the entire history of civilized man.

The renaissance in Europe covered a long period of time and affected the entire range of men in this geographical area and indeed the world. It was too diversified to assign it to any single cause like the fall of Constantinople, the appearance of a new literary star, the downfall of a political institution or the economic betterment of a people. There were many other causes or influences which were incorporated in it. It presents, however, such a unity of result that it indicates a strong presumption in favor of a deeper influence—the influence of a force working in and through human beings greater than they and of which they are a part.

In refutation of such a theory, it is easy to point out the irrationalities of many phases of these group performances. The crusades, monasticism, sectarianism, democracy in political institutions and many other movements include much that is unreasonable, contradictory and repulsive. This is true of life in general. The imperfections of movements merely point them out as human; and as such always incomplete, always faulty. But unquestionably group movements of the nature of those indicated have had their influence, either directly or indirectly, in the advancement of the human race. Even terrible war with its awful destruction may become instrumental in creating a better state of society. It is no advocacy of war to say that the splendid heroism, discipline, genius, sacrifice manifested are qualities of the higher life, and that even the whole institution of war may make for a better state of man. The world war, involving most of the nations of the world, manifested a deep seated protest against certain conditions of society, which must be remedied if the world is to go on.

This thought of an underlying divine current applies equally to individuals. Similar theories and inventions have occurred to different minds in different places. In single individuals, there are often manifested extraordinary forces, that certainly appear superhuman, against tyranny in government and the usurpation of power economically and socially.

There is no satisfactory way to explain these coincidences and extraordinary manifestations except by observing the demonstrable presence of a subconscious principle working through individuals, constantly operative and occasionally breaking through in an overpowering and unique way. Its operation in individuals betrays a similarity which declares it to be a unified and unifying spirit, none other than the Spirit of God.

Herein also is the explanation of the mystery of our self-conscious life, its unique individuality. The sufferer knows that no one has suffered as he does. The mother whose baby is snatched away by death knows that no one else has had just this experience. Others have lost but no one has had this particular loss and no one has had just these particular emotions. The lover is in the same case. Despite the humor indulged in at his expense, despite the many recitals in book and by word of mouth of the difficulties and sorrows of others, he knows his case to be unique. His beloved is the only one. His love difficulties and sorrow appear for the first time. His reason may take him often to task, asking him to consider millions of souls who have similarly suffered and loved; very true, he may admit, but "here I am living at this particular moment in the history of the world, in this place, with these circumstances confronting me. No one else ever had my experiences. No one else was born just like me. No one else had just these hereditary traits, just my way of thinking about things, just my way of loving. Then there are these particular circumstances. No one else ever had just these complications, however similar they might have been. And then there is my beloved; no one ever existed just like her. Thousands have been similar, but no one just identical. And whatever may be said in refutation of my attitude, I know that no one is just like her for me." Who can gainsay this lover? In our deeper moments the sense of uniqueness is very overpowering. This is intensified by reflection. The great souls of the world have been very lonely. They reached the mountain-heights of experience, to which very few make the ascent. Again they reached the great deeps of being; they tasted the bitterness of existence, realized the great chasm, a chasm, which can never be closed between the finite and the Infinite. They are and have been the great sufferers of the world. They are often afflicted with the blackest pessimism. It is in their case incurable; and it is incurable to any one who lives beneath the surface. They tried to overcome the depressive experiences in deserts and gardens of Gethsemane, but they were always defeated except when they realized that in spite of the chasm there is something that underlies the cleft of existence, something that gives ultimate unity and reconciliation. In that realization they rose triumphant and knew that neither life nor death, things present nor things to come, could separate them from the love of God. Even here, however, the sense of the uniqueness of their self-conscious life did not leave them. They were men apart. They knew their experience to be unique.

The meaning of this uniqueness is the participation of all souls in the soul of the universe. It is not a uniqueness that arises from the separateness of men, each being different in the sense of being divided off from the rest; no, it is a uniqueness of common life, of association in the great life of the universe. There is a common element in men. The uniqueness of self-conscious life is a mystery—the mystery of the individualization of the Infinite. And yet it is unique; this we cannot emphasize too often, keeping in mind the other truth that it is not a cut-off uniqueness, separating self-conscious souls, but rather uniting them as parts of the infinite life. It is, therefore, a uniqueness both of individuality and association. That is the profound meaning of all theories of the subliminal self. Each human being carries within himself a two-faced self-conscious life, one looking toward the Infinite, another looking in upon himself and his wonderful life of thought and ideal. On its metaphysical side that is the meaning of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, of Green's spiritual principle of the universe, of Schopenhauer's *Wille;* it is the binding force of human souls. That gives meaning to political life; it also gives meaning to the associative religious life. Therein lies the mystery of association in general. There is one spirit common to all men working in and through them, the copartner and inspirer of all their intentions and purposes in the world, one God and Father of all, in us all and through us all.

Bearing of These Considerations upon the Hope of Immortality

Our life is, therefore, indissolubly united to the life of God. Its present physical manifestations, absolutely necessary for the development of full-orbed self-conscious life, are not necessary to its continuance. It may possibly express itself, and expression seems absolutely necessary, through other physical media. Be this as it may, human self-consciousness is an essential and contributory process of the Infinite. This being so, it cannot be destroyed. In order to destroy it, it would be necessary for the Infinite to commit suicide.

An illustration of this thought is found in the relation of the eternal Spirit to the material world. We all admit under different terms and definitions that there is an omnipresent power in nature. This spirit is in the flowers. It is in the beautiful rose. It was there when the rose sprang "from the clefts of its hood, and, at first, it was fair as the morning and full of the dew of heaven, as a lamb's fleece." But a change came in the life of the rose. "When a ruder breath had forced open its virgin modesty, and dismantled its too youthful and unripe retirements, it began to put on darkness and to decline to symptoms of a sickly age; it bowed the head and broke its stalk, and at night, having lost some of its leaves and all of its beauty, it fell into the portion of weeds and outworn faces." Could any one assert consistently that the presence of the Infinite was less in the decayed rose at the end of the day, when it lay a worthless weed, than in the morning of its virgin beauty? It matters little about the particular form it assumes as affecting its presence. The universal Spirit is there giving significance to the form. So it is with the spirit of man. It is present now in a certain assemblage through which the soul may yet reach greater developments. The universal Spirit assumes a myriad forms; shall a few forms be denied the finite?

This consideration, however, is incidental. The paramount metaphysical fact is our unity with the divine life;

being copartners, co-workers, co-creators with it, we already share its eternal life. The Infinite has diversified itself in us in order that he might share in our companionship and that we through our individualized, self-conscious forms might as children enter into the joy of the Father's life and take part in the great enterprise of evolving the universe. A soul that appreciates the highest, that strives for the highest, that communes with the highest, is fulfilling the end and aim of this earthly existence. That is the primary consideration. God became man—this is the greatest mystery of all existence. Why he became man, we cannot tell. But this we know: that once the process of individualization has taken place, the continuance of the life so individualized is a matter of course. This is the resultant of our metaphysical analysis. God and man are so united that no other power in the universe will be able to separate them.

The Theory of Professor Royce

Professor Royce worked out the problem of immortality[343] in an acute and interesting way on the basis of an idealistic and monistic philosophy. The stages of his argument are as follows. There is only one individual in the universe. The essence of the individual, and therefore of the universe, is will and purpose. This individual is God, who is all in all. The Infinite is the only individual. Finite beings are individuals, as they partake in this individuality. The individual is "an essentially unique being, or a being such that there exists, and can exist, but one of the type constituted by this individual being." But this definition merely calls attention to differences and overlooks resemblances, for individuality is only relative in finite beings; they are particular expressions of the will and purpose of the Infinite. That is why individuality always involves a mystery; its roots are always in the soil of Deity. Individuality is thus, in the last analysis, indefinable because it is a metaphysical mystery and yet most knowable through each finite will and purpose. The reality of the world is my will. There is, therefore, one supreme individuality, one supreme will, and our finite individualities or wills are parts of this and only as such can they be individuals. The whole cannot exist without its individual expressions any more than the individual expressions can exist without the whole. This at once involves immortality; no human individuality can be spared.

This brief account of Professor Royce's theory is rather meager and serves only as a suggestion, for he has worked out the theory in a very elaborate and intensely suggestive way, especially in "The World and the Individual." The presentation agrees in the main with the viewpoint of this treatise, except that in Professor Royce's system there is an over-emphasis of volition.

Professor Royce wavered between the subordination of intellect to will and that of the will to the intellect. The latter position seems to be his final preference. But in the Ingersoll lecture on immortality, voluntarism is central in his system of thought, and it is fair to assert with Professor Dewey[344] that voluntarism persists as a method of approach to the Absolute and within the conception of the Absolute in Royce's system of philosophy.

But there is no reason for isolating certain aspects of consciousness and sublimating these isolated functions into the high place of a supreme reality. There is no more reason for deifying will than there is for the deification of the intellect. Further, by the isolation of any process of consciousness other functions become nonoperative. But consciousness moves together in all its efforts. Because certain processes are in the background, it must not be argued that they are non-existent. The definition of sensation, or rather description of it, involves a minimum at least of the higher processes. It is comparable to the infinite series conceivable in the form of a Japanese toy egg; the outer layer is removed only to find another and another indefinitely. In our interpretation of the universe, the best we can do is to make it an enlargement of our conscious life; or in the language of this treatise to consider the Infinite as an infinite self-consciousness. Even this conception is certainly impoverished enough. But what shall we say when a thinker like Royce isolates a single process of this consciousness and sublimates it into the Infinite? That process pauperizes poverty. Whatever mistake may be committed in the interpretation of the absolute from the viewpoint of the totality of self-consciousness far greater is made by endeavoring to account for it on the basis of a single process of this consciousness.

Otherwise, the argument of Professor Royce is the only one defensible on philosophical grounds: that is to say, "No human being can be spared." Nothing can be spared in the universe. Self-conscious beings are necessary and essential parts of the Infinite.

Psychical Research and Immortality

The endeavor made in recent years to ascertain the possibility of communicating with departed spirits has been extremely interesting. When this is done in a scientific way, it is altogether admirable. Such communications are not only possible but carry a great deal of probability in their favor. Of course, surrounding all such earnest efforts is a penumbra formed of people with wild philosophies, and charlatans who receive financial gain from the overcredulous, and many others who form elaborate conclusions on a very slight basis of fact. This is always the case when a new avenue is opened into the mystery surrounding human life. Nevertheless, this should not discredit the worthy efforts that are made to communicate with invisible souls nor discourage those who are making the attempts. All religions and sciences have been born in very lowly circumstances, in superstition, fear, subservience; yet notwithstanding, they are the expressions of the religious and intellectual nature of man. As time went on, both religionists and scientists "lopp'd off the excrescent parts" until science and religion became accepted in respectable circles. Religions became refined and commended themselves rather universally; the sciences became the pursuit of universities and learned societies. It may so happen with so-called "Psychical Research" endeavors.

Many of the theories upon which some of these thinkers base their conclusions, as we have already shown, are both futile and superfluous. The theory of a subliminal self, for example, according to Mr. Myers, is "A primary and independent stream of consciousness having its own separate system of mental traces and dispositions formed in the course of its own separate existence." Such a conception is absurd. Even when it is asserted that this "independent stream of consciousness" is always a potential accompaniment to the subjective self, there is no provision made for the conversion of this potential power into a kinetic force. The two selves, as so conceived, are as distinct and impenetrable as if they occupied separate bodies. They could only influence each other as any two individuals influence each other. Mr. Myers does not take into account an all-inclusive being in which all souls are united. He has, therefore, made no provision for the statement that the subjective self is only a fragment of this larger subliminal self. And to bestow immortality upon this subliminal self is certainly no consolation to the subjective self. It is in reality equal to conferring immortality upon a superfluity. All the psychical phenomena mentioned by Mr. Myers can be successfully explained by the operation of general subconscious processes. I agree with G. F. Stout[345] that there is a constant operation of unconscious elements in every human being. All our experiences leave traces or dispositions. These assert themselves, for example, when we try to recall a name or launch upon new mental combinations. These dispositions may act as relatively detached systems, so that two streams of consciousness may appear to flow at the same time. This is a matter of common psychological observation. While in active conversation with a person, it is possible to carry on an elaborate train of thought in an unconscious manner. In addition to the subconscious forces, we must assume the constant presence of the infinite consciousness coöperating with our own, as the condition of its operation. In fact, our own conscious stream is a relative operation of the divine consciousness. These two factors—that is to say, the relatively detached systems of consciousness and the presence of the Infinite in each soul—would account fully for double consciousness and enable us all to partake of the conviction of Père Malebranche that there are two guests always present in the human soul, the Infinite always face to face with the finite.

CHAPTER FIVE

OBJECTIONS TO IMMORTALITY CONCLUSION TO ARGUMENT OF THE TREATISE

Science and Immortality

Science has destroyed the hope of immortality, it is sometimes asserted. The belief is a mere relic of earlier superstitions; it must therefore disappear in the light of greater knowledge and profounder reasoning. A large number of individuals still continue to indulge their hopes and ideals concerning the continuance of human life beyond death, but there is no scientific basis for them.

But this assertion must be examined.

The principal argument, upon which the negative attitude toward the question is based, is the dependence of the mind upon the body. The biologist finds the same laws in operation for all animal life. Whenever there is a falling apart of protoplasmic molecules, there is death,—and with death, what? For one animal like another there is a stop to all the operations of its consciousness. Mind and body move together in two lines which interpenetrate. They develop together in the child, come to maturity in man, and together fall into decay. For when "The almond tree shall blossom, and the grasshopper shall be a burden, and the caperberry shall burst," there is a prophecy of the approaching decay of man both mentally and physically. That seems to be the inevitable result. Mind and body develop together and perish together.

Particulars of the dependence of mind upon the physiological organism are also adduced to fortify the argument. The size of the brain within certain limits bears direct relation to the amount of psychical work a man is able to perform. If it were not for his large brain, man would not be a godlike animal. His capability of reason would not be superior to that of a horse or a sheep. Even the areas of the brain concerned with sensations and the central areas concerned with volitional deliverances are located. The regions of the auditory, visual, etc. centers are fairly well determined; at least their main headquarters are marked out, for it must be remembered that the brain is an associative mass of nerve fibers with meeting points at certain centers. The health of the mind depends upon the well-being of the nervous system in all its parts and especially upon the great centers of the sympathetic and cerebro-spinal systems. Paresis of the brain means a breakdown not only of bodily functions but also of mental operations.

Nor is the dependence of intellectual faculties upon the quality and supply of blood less marked. Aerated blood is an unfailing condition of thinking.

The effect of certain drugs and alcoholic liquors upon the system is very marked, and according to the degree of infusion they derange mental operations, and if a sufficient quantity be taken, then complete unconsciousness ensues.

I have suggested only a few things. So complete is the relation, so accurate the parallelism between consciousness and bodily function, the conclusion has seemed inevitable, that mental functions shall cease altogether when the physiological processes stop at the moment of death.

But scientific investigation leaves the problem of immortality untouched. Huxley and Tyndall long ago pointed out that there is an impassable gulf between the physics of the brain and the simplest fact of consciousness. This still obtains so far as present knowledge is concerned. The end organ of vision, the eye, is affected by light. Physical light is carried through and is transformed into vibrations, which proceed through the layers and liquids of the eyeball until they reach the retina; then they pass through the elaborate processes of the retina until they stimulate the optic nerve with its four hundred thousand fibers. The stimulations are carried by these to the optic lobe at the back of the cerebrum, and there in the dark chamber of the cuneus is a realization of seeing something. This conscious fact of visual perception is totally distinct from all that has preceded. Over against a physiological process that can be described and traced is the conscious fact that, while it admits of description, cannot be predicted or traced. A thousand persons may look at the Venus de Milo and the visual perception will yield a thousand different forms of conscious reaction. The mental correlation cannot be traced like the vibration of a nerve, its effects cannot be described as we may describe the stimulation of a nerve center. The law of the correlation and conservation of energy does not apply to it. It is *sui generis*. But it is there as a constant fact, not only as a simple process of sensation in this particular case, but as a self-conscious, manipulative ability. The slightest stimulation of light, through the associative power of perception, recognitive memory and thought, may call into play the full force of the creative power of the soul; and fascinating memories or sad reflections, new inventions, systems of constructive thought and a thousand other new insights into truth may loom up. Between these psychological marvels and a neural or electrical stimulation there is an impassable gulf. It is all very well to say that the physical conditions it, which is absolutely true; but the psychological reaction stands out in unique fashion, unaccounted for except as the act of a self-conscious being. This discussion is purely from the scientific viewpoints of psychology and physiology. There are profounder philosophical questions as to the relation of mind and matter which enter at this point, but for the moment we are confining ourselves to the scientific viewpoint.

Viewing the question from the other side, for every fact showing the dependence of mind upon the physiological organism, another may be found to prove the dependence of the body upon the mind. This is what modern psychology is demonstrating magnificently. Body and mind move together. They are essential each to the other. They continue to operate together reciprocally until the hour of death, when they separate. Psychological developments of recent times are rapidly accumulating evidence beyond question showing that the mind is the more independent and controlling factor. Ideas modify vaso-motor activities. Even a soft word may make one flush with anger. Chagrin poisons the blood in the arteries. Worry hastens the payment of life insurance policies; and these far-seeing corporations are employing experts to advise policy-holders to keep cheerful, to banish worry and carking care. Mind is a controlling function in all biological processes; it is able both to stimulate and inhibit them.

Materialistic Tendencies Disappearing

Materialistic tendencies in therapeutics are giving way before the preponderance of scientific evidence. Medical schools have introduced courses in psychology. It was at one time admitted that the mind had something to do with functional diseases; now it is seen that even organic diseases become amenable to psychological treatment. These considerations have been forced upon the science of therapeutics from unexpected quarters.

A revelation of the great complexity of a human being has gradually dawned upon the modern world. The psychological novelist has discovered the fabulous wealth of hidden treasure in the human mind. Man is not the simple, impoverished being formerly pictured by theology and medicine; the former administering a simple medicament for a uniformly diagnosed disease of the soul, ignoring the physiological organism; the latter doing precisely the same thing practically in the reverse order, treating the disease of the body while ignoring the spiritual organism. Recent discoveries indicate not only that both must be taken into the account, but there is necessity of proceeding still further. Psychology itself was unaware of the profundities of its subject of treatment. Now we see dimly at least the necessity of bringing the entire battery of conscious processes to bear upon organic deteriorations and functional disturbances; the unconscious powers of the mind are also marshalled. "Live according to nature" is an imperative which is gaining new significance from these psychological discoveries. The great realm of the unconscious is being brought into play, for here man is brought most closely into unity with nature in general. The great silences of the desert, the effortless movements of the starry heavens, the constant persistence of the flow and ebb of the tide, the consorted habit of the seasons with the vegetable covering of the earth, the intense and interesting force of instinct in the lower animals are in line with the unobserved and yet potent forces of the human soul. In this unconscious realm resides man's true nature, the better, deeper self, the source of health and inspiration, the power which develops heroes and martyrs, the source of genius, the perennial inspiration of prophet, musician, painter. We have really not begun to use our unconscious powers fully. They have unending possibilities. Not until these are fully utilized shall we live according to nature—that comprehensive nature which is common to star, desert, tide, seasons and binds us to all conscious life both in the lower and upper register, in the scale of conscious values.

Great religious movements insist that in the unconscious realm the soul approaches nearest to God; it meets the divine host there face to face. But this conception, suggestive as it is, needs supplementing. The manifestations of the Infinite in nature are not confined to the unconscious, silent forces. God is as much in the storm, earthquake and fire as in the still, small voice; as much in the subjective as in the subliminal self; as much in the psychological storm and stress as in the calm reflection of a quiet hour. Yet, notwithstanding, these religious movements are justified in holding to the essential unity of God and man, and insisting upon the healing power of the Infinite, which is indissolubly connected with each human soul.

The meaning of these reflections is clear. The soul is coming to its own in modern tendencies. The body does not have the last word. The soul is the master of its fate and superior to physiological correlations. It is more than a conqueror through its own right of mastery and wins the great battle for the effort of the Infinite to develop self-conscious spirits.

The scientific knife cuts both ways. At death mind and body separate. The body is resolved into its physical and chemical elements. Shall the body, then, continue to exist? Yes, we are told, it will exist in the form of chemical atoms or the subdivision of these as negative and positive charges of electricity. These are immortal. But what is the basis of this scientific faith? Simply the theory of the correlation and conservation of energy. If the scientist admit mass and energy as fundamental categories of matter, then the quantity of mass and energy in the universe is held to be unchangeable; or, if he reduce all matter to energy, the same principle obtains. Atoms or their constituents can never be destroyed. They may be separated from certain combinations only to render service in another connection. Is not this a splendid leap of scientific faith? What a daring plunge into the realm of unseen realities! We are thus assured that the atoms of the body, atoms which elude our senses, whose very existence was at first dogmatically asserted and later became an inference from the principle of the correlation and conservation of force, will continue to exist forever. Any sceptic, of course, may use very scathing criticism at this point, but the procedure of the scientist in the light of his scientific faith is justifiable; he has the justification of a principle which underlies all knowledge—that is to say, he relies upon faith based upon inferential probability.

The legitimate inference in relation to mind and body is therefore this: in mind and body we have two distinct series of phenomena. They are correlated during the life of the organism. After the incident of death, the constituents of the body continue their existence in other combinations endlessly. By precisely the same method of inference, the believer in the immortality of the soul may hold to the endless continuance of its existence. The one mind of the universe has individualized itself in self-conscious minds; they are eternal constituents of the universe as matter is. Anything in the universe cannot be destroyed because it is an essential part of the Ultimate, much less self-conscious souls.

In the language of poetry, the soul occupied the bodily tent for a while. In death the tent was pulled down. But the soul proceeded on its journey and pitched its tent elsewhere. Or, the mind used the body for awhile as an indispensable instrument in the development of its experience and in the formation of its self-conscious personality; after death, it no longer needed this instrument. It found other media of expression. The body was the lyre through which the soul made music in the world, sometimes in the major, sometimes in the minor key. The lyre was destroyed but the musician made music through other instruments. The lyre is not the only instrument through which music may be made.

Imaginative Arrangement of the Particulars of the Future Life

We cannot arrange the particulars of the life after death any more than we can arrange the particulars of the present life very far in advance. Life arranges its particulars as it goes along. The immortal life will simply be a continuance of the life of self-consciousness. There shall be a continuance of the intellectual, emotional and volitional activities without the presence of the bodily organization. Our activities will have a freer scope untrammelled by the influence of the nervous system. We scarcely begin to use our faculties at present. Each soul exercises a minimum of its capacity. When the mortal coil shall have been shuffled off, a freer flight may be imagined for the astronomer; telescopes and books will not retard his progress in the examination of worlds at first-hand.

The philosopher may have newer and profounder insights into the meaning and significance of reality. The necessity of earning the daily bread makes life often sordid and uninteresting. It has, of course, its educative value. It gives an insight to the great struggle in the universe between the phenomenal and the real. This appreciation will doubtless grow more acute. Pessimism shall not cease. Acute mental suffering will always be a characteristic of the finite. Minds will always follow their bent. Schopenhauer may still intensify his *Weltschmerz* conclusions. Optimism may also take higher flights. The soul's cup of joy may be filled to the brim. The thinker in any case may ponder into the deep things of God unhindered. He shall have opportunity to unravel many of the tangles of existence. Plato may wield the archetypal ideas better and freer from contradiction. Spinoza may indulge in a unity that shall shame his Cartesian, poverty-stricken substance, which is only a dualistic crown to the philosophy of Descartes. Kant may come to understand things in themselves as particulars within the concept of the Infinite, merely phenomenal reflections, which he misunderstood for realities. The artist, the poet escaping the shackles of mechanics, shall continue to construct beautiful, imaginative forms and voice the vision of the ideal in sublimer ways. As Taylor remarks: "All the practical skill we acquire in managing affairs, the calculation of chances, the patience and assiduity, the promptitude and facility, as well as the higher virtues we are learning every day, may well find scope in a world such as is rationally anticipated when we think of heaven as the stage which is next to follow the discipline of life."

Conclusion of the Argument of This Treatise

Our analysis of philosophical and religious thought has led us inevitably toward a unitary conception of thought and existence. This is one universe in principle, manifesting itself in inconceivable multiplicity. It has been our effort in the department of the philosophy of religion to think of this universe in such terms as will do justice to its elements of multiplicity; this became apparent in the progress of the work as we endeavored to make clear that the phenomenal universe is the manifestation of one universal spirit of which it is an essential objectification. This principle of unity struggled for expression in the Cartesian thinkers, culminating in the unsuccessful but splendid attempt of Spinoza. All these thinkers sought the underlying unity of mind and matter, which they thought they had discovered in its fulness in the notion of substance. But in gaining this comprehensive view, they emptied the notion of substance of all content and thus ultimate reality became an abstraction, too impoverished to account for the wealth of the universe; just as Heraclitus emptied his principle of unity in order to make room for the process of becoming until he could neither explain unity nor becoming. A philosophy is worthless, on the one hand, when it makes a mathematical formula adequate to account for the fulness of self-conscious life; and on the other when it fails to do justice to all the experiential facts of life. The fundamental principle of the universe must be as wealthy as the self-conscious life which to us is its highest embodiment; even further, the expression must be a part of its life and experience, through which it organizes itself in individual forms.

Religion in all its forms expresses the eternal unities. On its mystical side it voices the endeavor of the finite to commune with the Infinite, to be at one with it in thought and deed, to be worthy of the heritage of being essential and contributory parts of it. This attitude struggled for expression in the primitive forms of religion and comes to fruition in the higher religious experiences through which the human soul realizes the climacteric point of its being when it is able to say: "I and the Father are one."

Through the ethical life man is bound up as an integral part of society. The principle operative here is altogether natural. The Greeks discovered this operative principle in the process of birth and also in the workings of the cosmos. It was described in a variety of ways down to the time of the Stoics, who defined it as reason, which is of course a distinct psychological principle. Later, applications of it were made to man's relation to man, man's relation to the state and to the international obligations of peoples. As in the case of religion, the ethical intuitions are born within the soul of man. They are native there. As natural principles, they develop and are later applied to society. They are in the last analysis the expressions of the copartnership of the divine and the human.

The same principle was found at work in man's aesthetical appreciation of nature. Through these divers ministries, man finds himself inspired to closer union with the divine presence within the soul and in the beautiful world around him. He enters into the joy of creation. Through ethical, religious and aesthetical appreciations and forthputtings, he enters more fully into the larger, diviner life—a life in more perfect unity with that of his divine Father, the ultimate principle of the universe.

Certain questions pertaining to the knowing of ultimate reality were then taken up as the ability to know what is ultimate has been seriously questioned in many quarters. It was discovered that knowledge and reality are locked together in the act of self-realization. Here all reality and knowledge are included. All knowledge is subjective; all reality is discovered within, or at least the key to it is there discovered. Therefore, all truth is at par. We cannot know the truth of the senses any easier than the truth of God's presence. Knowledge is always an act of faith. It is always a partial insight because finite beings can never know anything absolutely.

Kant made splendid contributions to the consideration of the problem of knowledge. But he came short of his ideal at many points. While recognizing the unity of consciousness theoretically, he lost sight of it while working out the details of his problem. He also failed to recognize the harmony and unity of mind and matter. He swamped everything in subjectivity except the *Dinge an Sich,* and we have shown that even these were swallowed by the monster of subjectivity from the viewpoint of the *Critique of Pure Reason* because things in themselves were comprehended under identical categories with phenomena. But this was not a calamity; much as Kant disliked it, it was the only logical outcome. Of course this result made havoc with his system. He should have seen from the first that the material and spiritual universe are one and indivisible. He also failed to grasp the relation of the finite to the Infinite. His system was a hard and fast, rigid Deism, with all its unwieldy externalities. When Kant failed to reach the external world through knowledge, as of necessity he had to fail, why did he not adjust his system of thought to this conclusion?

Green took up the problem of knowledge from another angle. An analysis of the act of knowledge, together with the fact known, indicates that they form aspects of an identical process. Any object in nature presents to us a single and unalterable system of relations; that is to say, the object in nature is just a projection of our constructive consciousness, and it is nothing else. Yet the objects in nature do not jump into existence when we think of them. A tree may be in a garden a lifetime. A self-conscious being may perceive it occasionally during this time, and it has always presented a single system of unalterable relations. That consciousness did not create it in such fashion as to cause it to present uniformly these relations. What power could, therefore, create it? Evidently, it must be the work of a self-distinguishing consciousness like our own. There is an identical metaphysic, therefore, for mind and nature. The reality of mind is in the fact of its being a self-distinguishing consciousness; that is to say, it always presents a single and unalterable set of relations. The reality of the tree also consists in the fact that it also presents to consciousness a single and unalterable set of relations. The relations of my consciousness are my peculiar possession. To whom do a similar set of relations pertaining to the tree belong? Whose consciousness is operating through it? Green unites the ultimate reality of the universe from the viewpoint of a triangular relationship. Both nature and man manifest the activity of the self-conscious of the universe. That is the ultimate reality of both. It is the bond of union that makes it possible for man to have relations with both. We are limited manifestations of the one self-conscious activity of the universe, which is the essence and unity of the world. In us it communicates itself under the confining conditions of our physical organization. Thus we find the whole world interrelated through the ramifications of one all-embracing, self-conscious life.

Knowledge is a coöperative affair. It is the interaction of the human and divine. Man participates in the action of an all-embracing consciousness. This gives at once the possibility, meaning and scope of human knowledge.

Spinoza's splendid effort failed to yield a thoroughgoing conception of the unity of the world. Shackled by the two substances of Descartes, he still had a bifurcated ultimate reality; one-half of this reality consisted in dead extension, to which the thinking half contributed nothing, in spite of the fact that both mind and extension are phases of the self-same substance. This is a universe divided against itself, a hard and fast dualism. Yet Spinoza's ideal was to attain a unitary conception of reality.

Scientific theories have tended toward greater and greater unities in fundamental conceptions, and in many departments an all-embracing unity for the chemical, physical, biological and psychological phases has been sought.

The analysis of the causal notion drove us ultimately to the unity of an all-embracing conscious life, which is in reality the causal energy of the world. We found its psychological birthplace in our own volitional nature, in the self-activity of a conscious mind. Whenever we explain by cause and effect certain phases of nature, it is of course a subjective commentary upon them. It is an assertion that occurrences outside the mind follow precisely a law of procedure found within the mind itself. Causation is a mapping out of the external world after the pattern of our inner world of complicated activity. The world of force or dynamism is to us the ectype of the dynamism of the world within our mind. This is the psychological account, and it is very suggestive of the profounder issues involved.

The causal concept was also found to involve all the processes of the mind, not only the intuitive but all the complicated processes of self-activity. It is therefore always a subjective interpretation of events or changes in nature. But how shall we interpret the cause of these changes? That cause must be ultimately of the nature of self-consciousness; at least, that is the best index we have to it. And be it well remembered that an index is merely a bare suggestion of the contents. We interpret events in nature as if they were acts of a self-conscious being.

Our ethical and aesthetical interpretations follow the same trend. The acts of nature which are interpreted causally yield also an ethical implication and an aesthetical construction. On the whole, while admitting ample imperfections, nature is ethical. Man's intellectual nature makes him akin to planet, sun and molecule. His reason is of a piece with the law and energy they manifest. He is an expression of nature, coming out of its very heart, not only as a ratiocinative but also as an ethical being. He appears to be at the end of a very long line of the evolutional process. It is useless to oppose the ethicality of nature on the ground of its being merely a subjective interpretation. All interpretations are subjective. We can never escape this subjectivity; and herein as we have seen is the secret of the universe. Man is a microcosm. If this method of interpretation be valueless because of its subjectivity, then science, philosophy and religion must disappear like phantoms; and even scientific causality will finds its results in ruins alongside of all other interpretations of the universe. Verily, this is not only the best but the sole resort of man. If we cannot discover reality from within, we are of all men most miserable. Man is the best commentary upon nature.

The aesthetical interpretation of nature follows precisely the same lines. There is a response to the aesthetical ideal in the artist's soul. He proceeds on the principle that the life of nature is an expression of the being, which manifests itself in his own spirit. The ideal speaks to him through a bit of nature, he incorporates it and expresses it through his material, which in turn will suggest it to some other. The artist is looking at nature from within, from the viewpoint of his own subjective interpretation, his own ideals; nature responds. The reports of his senses are merely wings for his ideals. The art galleries of the world are the visible expressions of man's invisible, subjective sense of the ideal. Nature thus expresses his own divine life. This sense of unity causes the artist oftentimes to merge unconsciously the ideals in his work. He knows that the aesthetical ideal is all-sufficient for his purposes; yet he often becomes a prophet, giving expression to the ethical ideal as well. This is truer, of course, of literature, poetry and romance than it is of painting, sculpture and architecture; in all artistic expression the unity of all ideals tend to merge, as they express the one life of the universe, which flows through all.

The continuance of this life in God and the impossibility of destroying it is the basis of the hope of immortality. The education of life is not in vain. There is an infinity beyond. Higher and higher shall the human soul ascend, realizing more and more its unity with the Infinite and participating more and more in the ideal work of the whole creation.

NOTES

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4. Haldane's "Pathway to Reality," *Gifford Lectures,* 1902-03, p. 52.
5. II *Corinthians,* 3:5.
6. *Romans.* 1:19.
7. *James,* 1:17.
8. *Psalms* XCIV. 10.
9. *John,* 1:9.
10. *Oeuvres de Malebranche,* Tome 3, p. 401.
11. "Recherche de la Vérité," in *Oeuvres de Malebranche,* Tome 3, p. 403.
12. Victor Cousin, *Fragments Philosophiques,* PParis, 1866, p. 412.
12. Victor Cousin, *Fragments Philosophiques,* Paris, 1866, p. 412.
14. Cousin, *op. cit.,* p. 412.
15. Cousin, *op. cit.,* p. 424.
16. *Ibid.,* p. 424.
17. *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* 11th Ed., Vol. XXVII, p. 79.
18. *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* 11th Ed., Vol. XXVI, p. 338.
19. *Ibid.,* p. 338.
20. For origin of word, *cf.* "Du Culte des Dieux fetiche ou parallele de l'ancienne religion de l'Egypt avec la religion," by Charles de Brosses.
21. Otto Pfleiderer, *Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. IV, p. 186.
22. See an excellent discussion of the doctrine of the logos in James Drummond, *Philo Judaeus,* 2 vols., Williams and Norgate, 1888.
23. N. D. II, 8, Sextus Emp., Math. IX, 101-4, p. 575.
24. De Beneficiis, IV, VII, I.
25. *Cf.* James Drummond, *Philo Judaeus,* Vol. II, p. 155.
26. *Cf. James Drummond, Philo Judaeus,* Vol. II, p. 191.
27. James Martineau, *A Study of Religion* (Clarendon Press, 1888), Vol. I, pp. 15, 16.
28. *Loc cit.*
29. Martineau, Vol. I, p. 17.
30. *Ibid.,* p. 17.
31. *Ibid.,* p. 15.

32. Martineau, Vol. I, p. 1.
33. *The Method, Meditations and Selections from the Principles of Descartes,* translated by John Veitch, p. 32.
34. Alfred William Benn, *The Greek Philosophers* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1914), p. 5.
35. Benn, p. 117.
36. *The Dialogues, Plato,* translated by B. Jowett, 3rd ed., Vol. I, p. 160; Protagoras, 337 B.
37. *Xenophon: Memorabilia of Socrates,* translated by Rev. J. S. Watson, Bk. IV, pp. 491-92.
38. *Dialogues of Plato,* translated by B. Jowett, 3rd Ed., p. 323.
39. *Ibid.,* p. 358.
40. F. Zellar, *The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics,* translated by O. J. Reichel, p. 58.
41. Sir Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law* (London: John Murray, 1906), pp. 49, 50.
42. Maine, pp. 51, 52.
43. *Ibid.,* p. 53.
44. Maine, p. 55.
45. *Loc. cit.*
46. Maine, pp. 56, 57.
47. Maine, p. 85.
48. "Omnes homines natura aequales sunt."
49. Maine, p. 94.
50. Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis,* translated by William Whewell (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1835), Proleg. 28.
51. *Ibid.,* Proleg. 29.
52. Grotius, Proleg. 1-10.
53. *Ibid.,* Proleg. 13.
54. *Institutes,* Bk. I, Title ii, par. 1.
55. James Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* (Oxford University Press), Vol. II, p. 563.
56. *Ibid.,* pp. 563, 564.
57. Romans, 2:14, 15 (R.V.).
58. Shaftesbury, *Characteristics,* etc., edited by John M. Robertson (1900), Vol. I, p. 94.
59. Descartes, *The Method, Meditations and Selections from the Principles,* translated by John Veitch, p. 34.
60. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* p. 86.
61. Spinoza, *God, Man and Human Welfare,* p. 63.
62. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* translated by F. Max Müller, p. XIX. [Note: All references to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the translation of F. Max Müller.]

63. *Critique of Pure Reason,* p. 26.
64. *Ibid.,* 2nd ed., p. 446.
65. *Ibid.,* p. 258.
66. *Critique of Pure Reason,* 2nd ed., pp. 489, 490.
67. *Ibid.,* p. 490.
68. *Ibid.,* p. 490, 491.
69. *Critique of Pure Reason,* p. 493.
70. *Ibid.,* p. 494.
71. *Ibid.,* p. 495.
72. *Ibid.,* p. 496.
73. *Ibid.,* p. 497.
74. *Critique of Pure Reason,* pp. 497, 498.
75. *Ibid.,* p. 498.
76. *Ibid.,* p. 499.
77. *Ibid.,* p. 499.
78. *Ibid.,* p. 500.
79. *Ibid.,* p. 501.
80. *Critique of Pure Reason,* p. 518.
81. *Ibid.,* p. 519.
82. *Ibid.,* p. 522.
83. *Critique of Pure Reason,* p. 539.
84. *Ibid.,* p. 540.
85. *Ibid.,* p. 549.
86. *Ibid.,* p. 544.
87. *Ibid.,* p. 549.
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